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… by now I’m fed up with packing my baggage, walking and running, carrying 
my arms and armour, marching in formation, standing guard, and fighting. 
Now that we’ve reached the sea, I want to put all this hard work behind me and 
sail the rest of the way. I’d like to arrive in Greece flat on my back, like 
Odysseus. 
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Since the early 1990’s, the Great Lakes Region (GLR) has been devastated by a wave of 
interconnected interstate, intrastate, and local conflicts involving hundreds of thousands of 
soldiers in dozens of armed groups. An important part of the international community’s 
approach to peacebuilding in the region has involved the disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration (DDR) of armed groups. Because of the transnational nature of many armed 
groups in the GLR, a regional approach to DDR has been adopted. The World Banks Multi-
Country Reintegration Program (MDRP) and Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration 
Program (TDRP) have been key institutions involved in facilitating national efforts for the 
demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants across the region. 
 
While DDR has evolved considerably since 1990’s, the reintegration component remains 
among the cruxes. One reason for the enduring challenge of reintegration is that while 
technical approaches to the delivery of reintegration programming have become ever more 
refined, the nature of the social and economic reintegration processes that reintegration 
programs aim to affect in individual ex-combatants have remained largely unproblematized. 
The mixed track record of DDR programs in the GLR, and around the world, speaks to the 
idea that without a deep understanding of the endogenous social and economic processes of 
reintegration, reintegration programs might risk becoming detached from the outcomes 
they mean to affect.  
 
Through the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of reintegration programming in the GLR, the 
TDRP has collected vast amounts of social and economic survey data on ex-combatants and 
community members. Previously, this data has been used to evaluate the extent of 
reintegration programming impacts in specific country contexts. However, in 2013 the TDRP 
merged a series of survey datasets that include the experiences of nearly 10,000 ex-
combatants and community members from across five GLR countries (Rwanda, Uganda, 
Burundi, DRC, and RoC) captured between 2010 and 2012. The merged TDRP-GLR 
Reintegration Dataset opens the door to the systematic comparative analysis of the social 
and economic reintegration processes that individual ex-combatants navigate across GLR.  
viii 
 
In examining the social and economic processes through which individual ex-combatants 
across the GLR reintegrate, this doctoral thesis explores numerous issues. We investigate the 
deep set of social and economic disadvantages that ex-combatants carry with them as they 
attempt to reintegrate, and the ways in which disadvantages can influence the economic 
livelihood strategies that ex-combatants pursue as a part of reintegration. In turn, we reflect 
on the relationship of economic processes to a slower moving set of social processes that 
revolve around negotiating identity and building social networks. Further, we consider the 
profound role of gender in shaping individual ex-combatants’ social and economic 
reintegration experiences.  
 
Based on this set of insights about some of the underlying social and economic processes 
that ex-combatants across the GLR navigate during reintegration, we move to reflect more 
broadly about the direct implications for our understanding of the potential role of 
reintegration programming in shaping post-conflict societies, and how we understand the 
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Since the early 1990s a series of interconnected interstate and intrastate conflicts have 
devastated the Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Africa. Estimates indicate that between 5.5 and 
8.5 millions of lives have been lost and countless millions more have been displaced as they 
have fled insecurity and violence. Today the GLR is in the process of ongoing stabilization 
and recovery after the close of nearly two decades of widespread violence. One of the many 
challenges in peacebuilding in the region has been how to deal with the hundreds of 
thousands of soldiers that have taken part in violent conflicts across the region as a part of 
national armed forces, rebel groups, local militias, or criminal organizations, and which must 
now reintegrate into a peacetime way of life.  
 
As the violent conflicts across the GLR have come to a close, ex-combatants have been 
imbued with a range of deep social and economic disadvantages. Having spent much of their 
adult, or even adolescent, lives in armed groups, ex-combatants may have no experience of 
formal education; no skills beyond those acquired as a soldier; no economic track record on 
which to draw; and no secure access to food, housing, income, or land. Given that the GLR 
includes among the poorest and least developed countries in the world, the disadvantages 
that ex-combatants face may represent a struggle for basic survival. Because many armed 
groups across the GLR have regularly abused civilian populations through violence, looting, 
forced recruitment, and the widespread use of sexual violence, ex-combatants may be 
perceived unwelcome perpetrators in the communities in which they attempt to reintegrate.  
As such, ex-combatants may face enormous social barriers to building trust and acceptance 
in familial and communal networks, to the extent that ex-combatants have such networks, 
and struggle with the interpersonal challenges of reshaping identity and adapting to 
peacetime social norms. Indeed, in many ways the “re” in reintegration is misleading. Many 
ex-combatants in the GLR are not returning to familiar peacetime way of life, but rather 
building it anew as they struggle to integrate into community settings that may be entirely 




The experiences of many faltered peace processes support the that idea that if ex-
combatants in the GLR cannot overcome the challenges of reintegrating into society, then 
armed groups may continue to represent their best, if not only, sources of survival, mobility, 
and empowerment – ultimately threatening peace in the region. Thus, the international 
community’s approach to peacebuilding and development in the GLR has prioritized the 
needs of ex-combatants through a body of post-conflict security and development 
programming called Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR). Disarmament 
involves the collection and destruction of weapons. Demobilization involves breaking 
command and control structures through formally discharging and dispersing ex-
combatants. Reintegration programming, however, can take many forms, and is focused on 
longer-term support to ex-combatants that is meant to help compensate for their social and 
economic disadvantages as they navigate reintegration processes. 
 
Since the early 1990s, reintegration programming as a part of DDR has been a boom industry 
of sorts. In the GLR alone easily over a half billion dollars have flowed from international 
organizations and donor countries into funding reintegration programming. Key 
international actors involved in facilitating reintegration programming are the United 
Nations and, especially in the GLR, the World Bank. However, despite two and half decades 
of investment in DDR, reintegration programming remains a highly contested concept. There 
is enduring disagreement about the appropriate and feasible objectives for reintegration 
programming, which manifests further as a lack of uniform standards for evaluating 
programming successes and failures. Institutional and scholarly literature on reintegration 
has tended to reflect on the technical and logistical challenges of programming 
implementation, while substantive knowledge about ex-combatants themselves, and the 
social and economic reintegration processes they navigate, has remained relatively scant. At 
times, reintegration programming has risked becoming disconnected from the impacts it 
means to affect. 
 
Indeed, fundamental questions about what it means to reintegrate, at the ontological and 
epistemological levels, remain unaddressed. By what social and economic processes do ex-
combatants themselves reintegrate? By what mechanisms are these processes governed? 
How we answer these types of questions about what it means to reintegrate can directly 
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shape what we look at, how we go about looking at it, and what we see when we study ex-
combatant reintegration. This in itself would seem enough to justify a deep engagement 
with the fundamental mental nature of what it means to reintegrate. However, considering 
the inherent normative dimensions embedded in the study of ex-combatant reintegration, a 
moral imperative may exist. Because all research on ex-combatant reintegration may play 
some potential role in informing the act of executing DDR programming, in turn affecting the 
lives of countless individual ex-combatants – their families and communities, engaging with 
deep questions about what it means for individuals to reintegrate may be essential.  
 
Exploring the fundamental nature of reintegration processes in the GLR, and the ways in 
which our conceptual and methodological approaches shape our understandings of those 
very processes, and in turn the space for intervening in them through reintegration 
programming, is the task undertaken in this doctoral thesis. In this way, we aspire to 
Skocpol’s (2003) “doubly engaged social science”. That is, while we are focused on explaining 
causal processes and mechanisms behind ex-combatant reintegration in the GLR, we are 
simultaneously enmeshed in debates about the optimal conceptual and methodological 
approaches for the empirical investigation of those specific processes and mechanisms, and 
their implications for the normative intervention in society that DDR represents. 
 
Since 2010 the World Bank’s Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP) 
has played an important role in the most recent wave of reintegration programming in the 
GLR. The TDRP’s main functions have been as a funding conduit, technical advisor to national 
DDR commissions, and as responsible for the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of 
reintegration programming. Through its role in the M&E of reintegration programming, the 
TDRP has carried out numerous survey-based studies of ex-combatants’ experiences of 
social and economic reintegration. The data from these surveys has served as the basis for 
impact assessments of national reintegration programs in individual countries across the GLR 
between 2010 and 2012. In 2013 the TDRP merged a selection of survey data on just under 
10,000 ex-combatants and community members from Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Republic of Congo (RoC) into a single dataset. The 
resulting TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset represents what is likely the single most expansive 
source of survey-based data on the reintegration experiences of ex-combatants in any 
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setting, both in terms of the number of individuals surveyed and the range of social and 
economic data captured. The merging of previous survey data was largely made possible by 
the fact that a fairly consistent set of survey tools were used across the five GLR countries. 
Thus, the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset also represents what is likely the first source of 
systematically comparable data on ex-combatants’ reintegration experiences from across 
different country settings, opening the possibility for systematic comparative analysis. 
 
In 2013 the TDRP commissioned a study (Rhea 2014) to build on previous impact evaluations 
from the five GLR countries through a comparative analysis utilizing the TDRP-GLR 
Reintegration dataset. The overall aim of the study was to help consolidate knowledge and 
understanding of reintegration processes across a broad range of contexts across the GLR. 
This doctoral thesis is a direct extension of that initial study, and seeks to continue to 
capitalize on the inherent opportunities for comparative analysis of social and economic 
processes that exist in the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset.  This doctoral thesis builds on 
the previous study through anchoring itself in an eclectic selection of theoretical and 
methodological traditions from across the social sciences and goes on to explore a diverse 
range of issues related to how reintegration processes occur across the GLR, and the space 
that exists for reintegration programming to affect these processes. We explore the legacies 
of mobilization and wartime experiences that ex-combatants carry with them as they 
attempt to reintegrate, and the ways in which these legacies live on – influencing the distinct 
livelihood strategies that ex-combatants pursue as a part of economic reintegration 
processes. In turn, we explore the relationship of economic processes to a slower moving set 
of social processes - revolving around negotiating identity and building social networks. 
Further, we consider the profound role of gender in shaping reintegration processes across 
social and economic dimensions. For better or worse, DDR is an intervention in post-conflict 
societies. It is impossible to run DDR programs without some guiding sense of what allows 
them to have positive or negative effects on those societies. Thus, we reflect more broadly 
about the direct implications that this broad range of social and economic processes hold for 
the potential role of reintegration programming in shaping post-conflict societies - in turn 




1.1.1 Thesis Structure 
 
This doctoral thesis is organized in three main parts. Part I includes this introductory chapter 
(§1), as well as chapters that outline the conceptual (§2) and methodological (§3) 
approaches utilized. Part II includes the analysis chapter (§4) as well as the summary and 
conclusions (§5). Part III consists of a short introduction (§6) and two detailed data 
presentation annexes for ex-combatants (§7) and community members (§8). The analysis 
presented in Part II, which for readability is mostly free of numeric figures and tables, can be 
thought of as a meta-analysis of the detailed data presentation in Part III. Thus, parts I and II 
together can be read as a freestanding work, though a serious reading will benefit 
significantly from an engagement with the detailed data presentation in Part III.  
 
This chapter, Chapter 1, includes a select introduction to the contemporary history of armed 
conflicts in the GLR – emphasizing their interconnected and transnational nature. In 
addition, we present a brief introduction to the evolution of DDR programs since the end of 
the cold war as embedded within the broader evolution of approaches to international 
peacebuilding and development. These two parts are used as the context to develop the 
point of departure for this doctoral thesis – an inquiry into the social and economic 
processes that individual ex-combatants navigate as they return to communities across the 
GLR. 
 
Chapter 2 details the conceptual approach utilized in this doctoral thesis in three main 
sections. First, we unpack the concept of reintegration and frame it as a complex social and 
economic process. With this framing in place we go on to, secondly, conceptualize social 
reintegration processes within frameworks of social identity theory and social capital theory. 
Thirdly, we conceptualize the economic side of reintegration processes within the 
sustainable livelihoods framework. These three distinct theoretical traditions share a range 
of complementary ideas, which in synthesis form the overall conceptual approach in this 
doctoral thesis.  
 
Chapter 3 outlines the methodological approach utilized in this doctoral thesis in three main 
sections. Frist, in an effort to take the framing of reintegration as a complex process 
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seriously, we root our methodological approach in a complex-realist meta-theoretical 
framework. Secondly, with this framework in place we turn a critical eye to the primary data 
source in this doctoral thesis. We explain the origins of the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset 
and explore the perspectives embedded within it. Thirdly, with this critical evaluation of our 
primary data source in place, we go on to reframe the dataset within a comparative case-
study framework. Within this framework, we outline the specific methodological tool of 
process tracing as especially attuned to exploring the underlying processes & mechanisms of 
ex-combatant reintegration in the GLR.  
 
Chapter 4 outlines the core analysis and findings of this doctoral thesis, and is comprised of 
two main parts. The first part focuses on the processes and mechanisms through which 
individual ex-combatant across the GLR reintegrate. We explore the legacies of mobilization 
and wartime experiences, the distinct strategies ex-combatants take as a part of economic 
reintegration processes, the importance of social networks and identity for social 
reintegration processes and their interaction with economic reintegration processes, and the 
special gender dynamics in social and economic reintegration processes. Ultimately, we 
outline an integrated model of all these interrelated dimensions of reintegration processes. 
The second part of Chapter 4 moves to situate our understanding of individual-level 
reintegration processes within a broader conceptualization of country-level reintegration 
processes in the GLR. We devote special attention to DRC as a unique case in the GLR that 
highlights a paradox for understanding reintegration processes at the country-level. To 
address these paradoxes we develop the concept of country-level reintegration trajectories. 
We elaborate a taxonomy of possible country-level trajectories and explore the implications 
for our understanding of reintegration programming successes and failures, as well as the 
related idea of the “scope of possible programming impacts”.  
 
Chapter 5 is includes a summary of the context, conceptual and methodological approaches, 
and findings of this doctoral thesis. As a conclusion, the analytical contributions to 
reintegration research and implications for future reintegration research and programming 




Chapter 6 is a brief introduction to the technical components of the TDRP-GRL Reintegration 
data presentation in the annexes. The annexes themselves, Chapters 7 and 8, include 
detailed data on ex-combatants and community members from the five GLR countries on 
demographics; housing, land, livestock, and food security; economic issues; social capital; 
and DDR experiences. These three chapters (6-8), are taken almost directly an earlier report 
published by the World Bank’s TDRP (Rhea 2014).  
 
 
1.2 A Brief Introduction to Conflict in the Great Lakes Region 
 
The GLR countries have experienced a complex set of multifaceted and interlocking wars in 
the post-colonial era. The scale of devastation to the region in terms of loss of life and 
displacement of people has been nothing short of cataclysmic. Though the region as a whole 
has seen considerable improvements in stability over the last decade, pockets of local 
conflict persist – most notably in Eastern DRC. Even in the large parts of the GLR where some 
form of peace has emerged, millions of individuals have lost their livelihoods, trapping them 
in poverty. Indeed, when combined with the retarding effects of war on development in the 
region more broadly, as many as 56 million people in the GLR remain in extreme poverty 
(UNDP 2014). Throughout the course of the conflicts in the GLR dozens of armed groups 
have participated organized violence. At various stages of peacebuilding in the GLR most of 
these armed groups have participated in some form of DDR programming - including those 
individual ex-combatants in the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset on which this doctoral 
thesis is based.  
 
To better understand the origins of armed groups in the GLR and to give historical context to 
the analysis in this doctoral thesis, this section offers an outline of the main conflicts since 
the 1990s. What is offered is a select review that attempts to highlight the broad cleavages 
in the GLR, and their sources. A comprehensive examination of the many interrelated wars in 
the GLR is a weighty task well beyond the bounds of this doctoral thesis. This section 
proceeds in two subsections. First (§1.2.1), we outline the colonial-era distortion and 
entrenchment of ethno-cultural power structures and their disastrous consequences of for 
the post-colonial era in the GLR. The epicenter of this narrative revolves around the Hutu-
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Tutsi divide and its role in the Rwandan Revolution, Rwandan Civil War, Rwandan Genocide, 
as well as the First and Second Congo Wars. The warped colonial-era antagonisms between 
the Hutu and the Tutsi remain relevant for understanding ongoing violence in Eastern DRC 
today. In the second subsection (§1.2.2), we very briefly outline the emergence of the World 
Bank’s MDRP and TDRP.  
 
1.2.1 Distorted Power, Entrenched Cleavages, and Endless War 
 
Throughout the 1800’s, industrial development in European countries created demands for 
natural resources, e.g. raw minerals, far beyond their ability to produce at home. In order to 
fuel continual industrial development, and also enabled by industrialization itself, European 
powers became focused on consolidating their interests in the African continent, and 
elsewhere around the word, through conquest and colony at a level not previously possible. 
The era of the European colonization of Africa approached its zenith in the Berlin Conference 
of 1885, where European leaders met to agree on the premises of African colonization - in 
effect Balkanizing the continent. In the GLR, what is current day Burundi and Rwanda went 
to Germany, DRC to Belgium (first as a private territory of King Leopold II, which Belgium 
would take over in 1906), Uganda to Britain, and RoC to France. However, as a part of the 
treaty of Versailles at the end of WWI, Germany would cede its colonies in the GLR, and 
Burundi and Rwanda were transferred to Belgian rule. Millions of people divided among 
hundreds of ethnic, cultural, and linguistic groups were now forced together under imposed 
colonial power structures. 
 
In the European discourse, colonialism was framed as a “necessary humanitarian 
intervention conceived to save, guide, and civilize the Africans” (Omeje 2013: 26). Mbembe 
(2001) argues that the “fiction of compassion and benevolence” legitimated the destruction 
of local political, social, cultural, religious, economic, and legal structures and replacement 
with the colonizers own “enlightened” values - thereby lifting Africans into modernity. In the 
most critical historical interpretations, the discourse of humanitarian intervention and 
enlightenment concealed that the sole agenda of colonialism was resource extraction and 
economic exploitation for the benefit of European colonial powers (Rodney 1972). Solid 
minerals and cash crops were especially important, and what little infrastructure colonizers 
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developed, e.g. railroads, was almost exclusively intended to facilitate the evacuation of 
these resources to Europe – a fact that plays a continuing role in the economic development 
of the region today. To get at resources colonial powers appropriated land and displaced 
untold numbers of people. Forced labor and migration was commonplace. Others found 
themselves displaced and landless, having no other option but to begin a desperate search 
for wage labor from colonial powers under newly imposed, and brutally enforced, market 
economies. In the GLR, an important example of this dynamic is the relocation of huge 
populations from Rwanda into Eastern DRC to work in the vast mines and plantations that 
fed European industrialization. Over several generations, Rwandans in Eastern DRC would 
eventually outnumber the local Congolese populations, but have continued to face 
contested access to land, resources, and power structures in the region toady (Jourdan 
2005).  
 
Through the arbitrary drawing of boorders, the large-scale displacement of people, and the 
privileging of certain groups over others in an effort to establish control over the region, the 
entire geo-demographic power landscape of the region was distorted (Kagame 2006). Even 
as the colonial era came to a close, European powers were unwilling to grant independence 
to their colonies without first entrenching power structures that could serve their continued 
interests in the region. Omeje (2013) argues that rather than transforming the power 
structures in the post-colonial era, the local elites that came to power have simply 
maintained the iniquitous colonial-era power structures, many of which have pre-colonial 
origins, and turned them to their own favor – effectively replacing the colonizers, and 
perpetuating the societal divisions that were distorted, amplified, and ingrained under 
colonialism. No place are these distorted divisions so evident as in the Hutu – Tutsi divide in 
Rwanda and Burundi, which would ultimately come to affect the entire region.  
 
The populations of Rwanda and Burundi are roughly 80% Hutu, 15% Tutsi, and 2% Twa. The 
Hutu are Bantu speaking horticulturalists that are thought to originally have migrated to 
present day Rwanda and Burundi, where the Pygmoid hunter-gatherer Twa were already 
settled, around 3000 years ago from coastal areas of present day Cameroon. While today it 
is generally accepted that the Tutsi originated from the Nilotic-Luo speaking groups of 
present day South Sudan, due to their generally taller stature and more slender noses 
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colonialists originally thought the pastoralist Tutsi to be of Ethiopid or Hamid decent. This 
classification would have serious consequences. Prior to colonization the Hutu and Tutsi 
labels were somewhat permeable. In the feudal-era, elites labeled themselves as Tutsi, a 
term that literally described a wealthy person, and all those that they conquered as Hutu. 
Further, over time the Hutu and Tutsi peoples become so interrelated through marriage that 
the terms Hutu and Tutsi had become less indicative of ancestral ethnic identities, but of 
socio-economic classes that individuals could move between, even if they often fell across 
ancestral lines (Omeje 2013). De Forges (2004: 34) summarizes the sources of colonial 
(mis)understandings of these three groups well: 
 
“The Belgians believed that Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa were three distinct, long-
existent and internally coherent blocks of people, the local representatives of 
three major population groups, the Ethiopid, Bantu and Pygmoid. Unclear 
whether these were races, tribes, or language groups, the Europeans were 
nonetheless certain that the Tutsi were superior to the Hutu and the Hutu were 
superior to the Twa -  just as they knew themselves to be superior to all three. 
Because Europeans thought that the Tutsi looked more like themselves than did 
other Rwandans, they found it reasonable to suppose them closer to Europeans 
in the evolutionary hierarchy and hence closer to them in ability. Believing the 
Tutsi to be more capable, they found it logical for the Tutsi to rule Hutu and Twa 
just as it was reasonable for Europeans to rule Africans.”  
 
With this understanding, the Belgian colonial power institutionalized privileges for the Tutsi 
in terms of access to education, public service, positions in police and military forces, private 
business, and Christian missions. Ultimately, the Tutsi monarchy (prior to colonization 
numerous kingdoms spanned the region) was recognized by the Belgian colonial powers as a 
regent to its own authority, solidifying Tutsi minority’s economic and political dominance 
over the majority Hutu who, with the Twa, were largely relegated to physical labor. With 
this, the Belgian colonial powers had transformed what was previously a somewhat flexible 
socio-economic status into an entrenched ethnic division with deep social and economic 
imbalances (Omeje 2013). As independence approached by the middle of the 20th century, a 
large and dissatisfied Hutu middle class had emerged. In 1959 the marginalized Hutu 
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majority rose up and the Rwanda Revolution began. Around 20,000 Tutsis were killed and 
another 200,000 fled across the borders into Uganda and Eastern DRC (Cohen 2007). The 
Tutsi monarchy was abolished and a Hutu government was elected at independence in 1962. 
In what would become a recurring motif in the GLR, power had come into the hands of a 
group (in this case the Hutu) that had been marginalized through power structures 
entrenched during the colonial era, but instead of dismantling the iniquitous power 
structures that had denigrated them in the past, once having attained power they instead 
reversed and intensified those very suppressive power structures against those that had 
previously lorded over them (in this case the Tutsi) (Omeje 2013).  
 
Throughout the 1960s and 70s the Hutu’s continued vendetta against the Tutsi in Rwanda 
fueled ongoing displacement as Tutsis fled the country into exile. While Rwanda had 
maintained a “veneer of stability” though the total exclusion of Tutsi, in Burundi a 
continuous chain of coups and counter-coups saw repeated reversals of power and 
suppression between the Hutu and Tutsi (Omeje 2013). In 1990 the Rwandan civil war began 
when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a militia of exiled Rwandan Tutsi in Uganda, 
invaded Rwanda with the goal overthrowing the Hutu government that refused to recognize 
their right to return after nearly 30 years of exile since the Rwandan revolution. With the 
help of French and Belgian troops the Hutu government of Rwanda managed to hold back 
the RPF. In 1993 a ceasefire was reached when the Arusha Accords, which allowed exiles to 
return and mandated a coalition government with power sharing between Hutu and Tutsi, 
were signed and the first UN peacekeeping missions to the region (UNOMUR and UNAMIR) 
were deployed.  
 
UN peacekeeping missions tried to maintain the ceasefire while preparations were made for 
the Arusha Accords to come into effect. Meanwhile the Hutu government of Rwanda 
intensified it persecution of Tutsi and dissident Hutu within the country. Daley (2006) argues 
that this was driven by the Hutu elite’s unwillingness to cede power in the face of the 
upcoming accords. The Hutu government began an expanding propaganda campaign as well 
as training youth militias, including the now infamous Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi, to 
terrorize Tutsi populations. In 1994 the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, both Hutu, were 
assassinated when unknown assailants shot down their plane. This is generally 
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acknowledged as the spark that ignited the Rwandan Genocide. An interim government was 
formed in Rwanda, but the Hutu-led military assumed de facto power. The full machinery of 
the Rwandan state was mobilized to plan and execute the genocide, and within a hundred 
days between 800,000 and 1,000,000 Tutsi and dissident Hutu were slaughtered (Cohen 
2007). The genocide ended when the Tutsi RPF fought its way to Kigali and overthrew the 
Hutu government. Fearing reprisals, over a million Hutu refugees, including those Militias 
that executed the genocide, fled across the border into Eastern DRC. While Burundi avoided 
the “genocidal implosion” of Rwanda, it became embroiled in civil war for the next decade, 
with over a dozen armed groups in the mix (Omeje 2013: 41). 
 
The Hutu exodus into Eastern DRC would lead to the First Congo War. The very Hutu militias 
that had perpetrated the Rwandan genocide now used refugee camps in Eastern DRC to 
wage a two-fronted war. First, Hutu militias carried out cross-border attacks on the RPF 
government of Rwanda. Second, the Hutu militias attacked Congolese Tutsis of Rwandan 
descent who had been living in Eastern DRC since they were moved there in the colonial era 
to work in mines and plantations. Congolese Tutsi of Rwanda descent were still not 
recognized as citizens of DRC and their presence was still highly contested, despite the fact 
that they had been there for a century and represented the majority of the population in the 
region. Thus, Hutu militias carried out local attacks with impunity from DRC’s government. 
As a response, in 1996 Rwanda and Uganda backed the Alliance of Democratic Forces of the 
Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) militia as the Congolese face of a campaign to protect 
Congolese Tutsi of Rwandan descent by driving back Hutu militias and overthrowing their 
implicit support from DRC’s long-time dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. Uganda’s involvement in 
the campaign in DRC was a result of the deep allegiance between the RPF and the Ugandan 
Government. During the Ugandan Bush War, the Tutsi’s that had been exiled to Uganda 
during the Rwandan Revolution fought alongside the Ugandan NRA in their own, eventually 
successful, efforts to take control of Uganda. Tutsis exiled to Uganda, now experiences in 
combat, would become the RPF that returned to Rwanda to take power the end of the 
genocide.  
 
The seven-month campaign in DRC ended in Mobutu’s ousting and replacement by the ADFL 
leader Laurent Kabila. In the process, around 800,000 people were killed and hundreds of 
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thousands were displaced. True to the trend in the region, as the new head of DRC Kabila did 
not dismantle the power structures that had supported Mobutu’s 30 years of dictatorship, 
but rather turned them in his favor and accelerated the persecution of those seen as threats 
to his absolute rule (Van Reybrouck 2014). Kabila quickly fell out with Rwandan and Ugandan 
leaders, whose lingering presence he saw as undermining his authority, and ordered their 
militaries to leave the DRC immediately. The Congolese Tutsis of Rwandan descent in 
Eastern DRC, now left defenseless, were especially alarmed by the withdraw of Rwandan 
and Ugandan forces. In 1998 Rwanda and Uganda would support Congolese Tutsis of 
Rwandan descent, most notably the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) militia, to begin a 
war to overthrow their previous ally Kabila. The Second Congo War, also known as the 
African World War, had now begun. Over the next five years Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, 
Sudan, Libya, and Chad would all become directly or indirectly involved in supporting the 
Kabila regime’s fight against the Rwanda-Uganda coalition. The 1999 Lukasa Agreement 
slowed the large-scale mobilization of state military forces against each other and mandated 
the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission (MONUC) and the disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration of all non-state armed groups. At this point the World 
Bank’s MDRP would come to play a central role in DDR in the region. However, none of the 
non-state armed groups that were to be demobilized had partaken in the peace process, and 
without their consent large-scale violence between militias continued even though their 
state sponsors had mostly pulled away (Autesserre 2010). In 2003 the largest remaining non-
state armed groups fighting in DRC, most notably the Rwandan backed RCD and the 
Ugandan backed MLC, signed the Sun City Agreement, ostensibly ending the war. Death toll 
estimates for the Second Congo War range as high as 5.4 million (Coghlan et al 2006).  
 
While the war was “over”, more focused local violence continued across Eastern DRC. In the 
mainstream discourse, this ongoing violence was a product of elites, from all sides of the 
Second Congo War, manipulating local proxy groups to maintain their continued interests in 
the region – most notably in the extremely profitable illegal resource extraction business. 
Eastern DRC is among the richest sources of gold, diamonds, cobalt, copper, and coltan in 
the world. Throughout the first and second Congo Wars illegal mining provided the financial 
means to keep armed groups going, and at times became an end in itself. Indeed, criminal 
motives have played some role for all sides involved in the Congo wars. This dynamic 
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continued in the post-war conflict landscape and was exacerbated by the growing presence 
of multinational mining corporations competing for access to the same mineral resources - 
sometimes buying concessions from non-state armed groups. It was thought that once the 
manipulative elites could be coopted into national power structures and the state could be 
strengthened enough to represent a credible authority in the “Hobbesian” east of the 
country, the remaining local armed groups would dissolve and be easily handled as a part of 
DDR or SSR programs (Autesserre 2009). 
 
Autesserre (2010) argues, counter to the predominant narrative, that continuing violence in 
Eastern DRC revolves around complex local disputes over land access, mineral resources, 
traditional tribal authority, taxation, and social status. Local armed groups continue to fight 
to accomplish their own local agendas, which previously had been subsumed into the 
broader national and regional conflicts. Local armed groups are not mere puppets of distant 
elites, but rather actively ally themselves with elites who hold complementary agendas. 
Autesserre (2010) calls this the “joint production of violence”. An important part of the local 
conflicts that continue to drive violence in Eastern DRC revolves around continued 
antagonisms against Congolese Tutsis of Rwanda descent. The contested status of the 
Congolese Tutsi of Rwandan descent’s right to access resources and power in the region has 
enticed some communities to allow Rwandan Hutu militias (most notably the FDLR) to 
remain in the region (ibid). In turn, this has motivated Tutsi militia factions to remain in the 
region (most notably the RCD-G, a faction of the original RCD, from which the CNDP would 
faction off from, and in turn which M23 which would faction off from) as well as continued 
tampering from Rwanda and Uganda in the region. Ultimately, these continued local issues 
have occasionally threatened the macro-level peace between DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda. 
However, in 2010 the UN peacekeeping force MONUC was given an updated mandate to 
reflect the de-escalation of national-level tensions and renamed MONUSCO. Likewise, the 
World Banks MDRP was replaced with the smaller TDRP program. Despite the improved 
relationship between the GLR states, over a decade after the end of the Second Congo War 
devastating local violence continues in Eastern DRC (North and South Kivu, and Ituri 




While Rwanda and Burundi have been largely stable, seeing minimal internal conflict since 
2000, this not the case in other parts of the GLR. Uganda has fought its own war rooted in 
entrenched colonial-era power inequalities between the Acholi peoples of Northern Uganda 
and the Bantu of the South. In the late 1980’s, parallel to the NRA Bush War, Acholi militias 
formed to challenge the colonially favored Bantu. The most notable armed group is the now 
infamous Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), who have destabilized large parts of the GLR as they 
have moved throughout Uganda, Eastern DRC, the Central African Republic, and South 
Sudan. In the wake of the LRA conflict other armed groups like the Allied Democratic Forces 
(ADF) and West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) have emerged with their own unique agendas – to 
some extent as a response to the Ugandan government’s own abusive tactics in the region 
and ultimate inability to protect them from the terror of the LRA (Borzello 2007). While the 
situation within Uganda is largely stable today, the spillover of armed groups into Eastern 
DRC has continued to play a role in the ongoing violence and instability in the region.  
 
The Republic of Congo (RoC) is geographically separated from the overlapping conflicts along 
the borders of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and DRC; and thus has a somewhat separate 
narrative. Nonetheless, similar motifs of colonial suppression and unequal access to power 
have shaped the contemporary conflict landscape in RoC. After gaining independence from 
France in 1960, RoC established a single-party scientific socialist regime that lasted until the 
end of the Cold War in 1992. In the new pluralist political landscape, ethnic leaders formed 
their own militias to vie for power. RoC experience two civil wars between 1993 and 1999, 
the second of which saw proxy backing from the two sides of the ongoing Angolan civil war 
to the south, both of whom were also simultaneously backing proxies in the Second Congo 
War in neighboring DRC. In the early 2000s contested presidential elections would see 
violence from the Ninja militia in the Pool district (including in the capital Brazzaville). 
Though direct clashes with the government ceased in 2003, the Ninjas continued to engage 
in criminal activities until eventually disarming and demobilizing in 2008.  
 
The conflicts that have plagued the GLR since 1990 have killed millions and displaced millions 
more. The disastrous consequences for the region include: the destruction of infrastructure 
and resources, the retardation of economic development, the ruining of the environment, 
the spreading of disease, the militarization of society, the reshaping of cultures, the 
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disruption of families, and the inflicting of untold traumas including the pervasive use of 
child abduction and sexual violence. The scale of damage to the region is nothing short of 
cataclysmic. Even as the GLR continues to stabilize today, the catastrophic legacies of war 
will live on through generations to come.  
 
1.2.2 A Regional Approach to Disarmament, Demobilization, & Reintegration 
 
Due to the interrelated nature of the conflicts across the GLR, and the transnational nature 
of many of the armed groups involved, it was decided that international peacebuilding 
initiatives in the GLR should take a regional approach that could engage with the 
interconnected social, political, and economic issues that spanned the region. The World 
Bank’s Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) is an example of 
exactly this. Starting in 2000, backed by a 500 million dollar multi-country trust fund (MCTF), 
the MDRP supported demobilization and reintegration programming for around 250,000 
combatants from dozens of armed groups across the Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, DRC, and 
RoC (as well as Angola and the Central African Republic). The MDRP came at exactly the era 
when DDR as a whole was beginning the transition towards second-generation approaches 
anchored in an expanding development agenda (discussed in §1.3.1).  
 
In 2010, as a part of the general de-escalation of national conflicts in the GLR, the 
Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP) succeeded the much larger 
MDRP. The TDRP has taken on a facilitating role in supporting nationally owned DDR 
commissions in demobilizing and reintegrating remaining armed groups as the region 
continues to stabilize. In this regard, the TDRP’s main functions are as a funding conduit, a 
provider of technical expertise, and as responsible for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of 
demobilization and reintegration activities. Indeed, under the TDRP an infrastructure UN and 
World Bank actors, partner agencies and organizations, and local DDR commissions has 
emerged. In comparison to the MDRP, the TDRP is mandated until the end of 2015 and is 
backed by a relatively small 33.7 million dollar trust fund.  
 
The MDRP and TDRP have ostensibly contributed much to the overall security in the GLR 
through the enormous task of dealing with soldiers in the aftermath of conflict. In addition, 
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the TDRP has built a strong knowledge base on the dynamics of ex-combatant reintegration 
in the GLR through M&E of demobilization and reintegration programming. However, there 
remains much to be learned about the activity of disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration programming and, perhaps more importantly, the complex processes through 
which individual ex-combatants who are supported by that programing go through as they 
reintegrate into society. To develop this point we now turn to a discussion of the evolution 




1.3 DDR & International Peacebuilding  
 
The act of disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating soldiers has existed, at one level or 
another, for as long as there has been war. In order to better understand the nature of 
contemporary DDR programs, it is important that we take a moment to briefly outline their 
evolution over the last 25 years. During this time, DDR programs have coevolved within the 
broader discourses of international peacebuilding and development. This section proceeds in 
two subsections. First (§1.3.1), we outline the broad strokes of the evolution DDR since the 
end of the Cold War. While in general DDR has seen an ever-expanding set of mandates 
within the shifting context of international peacebuilding and development, certain areas 
have remained largely unproblematized. In the second sub-section (§1.3.2), we argue that 
the underlying social and economic processes that the reintegration component of DDR 
programs purport to affect in individual ex-combatants almost always remain implicit and 
unoperationalized - we call this the program - process divide. We use the conceptual 
distinction between reintegration programs and processes as a point of departure for this 
doctoral thesis going forward. 
 
1.3.1 The Evolution of DDR 
 
Since the wind down of the Cold War at the end of the 1980’s there have been no fewer 
than 60 separate DDR programs undertaken across Africa, Asia, the Americas, Europe, and 
the Middle East. In the vast majority of these cases, DDR programs have been carried out as 
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a part of internationally mandated peace operations responding to civil war or some other 
form of intrastate violence (Schelhofer-Wohl & Sambanis 2010). As such, the evolution of 
DDR programs over time has been continually embedded in the evolution of international 
community’s broader approaches to managing conflict and building peace.  
 
The early DDR operations in places like Cambodia, El Salvador, and Mozambique were 
relatively minimalist, and were almost wholly focused around improving basic security in the 
post-conflict environment. These early DDR programs were often conceived as discrete 
operations carried out by military and security institutions within larger UN peacekeeping 
missions, and were typically characterized by a two-year deployment plan with the end goal 
of a democratic election (Muggah 2010). Throughout history military institutions have been 
responsible for the tasks of dealing with soldiers after war, not least because they have 
traditionally been the only institution with the capacity to do so. Thus, it is no surprise that 
the security-focused interests of military institutions were prioritized in this early era of DDR.  
 
Indeed, early DDR programs were often conceptualized as logistical and technical exercises 
to improve and maintain security through breaking the command and control structures of 
armed groups so that they could not easily remobilize into violence (Jennings 2008). 
Whether dealing with members of national armed forces or irregular armed groups 
(including rebel, militia, and criminal groups), early DDR operations were often conceived as 
a sort of one man, one gun linear process; collect gun, discharge combatant, give reinsertion 
package. This tactic has often been referred to as “pay and scatter”. With this modest 
support, ex-combatants were expected to return home and assume a civilian life. Some ex-
combatants who met special selection criteria could be given the opportunity to move into 
national armed forces or police. In this way DDR has always overlapped with broader 
security sector reform (SSR) initiatives. It was argued that the monetary savings in decreased 
military spending, known in the literature as the “peace dividend”, would contribute to 
national economic development (Schelhofer-Wohl & Sambanis 2010) 
 
The security focused goals of early DDR operations gave clearly delimited metrics for success 
– number of weapons collected, number of soldiers demobilized, number of reinsertion 
packages administered. Even if there was no direct evidence that these outputs contributed 
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to improved post-conflict security outcomes, the causal mechanisms seemed 
commonsensical – fewer guns and soldiers meant less potential for organized violence. Over 
time the technical expertise developed through hard won experiences of early era DDR 
programs would eventually inform the Unites Nations Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), a 
playbook that drew together the vast “lessons learned” literature into a sort of loose 
doctrine. However, the uneven track record of DDR programs in this early era suggested that 
there might be more to improving peace and security than addressing the presence of 
weapons.   
 
In the latter half of the 1990s and early 2000s the interrelated relationship between violent 
conflict and economic development came to the fore of peacebuilding agendas. It was 
argued that while “persistent conditions of insecurity prevent sustainable development, no 
amount of diplomatic mediation or military coercion will win the peace if people, especially 
the youth, have no alternative livelihood to that of the army or militia groups.” (Gueli and 
Liebenberg 2007: 86). This growing appreciation of the mutually reinforcing relationship 
between economic development and the potential for peace was supported by a rapidly 
expanding body of scholarly literature; most notably the so called “greed and grievance” 
discourse (see e.g. Berdal & Malone 2000). The paradox that emerged for DDR programming 
was that if it did not explicitly engage in broader development agendas, it risked placing the 
success of security goals outside its own ability to affect. As early as UN Secretary General 
Boutros-Gahli’s (1992) An Agenda for Peace, the United Nations began a large scale shift in 
its approach to dealing with post-conflict environment from the traditional and more 
minimal peacekeeping, the active brokering and maintenance of peace agreements, to a 
more inclusive agenda of peacebuilding which in included a continually expanding set of 
development mandates (Paris & Sisk 2009). DDR programs became the spearhead of this 
shift, and thus a second era of DDR programming was born.  
 
In the era of second generation DDR, the conflicts that international peace operations were 
responding to were becoming more complex – the Great Lakes Region a prime example. 
Instead of the traditional narrow focus on improving security through dealing with relatively 
clear-cut military command and control structures, second-generation DDR programs in the 
GLR were dealing with loose networks of militias with unique grievances. Decades of 
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protracted transnational violence in which one war rolled into another, the pervasive use of 
forced mobilization tactics, acknowledgement of the role women and children as 
participants in, or dependents of, armed groups,  and huge flows of internally displaced 
peoples (IDPs) and refugees meant there was an ever-blurring line between ex-combatant 
and civilian. DDR programs were charged with taking on a much broader caseload and 
engaging in an expanding range of social, economic & political tasks.  
 
While the concepts of disarmament and demobilization saw iterative refinement, they 
remained conceptually intact. It was reintegration, however, that was seen as second 
generation DDR’s connection to the expanding agendas of international peacebuilding. 
Reintegration was no longer seen as merely the “immediate provision of assistance such as 
clothes, medical assistance, tools, shelter, money or food” (Buxton 2008: 5), but was now 
expected to contribute to economic development by providing the education, training, 
materials, and finance to ex-combatants and their dependents that could help them towards 
alternative livelihoods – i.e. not based around armed violence or other illicit activities. In 
addition, reintegration programs were expected to play a role in addressing wartime trauma 
and the overall social dynamics of ex-combatant reintegration by supporting community 
projects and social institutions that would create space for the reconciliation and trust 
building between ex-combatants and communities - the “ultimately cathartic confrontations 
between perpetrators and victims” (Schulhofer-Wohl & Sambanis 2010:19). Beyond this, 
DDR programs were even expected to contribute to broader democratization efforts by 
strengthening civic institutions that could help create space for political participation. With 
its ever-expanding caseload and set of mandates, there was a growing trend to deliver 
reintegration programming at a community level - in theory spreading the dividends of DDR 
programming across a greater segment of society. 
 
An important organizational shift that reflects the expansion of UN-led DDR initiatives is that 
rather than being wholly administered by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (UNDPKO), as disarmament and demobilization still are, the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) takes primary responsibility for reintegration programming 
today. This division of labor was in part driven by the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development’s (OECD) exclusion of military related activities from the definition for 
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what could count as Official Development Assistance (ODA). In practice this meant that while 
disarmament and demobilization would be funded by the assessed budget of the UN and 
delivered by UNDPKO, reintegration would instead funded by donor contributions. Now that 
reintegration was classified as a development activity not only UNDP, but also all sorts of 
other organizations with development agendas could become involved in reintegration 
activities. This shift in funding structures opened the floodgates rapid expansion of players 
involved in reintegration – not least of all the World Bank.  
 
However, this expansion of reintegration was not without problems. International 
organizations, NGOs, and local stakeholders could be found operating in the same post-
conflict theatre with different strategic goals, and in some cases are directly competing with 
each other to affect distinct outcomes. For example, during DDR in Angola there were 57 
NGOs implementing 177 different projects as part of reintegration programming with very 
little in the way of strategic oversight (Schulhofer-Wohl & Sambanis 2010). Indeed, Muggah 
(2009: 6) critically notes that through its haphazard expansion DDR had become “a kind of 
hamper into which many priorities – some of them not necessarily complementary- were 
added”. The most recent DDR operations in places like Afghanistan (Bhatia et al 2009), 
Western Africa (Keen 2005; Jennings 2008a, 2008b), and The Great Lakes Region (Autesserre 
2010) have yet to produce broad results that had been hoped. Today the emerging 
consensus in scholarly literature is that second generation DDR has expanded to encompass 
such a large set of, often unclear, policy priorities that its effectiveness at achieving any one 
of them is watered down. The original fervor that had seen so many development 
organizations rushing to take part in reintegration programming has been replaced by a 
growing skepticism from program donors, and even implementing agencies themselves. 
Indeed, many development organizations have walked away from the enterprise of 
reintegration programming altogether (Muggah & O’Donnell 2015). However, the task of 
dealing with soldiers in the aftermath of war remains. Regardless of whether or not DDR 
programs continue to see the sort of enthusiastic engagement from the international 
community that they have in the past, they are likely to continue to play an important role in 




Despite continual refinement in the technical implementation of DDR programming 
(represented most directly by the 2014 update to the UN’s IDDRS), there are fundamental 
questions that remain unresolved. The underlying social and economic processes that 
reintegration programs purport to affect in individual ex-combatants almost always remain 
implicit and unoperationalized. The endogenous processes of reintegration, as distinct from 
the body of reintegration programming that means to affect them, represent a set of 
missing pieces. We now turn our attention to developing the idea of the programming - 
process divide and its importance as a point of departure in this doctoral thesis.  
 
1.3.2 The Programing - Process Divide    
 
There is a conceptual distinction to be made between two overlapping parts of 
reintegration. First, there is reintegration as part of DDR policy and programming. This type 
of reintegration is the programming activity of aiding combatants’ return to society in their 
transition from combatant to civilian. Second, there is reintegration as a process. This type of 
reintegration is the set of social and economic processes by which individual ex-combatants 
return to communities, build economic livelihoods, and perhaps most importantly, rebuild 
social connections with their families and in the community - reshaping their identity, in 
their own eyes and in the eyes of society. These are the endogenous processes that ex-
combatants themselves navigate, with or without assistance from reintegration 
programming. Indeed, for as long as there has been war ex-combatants have reintegrated 
back into society, long before the advent of formal programs to support them in these 
processes.  
 
The analytical distinction between reintegration as a program and reintegration as a process 
is not new, though the point is rarely given any explicit consideration. McMullin (2013: 40) 
frames reintegration processes as “the lived experience of reintegration”. Torjesen (2013) 
reaffirms this distinction between programming and processes by pointing out that due to 
the voluntary nature of most reintegration programming there are usually some ex-
combatants who opt out of reintegration programming, but nonetheless return to the home 
communities to navigate reintegration processes. Taking the distinction further, Özerdem & 




“For sceptics reintegration is essentially a social process, unrelated to DDR 
programs, which have little to contribute towards the return process and in most 
instances the family, and the home community of ex-combatants bear the onus 
of responsibility for reintegration success at an individual level.”  
 
We think of the relationship between programming and processes as more subtle than this. 
From the perspective of reintegration programming, programming is the subject that acts 
upon the object of ex-combatants. Inversely, from a reintegration processes perspective ex-
combatants themselves are the subjects with agency to act upon objects in their world 
(McMullin 2013).  The point of highlighting this subject-object dichotomy is not to assert that 
reintegration is caused solely by ex-combatants’ own agency, or to discount the role of 
reintegration programming, but to open the analytical space for investigating ex-combatants 
as subjects with agency. In practice, programming and processes are inherently bound - 
exerting force upon each other. Ex-combatants are acted upon through programming, but 
they also act upon their world through social and economic processes. The range of agency 
that ex-combatants are able to exert maybe be shaped or constrained through reintegration 
programming. In this way reintegration programming and reintegration processes are deeply 
intertwined.   
 
Literature on reintegration programming is abundant and tends to focus on the complex 
challenges of implementing reintegration programs. Indeed, much of the literature on 
reintegration originates from organizations with a stake in DDR policy and programming (e.g. 
UNDP or TDRP), and has thus has inevitably adopted their priorities around programing and 
policy. Consequently, there has been an overwhelming focus in reintegration literature on 
the technical and logistical components of program planning and management. This body of 
literature often draws from a single case to produce what has often been characterized as 
“lessons learned” or “best practices” literature. Collectively this body of work has been 
synthesized together into a broad base of programming knowledge, culminating most 
notably in the IDDRS. While these types of studies have a very real value to reintegration 
practitioners in terms of programming guidance, they often leave the underlying processes 
that programs are meant to affect fundamentally undefined with the vague assertion that 
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“context matters”. Practitioners and scholars alike often speak about the two types of 
reintegration interchangeably. Most often, when practitioners and scholars talk about 
reintegration processes they are still actually talking about reintegration programming - i.e. 
the processes through which reintegration programs are implemented. Indeed, the lack of a 
clear vocabulary in which to talk about reintegration processes as distinct from programming 
contributes to the conflation of these two fields. Knowledge about lived reintegration 
experiences of ex-combatants as subjects with their own agency is often supplanted by the 
discursive framing of ex-combatants as objects to be affected by reintegration programming 
(McMullin 2013). 
 
However, understanding the relationship between reintegration programs and reintegration 
processes is no easy task and the answers to many fundamental questions surrounding 
reintegration processes remain unclear. What are the social and economic dimensions of 
reintegration processes? By what mechanisms are these social and economic processes 
governed? What do reintegration processes look like empirically? Can we measure 
reintegration processes? To what extent can programming actually affect these processes? 
Are reintegration processes fundamentally unique to a given context, or is there an 
underlying structure to them that may exist across multiple contexts? How do individual-
level reintegration processes relate to country-level reintegration outcomes? The answers to 
such questions are of fundamental importance to reintegration policy and programming, 
and implicitly guide our investigation, opening analytical space, throughout this doctoral 
thesis. Without a clear understanding of reintegration processes, the prospect of 
understanding the scope of possible programming impacts  and in turn creating meaningful 
“metrics of success” for reintegration programming will remain a challenging endeavor 
(Bowd & Özerdem 2013). Indeed, without clear goalposts, including an understanding of the 
field on which they exist, reintegration policy and programming can risk becoming 
decontextualized from the very processes they are meant to affect. We call this problematic 
the programming - process divide.   
 
Recent academic studies on reintegration have begun to move away from the traditional 
program focused case-study characteristic of earlier reintegration scholarship, to focus 
instead on individual ex-combatants’ reintegration experiences through large-scale survey 
25 
 
techniques (see e.g. Humphreys and Weinstein 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008; Kaplan & 
Nussio 2012; or Porto et al 2007). While these studies may still be fundamentally focused on 
understanding the effectiveness of reintegration programming, such shifts in the unit of 
analysis open the door to an explicit exploration of individual ex-combatants’ reintegration 
experiences not solely for the purpose of understanding the extent program impacts, but for 
understanding the very processes through which those impacts can occur. However, such 
survey-based approaches are still not widely applied, as the ability to capture survey data in 
volatile and non-permissive post-conflict environments can often necessitate the capacity of 
large international organizations, most likely those directly involved in the planning, 
implementation, or monitoring and evaluation of reintegration programming.  
 
The data from the TDRP-GLR reintegration dataset utilized in this thesis represents the 
cutting edge of available quantitative data on ex-combatant reintegration processes, both in 
terms of scale and depth. While the TDRP’s previous individual country-level analyses of 
reintegration impacts in Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, DRC, and RoC have revealed much about 
the dynamics of reintegration in each of these specific country contexts, they have yet to be 
utilized in a comparative approach (beyond the initial study on which this doctoral thesis is 
based – Rhea 2014). Indeed, comparison across the GLR countries is methodologically an 
important step in building knowledge about reintegration processes - as comparison can 
serve a vital role in hypothesis confirmation, modification or falsification. It is only when we 
begin to compare outside the first case that the impact of elements that may have been held 
constant, and thus invisible, become plain to see (Rhea 2011). Indeed, scholars on 
reintegration, and DDR as a whole, have emphasized that “serious comparison across 
countries of relevant aspects of conflicts and the programs designed to address them will 
provide invaluable insight into the complex interaction between DDR programs and social 
processes beyond the insights a single case can provide” (Schulhofer-Wohl & Sambanis 2010: 
42). 
 
A focus on reintegration processes, distinct from the programming activity, is the frame from 
which this doctoral thesis departs. In this vein, we endeavor to identify some of the complex 
and interrelated set of social and economic processes, and the mechanisms that govern 
them, through which reintegration occurs in the GLR. It is through a careful descriptive and 
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comparative exploration of the experiences of nearly 10,000 individual ex-combatants and 
community members from Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, DRC, and RoC represented in the 
TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset that we approach reintegration processes. While a direct 
evaluation of the impacts of reintegration programming in the GLR on these distinct 
processes is outside the bounds of this doctoral thesis, we engage in hard reasoning about 
the implications that the reintegration processes in the GLR hold for understanding the 







2 Conceptual Approach 
 
2.1 Introduction: Framing the Conceptual Approach 
 
This chapter will outline the overall conceptual approach used in this doctoral thesis, and 
consists of three main sections. Before delving into the meat of the conceptual approach, 
the first section (§2.1) frames reintegration processes as complex phenomena as a backdrop 
the conceptual discussion, and then goes on to more deeply unpack the concept of 
reintegration. The second section (§2.2) explicates the conceptual approach to social 
reintegration utilized in this doctoral thesis as existing at the nexus of two distinct, yet 
deeply intertwined concepts: social identity and social capital. The third section (§2.3) 
focuses on outlining the sustainable livelihoods conceptual framework as a field for 
understanding economic reintegration.  
 
2.1.1 Reintegration as a Complex Phenomenon 
 
A serious engagement with complexity is fundamental to our conceptual, methodological, 
and analytical approaches in this doctoral thesis. However, complexity as a meta-theoretical 
concept that shapes our understanding of theory and methods is not widely applied in the 
social sciences. Thus, this doctoral thesis will require a considerable investment on the part 
of the reader to fully appreciate the attempts to engage seriously with the complexity of ex-
combatant reintegration processes. Here we introduce complexity in very preliminary terms 
to two ends; first, to provide a backdrop to the conceptual approach in this chapter; and 
second, as a primer to the more lengthy development concept of complexity in the methods 
chapter (§3.2.3) of this doctoral thesis.  
 
When we talk about complexity, or complexity science, we are actually referring to broad 
collection of influences, ideas, and principles from across the natural sciences (chaos theory, 
cybernetics, complex adaptive systems) and social sciences (postmodernism), including the 
broad field of systems thinking, which is found throughout all sciences (Ramalingam et al 
2008). With these diverse roots, it is perhaps not surprising that, like the term culture, 
complexity has many definitions each with strengths and weaknesses specific to their fields 
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of origin. Reading the diverse range of ideas about what complexity is as a mosaic, a 
consistent area of foundational agreement is that complex phenomena can be characterized 
as DEEP; that they are not easily described, evolved, engineered, or predicted (Page 2011). 
Ex-combatant reintegration processes fall easily within these characteristics.  
 
Describing the reintegration processes remains a central challenge within the field of DDR. 
Numerous fundamental questions remain. Describing reintegration processes is difficult 
because it demands an engagement with an extremely large range of information about a 
number of intricately interconnected social, political, and economic processes that occur 
simultaneously, but not necessarily synchronously. At times we describe pieces of 
reintegration processes, but we rarely approach the complex whole. This lack of 
fundamental understanding about the broad features of reintegration processes means that 
they are exceedingly difficult to predict and, in turn, instrumentally affect. As countless 
pieces of “lessons learned” literature on DDR and reintegration programming evidence (see 
e.g. Muggah 2008), our view is partial and reintegration processes seldom occur as we 
envision. Likewise, we are rarely able to evolve or engineer these processes via reintegration 
programming in the way that is aspired. Indeed, numerous authors on reintegration 
characterize it as complex (see e.g. Muggah 2010, Theidon 2009, Schulhofer-Wohl & 
Sambanis 2010), though seldom, if ever, with any operationalized understanding of the 
characteristics of complexity, the sources of complexity, and the implications of complexity 
for the scientific investigation of ex-combatant reintegration processes.  
 
What characteristics further typify the systems that produce complex phenomena? We find 
Page’s (2011: 6) definition of complex systems especially useful in thinking about this 
question:  
 
“Complex systems are collections of diverse, connected, interdependent entities 
whose behavior is determined by rules, which may adapt, but need not. The 
interactions of these entities produce phenomena that are more than the parts. 




Page goes on to argue that the underlying source of the complexity of systems is a product 
of the diversity of the entities that make up that system – in our case the diversity of ex-
combatants and community members. Page goes further to elaborate three kinds of 
diversity: diversity within a type of entity, diversity between types of entities, and diversity in 
the composition of systems of entities. For us this translates as diversity in the amount of an 
attribute or characteristic within different types of ex-combatants and community members 
(e.g. social capital); diversity between different kinds of ex-combatants and community 
members based on those attributes or characteristics (e.g. demographic subgroups); and 
diversity in the broader composition of the systems of ex-combatants and community 
members made up of those different types across the GLR countries (country-level 
reintegration trajectories). Together, these three kinds of diversity create the structure in 
which complex, and thus emergent, phenomena of reintegration evolves.  
 
We can linger on the point of emergence. Emergence is the process by which larger scale 
regularities arise through the interaction of smaller scale entities that themselves do not 
display such regularities. One of the typical features of emergent processes is that they are 
non-linear – they are not the linear aggregate of all their component parts, but are a product 
of the dynamic interaction of its component parts and the broader contexts they exist 
within. In the social world non-linearity is exacerbated further by the cognizance of social 
agents. As Ramalingam (2008:44) puts it, “the ability of adaptive agents to perceive the 
system around them and act on these perceptions means that their view of the world 
dynamically influences, and is influenced by, events and changes within the system.” Indeed, 
as evidence presented in §7 of this doctoral thesis suggests, ex-combatants are deeply aware 
of the context in which they act – including the challenges and opportunities embedded 
within these contexts. This awareness of the reintegration context shapes individual ex-
combatants’ actions and, in turn, reflexively shapes that very context in which they act. 
 
We can briefly conceptualize reintegration, and our overall argument in this doctoral thesis, 
within the terms of complexity. The individual level social and economic processes ex-
combatants and community members navigate may be governed by underlying causal 
mechanisms (rules), but the activation of these causal mechanisms is contingent (may adapt, 
but need not) upon contextual factors. Based on the conceptual approach in this chapter, in 
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§4.2 we will argue that human-capital and natural-capital based livelihood strategies are 
important mechanisms through which sustainable livelihood outcomes in the processes of 
economic reintegration take place. In addition, we will argue that marriage is a key 
mechanism through which social identity negotiation and social capital creation take place in 
the processes of social reintegration. Each individual ex-combatant’s social and economic 
state is the dynamic (emergent) product of all its component parts.  
 
In aggregate, the system of all ex-combatants and community members in a country 
produces what Page (2011:25) calls “higher order structures and functionalities”. For us, 
these higher order structures and functionalities are the different types of country-level 
reintegration trajectories.  Country-level reintegration trajectories are the product of the 
respective trajectories of the system of ex-combatants and their interaction with the system 
of the communities they return to (diverse, connected, interdependent entities).The 
interaction of ex-combatants and communities in a given context produces an overall 
(emergent) country-level reintegration trajectory. We argue in §4.3 that the country-level 
trajectory of communities plays a structuring role on the possible trajectory of ex-
combatants (rules, which may adapt, but need not). At this point these arguments should 
sound very abstract. However, through the development of complexity in the meta-
theoretical discussion in the methods chapter (§3.2.2), and subsequent operationalization 
and application in the analysis chapter (§4), these arguments will become much more 
concrete.  
 
What we seek to understand in this doctoral thesis is the nature of the diverse and complex 
processes of ex-combatant reintegration in the GLR countries and the rules that govern 
them. In the methods chapter we outline our approach in this endeavor as anchored in 
complex realist approach to science that conceptualizes a search for the “rules” of 
reintegration as the exploration of the causal mechanisms that underlie reintegration 
processes. Before we come to that, our task in this chapter is selecting those theories and 
concepts that we think are most useful, and synthesizing them into an overarching 
conceptual framework. There are numerous theoretical and conceptual ideas from across 
the social sciences that can prove invaluable for our query of the processes of ex-combatant 
reintegration. Which theories and concepts we select will have consequences for our 
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analysis. Thus, we take a moment to unpack the concept of reintegration more deeply 
before going on to outline our overall conceptual approach as anchored in social identity, 
social capital, and sustainable livelihoods theory. 
 
2.1.2 Unpacking Reintegration: Strands from Across the Social Sciences 
 
Reintegration is the central term in this doctoral thesis, and thus it is essential that unpack 
the meaning of reintegration for ex-combatants in post-conflict settings. Many definitions of 
reintegration focus on the idea of civilianization. In these definitions reintegration is the 
process of adopting civilian social and economic status. For example, the UN (2015: §4.3) 
defines reintegration as:  
 
“… the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain 
sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and 
economic process with an open timeframe, primarily taking place in communities 
at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a 
national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance.” 
 
Civilianization as a basis for reintegration is somewhat problematic. Some ex-combatants 
may retain access to weapons and continue to rely on them as a source of protection, 
power, status, or income even once they are no longer a part of an armed group. Are these 
ex-combatants (i.e. civilians) reintegrated? Likewise, some civilians who have never been 
part of armed groups may have access to weapons for similar reasons - are they 
combatants? What about those ex-combatants that reintegrate into the peacetime 
landscape as a part SSR - finding new lives as a part of national armed forces or police? 
Surely, these ex-combatants are not civilians. Are the children that are abducted, or women 
who are forced into sexual slavery, in armed groups ever really combatants, or are they 
civilian victims? The lines between combatant and civilian are blurry during and after 
conflict. We should not let the words “combatant” and “civilian” seduce us into believing 
that neither has elements of the other. In this light, civilianization as the basis for defining 




Indeed, the term reintegration itself can be somewhat misleading. The “re-“ suggests a 
return to a peacetime life. However, as evidence from the GLR attests, many ex-combatants 
may have spent their entire adult, or even adolescent, lives within armed groups, and may 
have no meaningful experience of peacetime life. These ex-combatants may hold only the 
social and economic skills they acquired as members of an armed group and, as such, may be 
severely unprepared for life outside of those armed groups. Ex-combatants may not be re-
integrating, but integrating into a new and unfamiliar social, political, and economic 
landscape. Even if ex-combatants are re-integrating based on previous peacetime 
experience, it is unlikely that the social, political, and economic landscapes that they once 
knew have not changed during conflict. Further, even if ex-combatants are returning to a 
familiar and unchanged peacetime environment, many “peaceful” settings are rife with 
forms of “structural violence” (Galtung 1996). Indeed, as McMullin (2013: 17) articulates 
clearly: “In many pre-conflict societies, ‘non-integration’ is the norm, due to political 
marginalization, poverty, and repressive social systems designed to keep certain segments of 
the population powerless – especially the youth population… “. The same remains true in 
post-conflict societies. Ex-combatants may return to communities and attain civilian status, 
but post-conflict social, political, and economic landscapes may keep them marginalized – 
non- integrated.  
 
To retain analytical value reintegration must mean more than the mere assimilation of ex-
combatants into, possibly unequal or exclusionary, post-conflict landscapes. Rather 
reintegration must be understood as the processes of ex-combatants’ broader social, 
political, and economic incorporation into an inclusive society. Where such a socially, 
politically, and economically inclusive society does not exist, ex-combatant reintegration 
must be understood as embedded in a broader transformation of post-conflict societies. The 
special of the case of DRC, presented in §4.3, in which ex-combatants return to settings 
continuing local insecurity, violence, social fragmentation, and economic marginalization, 
speaks clearly this point. Essentially ex-combatants in DRC assimilate into a setting of non-
integration. 
 
If reintegration is a set of social, political, and economic processes, then we must ask 
ourselves if these are processes that only ex-combatants navigate, or if are there 
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components that exists across different contexts than ex-combatant reintegration? What 
can we learn by looking across the social sciences at other groups that undergo similar 
transitions? What can we learn? What concepts and theory can we adopt to aid our 
exploration? If the process of reintegration involves reshaping identity, building trust and 
acceptance in the community, and establishing a modicum of economic stability, then there may be 
other groups, such as returning IDPs and refugees, not to mention the community as a whole, that 
face similar processes in the post-conflict environment.  
 
Indeed, the label of ex-combatant is a discursive frame that the peacebuilding community 
uses to distinguish ex-combatants for the security threat that they are thought to pose in the 
post-conflict environment. In this light, it is interesting to note that the analytical distinction 
between “ex-combatants” in the global south and “veterans” in the global north is often 
thin. Both ex-combatants and veterans are soldiers returning from combat who face the 
challenge of reshaping their identity and reentering society. However, the discourses 
surrounding the security threats they pose, their role in development, and the processes by 
which they reintegrate into society are separated by vast chasms in the global south and the 
global north. Indeed, McMullin (2013) gives an extensive account of the role of veterans in 
state development in USA and England – contrasting this against the discourse on 
contemporary ex-combatant reintegration. This reading is complimented by the likes of 
Campbell (2003) and Hannoum (2013). The point here is that while there are very real 
contextual differences between “ex-combatant reintegration” into post-conflict settings of 
extreme poverty and social marginalization in the global south, and “veteran reintegration” 
into settings unaffected by conflict with high levels of social and economic development in 
the global north, the underlying process that ex-combatants go through, and the causal 
mechanisms that govern them, may share some similarities.  
 
Interestingly, a group that faces remarkably similar context of reintegration as the vast 
majority of ex-combatants in the GLR (reintegration into poverty, insecurity, social 
marginalization, and stigma) as well as a similar discourse of securitization, accompanied by 
a massive project to aid their reintegration into society, is that of ex-prisoners – especially in 
North America. Ex-prisoner reintegration in the field of criminology has long addressed the 
processes by which individuals carry the legacies of their crimes and time in prison as they 
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attempt to find new identities, return to family structures, find economic independence, 
build ties in the community and contribute to society. Indeed, in reading contemporary 
literature on ex-prisoner reintegration one could be forgiven for mistakenly thinking they 
were reading a work about ex-combatant reintegration (See for example Visher & Travis 
2003). Discourse on ex-prisoner reintegration has much to offer the study of ex-combatant 
reintegration – which would stand to benefit from utilizing a long history of established 
sociological concepts in understanding reintegration. 
 
 
To this end, the remainder of this chapter will draw on of established concepts in the social 
sciences revolving around social identity, social capital, and sustainable livelihoods that we 
believe can offer valuable insights into the process of reintegration that ex-combatants 
across the GLR face. This chapter proceeds with outlining and synthesizing these distinct yet 
overlapping bodies of thought from across the social sciences.  
 
 
2.2 Social Reintegration: The Nexus of Social Identity & Social Capital 
 
In this section we conceptualize social reintegration through the theoretical lenses of social 
identity (§2.2.1) and social capital (§2.2.2). Essentially, we conceptualize that through the 
process of shaping, or reshaping, their social identities and gaining a level of acceptance in 
communities, ex-combatants can expand their connections in the community and leverage 
this social capital towards tangible social and economic outcomes – including, not least, the 
establishment of a sustainable livelihood. Thus elements, in turn, contribute to the further 
cementing of new identities and acceptance in the community. In this sense, social identity 
negotiation and social capital creation are mutually reinforcing processes that we argue to 
be at the heart of understanding social reintegration. 
 
2.2.1 Social Identity 
 
In this subsection we present the concept of social identity as a stepping-stone to the 
broader concept of social capital and in turn the processes of social reintegration. This 
subsection proceeds in two parts. First (§2.2.1.1), drawing from works from across the social 
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sciences, social identity is conceptualized as a dynamic and constantly evolving process – in 
contrast to a static attribute. Second (§2.2.1.2), with this conceptualization in place specific 
issues of social identity formation and community membership in reintegration, especially 
stigma and gender, are explored. 
 
2.2.1.1 Conceptualizing Social Identity: A Process, Not a Thing 
 
Social identity is a concept central to our understanding the human experience in the social 
sciences. Through the concept of social identity we understand ourselves as individuals and 
as members of collectives; we form expectations about how others will treat us, and in turn 
how we will treat others. As such, social identity is a crucial marker that shapes the 
individual and the social world. Jenkins (2014: 6) argues that identification is a “multi-
dimensional classification or mapping of the human world and our places in it, as individuals 
and as members of collectivities” – in other words a map of what’s what and who’s who. In 
this sense, identification is not an inherent or predetermined thing, but rather it is a process 
of constructing the map of the social world around us, and our place within it (see e.g. Barth 
1969, 2000; or Tajfel 1981). Our places, and the places of others, in the map are changeable, 
negotiable, and dynamic.  
 
Thus we can think of social identity as a meta-concept that that is equally useful for 
exploring individuals, collectives, and, perhaps most importantly, their interaction (Martin & 
Dennis 2010). In this way the process of social identity takes on a dialectic character – 
occurring in the interaction between individuals and the social worlds they navigate. With 
this conceptualization in mind, Jenkins (2014) argues that social identity is never reaches a 
fixed or settled position, but rather is continually being shaped and reshaped in a dynamic 
negotiation with social world around us. Indeed, the word social is redundant – all identities 
are social identities.  
 
In the context of ex-combatant reintegration in the GLR, the interactive process of social 
identity formation can matter profoundly. For example, whether ex-combatants are 
perceived by others and themselves as victorious heroes, shamed losers, or even the 
perpetrators of horrific violence against the very communities to which they return shapes 
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the process of the construction of their identity - their place in the “maps” of themselves 
and others.  The process of social identity formation for ex-combatants within the 
communities they return to is important because it can deeply influence how ex-combatants 
are treated, their access to material and immaterial resources, and in turn their prospects 
for reintegration into communities.  
 
So if social identity formation is a process of negotiation in the space between individuals 
and their social surroundings, then what do the workings of this negotiation look like? There 
is broad agreement across social identity literature that at the foundation of identity 
formation is a process of comparison of people or things to establish similarity and 
difference. Where there has been less agreement is on whether it is the attribution of either 
similarity or difference that is primary in the process of social identity formation. The 
overwhelming majority of literature on social identities emphasizes the role of difference 
(see e.g. Taylor & Spencer 2004, du Gay et al 2000, Woodward 1997). However, Jenkins 
(2002) (2014), among others (e.g. Anthias 1998, Weeks 1990), is extremely critical of this 
point. Using classic accounts of social change from the across the social sciences, Jenkins 
(2014: 25) argues that: 
 
“… collective mobilization in the pursuit of shared objectives is a characteristic 
theme of history and social change. It may not be the only important process at 
work, but it is to be found wherever one looks, and, unavoidably, collective 
politics involves collective imaginings of similarity as well as of difference.” 
  
It seems that just as we must think of identity as a processes occurring in the dialectic space 
between individuals and collectives, so must we think of the workings of this process as 
existing in the dialectic space between similarity and difference.  
 
Jenkins (2001) (2002) (2014) cements the idea of social identity processes occurring between 
individuals and collectives, rather than at exclusively the individual level (as psychologists 
tend to prefer) or the collective level (as sociologists and social anthropologists tend to 
prefer) by conceptualizing social identity existing as the composite of three orders: the 
individual order, the interaction order, and the institution order. The individual order is 
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made of individuals’ understanding of themselves – what goes on in their head. Mead (1934) 
suggests that at the individual order identity is comprised of both the ‘I’ (the individual’s self-
definition as a subject) and the ‘me’ (the internalized attitudes of others around us about 
ourselves as an object). Together these two ends of the dialectic are synthesized into the 
individual order of identity. Ex-combatant’s perceptions of trust, inclusion, self-worth, and 
empowerment in the community are all important dimensions of the individual order of 
identity. 
 
If the individual order of identity could be called our self-image (that which we perceive 
inwards), then the interaction order could be called our public-image (that which we project 
outwards to others. Goffman (1969) has dealt extensively with this idea in what he calls the 
“presentation of the self”. Likewise, in the interaction order Jenkins (2014: 44) points out 
that “identity is never unilateral.” Indeed, social identity is not just asserted from the 
individual, but must also be received and accepted (or denied) by the collectives around us. 
The ways in which communities in the GLR perceive ex-combatants in terms of trust, 
inclusion, and stigma are important dimensions to the interaction order of identity. 
 
Lastly, at the institutional order we reach the side of the individual-collective dialectic in 
which collectives shape individual identities from outside the individual. This line of thought 
also finds its roots in Goffman (1968a) (1968b) who described the way in which individual 
and collective identities are produced and reproduced by social and political institutions in 
society. Armed groups themselves can be thought of as “total-institutions” (Goffman 1968a) 
that, through their total envelopment of all aspects of life, shape the social identities of their 
members. Likewise, one could suggest that DDR programming itself is a sort of institution 
that can shape ex-combatants identities. Indeed, the very label ex-combatant comes from 
the peacebuilding community’s discourse of DDR and projects many implicit assumptions 
about who ex-combatants are, their motivations, and the threats they pose. Further, the ex-
combatant identity label can take on various negative associations in communities of return. 
We will return to this point in §2.2.1.2 below.   
 
Another essential dimension to introduce to the analysis presented throughout this doctoral 
thesis is that of gender. We are not concerned with the physical or biological dimensions of 
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gender, i.e. sex, but with the “… social construction of what is defined to be masculine or 
feminine within any particular culture, [which] includes our reflections on symbols, theories, 
practices, institutions, and individuals.” (Aolain et al 2011: 3). Indeed, to neglect the role of 
gender in social identity would be remiss. For, as Jenkins (2014: 84) notes: 
 
“The meanings of gender differences are locally variable, but that there is 
differentiation is not. […] In terms of its universality and its consequences for the 
organization and practice of everyday life, gender is the most significant fault line 
of identification in the human world.” 
 
As such, remaining conscious of the way that masculinity and femininity organizes 
individuals’ social, political, and economic (not to mention emotional and intellectual) lives 
will help to examine the patterned consequences these social identity constructs have for 
ex-combatants as they face reintegration.  
 
We believe that understanding ex-combatants perception of their own identity within the 
community, combined with the community’s perception of ex-combatants is essential to 
understanding their ability to reintegrate into communities – to build social capital that they 
can leverage towards tangible social and economic outcomes. With this conceptualization of 
social identity as a process in place we can go forward to outline some of the specific 
features of social identity negotiation that especially pertinent for exploring ex-combatant 
reintegration – namely the nature of community membership and the potential negative 
role of stigma in reintegration. 
 
2.2.1.2 Negotiating Identities & Community Membership in Reintegration  
 
At its outset, the prospect of reintegration represents a sort of identity crisis for ex-
combatants. Through participation in DDR most ex-combatants break their ties to armed 
groups and in doing so may lose their social status, their sense of belonging, their support 
network, and in turn their economic security. In short, they may lose their identity. For ex-
combatants, choosing to give up their arms and return to communities can often be equated 
to losing what semblance of purpose, prestige, and control they have in their lives, with little 
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guarantee that it can be reformed outside of armed groups. To understand the processes by 
which ex-combatants can renegotiate their social identities, and the possible barriers to 
doing so, we must reflect on the nature of social groups – i.e. the community. 
 
Social groups, or collectives, are essential conceptual building block in the social sciences. 
Indeed, it seems that without tackling the idea of collectivities it is difficult to think 
sociologically about anything (Jenkins 2014) - but how to do social groups come about? It 
seems that just as understanding social identity requires an engagement in a dialectic of 
similarity and difference, so too does understanding collective identity in groups. Barth 
(1969) (2000) argues that while, like identity, we must think of social group formation and 
membership as an ongoing dialectic process, it may be that the identification of differences 
between individuals and collectivities may be at the heart of social group formation. Jenkins 
(2014: 104) conveys this sentiment well:  
 
“To define the criteria of membership of any set of objects is, at the same time, 
also to create a boundary, everything beyond which does not belong. It is no 
different in the human world: one of the things that we have is common is our 
difference from others. In the face of their difference our similarity often comes 
into focus.” 
 
Out of difference so emerges similarity – groups. The stratum of social group that we are 
primarily interested in this doctoral thesis is the community. Since Tönnies (1887) and 
Durkheim (1883), the concept of community has been an inescapable in the social sciences.  
Jenkins (2014: 137) defines communities as groups of people with “…a sense of themselves 
and their fellows as ‘belonging’ in a particular locality or setting of relationships and 
interaction, and with – if not to – each other”. Indeed, within this basic conception Geertz 
(1973) and Cohen (1985) argue that communities cannot be said to exist at the ontological 
level, but rather are collectively constructed through symbols such as shared culture, 
ethnicity, religion and the beliefs, actions, and rituals they entail. From this view what 
matters is not that every individual member in a community understand things the same 
way as every other member, or different from those in other communities for that matter, 
but that their shared symbols allow them to believe that they do. If communities are socially 
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constructed then this means that their boundaries may be, as with identity, negotiable, 
flexible, or even situational.  
 
The benefits of communities are immediate. Communities give a sense of similarity among 
their members that allows their underlying heterogeneity to prosper, and can thereby create 
a setting of predictability and trust that opens the space for collective action (discussed 
further in §2.2.2. on social capital). With this in mind, we can begin to see the importance of 
identity and community membership for ex-combatants in the GLR. Without being able to 
reshape their identity and gain community acceptance (membership) ex-combatants’ access 
the essential social and economic support networks that communities in the GLR represent 
(having forgone those that existed in armed groups) can be severely degraded. In this way, 
we can say that identity and community membership are important for not only ex-
combatants potential reintegration, but also their overall life chances. With this in mind, 
understanding the barriers to social identity reformation – i.e. the ways in which ex-
combatant identities can become “spoiled” and possibly lead to rejection from communities 
- is essential.  
 
While the process of negotiating identities and community membership in many settings is 
often automatic, in fluxing post-conflict settings these exchanges can be more a matter of 
“imposition and resistance, claim and counter claim, rather than a consensual process of 
mutuality and negotiation” (Jenkins 2014: 97).  It is in this space of contested identities 
where concept of stigma can become salient. For Goffman (1968a) stigma emerges when 
there is a discrepancy between individuals’ “virtual identity” (the identity they present to 
others) and their “actual identity” (the externally perceived identity attached to attributes 
that they actually possess, regardless of how they present themselves) – this is similar to the 
idea of the individual and interaction orders of identity. When individuals’ actual identity 
includes undesirable characteristics, they may hide this by presenting themselves as 
“virtually normal”. For example, ex-combatants may try to adopt post-conflict identities 
around being a household provider. However, their actual ability to shed their identity in the 
eyes of the community as a violent and untrustworthy individual, and to be become 
perceived as family provider may be limited. Stigma is the shame attached to the discord 
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between these actual and virtual identities in ex-combatants’ own eyes, and in the eyes of 
the community.  
 
In thinking about stigma a paradox emerges for DDR programming. DDR puts ex-combatants 
out in the open by labeling them as such – exposing their potentially undesirable “actual 
identities” and limiting their ability to manage the presentation of the self in their “virtual 
identities”. At the same time, DDR programming must attempt to transform the societal 
meaning of the very labels it is ascribing. The danger is that the label of ex-combatant can 
become a “master status” which may act as a barrier to ex-combatants ability to negotiate 
identities, and ultimately to reintegrate into communities. In the worst cases, this 
marginalization may feed into the remobilization of ex-combatants, who have few choices 
for survival, into armed groups. This paradox in reintegration programming presents a 
dilemma for individual ex-combatants. Stigma and shame can be so powerful that they drive 
some ex-combatants to avoid identification through DDR programming at all, therefore 
foregoing the vital material assistance that reintegration programming often represents. This 
is especially true for female ex-combatants, for whom anecdotal evidence suggests forgo 
participation in formal DDR programming more often than males in order to avoid the 
consequences of the stigma attached to the ex-combatant label.  
 
Both Gilligan (2000) and Keen (2008) outline the key emotional role of shame in 
interpersonal violence. Bowd (2008) and Nadler et al (2008) posit that reconciling emotional 
wounds in the post-conflict landscape is an essential part of peacebuilding, not least of all in 
the context of ex-combatant reintegration. Further, Porto et al (2007: 152), drawing from 
Lederach (1997) assert: “the notion of reconciliation as an encounter where space for 
acknowledging the past and envisioning the future are necessary ingredients for reframing 
the present”. Indeed, reintegration is an encounter, at times even a confrontation, and 
embedded in this encounter is the process of negotiating identities and community 
membership. 
 
Understanding the gendered dimensions of the experience of violent conflict highlights the 
challenges of negotiating social identities in the post-conflict environment. While there are 
differential experiences of violent conflict for both men and women, it is worth beginning 
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with the unique experiences of women. Aolain (2011: 5) surmises many of the unique and 
detrimental experiences of violent conflict well: 
 
“Conflicts affect both men and women, but women face additional issues during 
and after wars that men do not, including, of course, pervasive sexual violence, 
forced impregnation, reproductive violence, sexually transmitted diseases, and 
forced abortion. Women and their children experience internal displacement and 
dominate the refugee populations across conflicts. Women are also differentially 
affected because of their role as the primary caretakers of the household and 
family, in this regard traditional gender dichotomies may be further entrenched 
and exacerbated during times of extreme violence.”  
 
Indeed, the in the context of violent conflict gendered identities appear in flux. As Aolain 
points out in the passage cited above, traditional gender roles may become exaggerated 
during violent conflict. This may be especially true for those women who do not participate 
in armed fighting directly, but are made subservient to armed groups as camp cooks, 
messengers, scouts, and “bush wives”. On the other end of the spectrum, there are those 
women who become active fighters and in doing so challenge traditional norms of 
femininity. In violent conflict women may find empowerment, mobility, and control over 
their lives at levels unknown to them within the confines of traditional peacetime gender 
roles. As such, the prospect of returning to traditional gender roles in the post-conflict 
landscape may be understandably unattractive. This gendered identity crisis can combine 
with stigmatization, for having stepped outside of prescribed societal notions of femininity, 
to create enormous barriers to reintegration for female ex-combatants – barriers that males 
do not face in the same way. Indeed, Kelly et al (2011) outline the disastrous effects of 
stigma for female ex-combatants in DRC, noting that: “Stigmatization is not just a passive 
phenomenon; it may also be enacted through frank discrimination; isolation; restricted 
access to economic opportunity and social support; physical abuse and insults; and 
alterations in decision-making capacity and power within the household unit.” 
 
While the vast majority of scholarly work on gender in reintegration has focused on the 
challenges that female ex-combatants face negotiating feminine identities, a gender lens 
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also adds invaluable depth understanding masculinity in the post-conflict landscape. Indeed, 
socialization in violent norms within armed groups (see e.g. Vermeij 2011) can contribute to 
forms of “hyper-masculinity” in which “…the strictures against femininity and homosexuality 
are especially intense and in which physical strength and aggressiveness are paramount.” 
(Harris 2000: 793). In the context of DRC, Elbert and Schaur (2013) outline how socialization 
in violence and hyper-masculine identities can drive “appetitive aggression” in which 
combatants begin to enjoy committing acts of extreme violence.  
 
While violent masculine identities may serve combatants during violent conflict, indeed such 
masculine identities may be important for survival within the ranks of violent armed groups, 
they present a mismatch to the post-conflict landscape. Slegh et al (2014: 8) illustrate this 
point well in their examination of masculinity for ex-combatants in Rwanda:  
 
“As a combatant, it was important for these men to be tough, powerful and in 
control, while findings show that their perspective on civilian life focuses on 
wanting to be “good family men”. During this transition, the findings show a gap 
between ex-combatants’ current perceptions of what it means to be a real man 
in civilian society and their current opportunities to be such a man. A “real man” 
is viewed as someone who should provide for the family, live together with his 
wife and children in a house and own property. However, ex-combatants lost 
their former status as military men who had guns and power, and they do not yet 
have an idea of how they can obtain the status of a respected man in their new 
life.”  
 
The challenges that male ex-combatants face in fulfilling traditional gender norms of 
masculinity can be further exacerbated by the evolving norms of femininity. Many men may 
return from conflict to find that, in their absence, women have adopted traditionally 
masculine roles such as ‘breadwinner’ or ‘protector’ – implicitly challenging men’s role in the 
home and community. Indeed, women may experience the return of men as a threat to their 
new roles and freedoms. If the process of reintegration in itself represents an identity crisis 
for ex-combatants, then an important part of this crisis revolves around gender identities. 
However, as the discussion here illustrates, masculine and feminine identities do not evolve 
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in isolation. In violent conflict and in the post-conflict landscape, masculinity and femininity 
are deeply intertwined and evolve vis-a-vis each other. Remaining attentive to the ways in 
which masculine and feminine notions of identity flux and collude is an essential facet to 
understanding the broader processes of ex-combatant reintegration (Aolain 2011).   
 
The process of negotiating social identities and community membership is an essential step 
for ex-combatants as they navigate the process of social reintegration. However, if we want 
to go further to understand the mechanisms through which social identity formation and 
community membership can lead to tangible social and economic outcomes for ex-
combatants across the GLR there is another piece to the puzzle. For us, the concepts of 
social identity and community membership must be understood as inlaid within the broader 
concept of social capital.  
 
 
2.2.2 Social Capital  
 
In this subsection we build on the previous discussion of social identity to present a 
conceptualization of social capital as at the core of ex-combatant social reintegration 
processes. The subsection proceeds in two parts.  First (§2.2.2.1), drawing from the 
foundational works of key authors, a synthesized conceptualization of social capital as 
comprised of three primary dimensions – bridging, bonding, and linking social capital – is 
presented. Second (§2.2.2.2), this conceptualization is used to explore the role of social 
capital in the outbreak and sustaining of violent conflict, and in turn the challenges that exist 
for individual ex-combatants as they navigate the processes of social reintegration. 
 
2.2.2.1 Conceptualizing Social Capital 
 
The central thesis of the concept of social capital is that - like money, property, or 
infrastructure - social relationships have value.  The value of social relationships is derived 
from the basis they provide for trust, cooperation, and a broader sense of social cohesion 
across strata in society.  With this social cohesion individuals and groups are able to work 
together to achieve outcomes that they could not have, or could have only with great 




To illustrate the idea of social capital we can immediately think of ex-combatants returning 
to communities in the GLR. Without social connections (a social network) in the community, 
many ex-combatants may struggle towards both social and economic reintegration. Because 
of the extreme challenges characteristic in the GLR, state intuitions have very limited 
capacity to deliver social services. Thus, the social and economic support individuals receive, 
ex-combatant or otherwise, is almost exclusively accessed through familial and communal 
networks. Ex-combatants returning to communities without the support of an immediate 
family network may be more exposed to material deficit such as food, housing, and income 
insecurity – exacerbating their already impoverished position. Further, without accessing 
broader community networks by building relationships through the slow processes of 
confrontation, atonement, and reconciliation ex-combatants can face further barriers to 
building trust and acceptance in the community – which can in turn have real effects in 
terms of their social and economic reintegration, e.g. the prospect of marriage and the 
establishment of a sustainable economic livelihood.  
 
Clearly relationships matter very much for ex-combatants attempting to reintegrate into 
communities after prolonged periods of violent conflict. In this way we can see clearly that 
the concept of social capital is deeply rooted in our previous discussion of social identity and 
community membership.  Just knowing people is not enough if they do not feel obliged to 
help you (Field 2008). This is why social identity and community membership are important 
overlapping concepts embedded within social capital. Some have even argued (e.g. Delanty 
2003) that, without being operationalized within the framework of social capital, the 
concept of community is far too imprecise for serious empirical investigations (though many 
social anthropologists may disagree!). For us social identity and community membership and 
social capital are symbiotic, merely facets of the broader processes of social reintegration.  
 
As early as de Tocqueville (1832), Tönnies (1887), and Durkheim (1893) social theorists have 
been interested in the value of social relationships. Indeed, Putnam (2000) suggests that the 
idea of social capital was invented at least six times in the 20th century alone. In early works 
though, the concept of social capital was rarely more than a metaphor. However, there is 
broad consensus (see e.g. Field 2008) that the idea of social capital came into prominence, 
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moving from metaphor to operationalized concept, starting in the 1980’s through the works 
of Bourdieu (1980), Coleman (1994), and Putnam (2000). Especially since Putnam’s (2000) 
Bowling Alone the concept of social capital has seen continued adoption across academic 
spheres as well as in policy applications – not least of all by the World Bank and OECD (see 
e.g. Grootaert & Bastelaer 2002). Understanding the emergence of social capital through the 
works of Bourdieu, Coleman, and Putnam is an important stepping-stone to explicating the 
conceptualization of social capital utilized in this doctoral thesis, and thus our discussion 
begins there.  
 
Today Bourdieu is perhaps most associated with the development of the concept of 
“habitus” – sets of values and ways of thinking dynamically formed through the interaction 
of individual agency and the structuring forces of society.  Indeed, the concept of habitus 
would be the impetus to Bourdieu’s eventual elaboration of social capital.  Within their 
habitus, groups were able to use cultural symbols as “cultural capital” to both signal and 
constitute their position in society. It is important to understand that Bourdieu was primarily 
interested in explaining social hierarchy, especially social class, and other forms of 
entrenched inequality. As such, cultural capital was the grease in the wheels of the machine 
of social reproduction that maintained disparities in access too economic capital. However, 
there was still a piece missing. Bourdieu (1980: 2) notes that: 
 
“… different individuals obtain a very unequal return on a more or less 
equivalent capital (economic or cultural) according to the extent to which they 
are able to mobilise by proxy the capital of a group (family, old pupils of elite 
schools, select club, nobility, etc.).” 
 
Bourdieu was acknowledging that individual’s position in social hierarchy is maintained not 
only by their levels of cultural and economic capital, but also by the extent that they were 
able to mobilize the capitals of others around them. In other words, social relationships have 
value. Bourdieu (1980)(1984) used the example of professionals such as doctors or lawyers 
using their social networks to actualize economic (e.g. referring clients) or cultural 
(honorability or respectability) capital in ways that those individuals with the same 
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credentials but lacking  a rich social network would not be able to achieve. As such, Bourdieu 
defined social capital as: 
 
“Social capital is the sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an 
individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.” 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 119) 
 
Bourdieu’s conceptualization, while foundational, is not without points of weaknesses. First, 
remember that Bourdieu was trying to explain class hierarchy and entrenched inequality – 
for him this meant offering an alternative to Marxist explanations these phenomena. 
However, much like Marx conceptualized capital as exclusive to the elite, so too did 
Bourdieu conceptualize social capital as a property that only elites use to secure their 
societal position. This is problematic, as there is good reason to think that social capital plays 
a vital role in the lives of even the most impoverished peoples. As Coleman (1994) argues, 
relationships matter not just for elites, but for everyone. A second important point of 
critique is that Bourdieu saw social capital as an inherently positive force. Yes, it could 
maintain inequality by denying access to cultural and economic capital to those who lack it, 
but its presence was always positive for those who possessed it. This is not always the case 
and the social capital has a “dark side” too, but we will come to this point later. Nonetheless, 
Bourdieu has played a key role in the progress of social capital from pure metaphor to 
analytical concept (Field 2008).  
 
While Bourdieu was interested in explaining social class, Coleman (1990) first came to the 
concept of social capital through his research on education and career achievement. For 
Coleman everyone had social capital, regardless of their class or status. For Coleman this 
social capital was an important explanatory factor understanding variation in levels of career 
achievement within groups of equivalently educated individuals. In this context, similar to 
Bourdieu, Coleman (1994: 300) defined social capital as: 
 
“… the set of resources that inhere in family relations and in community social 
organization and that are useful for the cognitive or social development of a child 
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or young person. These resources differ for different persons and can constitute 
an important advantage for children and adolescents…” 
 
Within this conceptualization Coleman would acknowledge social capital formation as not 
only an important part of gaining future work credentials, but also of overall cognitive 
development and social identity formation (Field 2008). Coleman’s understanding of social 
capital informed, and evolved with, his broader effort to merge sociology and economics in a 
more general explanation of social order (see Coleman 1994). As such, Coleman subscribed 
to a rational choice lens for understanding many social interactions. For Coleman, social 
capital was a way to understand why people cooperate even when their interests might be 
best served by competition (i.e. the collective action problem). Essentially, Coleman thought 
social capital could explain cooperation via the expectation of reciprocation (quid pro quo). 
In this way, Coleman’s conceptualized social capital was as broad force working that guided 
cooperation and competition in a manner similar to idea of the “invisible hand” of the classic 
market economy (Field 2008).  
 
Despite key differences, Coleman’s work shares many parallels with Bourdieu, and thus faces 
similar lines of criticism. Though Coleman took a step forward by exploring social capital as a 
force existing in the lives of all individuals, beyond the province of elite class reproduction, 
he still saw social capital, like Bourdieu, through perhaps naively optimistic eyes. Social 
capital allowed cooperation for mutual gain and had little, if any, “dark side”. Also like 
Bourdieu, Coleman was inattentive to the role of affect, the idea that not all social network 
relationships are equal – there are relationships of like, love, loathing, etc. (Field 2008). 
Affect can determine the value and function of relationships. Despite these points of 
critique, Coleman’s work is still an important step in understanding the evolution of social 
capital, especially as it would emerge in the work of Putnam.  
 
While Bourdieu and Coleman were coming at social capital from the view of sociology, 
Putnam came from political science. While Putnam’s early conceptualization of social capital, 
used to explain civic engagement in Italy (1993), can largely be seen as an extension of 
Coleman’s own ideas, it was when he shifted focus to explaining the decline of civic 
engagement in the United States since the 1960’s that Putnam’s work proved especially 
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innovative. In his book Bowling Alone (2000), Putnam outlines the decline of civic 
participation in the USA in terms of voter turnout, public meetings attendance, various 
forms of committee and political service volunteering, as well as overall feelings of trust in 
the government. Putnam goes on to argue that a parallel decline can be seen in broader 
forms of civic engagement such as membership or participation in organizations such as 
religious groups, labor unions, educational associations, leisure groups such as Boy Scouts or 
organized league sports, fraternity organizations such as the Elks Club or Freemasons, and 
etc. Putnam argues that the decline of broader civic participation meant that individuals had 
less contact with others across society and are thus less likely to engage in the sort of civic 
discussion that might occur in those settings – and in turn less likely to engage in civic 
matters. Individuals have smaller networks and thus less social capital. In Putnam’s analysis, 
the value of social capital is not just to individuals or groups, but resides in the way this value 
aggregates into collective action that drives political functions at the national level. Putnam 
offers a number of social (e.g. women’s broader integration into the workforce) and 
technological (e.g. the individualization of leisure via television) shifts to explain the long-
term erosion of social capital in the United States.  
 
The evocative image provoked from the title of Putnam’s book, and previous paper, Bowling 
alone (1995) (2000) of an individual bowling in solitaire gave force to Putnam’s points. 
However, Putnam’s metaphor was slightly more complex than this image suggests (Field 
2008). Putnam’s point was not that Americans played in isolation, but that they were ever 
less likely to play in an organized league that would expose them to broader segments of 
society, create space for civic discussion and action, and broaden their social capital. Instead, 
individuals were more likely to play with closer groups of family and friends. In asserting this 
point Putnam made perhaps his greatest contribution to thought on social capital; the 
distinction between bonding and bridging social capital. Putnam built these subtypes as a 
deeper elaboration of Granovetter’s (1973) ideas about strong (bonding) and weak 
(bridging) ties. Bonding (exclusive) social capital is that that exists in networks of close 
relationships with individuals in similar situations such as family members, close friends, or 
neighbors and can bolster social identity and group loyalty. Bridging social capital (inclusive) 
is that which exists in networks of looser relationships such as acquaintances or work 
colleagues and can generate broader identities and reciprocity. In other words, “Bonding 
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social capital constitutes a kind of sociological superglue, whereas bridging social capital 
provides a sociological WD-40” (Putnam 2000: 23).  
 
For Putnam the decline in civic engagement in the United States was due to social and 
technological shifts that affected a decline in networks of bridging social capital and an 
emerging primacy of bonding social capital. This shift in balance between the two forms of 
social capital was problematic in Putnam’s eyes. Essentially, without the ameliorating effects 
of bridging social capital, which can bring together individuals from diverse groups, “bonding 
social capital, by creating strong in-group loyalty, may also create strong out-group 
antagonism…” (Putnam 2000: 23) which can undermine broader societal cooperation in the 
form of civic engagement.   
 
While Putnam offers a powerful account of the role of social in civic engagement, backed by 
meticulous empirical data, his work is not without criticism. Like Bourdieu and Coleman, 
Putnam still understands social capital as fundamentally good and pays little explicit heed to 
the ways in which social capital can be instrumentalized for malicious outcomes. Some 
authors (see e.g. Misztal 2000) have criticized Putnam as “romanticizing the community”. 
Also like Bourdieu and Coleman, Putnam offers a generally ahistorical account of social 
capital in which “the volume of social capital may grow or diminish with time… but not that 
its components and outcomes may alter…” (Field 2008: 45). However, unlike Bourdieu and 
Coleman, Putnam offers an essentially bottom up conceptualization of social capital that 
leaves little space for the top down role of institutional and state agency in shaping social 
capital -  if you will, Bourdieu’s “structuring structures” (to be discussed in §3.2.3). Yes, social 
capital may affect the functioning of the state, but the state may reflexively shape social 
capital at the lower levels of society.  
 
Two other points of criticism on social capital in the works of all three authors are worth 
noting. First, none of the three foundational authors offers an elaboration of social capital 
that can take into account the role that context plays in the value of social capital. Not all 
social capital is equal. Putnam (2000: 21) points out the problem by using physical capital as 




“An eggbeater and an aircraft carrier both appear as physical capital in our 
national accounts, but the eggbeater is not much use for national defense, and 
the carrier would not be much help with your morning omelet. Similarly, social 
capital – that is, social networks and the associated norms of reciprocity – comes 
in many different shapes and sizes with many different uses.” 
 
Indeed, in the works of Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam social capital lacks the conceptual 
specificity to outline the precise mechanisms that govern social capital and the conditions 
under which these mechanisms operate, and thus straddles the void between metaphor and 
concept (Field 2008). Second, it is also worth noting that none of the three key authors of 
social capital presented gives a meaningful account of the role of gender in the social capital. 
Nonetheless, while Bourdieu, Coleman, and Putnam’s works all have their respective 
strengths and weaknesses, they are the foundation from which all works on social capital in 
the last 15 years have proceeded, and thus inform our operationalization of social capital 
going forward.  
 
While Putnam contributed greatly to the literature on social capital by popularizing the ideas 
of bridging and bonding social capital, he gave little explicit attention to logical conclusion of 
there being multiple dimensions to social capital – namely, that different combinations of 
bridging and bonding capital could lead to different outcomes for society. Michael Woolcock 
was perhaps the first to deal with this issue in a systematic manner. Woolcock & Narayan 
(2000) agree with Putnam’s idea that bridging social capital is import for the civic functioning 
of the state. Indeed, they ultimately argue that low levels of bridging social capital in settings 
outside the west can be linked to forms social and economic inequality at a national level, 
and even as a contributing factor to the outbreak of violent conflicts. We will return to this 
point in the next section (§2.2.2.2), however for now we can question how Woolcock & 
Narayan account for the fact that there are settings where bridging social capital appears 
low or in decline, e.g. the United States if we accept Putnam’s (2000) analysis, but where the 
associated conflicts are not present.   
 
To account for this issue Woolcock (2001) suggests that a third type of social capital, 
“linking” social capital, conditions the effects of bridging and bonding social capital levels on 
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potential conflicts. Linking social capital is the formal and informal connections between 
individuals and communities to the higher-level structures and institutions of the state and 
market. These higher-level structures could be, for example, powerful elites or institutional 
and bureaucratic structures.  Halpern (2005: 24) puts it well when he explains that linking 
social capital is all about “…how closely tied, or embedded, the state is to or in the society 
over which it presides”. Linking social capital is the force that aggregates the potential for 
collective action found in bridging and bonding social capital to the national level. The 
implicit argument (present since Putnam 1993) is that aggregate logic of social capital is the 
foundation on which strong democracies are built. So for Woolcock (2001), the outcome 
produced by low levels of bridging social capital between communities in a society is 
conditioned by the overall density of connections between communities and higher-level 
structures and institutions in the state or market. Bowd (2008) summarizes Woolcock’s 
overall point well, and in doing so captures the interplay between the state and communities 
as simultaneously shaping each other:  
 
“… the state is the ultimate provider of public goods and the final arbiter and 
enforcer of the rule of law, as well as being the actor most able to facilitate 
enduring alliances across the boundaries of class, ethnicity, race, gender, politics, 
and religion. However, communities and firms also have an important role to 
play in creating the conditions that produce, recognize, and reward good 
governance.” 
 
So now we have bridging, bonding, and linking as the three dimensions of social capital. 
Halpren (2005) argues that there are three components to social capital in each dimension:  
the actual social networks that constitute the various dimensions of social capital; the 
norms, values, and expectations that exist for members of those networks; and the 
sanctions in those networks for norm breaking behavior. The last two pieces, norms and 
sanctions, is where the previously outlined concept of social identity becomes especially 
salient. The dynamics of negotiating social identity and group membership (networks in the 






Figure 2.1 – Social Capital Conceptual Map. Reproduced from Halpren (2005). 
 
Halpren (2005) argues further that in taking into account both the bottom-up and top-down 
nature of social capital as a function networks between various strata of society, from the 
individual to the state, we can map the concept of social capital at the micro, meso, and 
macro levels. Halpren’s (2005: 27) conceptual map of social capital (reproduced in Figure 
2.1) collects the analytical contributions of the key authors before him and provides us with 
the conceptual space to elaborate a more specific exploration of the role of social capital in 
ex-combatant reintegration in the following subsection.   
 
2.2.2.2 The Transformation Social Capital in Violent Conflict and Reintegration 
 
The conceptual framework of social capital has much to offer for understanding the 
outbreak of violent conflict, the transformation of social capital in violent conflict, and thus 
the challenges that lay ahead once hostilities cease and peacebuilding begins. As mentioned 
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above, Woolcock & Narayan (2000) argue that levels of bridging social capital, conditioned 
by levels of linking social capital, can play a role in explaining the outbreak of conflict. As is 
visible in Figure 2.2, dysfunctional states (low linking social capital) create the context in 
which varying levels of bridging social capital lead to different outcomes. Reflecting loosely 
on the GLR, we can say that the five states examined in this doctoral thesis all likely fall 
somewhere on the bottom half of the continuum between well-functioning states and 
dysfunctional states (this may even be generous). In terms of bridging social capital across 
the GLR, loose reflection would suggest that there is considerable variation. However, the 
sharp socio-cultural and ethno-religious divides in the region likely play a role in maintaining 
bonding social capital, while possibly limiting the expansion of bridging social capital. 
Especially in rural regions, geography combined with dilapidated infrastructure and seasonal 
rains can mean that travel is near impossible for many in the GLR. In effect, the kind of 
movement of people that facilitates the expansion of bridging networks through simple 
exposure can be extremely limited. Within Woolcock & Narayan’s framework, we can loosely 
think of the balance of social capital in the GLR countries as likely playing some role in their 




Figure 2.2 – Relationship between levels bridging social capital and state functionality for 




While Woolcock & Narayan’s (2000) framework on conflict and social capital is useful, it is 
not without weaknesses. The first notable point is that the horizontal axis in framework 
implicitly conceptualizes intrastate conflict a product of state functionality. However, as we 
have seen in §1.2.1, the conflicts in the GLR include numerous transnational and local 
dynamics. That is, state power structures are not the only ones that have been important in 
the GLR. Also notable is the lack of explicit attention to the role of bonding social capital. The 
implicit idea - present in the works of Bourdieu, Coleman, and Putnam – is that strong 
bonding social capital can create “in-groups”, and thus by definition also create relative “out-
groups”. Recall from our previous discussion of social identity that: “To define the criteria of 
membership of any set of objects is, at the same time, also to create a boundary…” (Jenkins 
2014: 104). Woolcock & Narayan (2000) assume that when there are weak connections 
across different networks (low bridging social capital) that these isolated networks are 
strong in-group networks (high bonding social capital). These implicit ideas need further 
clarification. What role could bonding social capital play in the outbreak of violent conflict?  
 
Colletta & Cullen (2000) address exactly these issues by making explicit the role of bonding 
social capital that remains only implicit in the Woolcock & Narayan (2000) framework. 
Colletta and Cullen break bridging, bonding, and linking social capital into the two categories 
of horizontal (bridging and bonding) and vertical (linking) social capital. As is visible in Figure 
2.3, bridging and bonding social capital are seen as existing on opposite ends of the 
continuum of horizontal (ties across society) social capital. Conflict occurs when horizontal 
social capital is balanced towards the predominance of strong bonding networks in society. 
This is balance between bonding and bridging conditioned, similar as to in the Woolcock & 
Narayan framework, by the balance of vertical social capital. However, unlike the Woolcock 
& Narayan framework which sees this vertical dimension as merely state functionality, the 
Colletta & Cullen framework conceptualize it as a continuum between macro level 
connections to the state and markets at one end, and micro level connections to 
communities and individuals at the other. Colletta & Cullen (2000)(2002) argue that when 
the horizontal and vertical dimensions of social capital are in “synergy” (what Woolcock & 
Narayan 2000 call “complementarity”) they contribute greatly to the overall cohesiveness of 




“Social cohesion is the key intervening variable between social capital and violent 
conflict. The greater the degree to which vertical linking and horizontal bridging 
social capital integrate, the more likely it is that the society will be cohesive and 
will thus possess the inclusive mechanisms necessary for mediating or managing 
conflict before it turns violent. The weaker the social cohesion, the weaker will 
be the reinforcing channels of socialization (value formation) and social control 
(compliance mechanisms). Weak social cohesion increases the risk of social 
disorganization, fragmentation, and exclusion and the potential for violent 
conflict.”  
 
In the passage cited above, Colletta & Cullen (2000: 13) elegantly assemble the various 
strands of social capital, and by implication social identity, and their interrelated role in 
violent conflict. Further, their mention of “value formation” and “compliance mechanisms” 
maps especially well onto our earlier presentation of Halpren’s (2005) idea of networks 






Figure 2.3 - Horizontal and Vertical Social Capital. Reproduced from Colletta & Cullen (2002). 
 
If social capital plays a role in shaping the potential for violent conflict, then it is most 
certainly transformed during violent conflict. While traditional interstate conflict may in fact 
draw on national unity and turn contribute social cohesion, this is unlikely to be the case in 
the forms of, primarily, intrastate conflict pervasive through much of the GLR in the 1990’s 
and early 2000’s. Colletta & Cullen (2002: 279) paint the picture starkly: 
 
“…intrastate conflict divides the population, undermines interpersonal and 
communal group trust, and destroys norms and values that underlie cooperation 
and collective action for the common good, decimating social capital stocks – 
and, thus, exacerbating communal strife. This damage to a nation’s social fabric 
impedes the ability of states and communities to recover after hostilities cease. 
Even if other forms of capital are replenished, economic and social development 




As the analysis presented in §4.2.3 suggests, the GLR countries have seen a profound erosion 
of social capital due their prolonged, and in the case of DRC ongoing, exposure to violent 
conflict. In the post-conflict landscape the task of rebuilding social capital - reweaving the 
social fabric of society by building bridging and bonding relationships based on shared 
norms, and establishing the modicum of trust and social cohesion necessary for post-conflict 
recovery to progress is a monumental task. From the peacebuilder’s perspective, the size of 
the task of facilitating the rebuilding of social capital is matched by the difficulty of affecting 
such an intangible resource.  Though post-conflict peacebuilding measures such as 
reconciliation programs (e.g. truth commissions, see e.g. Bowd 2008) and transitional justice 
measures (e.g. amnesty commissions, see e.g. Rose 2008) can provide a setting where the 
process of confrontation and atonement can begin, they cannot serve as a substitute for 
slow societal dialogue of “acknowledging the past and envisioning the future [… as] 
necessary ingredients for reframing the present” (Porto et al 2007: 152, see also Lederach 
1997). Put plainly, groups cannot be made to interact with and trust one another. Further, in 
some cases (e.g. Sierra Leone) a reconciliation process may not be back by popular support 
from communities, who instead prefer a “forgive and forget” approach (see Shaw 2005).  
 
Thus far our discussion of social capital in violent conflict and peacebuilding has focused on 
various forms of social capital at the meso-level and their connection to the macro-level (see 
Figure 2.1 above), but what does all this mean for individual ex-combatants? Indeed, while 
outlining some features of the meso-macro levels of social capital provides essential context, 
in this doctoral thesis we are primarily engaged with exploring social capital at the mirco-
level of individuals. It is here, in shifting focus to the micro-level, that we can begin to see 
that our previous discussion of social identity in §2.2.1 seats into the concept of social capital 
in a complementary manner.  
 
We can think of Individuals as existing in a landscape of social networks. The individual 
relationships represented in these networks can take different forms. Those sets of 
relationships that from tight networks of mutual norms (be they social, cultural, ethnic, 
religious, or etc.) can be thought of as communities. In terms of social capital, the resources 
that these communities represent to their members is bonding social capital. When 
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individual ex-combatants engage in the process of negotiating identity and community 
membership, they are in part negotiating access to a network of bonding social capital. This 
bonding social capital facilitates an environment of trust in which forms of collective social 
action can take place. For example, in the GLR state provision of social support is negligible 
and instead the primary source of basic social support is delivered to individuals through the 
collective action of familial and communal networks. Gaining access to these networks of 
bonding social capital may prove vital to ex-combatants immediate prospects in the broader 
processes of reintegration. However, as de Souza Briggs (1998) notes, bonding social capital 
is important for “getting by”, but truly “getting ahead” requires bridging social capital. 
Indeed, as ex-combatants move through the processes of social and economic reintegration 
their ability to use bonding social capital, and the trust that it represents, as a springboard 
for expanding their networks to include relationships that represent bridging social capital 
may dictate their ability to flourish.  
 
The consequence of faltering in the process of negotiating identity and community 
membership may be social isolation and the associated deficiency in social capital. As Field 
(2008: 48) notes: “… it is well established in the social sciences that socially isolated people 
face severe risks to their well-being”. The negative effects of social isolation for individuals’ 
well-being can include low sense of self-worth and low sense of empowerment that 
undermine their ability to participate in society. Inversely, stable and dense networks 
facilitate individuals’ general sense of self-worth and belief in their ability to affect change in 
their lives (Campbell 2000). The consequences of social isolation are not only psychosocial, 
but extend to the economic realm. Those without social acceptance within the community 
(bonding social capital) or broader social connections that transcend their immediate family 
or community networks (bridging social capital) may face considerable barriers to leveraging 
their skills and resources towards tangible economic improvements. This is especially true in 
the context of the GLR countries, where the economy is almost entirely informal. As 
discussed in the analysis presented in §4.2, social isolation can amplify the weaknesses of ex-
combatants who are already economically disadvantaged. For example, those ex-
combatants in the GLR with weak social capital may have trouble accessing socially allocated 




It seems that social identity and social capital are inextricably, and at times paradoxically, 
interrelated. Ex-combatants need to navigate the process of negotiating social identity and 
community membership in order to gain access to social capital. Simultaneously, without 
any bonding connections in the community ex-combatants’ ability to engage in the process 
of negotiating social identity and community membership may remain limited. Though far 
from the only influencing factor, social isolation and the lack of social capital it represents, 
especially when combined with stigma, can feed into deviant behavior (Halpern 2001). In 
terms of reintegration in the GLR, the most worrisome form of deviance is remobilization 
into armed groups. Indeed, armed groups themselves can effectively serve as a replacement 
for the community - forming tight and cohesive networks based on strict norms and harsh 
sanctions. This abundance of bonding social capital within the setting of armed groups 
allows decisive collective action, albeit for often perverse or destructive aims. Indeed, Leff 
(2008: 13) notes that: “During armed conflict, social capital is often hijacked and used to 
form allegiances in the warring parties. In other words, combatants join a new social unit 
that rewards them with social status and means to earn a living.” 
 
Many irregular armed groups in the GLR, especially those that rely on forced recruitment, 
rely on powerful processes of identity formation to foster group loyalty strong enough to 
facilitate the execution of otherwise socially immoral acts of violence. In societies with weak 
bridging and linking social capital, armed groups may represent a sense of empowerment 
and mobility where there otherwise is little (see e.g. Baas 2012, Bøås & Dunn 2007, Uvin, 
2007, or Utas 2005). In this sense, social identity and social capital help us to understand 
some of the factors that may contribute to the mobilization of individual combatants in the 
lead up to conflict, but also highlights the challenges they can face in wake violent of conflict 
– now possibly estranged from very communities into which they must reintegrate. In this 
light, we can see that social identity and social capital help illuminate at least some 
dimensions of the cycles of violence in the GLR in which ex-combatants continually 
remobilize into new or different armed groups - perpetually stalling the transition to peace.  
 
Returning to our previous analogy of social identities as a map that “…enable individuals to 
both locate themselves in the social order and navigate effectively with that social order” 
(Kramer 2006: 29). Social capital then is the vehicle that individuals use to expedite their 
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path through the social landscape. To some extent, individual ex-combatants may be able to 
achieve tangible social and economic outcomes on their own. However, they will 
undoubtedly do so more quickly and with fewer barriers when supported by the collective 
action of a strong social network.  
 
The processes of social reintegration at the individual level are thought to aggregate 
upwards to the meso and macro levels (refer to Figure 2.1) to constitute, in part, the broader 
societal shift towards peace. However, social reintegration processes do not occur in a 
vacuum. As outlined in §2.1.1., we conceptualize reintegration processes as fundamentally 
complex – the product of an intricately interconnected and simultaneously occurring set of 
social, economic, and political processes. As Field (2008: 151) notes: “Of course, social 
capital can only marshal resources where they already exist. It is not a substitute for credit, 
infrastructure, education and skills – but it can increase their yield by reinforcing statutory 
with voluntary effort, and sanctioning malfeasance”. In maintaining our analogy - even with 
a map and a vehicle individuals will still need fuel to propel them forward. In reality 
separating out the social from the economic or the political may prove futile – they are all 
distinct parts of an inseparable whole – however here there is analytical clarity to be gained 
through examining each piece in relative isolation. With this in mind, we turn from this 
focused conceptualization of social reintegration to one of economic reintegration. 
 
 
2.3 Economic Reintegration: Sustainable Livelihoods  
 
This section conceptualizes economic reintegration through the sustainable livelihoods 
framework. Economic reintegration is the process through which ex-combatants close 
education and skills gaps and, in turn, establish an income generating activity that can be 
sustained through the inherent challenges of the post-conflict environment. The benefits of 
a sustainable livelihood are not only economic, but rather there are numerous collateral 
outcomes – in that economic reintegration can directly impact, and be impacted by, the 
social reintegration processes of social identity reformation and social capital accumulation 
outlined in the previous sections.  Here we proceed in two subsections. In the first 
subsection (§2.3.1), the sustainable livelihoods conceptual framework is presented. In the 
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second subsection (§2.3.2), specific issues of ex-combatant reintegration within the 
conceptual framework are considered. 
 
2.3.1 Conceptualizing Sustainable Livelihoods  
 
Sustainable livelihoods is an analytical and normative framework that attempts to transcend 
traditional conceptualizations of poverty, e.g. as revolving around low income or as a result 
of low market demand, and instead takes into account the broader range of local factors, 
such as the overall vulnerability context or social exclusion dynamics, that shape individuals’ 
ability to secure their basic needs in a sustainable manner. The sustainable livelihoods 
framework began to emerge in the early 1990’s, however its conceptual roots can be traced 
back in part to Evans-Pritchard’s (1940) examination of the Sudanese Nuer’s ways of 
“making a living” in a setting almost completely disconnected from a modern economy. 
Conceptually Polanyi’s The Great Transformation (1944) and The Livelihood of Man (1977) 
also provide important foundational strands. Polanyi argued that before the advent of the 
market economy, the individual and collective rational of exchange was based on reciprocity 
and redistribution. As the market economy began to emerge there was a social and cultural 
transformation in which the rational of exchange moved towards individual utility 
maximization. In this way, Polanyi argued that in this way economic activity has to be 
understood as socially, culturally, and historically embedded. This point remains relevant as 
we explore ex-combatant livelihoods in the GLR. 
 
Today Chambers & Conway (1992) are commonly cited as the impetus to the modern 
conceptualization of sustainable livelihoods. Chambers & Conway (1992) argue that three 
traditional ways of thinking about poverty were insufficient. Frist, “production thinking” in 
which underproduction leads to poverty conditions is insufficient. From this view, features of 
poverty such as malnutrition, or even famine, would be seen as issues of underproduction of 
resources. However, works such as those of Sen (1981) show that, specifically in the example 
of famine, the source of food shortages in famine rarely a matter of supply, but is rather 
based on numerous social and political factors such as entitlements to access food 
resources. More recently, Keen (1994) has outlined the ways in which the distribution of and 
access too food resources were manipulated towards political aims during the Sudanese 
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famine of the 1980’s - in essence the famine was not a product of a lack of available food 
resources, constructed through the direction (and misdirection) of food resources. 
Understanding the resource production is important, but it provides far too narrow a lens for 
understanding poverty.  
 
Second, “employment thinking” in which lack of employment is seen as the overarching 
source of poverty is insufficient. While employment thinking may play a greater role in 
developed market economies, the idea of every individual having a “job” is deeply 
mismatched with under developed rural market realities predominant across many poverty 
settings, not least of all the GLR. In these rural settings formal employment may not exist 
and individuals often ensure economic stability through adopting a diverse range of informal 
or semi-formal activities  -  in the sense that are largely disconnected from broader market 
structures and institutions. Lastly, “poverty-line thinking” in which low incomes are the 
source of poverty is also insufficient.  There are many dimensions to deprivation and 
wellbeing, as perceived by poor rural people, which are not captured by income measures – 
social and emotional not the least. Further, two important characteristics that Chambers & 
Conway identify in all three of these lines of thinking is their industrialized country imprint 
and their reductionism for ease of measurement. Ultimately, Chambers & Conway (1992: 3) 
argue that production, employment, and poverty-line thinking “do not fit or capture the 
complex and diverse realities of most rural life”.  
 
As an alternative to traditional modes of thinking about poverty and poverty alleviation 
Chambers & Conway (1992) suggest that three factors needed to be taken into account 
(presented in Figure 2.4). Individuals’ capabilities (i.e. knowledge and skills), their equity (i.e. 
their tangible and intangible resources), and the sustainability of the resulting livelihood (as 
a conglomerate of activities) in the face of stresses and shocks. Chambers and Conway 
emphasize the dynamism of a livelihoods approach by pointing out that capabilities and 
equity not only shape one another, but that they are simultaneously the means and ends of 





Figure 2.4 – Components of a Livelihood. Reproduced Chambers & Conway (1992) 
 
What is not visible in Figure 2.4 above is the dimension of sustainability, i.e. the ability of an 
individual’s livelihood to cope with stresses and shocks. “Stresses are pressures which are 
typically continuous and cumulative, predictable and distressing, such as seasonal shortages, 
rising populations or declining resources, while shocks are impacts which are typically 
sudden, unpredictable, and traumatic, such as fire, floods and epidemics” (Chambers & 
Conway 1992:10). We would add violent conflict to that list. Though environmental 
sustainability is also a part of the Chambers and Conway framework, today this dimension is 
largely absent in sustainable livelihoods frameworks. 
 
Chambers and Conway’s (1992) ideas on sustainable livelihoods would begin to gain traction 
at the end of the 1990s, when it would become a boundary term that attracted different 
disciplinary and professional perspectives (Scoones 2009). The UK’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) is most responsible for the proliferation of the sustainable 
livelihoods frameworks. Farrington et al (1999), commissioned by DFID, designed what is 
today the most widely applied and recognized form of the sustainable livelihoods 
framework. At this point sustainable livelihoods moved from a position as a conceptual and 
analytical framework to that of a full-blown normative policy framework. However, this is 
not to say that there were no conceptual contributions in the emerging normative 
framework. One of greatest contributions from the Farrington et al (1999) was its deeper 
65 
 
conceptualization of the kinds of resources that individuals living in poverty hold. While 
Chambers & Conway (1992) only divide individuals’ resources (in their words “equity”) into 
two categories, tangible and intangible resources, with capabilities as a third and separate 
category, Farrington et al (1999) suggest five categories of resources (in their words 
“capitals”) which integrate capabilities as a form of resource. The five categories of capital 
are: 1) human capital – resources in terms of labor, skills, and knowledge; 2) natural capital – 
resources in terms of natural resources such as land, water, forest, or minerals; 3) physical 
capital – resources in terms of tools, housing, livestock, food stocks, and etc.; 4) financial 
capital – resources in terms of money or access to loan or other forms of credit; and lastly 5) 
social capital – resources in terms of social connections that can help individuals to leverage 
their other forms of capital. These five forms of capital today are commonly formed into an 
“asset pentagon” (visible in Figure 2.5) to give a holistic profile of the range of resources 
available to individuals living in particular vulnerability contexts and the possible livelihood 




Figure 2.5 – DFID Sustainable Livelihoods Framework. Based on Farrington et al (1999). 
Reproduced from DFID (1999). 
 
The second important contribution from Farrington et al (1999) is their conceptualization of 
the role of structural dimensions to poverty and livelihoods.  That is, the ways in which the 
broader characteristics of the government and private sector play a structuring role in 
66 
 
shaping access to resources, and in turn the livelihood strategies of the poor, through law, 
policy, institutions, and culture. As de Haan (2006: 3) elaborates: “… capitals and livelihood 
strategies are not floating freely but are embedded in structure like rainfall is bounded by 
climate, fields placed in property systems and wages governed by supply and demand for 
labour…”. Indeed, in acknowledging the dynamic interaction of resource access and the 
structural dimensions to poverty the Farrington et al (1999) framework highlights the 
connection between the micro and macro levels of poverty and economic development – a 
point developed further in the World Bank’s own weighty study by Narayan et al (2000).  
 
However, the sustainable livelihoods framework as presented by Farrington et al (1999) is 
not without substantial points of critique. De Haan (2000) (2006) (2012) has been a 
consistent critical voice in the sustainable livelihoods scholarship since its consolidation at 
the start of the 2000s. For de Haan the biggest piece missing from the sustainable livelihoods 
framework is an explicit conceptualization of the role of individual livelihood strategies not 
only as a product of the interaction of different forms of capital and structures that shape 
them, but as incorporating individuals own agency – agency which not only shapes 
individuals’ actions forward, but which also reflexively affects back on resource access and 
structures. For de Haan the dynamic interaction of agency, structure, and the five forms of 
capital resources are simultaneously a product of, and yet also reflexively constituting, the 
experience of poverty and the pursuit of sustainable livelihoods. De Haan (2012: 348) 
paraphrases Bebbington (1999), who is himself citing Giddens (1979), and posits that: 
 
“A person’s assets, such as land, are not merely means with which he or she 
makes a living: they also give meaning to that person’s world. Assets are not 
simply resources that people use in building livelihoods: they are assets that give 
them the capability to be and to act. Assets should not be understood only as 
‘things’ that allow survival, adaptation and poverty alleviation. They are also the 
basis of an agent’s power to act and to reproduce, challenge or change the rules 
that govern the control, use and transformation of resources.”  
 
De Haal’s (2000) expanded sustainable livelihoods framework compliments our previously 
developed conceptualizations of social identity and, especially, social capital. Indeed, the 
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logic of social capital is built into the asset pentagon of the sustainable livelihoods 
framework. However, this leads to one of the overarching critiques of the sustainable 
livelihoods framework from the social sciences – that discussing livelihoods through an 
economic lens obscures the holistic nature of livelihoods outside of their relationship to 
material wellbeing. The sustainable livelihoods framework does allow us to think about the 
ways in which individuals’ can utilize diverse forms of tangible and intangible resources to 
actualize material outcomes – for example leveraging social capital to maximize human and 
natural capital gains. However, there is broad agreement across the social sciences that 
livelihoods are about much more than opportunities, investments, and gains. Wallman (1984 
quoted in Appendini 2001: 25) illustrates this point clearly in pointing out that: 
 
“...a livelihood is never just a matter of finding or making shelter, transacting 
money, getting food to put on the family table or to exchange on the market 
place. It is equally a matter of ownership and circulation of information, the 
management of skills and relationships and the affirmation of personal 
significance… and group identity. The tasks of meeting obligations, of security, 
identity and status, and organizing time are as crucial to livelihood as bread and 
shelter.”  
 
Indeed, to truly utilize the sustainable livelihoods framework in this doctoral thesis, we 
believe that it must be understood as dynamically connected to our previously developed 
conceptualizations of social identity and social capital. All three concepts are overlapping 
facets of one social and economic reality that individuals simultaneously navigate and 
construct. This is no less true for ex-combatants in the GLR, who face not only a unique set 
of economic disadvantages but also an interrelated set of social disadvantages that 
constitute the context in which they must transform through the processes of reintegration. 
With this in mind, we now turn to an exploration of sustainable livelihoods and specific 






2.3.2 Sustainable Livelihoods in the Context of Reintegration 
 
The GLR countries are among the least developed in the world, both in terms of economic 
and human development indicators. Indeed, DRC is regularly in the running for the lowest 
ranking on the annual Human Development Index. The features of these low levels of 
development represent the “vulnerability context” in which the vast majority of individuals 
across the GLR must attempt to make living. However, periods of violent conflict exacerbate 
and amplify these already challenging conditions.  
 
Violent conflict destroys resources and infrastructure, retards local economic exchange, 
spoils environmental resources, and erodes the trust that underpins much individual 
economic exchange through militarizing society. By diverting resources away from 
constructive social and economic activities, violent conflict can often be a sort of 
development in reverse (Levi & Thompson 2010). When the violence does cease, individuals 
may face a decimated economic landscape from which they must attempt to piece together 
a sustainable livelihood. For ex-combatants the extra challenges and barriers that exist in 
seeking sustainable economic livelihoods can be enormous. Indeed, Finn et al (2014: 6) 
articulates the nature of the post-conflict landscape well: 
 
“The post-conflict context in which DDR programs operate are characterize by 
weak political, social and economic structures, competition over power, 
insecurity, reduced productive capacities and livelihoods, destroyed 
infrastructure and other community services, collapsed markets, high inflation, 
un- and under- employment, and weakened social fabric with little social 
cohesion remaining. Prolonged civil conflict promotes its own economic 
imperatives with economies distorted and misaligned with their earlier or even 
later economic outlook.” 
 
For ex-combatants in the GLR, having participated in conflict represents a series of missed 
opportunities for developing the economic track record that can serve as the foundation for 
a sustainable economic livelihood. We can expand on this point by adopting the sustainable 
livelihood framework’s five forms of capital as a lens for viewing the specific range of 
69 
 
economic disadvantages that ex-combatants may face. In terms of human capital - i.e. labor, 
skills, and knowledge – ex-combatants may face a deficit in the skills and knowledge 
necessary for economic prosperity in the peacetime environment. Especially those ex-
combatants that mobilize at a young age may have missed opportunities for completing 
formal education and developing relevant economic skills such as a trade. This series of 
missed opportunities extends into the realm of natural capital where missed opportunities 
for establishing access to land, which is especially important in rural settings where 
agriculture plays a vital role in livelihood strategies, leave ex-combatants especially 
disadvantaged. Likewise, the forms of physical capital - such as housing, tools, and food 
stocks - that facilitate daily economic activity may be absent. To the extent that forms of 
financial capital exists, especially in terms of formal and informal access to credit, in post-
conflict settings, ex-combatants may face barriers to access it due to their weakened social 
capital in the community. Indeed, weak social capital, in terms of familial (bonding) and 
broader (bridging) social networks, can play a central role in amplifying the range 
disadvantages that ex-combatants face. Stigma and contested social identity can block ex-
combatants from building social connections and engaging in social processes in the 
community that could otherwise help support their efforts towards building other forms of 
capital and achieving a sustainable livelihood. 
 
If ex-combatants have missed opportunities for developing various forms of capital need for 
establishing a sustainable livelihood during peacetime, they have spent that time developing 
forms of capital that facilitate violent conflict as a livelihood – skills in the use of violence 
(human capital), control over natural resources used to fund armed groups (natural capital), 
the possession of weapons (physical capital), broader access to financial capital resources, 
and connection to a cohesive armed group (social capital). Indeed, ex-combatants best 
economic opportunities at the start of peace may be exactly those, which they must leave 
behind. In cases where ex-combatants are unsuccessful in reintegrating into the community 
and building a semblance of economic stability, grievances may emerge and remobilization 
into armed groups may become the most viable strategy for economic survival.  
 
The stakes are high for ex-combatants, and attaining a sustainable economic livelihood can 
seem like an impossible task. Thus, the imperative of aiding ex-combatants through 
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economic reintegration programming as a part of the broader peacebuilding effort can be 
better understood. Immediate assistance during the early phases of reintegration 
programming in the form of food supplies, housing, and even cash transfers are meant to 
meet the immediate needs of ex-combatants (natural, physical, and financial capital). 
Primary and secondary education and especially vocational training are used to address 
human capital deficits. Labor cooperatives can help build social capital and prioritization in 
microcredit schemes can increase ex-combatants access financial capital. These forms of 
assistance themselves are not sufficient to guarantee ex-combatants a sustainable economic 
livelihood. The structural conditions of the broader development environment, e.g. the 
predominance of the informal economy and the possible presence of contested local power 
structures, will have much to say for the extent that ex-combatants are able to assert their 
agency to leverage this modest economic assistance towards a sustainable livelihood. 
Indeed, ex-combatants’ return can represent the abrupt release of excess labor into a setting 
where civilians already compete for extremely scarce livelihood opportunities – possibly 
sparking resentment in the community.  
 
Finn et al (2014) argues that the benefits of a sustainable economic livelihood are not only 
economic, but include a number of “collateral outcomes” such as the potential to shape a 
new identity by building social skills, self-confidence, independence, and overall social 
capital. In this way we can, yet again, highlight the deeply intertwined nature of social and 
economic reintegration. In fact, it may be that in the especially deprived post-conflict 
environments of the GRL the social dimensions (social identity transformation & social 
capital accumulation) to economic reintegration are paramount for the achievement of a 
sustainable livelihood. Even if ex-combatants are able to build knowledge, skills, and attain 
some modest physical (e.g. tools) and financial capital, without building trust and acceptance 
in the community (social capital) the barriers to accessing land (natural capital), most 
notably through marriage, for small-scale agricultural production will be considerable. 
Despite this intertwining with social factors, the imperative remains that ex-combatants 
must achieve a sustainable livelihood that can cope with the stresses and shocks of the post-




Just as in the social domain, there are important gender dimensions to sustainable 
livelihoods. Lower education levels (human capital), social isolation and inability to marry 
due to stigma (social capital), in turn legal boundaries to the ownership of land (physical 
capital) all represent serious barriers for female ex-combatants in establishing sustainable 
economic livelihoods. As Aolain (2011: 260) notes: “Frequently, […] women are the least 
often employed or employable because of their legally enforced second-class status in many 
conflict zones. Across most post-conflict transitions, women are the first to be fired and the 
last to be hired…”. Indeed, for female ex-combatants the pursuit of economic stability is 
deeply embedded in the broader societal renegotiation of traditional gender norms in the 
post-conflict landscape.  
 
 
2.4 Summary of Conceptual Approach 
 
This chapter has outlined the conceptual approach taken in this doctoral thesis in three main 
parts. First, the concept of complexity was briefly introduced as backdrop to our conceptual 
approach to ex-combatant reintegration (further developed in §3.1.2). In light of this, we 
argue that to conceptualize ex-combatant reintegration processes we would be well served 
to draw from the vast range of well-established concepts from across the social sciences.  
 
Second, in light of these imperatives we move on to conceptualize social reintegration as 
revolving around the negotiation of social identities and the building of social capital that 
can be used towards tangible and intangible outcomes. Third, we conceptualize economic 
reintegration within a sustainable livelihoods framework which takes seriously the contexts 
of vulnerability in which economic reintegration takes place, the interrelated nature of social 
and economic resources (including social identity and social capital), the role the structural 
factors that can shape economic reintegration processes, and the vital role of ex-combatants 
own agency as constrained by yet simultaneously shaping all these factors.  
 
We argue that reintegration must be conceptualized as more than assimilation to civilian 
status, more than assimilation into settings of weak social capital and disempowerment, 
more than an assimilation into basic poverty. We conceptualize reintegration in the GLR as a 
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complex phenomenon based on a deeply interrelated set of social and economic processes 
through which ex-combatants integrate into an inclusive society. This argument serves as 
our point of departure in the next chapter outlining the methodological approach utilized in 





























3 Methodological Approach 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter will outline the overall methodological approach used in this doctoral thesis and 
consists of three main sections. The first section (§3.2) outlines the broader meta-theoretical 
underpinnings to the methodological approach as rooted in complex realism. The second 
section (§3.3) focuses on building an understanding of the production and positionality of 
the primary data source utilized in this doctoral thesis - the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset. 
The third, and final, section (§3.4) outlines the strategy for reframing the TDRP-GLR 
Reintegration Dataset within a comparative case study approach, aiming to explore the 
causal mechanisms underlying the broader processes of ex-combatant reintegration in the 
GLR. The application of the specific method of process tracing from quantitative data is 
explored at length. 
 
3.2 Meta-Theoretical Underpinnings 
 
The landscape of the philosophy of science is characterized by a plurality of perspectives, 
with few, if any, absolutes.  In this landscape, it is therefore essential that we formulate the 
basic ontological and epistemological foundations underpinning this doctoral thesis. Without 
making such foundational ideas explicit, much of the analytical congruency between theory, 
methods, and analysis would remain somewhat hidden or, worse yet, invite incoherency.  
 
This section on the meta-theoretical foundations of this doctoral thesis proceeds in three 
subsections. In the first subsection (§3.2.1), the broad divides between classical empiricism, 
at one extreme, and idealism, at the other, are developed as a field for framing core issues in 
the in the philosophy of the social sciences – namely the ontological status of scientific 
observations. In the second subsection (§3.2.2), critical realism is introduced as a 
philosophical framework that attempts to reconcile core debates in the philosophy of social 
sciences, while simultaneously carving out space for a mechanisms focused methodological 
approach outlined later in §3.4 of this chapter. The third subsection (§3.2.3) nuances critical 
realism further by taking into account the specific features of reintegration as a complex 
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phenomenon, previously discussed in §2.1.1, by introducing the emerging philosophy of 
complex realism. It is argued that complex realism goes beyond critical realism to give us a 
specific framework through which to recast certain elements of the methodological 
approach, and will play an important role in the analysis and interpretation in the analysis 
chapter (§4) of this doctoral thesis. 
 
3.2.1 Poles Apart: From Empiricism to Idealism 
 
How is the world and how can we know about it? These vast questions constitute the core 
areas of inquiry in the philosophy of science. How these questions are answered hold 
enormous consequences for the feasibility of social science as an activity and directly shape 
our perspectives on what “good” social science is.  A brief survey of essential divides in the 
philosophy of the social sciences surrounding the question of “how is the world and how can 
we know about it?” is useful here to establish the context in which to understand the later 
discussion of critical realism. Indeed, Collier (1994: 70) points out “No philosophy exists in a 
vacuum; there are always particular opposing philosophies which coexist […] and every 
philosophy engages, implicitly or explicitly, in controversy with its opponents.” Therefore, to 
set the stage for a critical realist understanding of science we will first move forward with a 
brief sketch of the ontological and epistemological perspectives of classical empiricism at 
one pole, and idealism at the other. 
 
Much thought in the modern western history of the philosophy of sciences has been 
concerned with how to establish objective scientific knowledge about the world. As far back 
as, and indeed long before, Descartes’ famous “cogito ergo sum” philosophers have 
grappled with this immense issue. In his deep skepticism of the senses, Descartes concluded 
the only thing he could know objectively was that he existed.  Later, British empiricists like 
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume would take a more moderate position and emphasize the central 
role of observation and measurement as the central means for acquiring objective scientific 
knowledge. The idea of classic empiricism is that with sufficient objective measurements of 
observable phenomena we will be able to deductively reason to produce valid scientific 




Though the classical empiricist model of objective scientific knowledge has proved 
immensely influential over the last centuries, indeed it is the basis of the scientific method 
and positivism more broadly, it is not without problems. If classical empiricism posits that 
the treatment of observations through deductive logic will yield objective knowledge, 
theory, and concepts about the world, then how do we account for different deductive 
understandings from the same set of observations? Bhaskar (2008: 31) illustrates this 
dilemma well by referencing a classic shift in scientific understanding: “For Kepler to see the 
rim of the earth drop away, while Tycho Brahe watches the sun rise, we must suppose that 
there is something that they both see (in different ways).” Acknowledging that we as 
observers “see” in different ways is the crux here.  
 
How do we see in different ways? The knowledge that we already hold shapes how we 
observe and interpret. It is only through the lens of a Copernican theory of the solar system 
that Brathe could observe the sun rising - what we hold as common sense today. 
Observations are seldom objective in any definitive sense.  To be understandable at all 
observations are always embedded in earlier ideas or knowledge. Classical empiricism does 
not conceptualize the role of the observer as a social being and as an interpreter of 
observations within a constructed world of knowledge and ideas.  
 
It is through this sort of criticism that “naïve” empiricism has faced a serious problem in the 
pursuit of objective knowledge. Danermark et al (2002: 17) explain thus: 
 
“If reality cannot be understood by anything but constantly varying forms of pre-
understandings, if our different ways of seeing irretrievably determine what it is 
we see, what then remains of the scientific project? How do we choose between 
competing explanations and decide which one is ‘the best’ or ‘the truest’?”  
 
It is in this context what we can perhaps best understand the emergence of idealist 
perspectives on the philosophy of science. While classical empiricism tried to create a 
framework for scientific knowledge production that sought objectivity through excluding the 
perspectives of the observer, idealism is a philosophy that is the polar opposite – focused 
almost wholly on the subjective nature of scientific knowledge from an observer. In its most 
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distilled forms (e.g. Rorty 1980), idealism posits that our experience of reality itself is purely 
mental or socially constructed. In this world of infinite relativity the search for any objective 
or true knowledge about the real world outside of our minds becomes not only impossible, 
but also meaningless.   
 
However, while it is essential that we acknowledge the role of the observer in the pursuit of 
scientific knowledge, one need not be doomed to the sort of “naïve” idealism that asserts 
that we cannot objectively know about the real world outside of our minds; and perhaps 
even that no objective world exists outside or minds. Marx and Engels (cited in Collier 1994: 
88) poke fun at this notion of a purely socially constructed reality:  
 
“Once upon a time, a valiant fellow had the idea that men were drowned in 
water only because they were possessed with the idea of gravity. If they were to 
knock this notion out of their heads, say by stating it to be a superstition, a 
religious concept, they would be sublimely proof against any danger from 
water.”  
 
Indeed, there is an objective reality independent of our subjective experience of that reality, 
and that it is possible know things about this reality. In the example above, absence of 
socially constructed knowledge about gravity would not stop one from the fate of drowning 
because there is an objective reality. This tension between the aim of producing knowledge 
about the objective world, on the one hand, and acknowledging the inter-subjective nature 
of all such knowledge (as highlighted in the Kepler vs. Brahe example), on the other, has 
been absolutely central in the philosophy of science and is the point of departure for 
understanding the emergence of critical realism. 
 
3.2.2 Critical Realism 
 
The core tension between the scientific project’s ambition of producing objective knowledge 
and the simultaneously inter-subjective nature of all such knowledge has persisted into 
contemporary times. In the 1960’s and 1970’s thinkers such as Popper (2004a [1959] & 
2004b [1963]) and Kuhn (1970) grappled with how to understand the dual nature of 
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scientific knowledge and, more broadly, science as an activity. It was in this period that 
critical realism as a coherent philosophy of science began to emerge in the foundational 
texts of Roy Bhaskar (2008 [1975] & 2015 [1979]). 
 
The term realism has many meanings across scientific disciplines and can be a point of 
confusion, so it is worth clarifying here. In this philosophy of science the term realism refers 
to the ontological position that a real world of consistent laws and structures exists outside 
of our constructed perception of it. In this sense, many forms of classical empiricism 
described above could be classified as realist positions. Where critical realism differs 
compared to other forms of realism, is in a critical evaluation of traditional ontological views 
of what exactly that real objective reality is like.  
 
Bhaskar’s (2008: 43) point of departure was that from his view “classical philosophy asked 
merely what science would have to be like for the knowledge it yielded to be justified” while 
his critical realism “asks explicitly what the world must be like for science to be possible”. 
Bhaskar was critical to the way other realist positions, like classical empiricism, 
conceptualized the real world. Bhaskar argued that by emphasizing the observable 
regularities the real world produced, approaches to science like classical empiricism had 
reduced the real world into what it is possible to observe about it, when in fact Bhaskar 
believed there was quite a bit more to the world than what is observable.  
 
Bhaskar (2008) argued, for example, that when Newton saw the apple fall from the tree and 
formulated the theory of gravitation what Newton observed was not gravity itself, which is 
arguably unobservable, but rather the observable regularity that gravity produces. Through 
an intricate argument, Bhaskar posited that there must be an additional domain to reality – 
there must be a real domain (where the real unobservable causal structures and 
mechanisms of the world exist) and there must be an actual domain (where the actual 
observable regularities produced by the real dimension exist). This division between the real 
and the actual domains of reality is among the key features distinguishing critical realism 




What about the other side of the coin? What about the seemingly unavoidable idea that 
knowledge of the real world is socially constructed, and thus the world as we can observe it 
is inherently inter-subjective? To address this issue Bhaskar suggested a third domain of 
reality, the empirical domain. Returning to the example of Kepler and Brahe from earlier: 
from a critical realist perspective both scientists were interested in discovering the real 
structures and mechanisms of the solar system; and both scientists viewed the same actual 
observable regularity that the structures and mechanisms of the solar system produce. 
Where they differ was in their socially constructed empirical understanding of that the 
actual observable regularity – in turn their understanding of the real unobservable 
structures and mechanisms of the world. In summarizing these distinctions Bhaskar (2008) 
argued that for science as an activity to be coherent we would have to distinguish between 
the intransitive (unchanging: the real and the actual) and the transitive (changing: the 
empirical) dimensions of science.  
 
Disciplines within the field of humanities, which are often primarily concerned with the 
critical or speculative interpretation of meaning, are almost completely focused on transitive 
dimensions of science. The natural sciences traditionally occupy the opposite end of the 
spectrum – almost completely focused on the intransitive dimensions of science, without 
much serious consideration of the empirical domain of constructed interpretation. 
Inferential social science, Comte’s “queen of sciences”, holds the challenging and unenviable 
necessity of engaging in a serious pursuit of the intransitive dimensions of science while 
explicitly situated within the transitive. In this doctoral thesis, we are concerned with 
exploring the real causal processes and mechanisms that drive ex-combatant reintegration. 
To do this we focus on the actual observable regularities of these processes and mechanisms 
should produce. In analyzing the actual in an effort to glean the real we must, though, 
remain ever conscious of the inter-subjective, or constructed, nature of our empirical 
knowledge.  
 
The critical realist ontological division between the real and the actual has some important 
implication for how causality is understood, and in turn what methods may be suited to 
explore causality as such, which will serve as an important contextual backdrop for 
understanding the methodological approach utilized in this doctoral thesis (outlined in §3.4). 
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What is most important to emphasize here is the space that the division between the real 
and the actual opens for the explicit exploration of causal mechanisms, structures, and 
observable outcomes.  
 
The term causal mechanism is a metaphor for the generative causal force that produces 
observable outcomes. For critical realists causal mechanisms exist in the domain of the real 
and are the unobservable causal forces (e.g. gravity) that produce observable outcomes in 
the domain of the actual (e.g. Newton’s apple falling from the tree). For critical realists: “… it 
is the business of science to establish the connections between the empirical, the actual and 
the real; to observe and identify the effect of underlying generative mechanisms” 
(Danermark et al 2002: 43). We will return to the term mechanisms throughout this chapter 
to add further nuance and analytical clarity (see especially §3.4.1). For now, we will move 
forward to contextualize causal mechanisms in a broader critical realist framework. 
 
For critical realists the term structures refer to the nature of an object of science. Based on 
its structures an object has certain powers. Structures and powers exist in the real domain, 
though they have observable effects in the actual domain. Danermark et al (2002) offer an 
example – based on its chemical makeup (real structures) water can quench a fire (real 
power) regardless of whether or not it is used to do so (actual observable instance).  
However, structures and powers themselves do not cause outcomes, but rather condition 
the range of possible effects of their application.  
 
For critical realists, when the properties (structures and powers) of an object combine with 
contextual factors (e.g. someone throwing the water on the fire), they activate a causal 
mechanism to produce an observable outcome.  Further, just as the activation of causal 
mechanisms is a combination of the structures/powers of an object and conditioning 
contextual factors, the outcome of a mechanism, when it is indeed triggered, is itself 
conditioned by contextual elements (e.g. the fire being sufficiently small to be quenched). 
That is, even when context allows the powers of an object to activate a mechanism, the 
outcome is also contingent or context dependent. In this way we can say that objects have 
tendencies – they tend to act (or cause) in a certain way. Danermark et al (2002:56) make 




“Taken together this – that objects have powers whether exercised or not, 
mechanisms exist whether triggered or not and the effects of the mechanisms 
are contingent – means we can say that a certain object tends to act or behave 
in a certain way. Whether it will actually act or behave in this way, however, is a 
completely different matter.”  
 
We argue in §4.2 of the analysis chapter of this doctoral thesis that in reintegration factors 
such as age, gender, and disability take on role of structures that condition the way ex-
combatants tend to interact with the causal mechanisms that underlie the processes of 
reintegration. While we will leave the concept of tendencies for now, we’ll return to it to add 
further nuance and analytical clarity in the discussion of trajectories in the following 
subsection on complex realism (§3.2.3).  
 
If at its heart science is all about getting at the causal mechanisms that exist in the 
unobservable domain of the real, as critical realists assert, which is separate from the 
observable effects they produce in the observable domain of the actual, then there are 
immediate epistemological/methodological implications for the social sciences. Essentially, 
methods based on notions of classical empiricism, especially correlational statistics, 
implicitly assume that if there is no correlation between observable regularities, there is no 
causal connection (Mahoney 2001). Further, such methods assume the more frequent this 
regularity is, the stronger the evidence for causation. Sayer (2000: 14) contrasts the critical 
realist perspective: 
 
“… causation is not understood on the model of regular successions of events, 
and hence explanation need not depend on finding them, or searching for 
putative social laws. The conventional impulse to prove causation by gathering 
data on regularities, repeated occurrences, is therefore misguided; at best 
these might suggest where to look for candidates for causal mechanisms. What 
causes something to happen has nothing to do with the number of times we 
have observed it happening. Explanation depends instead on identifying causal 




Adopting a critical realist perspective entails an adjustment of ontological, epistemological, 
and in turn methodological commitments - these adjustments result in a shift in the overall 
mode of knowledge production in science. George & Bennet (2005) argue that the mode of 
knowledge production in a classical empiricist model of science can be called a deductive 
nomological model (that from observation we should be able to deduce general laws 
through a loop of observation, deduction, hypothesis, test, repeat). However, the critical 
realist mode of knowledge production evolves what can be called a middle range theory, 
demi-theory, or mechanisms focused model of science. In this model of science, we produce 
knowledge through a tighter, and non-linear, iterative loop of inductive and deductive 
reasoning. From observation we iteratively reason through inductive and deductive methods 
about the possible causal mechanisms at work in our causal inquiry, the logical observable 
implications of such mechanisms, and in turn the feasibility of such mechanisms existing, and 
the conditions in which they would operate. The products of this process are not the 
universal laws that classical empiricism seeks, but smaller context specific blocks of theory 
(mechanisms). Bhaskar (2008: 39) gives an instructive analogy in saying that from the 
perspective of critical realism:  
 
“Much scientific research has in fact the same logical character as detection. In 
a piece of criminal detection, the detective knows that a crime has been 
committed and some facts about it but he does not know, or at least cannot yet 
prove, the identity of the criminal.”  
 
Much to the like, if there is a real world of structures and mechanisms that cause processes 
of ex-combatant reintegration, then our understanding of those forces is an unfolding 
detective process. The theoretical perspectives offered in the conceptual approach chapter 
(§2) of this doctoral thesis are but clues to the possible mechanisms involved in ex-
combatant reintegration in the GLR (a constructed empirical domain), and the detailed data 
presentation the annexes (§6-7) is but a search for the observable implications of such 
possible mechanisms (actual domain). Thus, the elaboration of some of the mechanisms and 
processes (real domain) of ex-combatant reintegration in the GLR in the analysis chapter (§4) 




Before moving on to a more explicit discussion of the of the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset 
as an empirical domain construction (§3.3), and the approach used in this doctoral thesis for 
reframing it within a case study framework (creating space for an iterative dialogue between 
the actual and the empirical, about the real) (§3.4), we must consider some of the meta-
theoretical consequences of approaching ex-combatant reintegration as a complex 
phenomenon (see §2.1.1).   
 
3.2.3 Complex Realism 
 
As outlined in §2.1.1, reintegration can be thought of as a complex phenomenon that above 
all else is characterized by emergence – i.e. that reintegration occurs as an interactive effect 
of large number of interrelated causes, and cannot be reduced to the sum of their individual 
effects. Taking the complexity of reintegration seriously requires us to nuance certain meta-
theoretical ideas within the critical realist paradigm. In doing so we will outline the fledgling 
philosophy of science called complex realism. Complex realism takes critical realism as a 
starting point but adds the ontological position that the real world is constructed of complex 
systems. Taking this ontological stand raises many questions for the form of scientific inquiry 
within the complex realist paradigm - these include: what is a case? What are variables? 
What are causes and effects? Complex realism’s answers to these questions have 
considerable methodological consequences for the comparative case-study research 
strategy outlined in §3.3 of this chapter, and in turn interpretive consequences for the 
analysis chapter (§4). 
 
Concerning cases, we can start with George & Bennet’s (2005: 17) broad definition of “…a 
case as an instance of a class of events.” Likewise, Gerring (2007: 211) gives a definition of a 
case as “A spatially and temporally delimited phenomenon observed at a single point in time 
or over some period of time…” Within these definitions, though, there is nuance to be made. 
For complex realists cases are much more than this, they are the complex systems (See e.g. 
Reed & Harvey (1992); Cilliers (2001); Byrne & Uprichard (2012)). With this in mind, an 
extension of the definition of case is useful. Ragin (1987, 2000, 2008) suggests that indeed 
cases are an instance of a class of event or phenomena, but that what makes them that class 
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or kind of case is that they are constituted by a specific configuration, or specific range of 
configurations, of characteristics. It is the configurational nature of a case that makes it 
analogous to a complex system. Complex realists build on this to assert that the 
characteristics that constitute a case/system are interconnected and interdependent; they 
simultaneously constitute the case, yet are themselves a product of that case/system. All the 
elements that constitute a case can themselves be complex systems and, likewise, can 
overlap with or be nested within other systems.  This idea of nestedness will become clearer 
as we move along, but for now the main point is that for complex realists the real world of 
causal structures and mechanisms is one inherently endowed with the features of 
complexity. 
 
This reframing of the case as a complex system creates some treacherous ontological 
terrain. While it might not be immediately apparent, from a critical realist perspective the 
broad definitions of a case from Gerring (2007) or George & Bennet (2005) which define 
cases as observable instances of events subtly cast the case as existing in the ontological 
domain of the empirical. The observable regularities that are used to constitute one case 
could be used to constitute other different cases. In this sense there is nothing real about 
the case. Thus, the case appears to be an empirical domain construct. The position of 
complex realists suggests, alternatively, that there is indeed something real about a case, but 
that it is simultaneously an empirical construction. Cilliers (2001: 141) grapples with this 
point:   
 
“Boundaries [of systems / cases] are simultaneously a function of the activity of 
the system itself [real domain], and a product of the strategy of description 
involved [actual domain]. In other worlds, we frame the system by describing it 
in a certain way (for a certain purpose) but we are constrained in where the 
frame can be drawn. The boundary of the system is therefore neither a function 
of our description [actual domain], nor is it a purely natural thing [real domain].” 
(Brackets added) 
 
Addressing this ontological quagmire is perhaps best approached through an explanation of 
complex realist’s understanding of variables. If we take cases to be complex systems, then 
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how do we understand variables? From the complex realist perspective the traditional use of 
variables as being either a cause, effect, intervening, or etc. unknowingly compresses the 
domains of the actual and empirical into one. There is a division to be made between the 
empirical domain construct of a variable, what complex realists call a parameter, and the 
actual domain observable regularity that we measure within that parameter, what complex 
realists call ‘system traces’. We cannot apply all parameters to all cases (e.g. where there is 
no trace to observe), thus our empirical domain parameters, as Cilliars points out in the text 
quoted above, are bounded by the actual domain system traces (and the real domain that 
they imply).  
 
Thus, actual domain system traces cannot be seen as only a cause or effect, those are 
empirical domain distinctions. Actual domain system traces are simultaneously causing and 
caused. The parameters (empirical domain) we explore become constructed descriptors 
constituting the case/system. In a sense, complex realists attempt to strip some of the 
constructed interpretations of variables as cause or effect in the empirical domain and shift 
emphasis to describing the actual domain of observable system traces. From this 
perspective, causal inquiry takes on a distinct shape. Causal explanations become about 
describing the “space” and “state” of a system/case, as constituted by system parameters 
and traces respectively, and attempting to account for the trajectory (change or continuity) 
of that system/case over time – including hypothesizing the causal mechanisms that underlie 
those trajectories (Byrne & Uprichard 2012).  
 
The concept of trajectories is key in understanding the complex realist mode of scientific 
inquiry and plays a central role in the analysis presented in §4 of this doctoral thesis. The 
idea of trajectory is an embodiment of the complex realist reframing of the meaning of 
cause and effect. In a traditional critical realist perspective, we might say that cause x, 
through a mechanism, produced the effect of y. In a complex realist perspective where 
system traces describe the state of a case/system, effects become the trajectory of that 
entire system over time. Byrne (2011: 32) makes this point succinctly: “In this way of 
thinking measurement is a way of describing the position of a system in its possible state 
space at any time point and repeated measurement is an account of the trajectory of the 
system”. Trajectories are analogous to Bhaskar’s (2008) notion of causal “tendencies” 
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(§3.2.2) and to Popper’s (1990) idea of “propensities”. Trajectories emerge from the ways in 
which systems tend to, or have the propensity to, act. 
 
Before moving on it is important to take a moment to clarify the concepts of system state 
and system space, and the distinctions between them, for they carry deep epistemological 
implications. Because these terms have their origins in pure mathematics, they can be 
challenging to translate to the social sciences. System space is the space in which all possible 
states of a system are represented. Another way to phrase this is as the ‘range of the 
possible’. If we have three parameters that we are using to constitute a case/system, then 
the system space is a three dimensional space. This is easy to visualize. The system state is 
the area within the system space where observable system traces actually occur – clustering 
around metaphorical “attractors”. This all gets exponentially more difficult to visualize as the 
number of parameters we explore grows. When we are dealing with a hundred parameters, 
we are dealing with a hundred dimensional space. The concepts system space and state 
have implications for the complex realist account of variation. In almost all of the natural and 
social sciences variation is understood as the effect of causal forces. For complex realists 
variation is inherent to cases/systems. Variation is bounded within the system space and 
occurs around certain attractors in this space. Where these attractors are in the system 
space and the observable variation in the system traces that occurs around them is the 
system state. The relationship between system space and system state can be thought of as 
analogous to that between a truth table (system space) in Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(QCA)(Ragin 2000, 2008), and the total of the cells in the truth table filled with actual 
empirical instances (system state). 
 
If variation does not serve as an account for the effects of causal forces, but rather inherent 
to any system state, then what are effects? This leads us back to trajectories. For complex 
realists, effects are the trajectory of the system state over time. This could be a trajectory of 
continuity in the system state, where the system traces vary around a consistent attractor(s) 
within the system space. It is important to nuance that in the complex realist perspective, 
continuity in system state is not equivalent to a static state. In trajectories of continuity 
system states vary to a degree, but this variation is bounded and the system remains in 
fundamentally the same state even though it may “jiggle” some (similar to the idea of 
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bounded change in the concept of path dependence). The dynamics of continuity are an 
important area of inquiry; however, what we are often most interested by in the social 
sciences is explaining change. For complex realists, change in a system state is characterized 
by the movement of system traces from one area, around on attractor, of the system space 
to another. In the language of complexity this is called a phase shift - a change in the 
fundamental type or kind of system state (similar to the idea of dramatic change in the 
concept of punctuated equilibria / critical junctures). One way to phrase these two modes of 
change succinctly is as the difference between morphosis (the continuity in the form of a 
state) and metamorphosis (the change in type state itself) (Byrne & Callaghan 2014).  
 
Two points related to system space and system states need brief mentioning. First, systems, 
especially systems of social phenomena, rarely exist in isolation, but rather interact with 
other systems overlapping in their system space. We can say that systems can be nested 
within each other, but we cannot take along the assumption of a hierarchical line of 
causation that this often carries (Byrne & Callaghan 2014). Systems can overlap or be nested 
within one another (Harvey 2001: 165 calls them “loosely nested” or “interpenetrating”), but 
their effects on each other are a dynamic and multidirectional causation. Second, it is 
important to add that there can be multiple attractors in a system space. This has two 
important results. First, we can account for an even larger amount of variation within a 
system by identifying multiple attractors which system traces occur around (this is 
essentially what taxonomical methods like cluster analysis do).  Second, accepting multiple 
attractors in a system space creates room for explaining both equifinality (same outcome 
from different causes) & multifinality (different outcomes from same causes) in the 
trajectories of a system state change (phase shift). Traces can move from multiple attractors 
to one (equifinality), or from one attractor to multiple alternative attractors (multifinality).  
 
The discussion so far has been very abstract, so perhaps we can clarify by grounding these 
concepts in the inquiry at hand. In this doctoral thesis we want to account for two types of 
causal pathways (two sides of a coin). First, we want to account for those causal pathways 
those through which ex-combatants stay in one part of the system space (around one 
attractor) though time, and community members stay in another (i.e. trajectory of continuity 
– non-reintegration). Second, and more centrally, we want to account for those causal 
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pathways through which ex-combatants and community members shift from their respective 
parts of the system space (respective attractors) to occupy the same part of the system 
space (shared attractor). That is, we want to account for what causes a trajectory of change 
in type – a metamorphosis in which ex-combatants and community members become the 
same thing. However, as we will see in §4.3 of the analysis chapter, merely occupying the 
same part of the system space appears insufficient to denote reintegration, it also needs to 
be the right part of the system space.  Another way to say this is that conceptualizing 
reintegration as civilianization, as in §2.1.2, or operationalizing civilianization as parity across 
social and economic indicators, as in §3.3.2.1, can prove paradoxical.  
 
There are two parts to our ambitious analytical task. First, in §4.2 of the analysis chapter we 
need to account for the causal pathways (mechanisms) that produce the individual 
trajectories of ex-combatants and community members as two separate kinds of cases (class 
of events or phenomena). Essentially, we treat ex-combatants and community members, 
respectively, in each country case as their own complex system (e.g. the case/system of ex-
combatants in DRC and the separate case/system of community members in DRC, nested 
within the broader country system. In this way the systems of ex-combatants and 
community members as groups are sub-systems that together constitute, and are nested 
within, the super-system of the country case. The ex-combatant and community member 
sub-systems have their own state, traces, and trajectories. However, while the ex-combatant 
and community member group sub-systems have some unique parameters (see §6), the vast 
majority of their system space is overlapping - constituted by the same parameters as each 
other and as the country case super-system. In this way the sub-systems are nested in the 
super-system – they exist in the same system space, the same range of the possible (mostly), 
and have a dynamic causal relationship (as opposed to hierarchical or linear) at a sub-system 
to sub-system level as well as a sub-system to super-system (and vice versa). This is the task 
that we take on in §4.2 of the analysis chapter. 
 
If we have an understanding of the causal processes and mechanisms which drive the 
trajectories of ex-combatant and community member sub-systems respectively, then we can 
take on the second task, in §4.3 of the analysis chapter, of understanding what sorts of meta 
processes and mechanisms (sometimes phrased as second order mechanisms) drive ex-
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combatant and community member sub-systems in trajectories towards the same system 
space (around the same attractor) in the country level super-system. In this way, the 
respective trajectories of ex-combatant and community member sub-systems become 
parameters themselves for the system state of the country level super-system. It is through 
the comparison of the respective trajectories of ex-combatant and community member sub-
systems, within and across super-systems of the five GLR countries, that we iteratively trace 
the narrative of reintegration and attempt to identify key causal mechanisms in social and 
economic dimensions of reintegration at the individual and country levels. As outlined in in 
§3.4, we use a comparative case study approach utilizing process tracing as a key method to 
pursue these ends. 
 
We have not yet addressed one essential topic directly – namely, what is a cause in the 
complex realist paradigm? For complex realists causation is understood as dynamic and 
combinational, i.e. there is no one determinate variable but rather causation is a result of 
the complex interaction of many parameters in a system / case. However, not all parameters 
are equal. Certain parameters or, more likely, the interaction of certain groups of 
parameters may collectively act as ‘control parameters’ that determine the system state and 
trajectory. Byrne & Callaghan (2014: 190) explain control parameters as: 
 
“... the causal set which is less than the whole assemblage constituting any given 
complex social system, but which includes elements, which may themselves be 
complex, which in interaction with each other determine the state of the system. 
Note that changes in the state of the system, phase shift effects, may be, and 
generally are, not the products of changes in the value (however measured) of 
any control parameter but of interacting changes in the components of the 
control parameter set.”  
 
Another way to phrase this is that control parameters are the key parameters in the system 
space that define the fundamental shape of the system state and its possible trajectory over 
time. If there are control parameters that dynamically interact to define the fundamental 
state of the system (the type or kind), then these control parameters are themselves made 
up of configurations of dynamically interacting sub-parameters (which may not be exclusive 
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to a single control parameter). The configurational nature of control parameters as causes 
makes them describable within the language of necessary and sufficient conditions (see e.g. 
Ragin 1987, 2000, 2008). We can think of control parameters as necessary but insufficient 
conditions for the system state. No single control parameter, but rather their combinational 
interaction, is what defines the system state. The control parameters are themselves made 
of sets of sub-parameters that are necessary but not sufficient for the existence of the over-
arching control parameter. 
 
If control parameters are key in shaping the system state, then they are also key to 
understanding the emergent trajectory of that system state over time. The way we can think 
of control parameters as analogous to Bourdieu’s (1990, 1993, 1998) concept of “structuring 
structures” – that is, those structures that generate and organize the system state (in 
Bourdieu’s work the social world) and its “disposition” (i.e. trajectory) over time. Again, this 
fits very neatly with Bhaskar’s (2008) idea of conditioning causal factors that shape the 
“tendencies” of an object (in our case a system) and, perhaps even more so, with Popper’s 
(1990: 18) idea of “propensities” as “… weighted possibilities which are more than mere 
possibilities, but tendencies of propensities to become real” rings clear here too. For 
complex realists accounting for the trajectories of systems, both continuity and change, 
involves identifying control parameters (including the sub-parameters that comprise them) 
and the mechanisms through which they interact to produce a system state and the 
emergent trajectory of that system state over time. 
 
Again, it can be useful to clarify these concepts through grounding them in the doctoral 
thesis at hand. Byrne & Callaghan (2014) argue that in the social world demography is always 
a part, but never the whole, of the set of control parameters in a system. Indeed, in this 
research the each individual ex-combatant’s demographic characteristics (e.g. age, sex, 
disability status; literacy, education, & vocational skills; and civil status) are control 
parameters, or “structuring structures”, that conditions their position in the overall 
individual-level system. Other control parameters used to explore trajectories of ex-
combatant reintegration include mobilization and wartime experiences; housing, land, 
livestock, & food security; DDR experiences; economic issues; and social capital. Each of 
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these control parameters is comprised by the interaction of various parameters – which 
themselves can be thought of as sub-control parameters.  
 
For example, in this doctoral thesis an ex-combatants’ trace within the control parameter of 
social capital is conceptualized as the product of the complex interaction of the extent of 
their social networks and levels of sociability, feelings of trust and solidarity in the 
community, feelings of social cohesion and inclusion in the community, as well as 
perceptions of empowerment and the possibility for social change. Each of these sub-control 
parameters themselves are the dynamic product of a range of parameters (which may not 
be exclusive to a given sub-control parameter). Control parameters, sub-control parameters, 
and parameters all dynamically interact through causal mechanisms to produce the system 
state of an individual ex-combatant, which is in turn their trace in the system state of all ex-
combatants in a country case. 
 
How then to identify control parameters and, more importantly, the causal mechanisms 
through which they interact to produce system states and trajectories? This leads us to 
comparison. It is through comparison of the trajectories – not of any one parameter but of 
the entire narrative of their relationships to each other - of the system states of the five GLR 
countries, trajectories of both continuity and change, which we will attempt to glean the 
underlying causal mechanisms that interact to produce individual and country level 
reintegration processes. Comparison has had a long and central role in the social sciences. 
Mill’s (1843) methods of agreement and difference are early examples of formal thought on 
how to approach comparison. However, today the vast majority of the social, and natural, 
science conceive comparison within the bounds of correlational statistics. Indeed, measures 
of central tendency (i.e. sameness) and variation (i.e. differentness) are essentially 
comparing the degrees of presence or absence of variables across a population. Today the 
works of Ragin (1987, 2000, 2008) continue to develop formalized methods of comparison in 
the form of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). Regardless of the specific method, 
comparison is the key analytical pathway. MacIver (1942: 27) makes the astute point that: 
“… the search for causes is directed to the differences between things… underneath all our 





It would be tempting to assume that because our primary data source is in the form of large 
quantitative datasets with millions of data points, the natural approach to comparing the 
five GLR countries should be based in statistical inference. However, the linear additive 
epistemology of such statistical approaches, rooted in empiricism / positivism, is at direct 
odds with the complex realist ontology we have outlines out here. Since the state and 
trajectory of a system is seen as more than merely the sum of the system parameters, but as 
an emergent product of the whole of the dynamic interactions of its parts, in contrast to the 
product of one or a few determinate variables. No variable oriented statistical approach can 
approximate the inner workings of such a system as a whole. What is required is the 
enormous investment intellectual of labor, as Freedman (2010) put it, “shoe leather”. It is 
through the iterative toil of comparing the trajectories of ex-combatants, sub-groups within 
ex-combatants, community members, sub-groups within community members, and all these 
within and across the five GLR countries that we can begin to reason about the broader 
narratives of reintegration - the processes that occur and the multiple orders of mechanisms 
that underlie them. Though the primary mode of inquiry is retroductive (describing and 
analyzing  ex-combatant reintegration processes in the GLR to reconstruct the basic 
conditions for them to be what they are), it is not exclusively so - there are elements of 
deductive, inductive, and abductive reasoning (reinterpreting ex-combatant reintegration 
processes in the GLR within alternative conceptual frameworks to understand them in new 
ways) throughout that steer a broader retrodictive effort (using retroductive knowledge 
about how ex-combatant reintegration processes in the GLR came to be as they are, to 
understand that might happen in the future and possibilities for intervention through 
informed purposive action – i.e. reintegration programming). 
 
To these ends, in §3.4 we outline the research strategy used in this doctoral thesis as a 
comparative case study approach that utilizes process tracing as a central tool of inference 
(e.g. George & Bennet 2005, Gerring 2007, Rohlfing 2012, Bennet & Checkel 2015) – though 
with certain elements reframed within the critical and complex realist paradigms described 
here. However, before moving on to describe the research strategy it is essential to first 
consider the nature of the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset. To put it plainly – in the critical 
and complex realist paradigms data is never neutral, it is always constructed. The act of 
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measurement (data construction) is “… a process of interpretation, no less than the 
processes of interpretation which underpin qualitative research practice” (Byrne 2011: 31). 
In the terms of critical realism, we must understand the empirical paradigm through which 
the GLR data was produced in order to understand the possible implications for our 
abductive reframing of that data within the complex realist paradigm.  
 
 
3.3 The Origins of the TDRP GLR Reintegration Dataset 
 
Based on the meta-theoretical discussion outlined in §3.1, this section moves forward with 
the premise that due to the critical realist distinction between the real causal structures and 
mechanisms of the social universe, the actual observable regularities that these structures 
and mechanisms produce, and our socially constructed empirical understandings of these 
observations, then the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset, itself a constructed empirical 
domain representation of reality, utilized in this research may carry with it certain inbuilt 
positionalities.  
 
The TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset exist somewhere between the domains of the actual 
and the empirical. Though the data is a view of actual observable events (traces of the 
system state), the data’s form, scope, and mode of collection (constructed parameters) 
represent the implicit effects of a socially constructed empirical domain of science. 
Therefore, the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset cannot be thought of as inherently neutral 
or unbiased. This section aims to explicate the inbuilt positionalities in the TDRP-GLR 
Reintegration Dataset and the possible consequences they may carry for the methodological 
approach of reframing of dataset in a comparative case study framework in §3.4 of this 
chapter, as well as the analysis in §4 of this doctoral thesis. 
 
This section of the methodological approach chapter proceeds in two subsections. In the 
first subsection (§3.3.1), to understand the empirical paradigm in through which the GLR 
reintegration datasets were produced, the field of monitoring and evaluation is introduced 
as a form of applied social science within a broader political shift towards evidence based 
policy. Specific consequences of complexity in social policy problems are also considered. In 
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the second subsection (§3.3.2), the specific approach utilized by the TDRP to build the GLR 
reintegration dataset through the monitoring and evaluation of reintegration programming 
are outlined in an effort to reveal the overall epistemological positionalities of the TDRP-GLR 
Reintegration Dataset. 
 
3.3.1 Applied Social Science, Evidence Based Policy, and Monitoring & Evaluation  
 
What is applied social science? The distinction between the Attic Greek terms of episteme 
and techne is perhaps an illustrative place to begin. Episteme, the root of the word 
epistemology, refers to abstract theoretical knowledge. That is, knowledge that is 
transfactual – separated from a specific context. Much of what we endeavor to produce in 
the social sciences falls into that category of episteme. Techne, the root of the word 
technology, on the other hand refers to context specific knowledge that is to be applied 
without abstract reasoning. In highlighting this distinction Byrne (2011) gives the example of 
the distinction between the mason and the architect. The mason holds deep contextual 
knowledge about materials and structures, but without a grounding in abstract ideas or 
calculations about the properties of such materials – techne. The architect, in contrast, may 
not be able to work stone, but holds profound abstract knowledge of engineering. Together 
these two forms of knowledge come together under praxis, which Freire (1972: 28) 
succinctly defined as “reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it”. Praxis is 
the essence of applied social science. 
 
With these three terms in mind we can reflect on the nature of DDR programming as an act 
of praxis, an application of abstract and technical knowledge of the world in order to change 
it.  One could argue, and indeed we have in §1.3, that in the field of DDR, and specifically in 
reintegration programming, there is an abundance of knowledge in the form of techne, but 
at the same time a relative dearth of knowledge in the form of episteme. We know quite a 
lot about how to implement reintegration programming (techne), but how much do we 
really know about the abstract, and complex, phenomena of reintegration that we are trying 
to affect (episteme)? To explore this argument we will examine that nature of our primary 
source of knowledge, both techne and episteme, about reintegration – that is, the 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of reintegration programming. Loosely speaking, we can 
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say that monitoring is primarily concerned with the production of techne, and thus is mostly 
focused on the monitoring the implementation stage of a reintegration program. The 
evaluation side M&E includes more specific space for establishing episteme, and is primarily 
focused on the impact (i.e. effects) of reintegration programming. The evaluation side of 
M&E is our primary area of interest in following discussion. Together, the emerging techne 
and episteme should form the basis of praxis in reintegration programming.  
 
In order to understand the nature, and prevalence, of M&E it is useful to contextualize it in 
the broader political shift in the last half century towards evidence-based policy. Evidence 
based policy is “… the rational development of policies on the basis of evidence…” (Byrne 
2011: 5). Byrne (2011), Pawson (2006), and Solesbury (2001), while all writing primarily in 
the context of public policy in the UK, argue that evidence based policy has seen increased 
prevalence due to a broader pragmatic or anti-ideological turn in modern politics. This shift 
is certainly present in reintegration programming carried out in the UN and World Bank 
systems (UN 2015). Both the UNDP and the World Bank are almost completely dependent 
on donor contributions to fund their reintegration activities. With the emerging 
understanding among donor countries, especially since the early 1990’s, that not all aid is 
good aid (see e.g. Moyo 2009 or Tvedt 1998), M&E has become an essential tool through 
which international organizations like the UNDP and World Bank can establish a level of 
accountability internally, and to their donors externally. At the same time M&E is a powerful 
tool that can legitimate and justify reintegration policy and activities on the basis of 
‘scientific’ evidence.  
 
If reintegration programming is to proceed on the basis of evidence, then perhaps the 
natural question to follow, at least from the perspective of a social scientist, is: which 
evidence and from what perspectives? In light of the meta-theoretical paradigm outlined in 
§3.2, we are staunch in our support of Bhaskar’s (2008: 21) idea that “the social sciences 
deal with a pre-interpreted reality, a reality already brought under concepts by social actors, 
that is, a reality already brought under the same kind of material in terms of which it is to be 
grasped”. Empirical evidence is a socially constructed understanding of an underlying reality. 
The empirical paradigm though which we view this reality, and indeed the methods that are 
understood as appropriate for viewing this reality, will temper where we look for evidence 
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and what we see when we observe it. In this way the meta-theoretical and empirical (in the 
critical realist sense) underpinnings of reintegration programming impact evaluations can 
have profound implication on the knowledge (episteme) produced – in turn, at least 
theoretically, a profound impact on the act of reintegration programming (praxis). Will we 
see the edge of the earth fall away, or will we see the sun rise?  
 
The answer to the question of which evidence and what perspectives will underlie M&E may, 
somewhat paradoxically, end up depending on the political landscape. Evidence can shape 
reintegration policy, but the constructed nature of evidence from M&E means that 
reintegration policy can also play a pivotal role in shaping the construction of that evidence. 
Byrne (2011: 5) calls this policy based evidence (in contrast to evidence based policy); “… the 
selective use of research findings to assert that policies have worked, continue to work, and 
will work in the future.” In its most problematic forms policy based evidence can involve the 
construction data and selection of evidence to legitimate a certain action or position – to 
create a self-serving discourse of evidence. This is more subtle than a plain manipulation of 
scientific findings, it is the total of a set of decision around the concepts and methods 
through which to investigate a phenomena. One example of this is the cigarette industry’s 
selective construction of and interpretation of scientific evidence surrounding the health 
effects of smoking in a way that serves their political and economic interests.  
 
Almost always though, policy-based evidence is of a less malevolent variety – less a product 
of deliberate steering of evidence construction and interpretation and more an indirect 
response to a set of implicit incentives and commitments. For example, the UN and World 
Bank are both committed to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and are mandated 
to conceptualize some elements of ex-combatant reintegration within this framework. This 
is not to point out that the MDGs are somehow inherently problematic, but rather that the 
idea that they should a priori serve as a lens for understanding the phenomena of 
reintegration is a political decision that affects how we construct and interpret evidence 
about reintegration through M&E.  
 
All scientific inquiry makes decisions surrounding the construction and interpretation of 
evidence. Exposing this truth is the whole point of the critical realist distinction between the 
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real, actual, and empirical domains. In this way all science is reflexive, or self-referential. 
However, applied social science, which includes M&E, can be indirectly steered by the 
powerful interests of the political organizations executing, or more often contracting, such 
social scientific evaluations – and in this sense there may exist an extra layer of reflexivity. 
Booth (1988), in a step very much in line with the thinking of Foucault (1980), suggests that 
due to this sort of double reflexivity, government statistics can sometimes tell us more about 
the needs, administrative routines, and operation of government than about the condition 
of society itself. Indeed, Byrne (2011: 16) warns that in our critical evaluation of applied 
social science, we must always consider “… the degree to which he who pays the piper calls 
the tune”. 
  
Keeping in mind our previous discussion of complex realism in §3.2.3, we can think of the 
political environments in which reintegration M&E take place themselves as complex 
systems. This is very much in line with Rittel & Weber’s (1973) discussion of “wicked” vs. 
“tame” policy problems – i.e. complex vs. non-complex. Complex political environments 
shape the way M&E is designed and carried out and, in turn, the knowledge produced about 
the complex system of reintegration. Thus, any attempt to produce knowledge about what 
has generated change in the complex system of reintegration must be founded on a clear 
understanding of the implications of the ontological specifications for the construction of 
meaningful knowledge derived from the complex political environment from which the 
knowledge of reintegration itself is produced – i.e. the positionality of such knowledge. In 
the next subsection explores the construction of the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset in 
practical terms as well as the political landscape of which it is a product of, in a twofold 
attempt to glean the paradigm of data construction and analysis built into the data.  
 
3.3.2 The TDRP Approach to Monitoring & Evaluation in the GLR 
  
In outlining the TDRP approach to monitoring & evaluation in the GLR there are two 
important components to consider. Firstly (§3.3.2.1), it is essential to understand key 
features of the overarching political landscape of reintegration programming that shape the 
TDRP’s approach M&E. This political landscape then, secondly (§3.3.2.2), provides the 
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context for us to outline the more technical structure of the M&E of reintegration 
programming in the GLR, and the construction of the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset. 
 
3.3.2.1 The Political Landscape of Reintegration M&E 
 
There are three overarching factors to the political landscape of reintegration programming, 
and broader institutional structures it exists within, that have played a decisive role in 
shaping the TDRP’s approach to the monitoring and evaluation of reintegration in the GLR. 
First, at some level or another the TDRP has partnered with the UN and UN agencies in their 
reintegration programming related activities – including M&E. In the GLR the UN has been 
the key institution through which DDR programming has been planned and implemented. As 
such, the UN provides the larger framework though which reintegration programming is 
approached in the GLR – today, most notably through the IDDRS. In this regard, the TDRP’s 
cooperation with the UN is not only unavoidable, but also essential. The TDRP’s role in 
reintegration programming in the GLR has been threefold: as a funding conduit, a technical 
advisor, and as responsible for M&E. These three roles are inherently executed within the 
broader framework of the core mandates of the UN charter. As such, various components of 
the TDRP’s approach to M&E are conceptualized to correspond to the broader UN 
framework. For example, the UN convention on the rights of the child and security council 
resolution 1325 on women peace and security, themselves both political processes external 
to ex-combatant reintegration, play an influential role in the way age and gender are 
conceptualized as factors in ex-combatant reintegration – in turn the forms of evidence 
constructed and knowledge produced through M&E about the role age and gender in 
reintegration.  
 
In making this point we are by no means attempting to assert that the influence of ex-
combatant age or gender are not important dimensions to ex-combatant reintegration, 
rather that the specific ontological and epistemological formulation the role of age and 
gender in reintegration M&E are influenced by a broader set of political processes external 
to reintegration programming itself. The extent of these external political influences is not 
limited to age and gender, but are evident in all components of reintegration M&E – 
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including key dimensions of this doctoral thesis i.e. social identity, social capital and 
sustainable livelihoods.  
 
A second factor in the political landscape that drives the TDRP’s approach to M&E in the GLR 
is accountability to donors. Reintegration programming, including M&E, are funded almost 
entirely through donor country contributions in the form of official development assistance 
(ODA). ODA is itself is defined by the OECD in a broader political process completely separate 
from reintegration programming. Nonetheless, OECD’s definition of what counts as ODA 
plays a role in defining what reintegration programming can include and still “count” as ODA. 
Considering that many reintegration programs can run expenses up into the hundreds of 
millions of dollars there is considerable pressure from donors countries on actors such as 
TDRP and UNDP to show not only that funds have been used appropriately, but also that 
they have generated the desired impact of reintegration. The role of this political pressure 
cannot be understated. The mode of inquiry in the M&E of reintegration programming is 
geared almost wholly towards proving the extent of programming impact – as opposed to 
understanding the processes and underlying mechanisms that drive ex-combatant 
reintegration.  
 
Somewhat paradoxically, the political demand for knowledge that proves programming 
impact has often supplanted knowledge of the very processes and mechanisms that such 
reintegration programming means to impact. Another way to say this is that there is an 
inbuilt incentive in reintegration M&E to constructed evidence and knowledge based on 
correlations between reintegration programming efforts and ex-combatants’ position across 
a number of social and economic indicators. This, as opposed to evidence and knowledge 
about the underlying causal process and mechanisms that drive ex-combatant reintegration 
independent of reintegration programming. Again, the point here is not to dismiss all 
evidence produced through M&E as useless for understanding the processes and 
mechanisms of reintegration – to the contrary, this doctoral thesis is based on the idea that 
there is enormous value in this evidence. Rather the essential idea here is to acknowledge 
the influence that such political demands have for the forms of evidence constructed and 




Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly for this research, the TDRP is a component in the 
larger institution of the World Bank and as such is subject to the broader institutional 
incentives of the World Bank. One could ask why the World Bank is involved in the 
reintegration of ex-combatants at all. After all, the World Bank is, among other things, in the 
business of giving loans, albeit with particularly low interest rates, to countries in need of 
development assistance. However, after periods of war or protracted violence it is essential 
the World Bank see a given country as relatively stable before issuing blanket development 
assistance in the form of a loan. The reintegration of ex-combatants is seen as a key 
component of post-conflict stabilization. Thus, targeted development assistance to ex-
combatants in the form of reintegration programming is seen as an important step towards 
the stabilization of the post-conflict environment. This dynamic of targeted assistance 
(reintegration programming) as a step towards blanket assistance (development loan) has a 
profound impact on how the TDRP conceptualizes what reintegration is, and in turn what 
forms of evidence and knowledge (produced through M&E) about reintegration are needed.  
 
As a result of these political incentives, the TDRP has focused on reintegration as constituted 
by ex-combatants reaching a level of parity with non-combatant community members across 
a broad range of social and economic indicators (i.e. civilianization). Once a certain level of 
parity is achieved ex-combatants are no longer seen as a uniquely disadvantaged group that 
requires targeted assistance in the form of reintegration programming, instead blanket 
assistance in the form of a development loan can take over. As we will discuss in §4.3.1, 
once we start to look at the underlying causal processes and mechanisms to reintegration, 
the formulation of reintegration as indicated by parity alone proves especially paradoxical. 
While it appears that parity is indeed an important element of understanding reintegration, 
an overt focus on parity, at the expense of focus on the underlying processes and 
mechanisms of reintegration, can obscure at least as much as it reveals.  
 
The interaction of these three central political factors when combined with the overarching 
anti-ideological shift towards evidence based policy are the context for understanding much 
of the TDRP’s approach to the M&E of reintegration programming the in GLR. We must 
temper this critical discussion of the political factors that influence the TDRP’s construction 
of evidence and knowledge about reintegration through M&E by pointing out that there are 
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numerous examples of invaluable efforts at revealing the underlying processes and 
mechanisms of ex-combatant reintegration in the GLR from within the TDRP (see e.g. Finn 
2012). Counterexamples notwithstanding, the overarching approach to the construction of 
evidence through M&E in the GLR is one that has been less focused on what complex 
processes and mechanisms must exist in order for reintegration to be possible as it 
observed, and is instead more focused in how the process of reintegration must be for the 
actions undertaken in reintegration programming to be justified.  
 
This is not to assert that the evidence constructed through the M&E of reintegration 
programming is not useful for exploring the underlying processes and mechanisms of 
reintegration. Rather, the point is that the evidence has been constructed within a specific 
political landscape that has had an important influence on the form, scope, and mode of 
data collection (its positionality). We argue in §3.4 that a careful reframing of the GLR data 
under a comparative case study approach utilizing process tracing can help us to shift our 
angle of inquiry and shed some of the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset’s inbuilt positionality, 
to give us a clearer view of some of the complex processes of ex-combatant reintegration, 
and the causal mechanisms that underlie them - unburdened by the pervasive incentives 
embedded in the political landscape. 
 
3.3.2.2 The Construction of the GLR Data 
 
The GLR reintegration datasets have been produced as a part of M&E under logic of a 
periodic non-randomized control trial designed to correspond to various phases of the 
reintegration programming life cycle in each of the five GLR countries. Surveys are carried on 
ex-combatants partaking in reintegration programming but also, critically, on community 
members in the areas where ex-combatants will be returning. In this way community 
member are intended to serve as a control group by which the specific issues relevant to ex-
combatants, as opposed to those pervasive in the general post-conflict environment, can be 
identified (see Figure 3.1).  The GLR surveys have covered a breadth of issues deemed 
relevant to programming goals (e.g. demographics, education and skills, housing and 
security, reintegration experiences, economic issues, social capital – for detail see the data 
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presentation annexes in §6-8) and were planned to be carried out at five points in a seven 
year program cycle.  
 
First, there is typically a pilot survey to be completed in the first year of programming. The 
pilot is intended as a venue for testing and adjusting the survey tools as well as the broader 
M&E system (including data capture, management, and analysis) for the second survey – the 
baseline. The baseline survey is typically planned sometime around year one in the 
programming life cycle. The purpose of the baseline, as the name implies, is to provide and 
anchor point to compare future survey data to in order to understand the depth of change in 
ex-combatants. Next, tracer surveys typically are planned for years three and five of 
programming and are ideally used against baseline data to steer and adjust reintegration 
programming. Lastly, the final impact evaluation survey is planned for somewhere around 
year seven. It is at this point that survey data is used to assert the extent of programming 
impact – in the TDRP approach to M&E this is primarily signaled by the level of parity 
between ex-combatants and community members across the broad range of politically 
defined indicators surveyed. However, as explored in §4.3.1, a sole focus on parity can yield 




Figure 3.1– Structure of GLR Reintegration M&E Surveys. Adapted from Gerring (2007). 
 
It is important to remember that post-conflict and development environments are 
notoriously unstable. Even with the logistical capacity of institutions like the UN and the 
TDRP, carrying out large surveys can prove very challenging. The actual timing of surveys 
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rarely corresponds to plans and the quality of data can vary considerably.  The positivist ideal 
of a pure or objective dataset is rarely, if ever, approached. Though M&E strategies attempt 
to mimic the logic of a controlled experiment, the post-conflict environment almost never 
allows for this. Thus, in the process of merging various surveys from across the five GLR 
countries into the one mega-dataset utilized in this doctoral thesis, there has been 
considerable “cleaning” (i.e. throwing out bad or suspect quality data), adjusting, and 
recoding. The decisions made around these points is discussed in detail in the introduction 
to the data presentation annexes (§6).  
 
The result of merging surveys from the five GLR countries is an incredibly detailed data 
source on the social and economic dynamics of ex-combatant reintegration in the region. 
However, as argued above, the incentive structures of the political landscape favor certain 
forms and scopes of data to be used for M&E. Much of the enormous potential of the GLR 
datasets for exploring the underlying processes and mechanisms to reintegration is never 
actualized through M&E in the individual GLR countries. However, as we argue in the 
following section, reframing the merged datasets in a comparative case-study mode of 
inquiry, utilizing process tracing, creates the space for shedding the political incentives that 
drive M&E and delving into an exploration of processes and mechanisms – the space for 
beginning to actualize the potential of the GLR dataset for social scientific inquiry.   
 
 
3.4 Reframing the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset within a Comparative 
Case Study Framework 
 
Moving forward with the ideas built in §3.2 on the meta-theoretical foundations of this 
research and in turn the space that this opened in §3.3 for a discussion of the empirical 
positionality embodied the GLR reintegration datasets, the current section of the 
methodological approach chapter aims to reframe the GRL reintegration datasets within a 
case study based methodological approach. It is argued in this section that adopting such a 
case study based methodological approach can help to ameliorate some of the issues of 
positionality discussed in §3.3, and open space for the exploration of the causal mechanisms 
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of ex-combatant reintegration in the GLR and the possibility of theory building about the 
broader processes of ex-combatant reintegration.  
 
To pursue these aims this section proceeds in two main subsections. The first subsection 
(§3.4.1) focuses on broadly on outlining the core strengths and weaknesses of case study 
research in the social sciences. Similarly, the strengths and weaknesses of the specific 
method of processes tracing within case study research are considered. In the second 
subsection, (§3.4.2) the specific case study approach utilized in this doctoral thesis is 
outlined, with specific discussion of the strategy of processes tracing from quantitative data.  
 
3.4.1. Case Study Research in the Social Sciences 
 
This sub-section explores the nature of case study research in the social sciences in three 
parts. First (§3.4.1.1), we explore the general nature of case study research, Second (3.4.1.2), 
we develop the relative strengths and weaknesses of case study research relative to 
quantitative paradigms of social scientific inquiry.  Third (3.4.1.3), we give specific attention 
to the methodological tool of processes tracing. 
 
3.4.1.1 What is Case Study Research? 
 
In making a compelling argument for the application of a case study approach in this 
research, a useful place to start is with the fundamental question: what is case study 
research? Indeed, though case study research approaches, sometimes called case-based 
methods, have seen a resurgence in recent decades they are still far from ubiquitous. Two of 
the most important contemporary texts giving case study research comprehensive attention 
are George & Bennet (2005) and Gerring (2007), and as such, they will serve as the basis for 
much of the discussion here. So what is a case study? George & Bennet (2005: 5) define a 
case study as “… the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or 
test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events…” Similarly, Gerring 
(2007: 211) offers that case studies are “The intensive study of a single case for the purpose 
of understanding a larger class of similar units (a population of cases).” Though it appears 
that George & Bennet see case studies as more explicitly tied to historical explanation (they 
are correct in that all causal explanation includes elements of historical explanation) it is 
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clear that both authors agree upon a fundamental idea of case study research; the 
exploration of a specific case, or group of cases, in the hopes of understanding a broader set 
of similar cases.  
 
Perhaps it is helpful to look at an even more elemental level to ask “what is a case?” For 
George & Bennet (2006: 17) a case is “… an instance of a class of events.” Gerring (2007) 
agrees, but stipulates that cases must be temporally and spatially defined. This seems 
reasonable. A case is an instance of a class of events in a specific time (or range of time) and 
place – that is, a specific context. In this research there are five cases (Rwanda, Uganda, 
Burundi, DRC, and RoC) that are all instances of institutionally and developmentally weak 
countries in the GLR of Africa, with ex-combatants reintegrating into communities with the 
assistance of DDR programming after prolonged periods of violent conflict. It is important to 
address the point that while the predominant focus of discussions of case study research is 
on the strengths and challenges of taking inferences from the in-depth investigation of a 
single case and rigorously applying them to a broader set of cases, case studies can also 
include the investigation of several cases, and comparison among them, to produce 
inferences and reflect on a broader set of cases (George & Bennet 2006: 18). Indeed, 
comparison is a central component of almost all scientific inference, and has a long history in 
the social sciences (e.g. Mill 1843; Ragin 1987). Comparison of the trajectories of ex-
combatants and community members within and across the five GLR countries will play a 
pivotal role in our ability to produce inferences about the processes of reintegration and the 
mechanisms that underlie them.  
 
Case study approaches fit nicely into the framework of scientific realism (critical or complex 
varieties) presented in §3.2. It is the case study’s emphasis on the extrapolation of 
inferences beyond the original observation range that places it firmly in line with forms of 
scientific realism. The implication of such an approach is that there is something in the case 
that exists at an ontological level independent of that specific case - and thus exists in other 
similar cases. This ontological specification is what allows us to use the investigation of 
specific instances of processes and mechanisms of ex-combatant reintegration in the five 
GLR countries to hypothesize their workings across the region, and perhaps on a broader 
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level. However, no approach or method is infallible. There are always strengths and 
tradeoffs. With this, we can turn to the question of “what is case study research good for?” 
 
3.4.1.2 What is Case Study Research Good For? 
 
General Strengths and Tradeoffs  
 
One way to highlight some of the broad strengths and weaknesses of case study approaches 
to social scientific inquiry, which are often – but not necessarily – qualitative paradigm of 
inquiry, is to contrast them via the predominant quantitative paradigm of inquiry, which are 
often – but not necessarily – rooted in regression based statistics. Indeed, as our main data 
source in this doctoral thesis is a large quantitative dataset one could very reasonably ask 
why a quantitative paradigm should not be favored instead. In beginning to address this 
question a good place to start is with is in exploring the general orientations of case study 
versus quantitative paradigm approaches to social science research.  
 
Gerring (2007) points out that while all social science involves elements of both theory 
development and testing, or in Popper’s (2004b) words: “conjectures and refutations”. Case 
study and quantitative paradigm approaches tend to favor opposite ends of the spectrum. 
While case study approaches tend to favor the development of new concepts, ideas, 
frameworks, or theories, quantitative paradigm research in firmly rooted in the rigorous 
testing or “refutation” of existing theory. Much criticism of case study research, and 
qualitative research methods more broadly, has rested on its relative weakness in 
hypothesis testing, at least by the same standards of quantitative paradigm research (see 
e.g. King et al 1994). In other direction, a growing crowd of voices has been evermore critical 
to quantitative paradigm of inquiry for its heavy reliance on often arbitrarily defined model 
specifications and general tendency to supplant substantive theoretical knowledge of a topic 
(episteme) with sophisticated technical skills (techne). In the words of Freedman (2010: 46), 
“to substitute intellectual capital for labor” (see also, Brady & Collier 2010).  
 
Another related area where case study and quantitative paradigm research approaches tend 
to be divisive in in the preference for explanations with high levels of internal validity versus 
external validity. Do we prefer explanations that are specific to the idiosyncrasies of a 
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specific case, but may not prove useful for understanding many other cases (high internal 
validity)?  Alternatively, do we prefer an explanation that fits a large number of cases but 
may risk what George & Bennet (2006: 19) call “concept stretching” – comparing possibly 
inequivalent cases with concepts that may only be appropriate for some of those cases? 
While case study methods tend to favor internal over external validity, we will argue that the 
comparative case study approach utilized in this doctoral thesis helps to achieve balance 
between these two poles – providing explanations of the processes and mechanisms that 
underlie the individual-level processes ex-combatant reintegration across the GLR, but are 
also consistent with the dynamics of ex-combatant reintegration within each of the five GLR 
countries.  
 
There are numerous general trade-offs between case study and quantitative paradigm 
approaches to social scientific research. Where researchers ultimately land on the spectrum 
of approaches between them should be directly tied to the nature of the research questions. 
Broadly speaking, case study methods are more adept at answer what Scharpf (1997) calls 
“forward looking questions”, while quantitative paradigm methods are more adept to 
answer “backwards looking questions” (see also Byrne 2011b). Goertz & Mahoney (2012) 
offer another way of phasing this distinction as that between research questions concerned 
with the causes of effects (backwards looking) and those concerned with the effects of 
causes (forward looking). In this study our research questions are predominantly backwards 
looking – we want to explain the causal processes and mechanisms that produce the effect 
of ex-combatant reintegration in the GLR. Though in order to achieve such an explanation, 
we must also periodically investigate variation of reintegration outcomes based on variation 
in different causal components (effects of causes / forward looking). 
 
In the end, the purest forms of case study and quantitative paradigm research approaches 
exist at opposite poles of a spectrum. However, in practice most all social research involves 
elements of both. Again, the research questions should most directly dictate where a piece 
of research falls on the spectrum. Gerring (2007: 49) suggests that the many areas of trade-
off between case study and quantitative paradigm approaches to social scientific research 
may come down to “… a choice between knowing more about less, or less about more.” In 
light of the fact that our research questions explicitly ask about the processes and 
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mechanisms underlying ex-combatant reintegration, we now turn to explore the particular 
strengths of case study approaches for exploring these components of theory development 
and social scientific explanation. 
 
The Search for Causal Mechanisms 
 
In §3.2 we gave the concept of causal mechanisms a cursory treatment while outlining the 
core ideas of critical and complex realism. In its most elemental form the term causal 
mechanism is a metaphor for the generative causal force that produces observable 
outcomes. How are we to operationalize this conceptual metaphor in the methodological 
realm? Much literature on causal mechanisms agrees that it is identifying causal mechanisms 
that allows us to see causal chains/pathways/processes - but what does this really mean? 
Are causal mechanisms, and the causal processes that they account for, merely intervening 
variables as King et al (1994) suggest? If so, then perhaps statistical (quantitative paradigm) 
methods would be the mode of inquiry most adept to identifying mechanisms. However, the 
overwhelming consensus (e.g. Bennet & Checkel 2015; George & Bennet 2005; Gerring 
2007) has been that operationalizing causal mechanism as intervening variables is 
insufficient. Establishing yet another statistical correlation, even a perfect correlation, can 
still yield little causal explanation. Indeed, as Hedström (2005: 26) points out: “… correlations 
and constant conjunctions do not explain but require explanation by reference to the 
entities and activities that brought them into existence.”  
 
So if mechanisms are not intervening variables, what are they then? Are mechanisms merely 
analytical constructs as Hedström and Swedburg (1998) suggest? Or theories within theories 
as Stinchcombe (1991) offers? These too seem false steps. As detailed in §3.2, the critical 
realist paradigm places causal mechanisms firmly in the ontological realm of the real. From 
this view, mechanisms cannot be merely our constructs, but exist independently of our 
perception of them. There are many voices in the discourse on causal mechanisms with 
varying operationalizations of causal mechanisms (see e.g. Bhaskar 2008; Bunge 2004; Falleti 
& Lynch 2009; George & Bennet 2005; Gerring 2007; Goertz & Mahoney 2012; Mahoney 
2001; McAdam et al 2001; Pawson 2000; Stinchcombe 1991), however all agree that 
exploring causal mechanisms means explanations the how of causation. Here we are partial 
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to Hedström’s (2005) definition of causal mechanisms, though it is one of the more abstract 
definitions available, for its particular congruency to many of the ideas of complex realism 
detailed in §3.2. Hedström (2005: 25) defines a causal mechanism as: 
 
“… mechanisms can be said to consist of entities (with properties) and the 
activities that these entities engage in, either by themselves or in concert with 
other entities. These activities bring about change, and the type of change 
brought about depends upon the properties of the entities and the way in which 
they are linked to one another. A social mechanism, as here defined, describes a 
constellation of entities and activities that are organized such that they regularly 
bring about a particular type of outcome.” 
  
We can easily adjust the language here to align to the specific operationalization of ex-
combatant reintegration under complex realism in §3.2. The mechanisms underlying 
individual-level reintegration processes consist of ex-combatants (entities) with social, 
economic, characteristics and experiences (properties) and the activities they engage in (e.g. 
livelihood strategies), either by themselves or in concert with community members (other 
entities). These actions bring about change, and the trajectory (type) of change brought 
about depends on their characteristics and the way in which they are linked to one another. 
Ex-combatant reintegration mechanisms, as here defined, describe the constellation of ex-
combatant characteristics and activities that are organized such that they regularly bring 
about a particular trajectory in the processes of reintegration.  
 
Beyond the possibility of giving us glimpses into the how of the social world, the search for 
causal mechanisms is important in at least two other regards worth mentioning here. First, 
as mentioned in §3.2, the product of mechanism based explanations of social phenomena 
can be called middle-range theory. Middle-range theory is much more specific than general 
theory or covering laws, which George & Bennet (2005) argue are too vague to lead to any 
kind of valuable policy guidance (see also Byrne 2011 and Pawson 2006). Like it or not, in the 
field of ex-combatant reintegration in the context of DDR programming there is an inbuilt 
normative component. All research on processes ex-combatant reintegration in the context 
of DDR programming has and inherent role in guiding policy meant to affect those processes. 
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We argue that the rigorous application of a mechanisms focused mode of inquiry is 
indicative of taking these normative dimensions seriously.  
 
However, there are at least two potential disadvantages to middle range theory. Bennett & 
Checkel (2015: 92) argue that because middle-range theories often have “several 
independent variables or mechanisms at play, it is not possible to isolate the impact of any 
one factor”. This is not particularly problematic for us. Our complex realist framework rejects 
the idea that isolating causal impacts is the goal of scientific inquiry - all variables 
(parameters) are inherently interacting, causing and being caused, at some level. The goal of 
scientific inquiry in the complex realist framework is to account for the ways the parameters 
of systems “tend” to interact through mechanisms to produce the trajectories of those 
systems over time. A second drawback to middle-range theory is that through its micro-
focus on mechanisms within specific temporally or spatially delimited frames, it can risk 
becoming decontextualized from broader macro-factors that have baring on those 
mechanisms that play out at lower levels. In one way, this is a real point of criticism for our 
approach in this doctoral thesis - there is little explicit account of the role of specific macro 
forces that shape individual-level ex-combatant reintegration processes in the GLR. At the 
same time, our conceptualization of country-level reintegration trajectories in §4.3, as types 
of “second order” processes, creates a broad conceptualization of the role of macro forces, 
even if there is only a limited range of forces considered. 
 
The second point worth emphasizing is that focusing on mechanisms within a case study 
framework allows us to take complexity seriously. Gerring (2007: 61) dismisses complexity in 
saying that: “Indeed, “complexity,” as the term is used in social science circles, seems to 
refer to any feature of a causal problem that does not fit snugly with standard assumptions 
of linearity, additivity, and independence. As such, it is a red herring, for it has no 
determinate meaning.” On the other hand, George and Bennet (2005) repeatedly state that 
case study approaches help to address complexity – though they never offer any explicit 
operationalization beyond the notion that case studies leave space for equifinality. We have 
endeavored in §3.2 to give complexity an operationalized meaning within the complex 
realist paradigm of social inquiry. Further, we posit that our specific operationalization of 
complexity is not only compatible with a case study approach to social inquiry, but actually 
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enhances its already inherent strengths. For us, adopting a mechanisms focused approach is 
part of taking complexity seriously,  
 
Turning back to the beginning of this sub-section, it is the case study’s emphasis on the 
extrapolation of inferences beyond the original observation range that places it firmly in line 
with forms of scientific realism. Furthermore, it is this explicit rooting in scientific realism, in 
our case critical and complex realism, which makes case study approaches to social research 
particularly attuned to the search for causal mechanisms. Case study research, however, is 
broad framework for analysis that can be filled with a variety of specific methods for inquiry. 
One specific method used in this study, that is also commonly paired with case study 
approaches to social research more broadly, is that of process tracing. If case study 
approaches to scientific inquiry are the broad framework that make possible the critical and 
complex realist paradigm of scientific explanation possible, then we argue that process 
tracing is a method by which these explanations can be actualized in this study.  
 
 
3.4.1.3. Process Tracing 
 
While case study approaches to social research do not necessarily have to utilize process 
tracing specifically, process tracing almost always occurs within some variety of a case study 
framework. In this way, process tracing and case study approaches are deeply intertwined. 
Tilly (1997: 48) suggests that process tracing aims to establish “... relevant, verifiable causal 
stories resting in different chains of cause-effect relations whose efficacy can be 
demonstrated independently of those stories.” But what does process tracing look like in 
practice? How do we construct causal stories? Indeed, much of the challenge with process 
tracing is its amorphous nature. Gerring (2007: 178) points out that at times process tracing 
“borders on ineffable”. To critical eyes (e.g. King et al), process tracing can appear as nothing 
more than atheoretical historical explanation - story telling. In light of such skepticism, there 
has been a growing effort on the part of case-based methodologists to clarify and explain 




George & Bennet (2005: 206) posit that process tracing “… attempts to identify the 
intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between and 
independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.” This is a 
good place to start. George & Bennet’s (2005) definition points process tracing at 
understanding the processes and mechanisms between cause and effect – the “black box” of 
causation. However, their language of independent and dependent variables invites the 
idea, which we have already rejected, of mechanisms as intervening variables. How do we 
get around this? Bennet & Checkel (2015: 6) offer some clarity in saying that process tracing 
involves “… the examination of intermediate steps in a process to make inferences about 
hypotheses on how that process took place and whether and how it generated the outcome 
of interest.” Bennet & Checkel (2015) then go further to suggest that in examining the 
intermediate steps in a causal process we use multiple forms of evidence on the processes, 
sequences, and conjuncture of events in a causal story. They suggest that we can think of 
these multiple forms of evidence as “diagnostic evidence”, and thus drop the term 
intervening variable – along with its associated, and problematic in critical and complex 
realist views, ontological and epistemological commitments to positivism.  
 
The utilization of multiple forms of evidence is a key component of process tracing. Gerring 
(2007: 173) goes as far as to say: “The hallmark of process tracing, in my view, is that 
multiple types of evidence are employed for the verification of a single inference…” Indeed, 
using multiple forms of evidence to “triangulate” inferences seems logical. However, it is this 
inclusion of multiple forms of non-comparable evidence that has led to some of the critique 
of process tracing as lacking the rigor of, for example, more strict statistical methods. The 
detective analogy is useful here again. Through the careful and laborious examination of 
multiple sources of evidence, we are in the process of detection – seeking the causal process 
between evidence (causes – or traces in the language of complex realism) and outcomes 
(the trajectories of systems over time).  
 
In this doctoral thesis our primary source of evidence is the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset. 
However, this quantitative data is far from the only evidence used to process trace in this 
study. Other forms of diagnostic evidence utilized in this study include existing theory and 
empirical case material in the scholarly discourse on peacebuilding, development, DDR, and 
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reintegration; internal documents to the TDRP; personal interaction and field experience 
while working for the TDRP, as well as interviews and consultations with experts from the 
World Bank, UN, and other stakeholding organizations on the local dynamics of reintegration 
in the GLR. All of these sources provide clues that collectively create leverage for 
triangulating inferences about the nature of ex-combatant reintegration processes in the 
GLR and the underlying mechanisms that govern them. In other words, all these are the 
diagnostic evidence that allow us to process trace. 
 
So we have a lot of evidence and we are building a causal story, but what are the actual 
procedures by which we do this in process tracing? Because the nature of every case study 
and forms of evidence they offer are unique, so too are process tracing procedures highly 
idiosyncratic. However, generally speaking, process tracing involves a laborious process of 
examining many pieces of evidence in an iterative process of inductive and deductive 
reasoning. The research “soaks and pokes” in the data to inductively produce some initial 
inferences about the nature of the causal process or mechanism at hand (Bennet & Checkel 
2015). This is essentially what we do in the annexes (§6-8) of this doctoral thesis. With an 
initial inductive inference, or even partial inference, the researcher moves to the deductive 
mode to search for the observable implications of that initial inference in the other 
diagnostic evidence at hand.  
 
In this way the researcher is retroductively reasoning about what must be true for a given 
phenomenon to be as it is. Does the evidence match the inference? Is it contrary? Is there no 
substantive evidence through which to evaluate the inference? Based on this search for the 
observable implications of an inference the researcher can attempt to deduce the validity of 
the initial inductive inference – leading to confirmation, adjustment, or rejection. Process 
tracing proceeds in an iterative loop of this inductive and deductive investigation of 
evidence. It is in this way that case studies using process tracing can produce explanations 
with high levels of internal validity – the inferences they make have been iteratively tested 
against other available diagnostic evidence in a slow and laborious process.   
 
The idea of testing process tracing inferences by their observable implications by comparison 
to other within case diagnostic evidence has been the crux of skepticism about the process 
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tracing method. Rueschmeyer (2003: 305) laments “… the most conventional view, taught in 
countless classes on the methodology of social research. It holds that studying a single case 
yields only one reasonable theoretical outcome, the generation of hypotheses that may be 
tested in other more numerous cases.” Indeed, one can reasonably ask whether it is possible 
for cases to betray the highly specific process tracing derived inferences constructed around 
those very cases. In other words, are process tracing inferences from a single case, or small 
group of cases, irrefutable without being tested on other cases? This comes back to our 
previous discussion of internal versus external validity as two poles in a spectrum on which 
case study / process tracing approaches land firmly on the side of internal validity. A growing 
faction of methodologists are staunch in the idea that process tracing can indeed produce 
valid inferences that can be tested against other diagnostic evidence within a single case or 
small group of cases (see e.g. Bennet & Checkel 2015; Brady & Collier 2010; George & 
Bennet 2005; Gerring 2007; Mahoney & Rueschmeyer 2003; Ragin 1985, 2008; Rohlfing 
2013). George & Bennet (2005: 219) surmise this logic well: 
 
“We differ with many methodologists in that we argue that a theory can be 
derived or modified based on the evidence within a case, and still be tested 
against new facts or new evidence within the same case, as well as against other 
cases. Detectives do this all the time – clues lead them to develop a new theory 
about a case, which leads them to expect some evidence that in the absence of 
the new theory would have been wildly unexpected, and the corroboration of 
this evidence is seen as strong confirmation of the theory.” 
 
The inferences hypothesized and tested through process tracing can amalgamate to produce 
detailed causal narratives of the processes between cause and effect (for classic examples of 
process tracing see e.g. Collier & Collier 1991; Mahoney 2001b; and Skocpol 1979). When 
performed rigorously (see Bennet & Checkel 2015), these explanations include the 
identification of the hypothesized causal mechanisms that govern the causal processes of 
the specific case that can be evidenced to exist independent of the specific case. To achieve 
this last part, evidencing that mechanisms exist independent of the specific case, focused 
and structured comparison to other “like cases” is essential (George & Bennet 2005). Not 
only this, but comparison across other similar cases can help to sharpen the formulation of 
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the processes and mechanisms occurring within a case. It is only when we begin to compare 
outside the first case that the impact of elements that may have been held constant, and 
thus invisible, become plain to see. In this way deviant cases can play an especially important 
role in building explanatory leverage - as DRC does in §4.3.1 of this doctoral thesis.  
 
Comparison in process tracing is an important part of amplifying the external validity of the 
hypothesized causal mechanisms. Byrne & Uprichard (2012) argue that in taking the step of 
comparison process tracing moves beyond retroduction, explaining what mechanisms and 
conditions must exist for ex-combatant reintegration in the GLR to be as it is, to retrodiction, 
explaining what might happen (what trajectory) in the future in light of the mechanisms and 
conditions that must exist. This in turn opens space for exploring how to purposively shape 
these trajectories through reintegration programming. A comparative case study approach 
utilizing process tracing provides a framework for evidencing the causal processes and 
mechanisms within a specific case and, further, the generalizability of these specific 
processes and mechanisms to other similar cases. This is the approach utilized in this 
doctoral thesis, and outlined in the following sub-section.  
 
 
3.4.2 The Great Lakes Region as a Comparative Case-Study 
 
This sub-section outlines the specific approach in this doctoral thesis to reframing TDRP-GLR 
Reintegration Dataset in a comparative case-study approach, and proceeds in three parts. 
First (§3.4.2.1), we outline the specific structure to the case-study approach. Second 
(§3.4.2.2), we outline the range of “diagnostic evidence” utilized in the comparative case-
study approach. Third (§3.4.2.3), we outline the strategy of processes tracing from 
quantitative data. 
 
3.4.2.1 Comparative Case-Study Structure 
 
The case-study approach in this doctoral thesis is structured in three distinct phases. Frist, in 
the detailed data presentation annexes (§6-8) the initial “soaking and poking” of the data 
occurs. We describe the contents of TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset and, aided by 
additional diagnostic evidence, we reason about the relationships between various parts in 
115 
 
the iterative process of inductive and deductive reasoning. This first phase gives us a broad 
understanding of the shape of the data on ex-combatants and community members across 
the five GLR countries, and the trends within and across them. This is the groundwork of 
process tracing.  
 
The second phase of our case study approach moves to focus on individual-level 
reintegration processes and mechanisms. To do this each ex-combatant and community 
member is examined as an individual case / system. The variables of the TDRP-GLR 
Reintegration Dataset are conceptualized as the parameters that constitute the individual 
ex-combatant and community member systems spaces, and the observed traces for 
individual ex-combatants and community members within those parameters collectively 
define their system states. This is where we really roll up our sleeves and get into the heavy 
lifting part of processes tracing. We compare ex-combatants and community member 
trajectories, and the trajectories of many sub-groups, within and across the five GLR 
countries to retroductively reason about the processes and mechanisms that we reason 
must exist in order to account for the trajectories of individual ex-combatant and community 
member systems over time. This retroductive effort is guided by the theoretical perspectives 
presented in the conceptual approach chapter (§2), and in this sense is carried out in 
harmony with an abductive re-understanding of the TDRP-GLR data within that conceptual 
framework. The fruits of these efforts are presented in §4.2 of the analysis chapter of this 
doctoral thesis.  
 
In the third phase of our case-study approach (presented in §4.3), based on our 
understanding of individual-level reintegration processes and mechanisms, we turn to reflect 
on the ways in which the collective trajectories of ex-combatants and community members 
as sub-systems in each of the five GLR country super-systems amalgamate to produce 
country-level reintegration trajectories. While in the second phase of our case-study 
approach each individual ex-combatant and community member is understood as its own 
case / system, here the trajectories of individual ex-combatants and community members 
become the traces that constitute the trajectories of respective ex-combatant and 
community member sub-systems, which in turn constitute the trajectories of the five 
country-level super-systems in the GLR. Though the comparison of the country-level 
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reintegration trajectories in the GLR, and their component ex-combatant and community 
member sub-systems, we utilize further retroductive reasoning to conceptualize a “second 
order” processes that produces country-level reintegration trajectories. Based on our 
understandings of the processes and mechanisms that drive ex-combatant reintegration at 
the individual and country levels we take the next step to retrodictively elaborate a 
taxonomy of possible country-level reintegration trajectories that could exist outside of the 
context of the GLR, and to reflect on the potential for reintegration programming to impact 
these country-level trajectories.   
 
3.4.2.2 Data Sources 
   
While the empirical material utilized in this study is dominated by the TDRP-GLR 
Reintegration Dataset, there are numerous other sources of ‘diagnostic evidence’ that guide 
the comparative case study / process tracing approach outlined here. Again, the 
particularities of the GLR reintegration dataset as a source of evidence are discussed in more 
detail in the data presentation annexes (§6-8). Other forms of evidence include: 
 
 Social scientific theory on social and economic processes presented in the conceptual 
approach outlined in §2 of this study 
 Other scholarly and institutionally based literature on ex-combatant reintegration 
 Internal documents, including impact evaluations, from the TDRP and partner 
NDDRCs in the respective GLR countries 
 Field experience working with the TDRP on the design and implementation of pilot 
and baseline reintegration studies as a part of M&E in South Sudan summer 2013 
 Numerous data analysis consultations with TDRP experts (and affiliates) on 
reintegration processes within each of the five GLR countries.  
 
Though these sources of diagnostic evidence often fade into the background in the detailed 
data presentation in (§6-8) and analysis (§4), their importance is paramount. Without a 
guide in the form of the substantive knowledge that these forms of diagnostic evidence 
represent, a meaningful exploration of a large quantitative data source such as the GLR 
reintegration dataset would be fraught. Indeed, a regression based statistical analysis might 
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be the only recourse. However, this need not be the case here; the presence of such sources 
of non-comparable diagnostic evidence guide the process tracing approach outlined below. 
 
3.4.2.3 Process Tracing with Quantitative Data 
 
In this doctoral thesis we engage in process tracing to, as Gerring (2007: 178) puts it, “… 
make sense of a congeries of disparate evidence, each of which sheds light on a single 
outcome or set or related outcomes.” For us the primary source of evidence is the TDRP-GLR 
Reintegration Dataset. While key authors point out that process tracing with quantitative 
data is not problematic in principle (e.g. Bennet & Checkel 2015 or George & Bennet 2005), 
there are few guiding examples of what exactly process tracing from quantitative data 
entails. Even well regarded case studies that process trace from large amounts of 
quantitative data can be somewhat illusive in their exact method (e.g. Kalyvas 2006 or Wood 
2003). In the end, we may be guilty of this lack of clarity too. Explaining in technical terms 
the steps of inductively and deductively reasoning from descriptive quantitative data seems 
somewhat of fool’s errand. While there is clear logic, the moments of understanding are 
often sudden and ephemeral in nature.  
 
Is quantitative process tracing merely Lieberman’s (2005) “nested analysis” in which one or a 
few cases are selected from a quantitative cross-case analysis for further analysis of the 
correlation results? Is quantitative process tracing really just another way of saying agent 
based modeling (e.g. Checkel 2013)? Or, even further, is quantitative process tracing rooted 
in Bayesian (e.g. Bennet 2015) or Boolean algebras (e.g. Ragin 2000, 2008 or Rihoux & Ragin 
2009)? While it seems that there is an abundance of sophisticated quantitative and semi-
quantitative techniques, providing a rich toolbox for researchers interested utilizing 
quantitative data, there is little harmony in the discourse about the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of these various approaches. In fact, the only consistent view seems to be on 
the limits of the predominant regression based statistical analysis for contributing to process 
tracing - mostly because of the inherent epistemological and ontological ties to positivism.  
 
The approach to process tracing from quantitative data utilized in this doctoral thesis is most 
directly inspired by Tukey’s (1977) strategy of exploratory data analysis. Tukey proposes that 
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quantitative data analysis is comprised of two components, exploratory analysis and 
confirmatory analysis. The second component, confirmatory analysis, is comprised by the 
vast body of statistical methods that attempt to confirm extent of relationships between 
variables – the very methods that dominate the social sciences today. Even in the 1970’s 
Tukey (1977: vii) lamented that, the first component, exploratory data analysis was often 
regarded as “mere descriptive statistics”  - no matter how much we learned from it. This 
sentiment remains today.  
 
Exploratory data analysis, the first component of Tukey’s idea of data analysis, is a strategy 
of data expression, re-expression, and comparison, essentially analogous the iterative 
inductive deductive loop of “soaking and poking” that can later play a role in confirmatory 
analysis. In asserting this point Tukey compares the relationship between the exploratory 
and confirmatory sides of quantitative data analysis to that of the investigative and judicial 
arms of law enforcement. Tukey (1977: 3) posits that: “Unless the detective finds the clues, 
judge or jury has nothing to consider. Unless exploratory data analysis uncovers indications, 
usually quantitative ones, there is likely to be nothing for confirmatory data analysis to 
consider.” 
 
Tukey essentially suggests that we should mull over data. We should express and re-express 
data through descriptive techniques in order to see what we can re-understand in the data 
in the context of other diagnostic evidence and alternative conceptual frameworks 
(abductive reasoning). Tukey is staunch in the view that exploratory tools must be guided by 
substantive knowledge of the subject matter. In this vein, turning again to the detective 
analogy, Tukey (1977: 1) points out that: “A detective investigating a crime needs both tools 
and understanding. If he has no fingerprint powder [tools], he will fail to find fingerprints on 
most surfaces. If he does not understand where the criminal is likely to have put this fingers 
[substantive subject knowledge], he will not look in the right places. Equally, the analyst of 
data needs both tools and understanding.” Tukey’s analogy here is reminiscent of our 
previous discussion of techne and episteme in §3.3.1. While the exploratory analysis of the 
TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset in this doctoral thesis is largely a technical exercise 
(techne), the guiding of this analysis by our other data sources and substantive knowledge 
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on the topic (episteme) that allows to use the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset for process 
tracing.  
 
In practice we are involved in a sort of rudimentary cluster analysis where we are comparing 
various groups and subgroups in the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset to identify key their 
similarities and differences. Age, gender, and other demographic group traits provide 
consistent categories, or “clusters”, that are analyzed throughout our analysis. With the 
categories we define at the outset, and discover along the way, we are able to move to 
reason about the possible explanations behind these similarities and differences through 
pattern matching (e.g. Campbell 1988) and micro-correlation (e.g. Roberts 1996). This 
processes of analysis is guided by all the forms of diagnostic evidence outlined in the 
previous section §3.4.2.2. As discussed throughout this chapter, comparison of the data 
trends within and across the give GLR countries is an essential part of increasing leverage in 
our explanations. In this vein, Tukey (1977: 115) reminds us that “… no body of data tells us 
all we need to know about its own analysis. It always takes information and insight gained 
from other, parallel bodies to let us analyze our body of data as well as we can.”  
 
As a whole this form of analysis is a slow and laborious process. However, the result is that it 
allows us to iteratively reason about the processes of ex-combatant reintegration in the GLR 
and the possible mechanisms that underlie them. Overall, this approach seats well in the 
complex realist paradigm advocated in §3.2.3. As such, this approach to processes tracing 
from quantitative data creates the space for us to take the complexity of reintegration as a 
phenomena seriously in the analysis presented in §4 of this doctoral thesis.  
 
We remain wary though, as in §3.3, that the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset is inherited, 
and as such comes with inherited biases. Two of the ways these biases potentially manifest 
themselves in the GLR data is in the technical expression of data (e.g. scaling and concept 
operationalization) as well as the range and depth of data collected. On the first point, 
Tukey’s (1977) emphasis on re-expression as part of data exploration helps to ameliorate 
some of this. Especially through exploring different data field scaling, we can view data in 
different ways, from different angles, and see how, if at all, this alters our understanding of 
emerging processes – potentially revealing biases built in to particular forms of data 
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expression. On the second point, George and Bennet (2005: 21) are correct to point out that 
all studies utilizing existing or slightly modified databases face the problem that, because the 
range and depth of data are already defined, they do not have a direct means of inductively 
including new variables. This remains mostly true in our exploratory analysis of the GLR 
dataset; though there are some examples of being able to compute a new variable based on 
the values of others (e.g. using current age, time since demobilization, and time with armed 
group to compute approximate age at mobilization). Overall, our strategy in addressing 
these limitations is to lean heavily on our other forms of diagnostic evidence outside the 
TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset - to reason about what parameters are important, and to 
reason about their meaning outside the bounds of the dataset itself (as dataset 
observations); that is, within the larger body of diagnostic evidence (as causal process 
observations). This is where process tracing takes place. This is where we observe the 




3.5 Summary of Methodological Approach 
 
This chapter has outlined the methodological approach utilized in this doctoral thesis in 
three main parts. First, we detailed the meta-theoretical foundations of our methodological 
approach. We argue that a serious commitment to both the critical realist notion of causal 
mechanisms and the ontological specifications of complexity are brought into harmony 
through a complex realist meta-theoretical framework. We have explored at length how 
these ontological and epistemological commitments are operationalized in this study of ex-
combatant reintegration in the GLR, as well as the space they create for a comparative case 
study approach.  
 
Second, in light of the critical realist notions of the transient and intransient domains of 
science, we have turned a critical eye to the constructed nature of the primary data source 
in this study – the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset. We explore the broad political incentives 
that steer the act of evidence construction in the M&E of ex-combatant reintegration in the 
GLR within a broader framework of applied social science and an overarching shift towards 
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evidence based policy. This in an effort to take seriously the idea that inherited data comes 
with inherited biases.  
 
Lastly, this chapter explores case study research approaches and the method of process 
tracing at length. We argue that case study based approaches, especially when combined 
with processes tracing, are an especially good fit to our meta-theoretical emphasis on causal 
mechanisms and complexity. In this vein, we conclude the chapter by outlining the 
comparative case study approach utilized in this doctoral thesis and explore the 









































This chapter will present an analysis of ex-combatant reintegration processes in the Great 
Lakes Region based on the primary data presentation annexes in part four (§6-8) of this 
doctoral thesis. While the analysis here is coherent as a standalone piece, for optimal 
analytical value it should be read in conjunction with the annexes. There are two main 
sections to this chapter. In the first section (§4.2) we explore the individual-level processes 
of ex-combatant reintegration in the GLR while devoting special attention to explicating 
some of the key social and economic mechanisms that underlie those processes. In the 
second section (§4.3) we move further to situate individual ex-combatant reintegration 
processes within the trajectories of the communities they return to. We explore the nature 
of country-level reintegration trajectories and the paradoxes that ensue viewed from the 
perspective of reintegration programing.  
 
4.2 Individual- Level Processes & Mechanisms 
 
In this section we draw heavily on the primary data presentation annexes in part four (§6-8) 
of this doctoral thesis. It is at this point that we move beyond descriptive and exploratory 
examination (as we put it in §3.4.2.1: “soaking and poking”) of the data, presented in the 
two annexes, to engage in the strategy of process tracing outlined in the methodological 
approach chapter (specifically §3.4.1.3 and §3.4.2.3). We attempt to consolidate our insights 
and weave together a coherent picture of the individual-level processes by which ex-
combatants reintegrate, with special attention given to identifying key mechanisms that 
govern them.  
 
This exploration of the individual-level processes and mechanisms of ex-combatant 
reintegration proceeds in five subsections. First, we explore the dynamics of mobilization 
into, and demobilization from, armed groups in the GLR. Our focus is on the legacies that 
mobilization and wartime experiences carry for shaping individual ex-combatants’ prospects 
at the outset of reintegration. Second, we focus specifically on economic processes of 
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reintegration by exploring the predominant livelihood strategies that ex-combatants follow - 
the processes by which they achieve sustainable livelihoods, and the barriers for those who 
do not. We argue that human-capital based and natural-capital based livelihood strategies 
can act as key mechanisms that dictate the achievement of overall sustainable livelihoods in 
the GLR. Third, we turn to social reintegration processes by exploring the processes by which 
ex-combatants build social connections in the community, and the extent to which they can 
leverage this social capital towards tangible and intangible social and economic outcomes. 
We argue that marriage is a key mechanism through which ex-combatants gain access to 
bridging social networks and the resources they represent, as well as signal a shift in their 
social identity from soldier to civilian. 
 
Fourth, given the social and economic processes and mechanisms outlined, we explore the 
profound role of gender as a structuring force that shapes the space in which female ex-
combatants can exert their agency while navigating reintegration processes. We argue, 
however, that to truly appreciate the extent of gender-based disadvantages we must situate 
female ex-combatants within the broader context of gender dynamics across the Great Lakes 
Region. Fifth, and lastly, we draw together the previous strands of argument to outline an 
integrated model of reintegration processes and mechanisms. We argue that while 
separating the social and economic dimensions of reintegration can prove instrumental 
during initial analysis, in reality these social and economic processes and mechanisms are 
one and the same – entangled and inseparable. 
 
4.2.1 From Mobilization to Demobilization: Missed Opportunities 
 
Individuals mobilize into armed groups through various pathways. There those who join for 
ideological reasons, there are some that join for protection in the context of intense 
insecurity, there are others that join out of anger or in seeking revenge, and still there are 
others who join groups to escape the misery of extreme poverty. Most perversely, there are 
also those that are forcibly mobilized into armed groups. The pathways by which individuals 
mobilize can create lasting legacies that they must face as they return to communities as ex-
combatants (see e.g. Baas 2012). Unfortunately, while we know some about when ex-
combatants joined armed groups and how long they spent with them, there has not been 
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any systematic capture of their mobilization pathways and wartime experiences in the GLR 
countries. Thus, our analysis here is limited. 
 
In the GLR countries the majority of ex-combatants were mobilized as adults between the 
ages of 18-30. These ex-combatants spend on average between three and seven years with 
armed groups, meaning the majority of them return to communities between the ages of 
31-40. These trends are remarkably durable across the GLR countries. Ex-combatants in the 
GLR return to communities to face a range of interrelated social and economic 
disadvantages to their peers, tending to lag behind community members in terms of social 
and economic parameters. However, despite their universal disadvantage at the outset of 
reintegration, the majority of ex-combatants across the GLR display an overall positive 
trajectory of improvement over time.  
 
However, there are important nuances that need to be made to this general picture of ex-
combatants’ disadvantage to the broader community. When we turn our attention to those 
ex-combatants in the GLR who were mobilized under the age of 18 the mediating role of age 
at time of mobilization on the extent of ex-combatants’ social and economic disadvantages 
at the outset of reintegration becomes apparent. 
 
4.2.1.1 Mobilization under the Age of 18 
 
One-third (33.4% on average and just over 40% for females) of all ex-combatants across the 
GLR were mobilized as children under the age of 18. While there is much that can be said 
about when adulthood begins across the different cultural contexts in the GLR, the figures 
show that of those ex-combatants mobilized into armed groups under the age of 18, the 
average age of mobilization was only 13 – in early adolescence by international legal norms. 
These findings are robust across the GLR countries and drives home the point that the wars 
in the GLR have been fought with children to a significant extent - even though they may 
demobilize as adults. No ex-combatants that demobilize under the age of 18 are included in 
the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset, and we can only presume that that their presence 
would only further evidence the pervasiveness children mobilization into armed groups 




Those ex-combatants in the GLR who were mobilized under the age of 18 spend on average 
just under seven years with armed groups, meaning that the majority of them leave armed 
groups between the ages of 18-30 (64.1%). However, though these individuals return 
chronologically as adults, their social and economic starting point for reintegration is 
weakened. Mobilization at such a young age carries considerable legacies. Through their 
absence from a “normal” community setting while in armed groups these ex-combatants 
have missed out in the processes of education, maintaining and building familial connections 
through marriage, building social networks, engaging in community structures, and building 
an a basic economic track record. Indeed, in most indicators of these processes those ex-
combatants who were mobilized under the age of 18 perform considerably worse than their 
community member peers in the same age categories – as well as compared to older ex-
combatants in general.  
 
In this sense younger ex-combatants in the GLR, most of who were mobilized under the age 
of 18, start the process of reintegration with a handicap, having missed opportunities for 
personal development during their formative years. These ex-combatants face a double 
transition of relearning, or often learning from new, societal norms of adulthood while 
simultaneously reshaping their identity from soldier to civilian. As Özerdem & Podder (2011: 
9) point out:  
 
“… in post conflict settings youth face a dual and complex transition, while life–
stages preceding adulthood are characterized by complex and challenging 
transitions, conflict exacerbates the transition to adulthood by breaking down 
social norms and cultural practices, disrupting education systems and 
employment opportunities and for many youth, promoting a sense of identity 
based on the exertion of power through violence.” 
 
In the GLR, the missed opportunities for social development (social identity and social 
capital) that ex-combatants mobilized under the age of 18 face manifest themselves in terms 
of weaker perceptions trust, solidarity, inclusion, and overall social cohesion in the 
community; smaller social networks and lower levels of sociability; as well as weaker 
127 
 
perceptions of their own sense of empowerment (i.e. their ability to affect change in their 
lives). As we discuss later (in §4.2.2 and §4.2.3), this range of social disadvantages has direct 
consequences in the economic realm, as ex-combatants seek to establish sustainable 
livelihoods.  
 
There is another important dimension to understanding the effects of age at mobilization on 
reintegration. While there is no consistent trend in the GLR, it is clear that the amount of 
time spent with armed groups to some degree shapes the extent of disadvantages that ex-
combatants, especially those mobilized under the age of 18, face at the outset of 
reintegration. Of those ex-combatants mobilized under the age of 18, the general extent of 
their social and economic disadvantages to other ex-combatants (and community members 
in the same age bracket) increases with the amount of time they have spent with armed 
groups. However, there appears to be a threshold to the effect of time spent with armed 
groups as an amplifier of the range of disadvantages associated with those ex-combatants 
mobilized under the age of 18. Disadvantages at the outset of reintegration peak for those 
ex-combatants mobilized under the age of 18 who have spent between around 8-10 years 
with armed groups, and dissipate after this point. The reasons for this dissipation remain 
unclear. 
 
What is remarkable, however, is that while younger ex-combatants in the GLR (the majority 
of whom mobilized under the age of 18) may start with a range of disadvantages to other ex-
combatants, and not least to community members, they are quick to build momentum in an 
overall positive trajectory of reintegration towards parity with the community – displaying 
an overall narrative of reintegration processes similar to their older ex-combatant peers. 
Indeed, upon returning to communities the vast majority of ex-combatants in the GLR report 
being welcomed home by immediate family members (to the extent that they have them).  
 
4.2.1.2 Beyond Missed Opportunities: The Legacies of Mobilization and Wartime 
Experiences 
 
The pathways into, and experiences with, armed groups hold significant legacies for the 
prospects that ex-combatants face in the process of reintegration at war’s end. However, we 
have revealed little of the actual effects of mobilization and wartime experiences on 
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reintegration. If we are to take seriously Özerdem & Podder’s (2011: 313) point that “… 
reintegration does not happen in a vacuum and is not isolated from previous experiences of 
recruitment and involvement in armed groups” then it may be that appreciating the role 
that mobilization and wartime experiences have for reintegration processes goes beyond 
acknowledging opportunities missed.  
 
Perhaps the most stark and directly visible legacies of war for ex-combatants includes 
physical disability. Amputations, blindness, paralysis, or other serious head or body wounds 
are commonplace disabilities among ex-combatants that are lucky enough to survive serious 
injuries sustained during violent conflict in the GLR. Those ex-combatants in the GLR with 
physical disabilities face distinct barriers in the economic realm in terms of achieving a 
sustainable livelihood. Physical disability may also serve as a powerful symbolic reminder of 
ex-combatants mobilization and wartime experiences as they navigate the process of 
negotiating identity and building social capital - processes that all ex-combatants navigate.  
 
Indeed, there remains much to be learned about processes that youths and adults go 
through as they are socialized in the use of violence and the individual legacies that these 
socialization processes hold for the prospect of reshaping identities and building social 
connections– especially for youths who may have missed the opportunity for learning 
“regular” societal norms. There are some authors paving the way in this endeavor. Vermeij 
(2011), for example, provides a particularly good account to the dynamics of socialization of 
those mobilized as youths in Northern Uganda and the challenges that this these in 
reintegration as these ex-combatants may not be returning to a previously learned set of 
norms and customs, but entering an foreign social context. Similarly, Slegh et al (2014) has 
explored the effects of socialization in violence from a young age on masculine identities and 
the challenges of ex-combatant reintegration in Rwanda. 
 
However, perhaps the biggest blind spot in terms of the individual legacies of mobilization 
and wartime experiences is that of psychological illness. Epidemiological research has 
consistently shown that mental disorders are common in war-effected populations 
(Schulhofer-Wohl & Sambanis 2010). This is an issue that affects not only ex-combatants, but 
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also their families and the communities they return to, and has remained all but absent in 
reintegration programming in the GLR. Hinkel (2003: 5) paints the situation starkly:  
 
“What all psychiatric illnesses have in common is the fact that they impair the 
sufferer in every day functioning: reducing the capacity to sustain intimate 
relationships and friendships, hindering successful participation in work, 
lowering scholastic achievements, limiting the ability to participate in communal 
life and impairing the ability to plan and follow-up on realistic goals for the 
future. In this way, the mental consequences of war, terror and organized 
violence on the individual are long-term and psychiatric illness is often chronic. If 
mental health is not addressed in ex-combatant rehabilitation, the effort of 
improving social capacities and reducing poverty is clearly weakened.” 
 
Horn’s (2014) (2013a) (2013b) work on psychosocial well-being among ex-combatants in 
Uganda and DRC corroborates the idea that there are certain inherent mental health 
legacies that ex-combatants struggle with in reintegration. These mental health legacies can 
manifest through ex-combatants’ troubles in maintaining relationships and overall social 
withdraw, heightened anger and aggression, depression and hopelessness, trouble 
maintaining diet and hygiene, nightmares, and alcohol or narcotic substance abuse.       
 
Age at mobilization and the amount of time spent with armed groups matter for ex-
combatants’ prospects at the outset of reintegration – especially in terms of opportunities 
missed. However, going beyond this may require acknowledgement the social and 
psychological legacies of mobilization and wartime experience. While it remains true that 
most ex-combatants across the GLR countries have a positive reintegration trajectory, 
moving towards parity with community members, understanding which ex-combatants fall 
behind and why may involve engaging with wholeheartedly with the range of mobilization 
and wartime experiences that ex-combatants carry with them. In this regard, future research 





4.2.2 Economic Processes & Mechanisms 
 
Across the GLR countries ex-combatants are significantly disadvantaged to their fellow 
community members along economic lines. However, despite remaining economically 
disadvantaged to the broader community, most ex-combatants across the GLR countries see 
a trajectory of moderate economic improvement over time. Understanding the sources of 
the economic disadvantages that ex-combatants face, and in turn the pathways by which 
they are able to begin to overcome disadvantages, is an essential step in deciphering the 
broader processes through which ex-combatants achieve a sustainable economic livelihood 
– an essential dimension of reintegration. 
 
The macro-structural features of the GLR countries are such that their economies are 
characterized by extreme development challenges as well as, in the emergence from 
prolonged periods of violent internal conflict, fractious polities. In the GLR countries, the 
states’ very ability to provide the basic services and protections that underlie the social 
contract is severely weakened. It is in this context that ex-combatants must return to 
communities to carve out a livelihood. In this weakened setting, the demand for labor in 
local economies across the GLR is often negligible. At the same time ex-combatants’ return 
represents a flood in the supply of available labor for often exacerbating the situation for all. 
This is a risky prospect that can potentially breed resentment from the community. 
Especially when combined with ex-combatants’ range of missed opportunities for 
establishing economic footing due to time spent with armed groups, opportunities for wage 
based employment simply do not exist for the vast majority of individuals across the GLR 
countries. This is true for ex-combatants and community members alike. While reintegration 
programming can help close some of gaps ex-combatants face, i.e. their missed 
opportunities, for example in terms of education and vocational skills, no reintegration 
program alone will be able to solve the large-scale structural problems that shape the 
broader economic context of reintegration (Shibuya 2012). 
 
With this broader economic context in mind it is easier to understand why the vast majority 
of ex-combatants and community members across the GLR countries take independent, 
non-wage based, livelihood pathways – they have no other options. This means that the 
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overwhelming majority of ex-combatants and community members across the GLR countries 
base their livelihoods on small-scale agriculture, small business selling staple goods, or some 
combination of the two. Small-scale agriculture is the predominant livelihood pathway for 
ex-combatants and community members across the GLR countries, a fact that highlights the 
importance of access to arable land. Let us be clear though, for the vast majority of 
individuals in the GLR countries small-scale agriculture means subsistence level agriculture, 
in which few can truly prosper. Most ex-combatants and community members in the GLR 
that depend of small-scale agriculture alone struggle to carve out a livelihood in which they 
can merely subsist.  
 
In some regards this economic dynamic represents a dangerous prospect. Are ex-
combatants returning to the very situations of economic marginalization and immobility that 
may have served among the grievances that contributed to their mobilization into armed 
groups in the first place? Does economic reintegration in the GLR mean, to use McMullin’s 
(2004) (2013) oft cited quip, “reintegration back into basic poverty”? If so, the danger is that 
renewed feelings of helplessness and marginalization among ex-combatants can possibly 
feed into remobilization into armed groups – perpetuating a pervasive cycle of poverty and 
violence across the region. With this in mind, we observe that those ex-combatants across 
the GLR countries that combine small scale agricultural with small business activities appears 
to be those with the  livelihood pathway offering the largest possibility of upward economic 
mobility. 
 
From here, we move forward to develop a deeper understanding of the dynamics of 
economic reintegration processes by utilizing the five forms of capital in the sustainable 
livelihoods framework. We argue that in the economic realm there are two key mechanisms 
that are especially important for ex-combatants’ livelihood outcomes. Frist, human-capital 
based livelihood strategies - such as small business, vocation, or wage-based labor - can 
serve as an important mechanism through which ex-combatants actuate improvements in 
their food, housing, and income security. Second, natural-capital based livelihood strategies, 
namely small-scale agriculture, also serve as a key mechanism through which ex-combatants 
make similar improvements. However, it appears that either of these two livelihood 
strategies alone includes certain pitfalls. Those ex-combatants across the GLR countries who 
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can engage in both human-capital based and natural-capital based livelihood strategies in 
combination achieve the most “sustainable” livelihoods. 
 
4.2.2.1 Human-Capital Based Livelihoods 
 
Recall our previous discussion (§2.3) of the five dimensions of capital in the sustainable 
livelihoods framework: human capital, physical capital, financial capital, natural capital, and 
social capital. These five forms of capital weave a complex web of deeply interrelated 
economic factors. Indeed, the five forms of capital dynamically interact, within a broader 
structural context, to shape individuals’ possible livelihood pathways. In the GLR countries 
there are consistently identifiable patterns in ex-combatants’ positions in the five forms of 
capital, and their interaction, that lend narrative to the processes by which ex-combatants 
navigate towards a sustainable livelihood. In addition, this narrative reveals some the 
dynamics by which livelihood processes can become blocked, locking ex-combatants in 
patterns economic insecurity and immobility.  
 
Human-capital based livelihood pathways a good place to start. Human capital can be deeply 
shaped by mobilization and wartime experiences – especially for younger ex-combatants. In 
addition, human capital is an area where large portions of reintegration programming 
resources are aimed – so it has special policy relevance. We can think human capital in two 
parts that do not always move in unison: capacity and sense of empowerment. 
Understanding capacity is straightforward. Ex-combatants’ levels of education combined 
with vocational and other skills dictate their range of livelihood capacities. Reintegration 
programming such as primary or secondary education, vocational training, small business 
and entrepreneurship training, and even basic literacy and numeracy training are all 
designed to affect what ex-combatants’ are capable of achieving – i.e. the capacity side of 
human capital. Empowerment is, however, more subtle to appreciate. Essentially 
empowerment is ex-combatants’ perception of their own ability to affect change in their 
lives. Even with a strong set of capacities in the form of education and skills, if an individual 
ex-combatant does not perceive that they are capable of achieving social and economic 
outcomes (empowered) their ability to actually do so will be diminished. Social and 
economic factors, as well as individual histories and legacies of wartime and mobilization 
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experiences, all coalesce to shape ex-combatants’ perceptions of their own situation and the 
space for their own agency with it. So while bottom-line capacities are important, 
empowerment is also.  
 
As discussed in §4.2.1, for the majority of ex-combatants in the GLR participation in violent 
conflict represents a series of missed opportunities. This is especially true in terms of human 
capital. Across the GLR countries ex-combatants show clear disadvantages in education and 
skill levels in comparison to community members due to their missed opportunities to 
develop these areas. This is especially true for younger ex-combatants, who with the aid of 
reintegration programming are the most active in closing education and skills gaps over 
time. However, there is a minority of ex-combatants, especially those who mobilized into 
armed groups under 18 but demobilized as adults, who face specific social barriers to closing 
education gaps. Essentially, these ex-combatants may perceive a return to the classroom, 
now with younger pupils, as an existential challenge to the sense of adulthood, and deeply 
interrelated sense masculinity, developed while with armed groups. In this way, education 
and vocational training programming is a setting where the individual struggle to redefine 
peacetime identity can come to the fore. Without confronting these social barriers to closing 
capacity gaps, this minority of ex-combatants may risks developing enduring disadvantages 
in education and skills. 
 
Human capital in the GLR has a complex relationship to the other four forms of capital in the 
sustainable livelihoods framework. Human capital does not appear to have a direct 
relationship to ex-combatants’ levels of natural capital, most importantly access to arable 
land. However, higher levels of access to arable land are associated with stronger 
perceptions of empowerment. Perhaps this is not surprising. Remember, small-scale 
agriculture is the most viable, and accordingly predominant, livelihood pathway across the 
GLR. It is perhaps not surprising that those with better access to arable land perceive 
themselves as having a stronger ability to affect their economic situation. However, there is 
a more complex dynamic visible in the GLR countries than just this.  
 
Higher levels of education and skills (human capital) are associated with stronger income 
security (financial capital) and in turn stronger food security (physical capital). However, 
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housing security (also physical capital) is more directly shaped by land access (natural 
capital) than income security or access to formal or informal credit (financial capital). Indeed, 
those ex-combatants with access to arable land see higher levels of food and housing 
security (physical capital) compared to those without. In turn, those ex-combatants with 
higher food and housing security (physical capital) have stronger perceptions of 
empowerment, though they do not necessarily have higher levels of capacity in terms of 
education and skills (human capital). This makes sense: without the burden of insecure 
housing and regular hunger, ex-combatants have a stronger perception of their ability to 
affect their situation. However, improved food and housing cannot directly shape education 
and skills levels. It is arguable, however, that improved physical capital not gained through 
improved income (e.g. through social pathways) can increase the financial yields gained from 
those skills and education – as a smaller proportion of income needs to be utilized to cover 
housing and food deficits.  
 
In this dynamic interaction between human, natural, financial, and physical capital an 
important livelihood pathways begin to emerge. Those ex-combatants with higher levels of 
skills and education (capacity side of human capital) who engage in small business activities, 
vocational trades, or wage labor (to the extent that it is available) are able to secure 
relatively higher levels of income security (financial capital), in turn higher food and housing 
security (physical capital), and thus have stronger perceptions of empowerment (human 
capital). These ex-combatants are more likely to apply for formal credit (financial capital), to 
the extent that it is available, and vastly more likely to be successful in their applications. In 
turn, these ex-combatants can invest further in their small business, vocational trade based 
activities (this is less true for the few ex-combatants who engage in wage-based labor) and 
redouble their yields in terms of income security (financial capital) and food and housing 
security (physical capital). In this way human-capital based livelihood strategies can play a 
role as a mechanism for actualizing sustainable livelihood outcomes. This dynamic is 





Figure 4.1 - Human-Capital Based Livelihood Strategies 
 
However, it appears that this positive loop is highly dependent on the presence of strong 
social networks (social capital – especially bridging social capital) that can serve as ex-
combatants’ clientele networks in their small business endeavors. Anyone who has been to a 
market in the rural regions of the GLR countries can appreciate this. Hundreds of individuals 
run stalls selling an identical set of staple goods for identical prices. There is little space for 
product individuation to establish a competitive advantage through which individuals can 
help their businesses win over a clientele of customers. Thus, doing business in this kind of 
setting is heavily dependent on having a network of clientele who will loyally buy staple 
goods from you that are otherwise available at identical prices from other vendors. Without 
the presence of strong social networks, this positive economic loop between human, 
financial, and physical capital is far less likely to occur in the context of the GLR countries. 
Even the few ex-combatants who do make their way into wage-based labor may do so as a 
product of their social networks. Recall, in the GLR setting demand for labor is generally low, 
while supply is abundant. Education and skills (human capital) alone may not be enough for 
individuals to secure competitive advantage over their fellow laborers, and social networks 
may play an important role in this context. It may be that formal education only becomes 
especially relevant for wage-based labor after secondary education completion, when the 




Those ex-combatants in the GLR who move towards small business or wage based 
livelihoods without strong social networks are more likely to come into an alternative 
negative loop of income insecurity (financial capital) that feeds into food and housing 
insecurity (physical capital), and erodes their perception of their ability to affect their 
situation (human capital) - ultimately undermining their ability to actually do so. The ex-
combatants in this negative loop are more likely to engage in informal borrowing from 
family networks (bonding social capital), to the extent that they have them, to fill their food 
and housing deficits. However, the danger is that these ex-combatants come to rely on an 
unsustainable loop of “subsistence borrowing” that ultimately undermines their ability to 
establish a sustainable livelihood. In the worst instances, ex-combatants in this negative loop 
report that on top of regular informal borrowing they must eventually sell other forms of 
physical capital, such as tools and materials important for their livelihood, to cover income, 
food, and housing gaps - and in the act of doing so further undermine their ability to secure 
income. Disabled ex-combatants, who have slightly weaker human capital compared to non-
disabled ex-combatants in terms of skills and education, but dramatically weaker human 
capital in terms of perceived ability to affect their situation, are particularly likely to fall into 
this negative loop – reporting especially high dependence on their family networks to fill 
income gaps. This dynamic is likely related to the role that their individual physical 
disabilities play as barriers to engaging in various livelihood strategies.  
 
The ex-combatants trapped in this negative loop can quickly reach a position where the need 
for basic survival in the present moment outweighs investments in a sustainable economic 
future. Those ex-combatants who do not have the broader social networks to ensure a 
clientele network (bonding social capital) or the familial networks (bonding social capital) 
that can support them to fill income, food, and housing gaps are, however, at even more 
heightened risk for economic insecurity, marginalization, and immobility, and are among the 
most disadvantaged individuals across the GLR countries. These ex-combatants report 
greater willingness to migrate for the prospect of improved economic opportunities. 
However, in doing so they may further undermine their footing in the community – 




Thus, in reflecting on these two iterations of human-capital based livelihood strategies, one 
positive loop and one negative loop, it is evident that human capital in combination with 
social capital (to be discussed at length in §4.3.2.) is important for determining if human-
capital based livelihood strategies can serve as a mechanism for achieving an overall 
sustainable economic livelihood in the GLR. Reintegration programming can play an 
important role as an enabler in human-capital based livelihood strategies by improving ex-
combatants capacity through the provision of education and vocational skills training 
(human capital), micro-credit schemes (financial capital), and vocation related tools (physical 
capital). However, the empowerment and social capital sides of the equation may lie outside 
of reintegration programming’s ability to directly affect (a point discussed further in §5.2.2) 
 
Moving forward, if we are to understand the livelihood pathways for the vast majority of ex-
combatants across the GLR countries then we must go beyond human-capital based 
livelihoods to also explore natural-based livelihood strategies (i.e. small-scale agriculture), 
and the deeply entangled dynamics of access arable land, as a key mechanism for 
understanding economic reintegration processes in the GLR.  
 
4.2.2.2 Natural-Capital Based Livelihoods 
 
For many ex-combatants in the GLR, the economic context of pervasive poverty and 
underdevelopment characterized by a broad lack of labor opportunities, especially for those 
with low levels of skills and education (capacity side of human capital), means that human-
capital based livelihood strategies simply may not be viable as a standalone livelihood 
strategy. The vast majority of ex-combatants, and community members in the GLR, must 
engage at some level in natural-capital based livelihood strategies (i.e. small-scale 
agriculture), either as a primary livelihood strategy or in combination with human-capital 
based livelihood strategies. The viability of natural-capital based livelihood strategies as a 
mechanism to an overall sustainable livelihood is almost entirely dictated by ex-combatants’ 
levels of access arable land. Social capital plays an important role in access to arable land, 





Those ex-combatants with access to arable land (natural capital), especially those who see 
increases in access over time, display higher levels of food and housing security (physical 
capital) than those ex-combatants who engage in standalone human-capital based livelihood 
strategies. These ex-combatants in turn, as described in the previous section (4.2.2.1), hold 
stronger perceptions of empowerment (human capital). The capacity side of human capital 
can also play a role in natural-capital based livelihood strategies too, as advanced knowledge 
and skills in agricultural techniques in can contribute towards actualizing access to arable 
land into improved food and housing security (physical capital). 
 
However, it appears that access to arable land has a more subtle two-part relationship to 
income security (financial capital). One side of access to arable land’s relationship to 
financial capital is quite direct. Those ex-combatants who have more access to arable land, 
predominantly represented by those aged over the age of 30, are able to move beyond mere 
subsistence agriculture to make some direct income gains. Those ex-combatants who are 
especially successful in engaging in  small-scale agriculture a primary livelihood strategies 
may be able to use increased financial capital to invest back into farming tools (physical 
capital) that can help increase agricultural yields further, and that can then serve as the 
financial basis for greater access to arable land through either rent or purchase. In this way 
natural-capital based livelihood strategies can enter a positive loop - serving as a key 
mechanism for achieving sustainable livelihoods. This pattern of natural-capital based 





Figure 4.2 - Natural-Capital Based Livelihood Strategies 
 
However, there is also another indirect relationship between natural capital and financial 
capital. For those ex-combatants who have less access to arable land or less secure tenure, a 
group predominantly represented by younger ex-combatants (who have missed out on 
opportunities to establish land access while in armed groups) and female ex-combatants 
(who, as to be discussed in §4.2.4., access arable land almost exclusively through marriage, 
but are also the least marrying demographic group in the GLR), small-scale agriculture 
remains a subsistence level activity. Due to their limited land access, these ex-combatants do 
not produce strong enough agricultural yields to actualize improved food security (physical 
capital) into improved income security (financial capital), and in turn the possibility of 
reinvesting that improved financial capital into improved land access (natural capital). In this 
dynamic natural-capital based livelihoods strategies at a subsistence level relieve pressure 
on overall income needs by filling food and housing gaps (physical capital), but they do little 
to contribute directly to income (financial capital). Without any other sources of 
supplementary income these ex-combatants may be surviving, but many remain locked in 
economic insecurity and immobility.  
 
Thus, those ex-combatants with less access to arable land and that are in turn only engaging 
in small-small-scale agriculture at a subsistence level are especially dependent on combining 
natural-capital based livelihood strategies with human-capital based livelihood strategies. 
Indeed, ex-combatants report the amount of time in a year that they spend engaged in 
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natural-capital based livelihood strategies versus human-capital based livelihood strategies 
as moving in almost direct proportion to each other (though this is also likely steered by 
growing seasons too). However, a paradox of small-scale agriculture is that even though it 
represents an important part of ex-combatants overall livelihood opportunities, it may be 
perceived as a return to the basic poverty that may have played a role in some ex-
combatants’ mobilization into armed groups in the first place. This perception is not 
unfounded. Especially when considering the seasonal nature of farming across some parts of 
the GLR, it appears that for most ex-combatants natural-capital based livelihood strategies 
can be problematic as a standalone livelihood strategy. Again, ex-combatants may be 
surviving, but few prosper with this strategy alone.  
 
In contrast, those ex-combatants in the GLR who combine natural-capital based livelihood 
strategies with human-capital based livelihood strategies are the most successful in 
improving overall economic situation. Those ex-combatants who engage primarily in natural-
capital based livelihood strategies can benefit from supplementary human-capital based 
livelihood strategies that can bring additional income security (financial capital). This income 
can then be leveraged towards improving food and housing security, as well as other forms 
of physical capital like tools, which can improve yields from natural or human-capital based 
activities. With improvements in income security from stronger agricultural yields and 
supplementary income from human-capital based activities ex-combatants may be able to 
accrue the necessary financial resources to invest in improved access to arable land that can 
serve as a further foundation for achieving a sustainable livelihood.  
 
In addition those ex-combatants who engage in primarily in human-capital based livelihood 
strategies can benefit from even subsistence level engagement in small-scale agriculture, as 
it can ease expenses related the food and housing security (physical capital) and help 
prevent them from slipping into an unsustainable loop of subsistence borrowing (described 
in §4.2.2.1.) that undermines their ability to achieve a sustainable livelihood. In these ways, 
it is the combination of natural-capital based and human-capital based livelihood strategies 
as distinct mechanisms that create the most “sustainable” overall livelihood strategies for 
ex-combatants in the GLR. Indeed, diversified livelihood strategies are better equipped to 
deal with the seasonal nature of agriculture across the GLR, trends in increased competition 
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for labor, and the unexpected shocks of volatile post-conflict economic environments. The 
combined patterns of natural-capital based and human-capital based livelihood pathways 




Figure 4.3 - Combined Human & Natural-Capital Based Livelihood Strategies 
 
As with human-capital based livelihood strategies, reintegration programming can play an 
important role as an enabler in natural-capital based livelihood strategies. Skills training 
related to agricultural and animal husbandry techniques can improve human capital, 
provision of basic agricultural tools and supplies can improve physical capital, and micro-
credit schemes can help provide the financial capital to help ex-combatants actualize natural 
capital based sustainable livelihoods. However, access to arable land is a key issue that has 
traditionally stood outside the bounds of reintegration programming. While it does seem 
feasible that reintegration programming could build forums through which individual ex-
combatants were able to negotiate access to community managed land (to the extent that it 
exists), broader measures regarding the allocation or reform of land access will likely remain 
outside the ability of reintegration programming to directly affect (discussed further in 
§5.2.2).   
 
So, it is clear that access to arable land is important for ex-combatants’ economic 
reintegration processes across the GLR. Thus, a very important question is “by what 
processes do ex-combatants ensure access arable land”? It appears that just as social capital 
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plays an important role in ex-combatants’ ability to actualize human-capital based livelihood 
strategies, so too does it play a central role in their access to arable land. To deepen our 
understanding of the important role of social capital in in the economic reintegration 
processes of achieving a sustainable livelihood we will now shift our focus to an exploration 
of the social reintegration processes, and the mechanisms that underlie them, visible across 
the GLR.  
 
 
4.2.3 Social Processes & Mechanisms 
 
Social reintegration is the processes by which ex-combatants reshape their social identity, in 
their own eyes and the eyes of the community, and weave themselves into the fabric of 
society. This is no simple task, and involves multiple processes by which ex-combatants build 
social networks and a broader sense of trust and inclusion in the community. Those ex-
combatants who are successful in reshaping their identity and building social networks can, 
in turn leverage these networks towards tangible and intangible social and economic 
outcomes. These are a complex and slow moving set of processes – a fact that the 
experiences of ex-combatants in the GLR countries speaks to clearly. 
 
While in terms of economic parameters ex-combatants see a moderate, though limited, 
trajectory of improvement over time, in general moving relatively quickly towards parity 
with community members, but plateauing before achieving full parity. In the realm of social 
reintegration processes, progress moves more slowly. Ex-combatants have overall smaller 
social networks than community members and tend to be heavily reliant on their immediate 
family network for social support, to the extent that they have one, when compared to 
community members. Indeed, while ex-combatants report being accepted by their family 
networks upon returning to communities at a high level, they still have less familial contact 
than community members overall and expand their familial networks through marriage less 
frequently. 
 
Marriage is a core component to the process of social reintegration. Indeed, marriage is a 
mechanism through which ex-combatants extend their familial networks, signaling a shift in 
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identity to the community that serves as a platform for building broader social and economic 
networks, which then can be leveraged towards further social and economic outcomes. So, 
the fact that across the GLR countries ex-combatants marry significantly less frequently than 
community members is troubling. Ex-combatants and community members alike 
communicate their hesitancy around the idea of marrying an ex-combatant, citing stigma or 
fear as a central issue. The dynamics of ex-combatant marriage as a component of social 
reintegration presents a quandary. Marriage is a central pathway for ex-combatants to 
reshape their identities, erode stigma, and connect into society. However, pathways into 
marriage for ex-combatants appear to be blocked until they can begin to do the very things 
that marriage is the central pathway to achieving (reshaping identities, eroding stigma, and 
connecting into society). In this way marriage drives social reintegration processes, but is 
simultaneously a product of them  
 
Despite the challenges related to stigma and marriage, overall general trust does not appear 
to be an enduring problem for social reintegration processes in the GLR countries. 
Community members consistently report high levels of fear regarding the return of ex-
combatants before their arrival, but afterwards few report having few fears, and more often 
than not describe the positive contributions that ex-combatants make to communities. 
Indeed, both community members and ex-combatants report high levels of overall trust in 
the community (and improvement in trust over time) that contributes to an overall sense of 
togetherness and broader social cohesion across communities in the GLR. These are very 
positive findings indeed.  
 
However, stronger social cohesions does not appear to translate to higher levels of 
happiness or improved perceptions of their standing in communities. Indeed, ex-combatants 
are more likely to report being unhappy, unsatisfied with their lives in general, and that they 
have a negative impact on the community. Moreover, ex-combatants perceive themselves as 
considerably worse off than community members in wide range of social and economic 
categories – a perception that community members corroborate. Interestingly, despite these 
disadvantages ex-combatants, like community members, report a generally positive outlook 





Generally speaking, communities in the GLR countries have provided a positive social 
context into which ex-combatants can begin to reintegrate (with the exception of DRC, to be 
discussed in §4.3.1.1). However, there are very real barriers that ex-combatants face to 
social reintegration in the long run - primarily those related to marriage as a building block to 
establishing broader social and economic networks in the community, and in turn the ability 
to leverage these connections for tangible and intangible social and economic outcomes. 
Indeed, evidence from the GLR countries gives credence to the idea that while ex-
combatants can make quick gains in forms of human capital such as education and skills, 
especially with the help of reintegration programming, these gains are less likely to be 
leveraged to actualize improvements in income, food, and housing security through either 
human capita-based or natural-capital based livelihood strategies without a solid foundation 
of social capital. However, because social reintegration processes move more slowly, 
economic reintegration processes tend to plateau for ex-combatants. This is worrisome, as it 
may be that the processes of building social capital in the GLR remain outside the ability of 
reintegration programming to directly affect. To explore this point, we turn to a more 
focused discussion of the dynamics social capital in the GLR. 
 
4.2.3.1 The Dynamics of Social Capital in Reintegration 
 
Social Reintegration is perhaps the pivotal step in linking individual level reintegration 
processes to the larger prospect of building peace and reconciliation. Many scholars and 
practitioners alike acknowledge the centrality of social reintegration processes, yet the logic 
of social reintegration is rarely handled with any explicit operationalization (Bowd & 
Özerdem 2013; Bowd 2008; and Porto el al 2007 are notable exceptions). Indeed, 
understanding social reintegration is deeply challenging because, as we have argued in §2, it 
involves delving into an amalgamation of complex and overlapping ideas from different 
corners of the social science. Exploring the logic of social capital, and its implicit reflection of 
social identity, will shed much light on the social reintegration processes that ex-combatants 




Recall from our conceptual discussion in §2.2., for us the core of the processes of social 
reintegration revolve around social capital - the idea that social networks have value both 
tangible and intangible. These networks, and the trust they represent, provide the basis for 
and social cohesion. Behind the idea that social networks contribute to social capital and in 
turn social cohesion is the distinction between three types of social capital: bonding capital, 
bridging capital, and linking capital. Bonding social capital is that between immediate familial 
networks. Ex-combatants in the GLR indicate their quick acceptance into familial networks 
and heavy social and economic reliance on them, to the extent that they have them. In this 
way, it appears that many ex-combatants in the GLR countries are quick to build a basic 
foundation of bonding social capital, though in general they have less contact with their 
families than community members. However, as we will discuss, ex-combatants face specific 
stigma based barriers to expanding this bonding capital through marriage.   
 
Bridging social capital is about building crosscutting ties though networks that are not 
defined by familial connections. Ex-combatants’ bridging social capital is constituted by the 
quantity of social groups and demographic makeup of those groups, regularity of 
socialization, membership to economic associations, holding a seat on an organizing 
committee in a local organization, participation in community based activities, and etc. (see 
§6-8 for greater detail). These arenas transcend specific familial networks and connect 
individuals to the broader community. Interestingly, those ex-combatants with stronger 
levels of bonding social capital also display higher levels of bridging social capital, suggesting 
that familial acceptance may be an important pathway to bridging social capital – the 
broader social acceptance in the community that it represents.  
 
From country to country ex-combatants in the GLR vary in the extent to which they have 
been able to build bridging social capital. Specifically, in Rwanda and Burundi, where regular 
communal labor is institutionalized and serves as a platform for social interaction outside of 
familial networks and as a forum for discussing community issues, ex-combatants and 
community members alike appear to have higher levels of bridging social capital. In Rwanda 
this institutionalized national practice of communal labor is called Umuganda. In Burundi a 
similar national practice is called Travaux Communataires. In contrast, ex-combatants and 
community members in DRC and RoC and Uganda appear to have considerably less bridging 
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capital. Bridging social capital can have very real impacts on ex-combatant’s access to 
economic opportunities. As we discussed in §4.2.2.1., the viability of human capital based 
livelihood strategies across the GLR are largely dependent on access social networks – 
including those beyond immediate familial networks. Moreover, bridging social capital is the 
core of building a sense of overall social cohesion in the community. This is supported by the 
fact that those ex-combatants with larger social groups and more regular social contact 
report stronger perceptions of trust and togetherness in the community.  
 
If bonding social capital is about connections between ex-combatants and their core familial 
networks, and bridging social capital is about connections broader community networks, 
then linking social capital is about the connections between ex-combatants and higher-level 
civic structures. This is the upward logic of social cohesion that connects individual ex-
combatants’ familial networks to those between more disparate groups, and onward to the 
civic function of the country as a whole. In part, linking social capital is what we are referring 
to when we talk about the political reintegration of ex-combatants – building a relationship 
from the individual ex-combatant to top-level institutions. In the post-conflict context of the 
GLR, typified by weak states, this large-scale transformation of linking social capital is 
something that ex-combatants and community members face together. In this sense, we can 
understand the development of linking social capital as part of the process of linking 
individuals and groups to communities, and communities to the functioning of the state unit.  
 
There has been very little data collected in the GLR countries in this study that contribute 
directly to an understanding of linking social capital. The only directly related measures 
captured being ex-combatants’ rate of engagement with government leaders, and their 
perceptions of the extent that their concerns are taken into account by those leaders when 
making decisions. This gives us a very limited set of parameters by which to triangulate an 
overall sense of linking social capital. One can speculate that the large scale 
institutionalization of communal labor and meeting forums in Rwanda and Burundi 
contribute to overall linking capital by providing a mandatory forum for civic engagement 
(Barnhart 2011 implicitly supports this idea). Indeed, in Rwanda almost all ex-combatants 
report regularly meeting to express concerns to government officials, and an above average 
rate in Burundi. However, these higher rates of civic participation do not appear to translate 
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to stronger perceptions of being taken into account in government decisions. While ex-
combatants civic participation is an important part of bolstering post-conflict states, it is 
unlikely that more political participation from ex-combatants can directly shape a fractured 
and ill-functioning state into a fluid whole. However, our ability to seriously reason about 
linking social capital is limited in this doctoral thesis. Linking social capital is ultimately 
peripheral to the main focus here - an investigation of the connections between individual 
level social and economic processes, but not the political sides of these processes. This, even 
though we recognize that the political sphere is just as inseparable from the social and 
economic spheres as they are from each other (discussed further in 5.2.1).   
 
The evidence on ex-combatant social reintegration processes from across the GLR countries 
gives credence to the idea of different varieties of social capital, and the interconnected 
nature of these different varieties, established in the works of Bourdieu, Coleman, Putnam, 
and Woolcock (discussed in §2.2.2.). Intriguingly, in the GLR countries we can observe an 
upward dynamic of social capital. It appears that bonding social capital begets bridging social 
capital, and in turn bridging social capital begets linking social capital (to the extent we are 
able to measure linking social capital). We make this inference through observing that while 
there are those ex-combatants that have relatively well established bridging social capital 
without a strong base of bonding social capital, there are relatively few ex-combatants with 
that strong base of bonding social capital who do not have stronger bridging social capital. 
Likewise, while there are those ex-combatants who have relatively strong linking social 
capital (again, to the limited extent that we are able to observe it) without a solid foundation 
of bridging, and in turn bonding, social capital. However, relatively few ex-combatants have 






Figure 4.4 – Social Capital Dynamics 
 
This upward dynamic of social capital is visible in Figure 4.4. However, it is important to 
emphasize that the interaction of bonding, bridging, and linking social capital is not 
unidirectional. The three varieties of social capital interact dynamically – and thus there is 
weaker downward dynamic that is important to bear in mind. Guided by the social capital 
and social identity theory discussed in §2.2., we posit that overall social capital in ex-
combatant social reintegration processes is the dynamic product of the three varieties of 
social capital. With this in mind, we can say that we have a general picture of the process of 
social capital accumulation for ex-combatants reintegrating in the GLR. However, what are 
the key mechanisms that underlie this upward process of social capital accumulation? From 
here we move forward to argue that marriage is a key social reintegration mechanism that 
can galvanize a foundation familial acceptance (bonding social capital) into broader 
community networks (bridging social capital). Together these factors play a key role in social 
identity reformation.  
 
While it appears that reintegration programming can play an important role as an enabler in 
economic reintegration processes, its possible role in social reintegration processes is more 
obscure. Unlike many forms of human, physical, financial, and even natural capital that can 
be provided directly through reintegration programming, the social connections that 
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underlie the various forms of social capital cannot simply be delivered. However, this does 
not mean that reintegration programming has no role to play. Information and sensitization 
campaigns prior to the return of ex-combatants can play an important role in creating the 
space for forming expectations about ex-combatants’ return through shaping communities’ 
understanding of the challenges that ex-combatants will face in reintegrating (Malan et al 
2003). Community development projects that involve both ex-combatants and community 
members can bolster the perception that the community stands to benefit from the 
presence of ex-combatants, as well as providing a forum for social interaction that can 
contribute to breaking down stigma and identity based barriers (Veale & Stavrou 2003). 
Reintegration programming that supports civic organizations in the community such as 
sports and religious organizations can likewise create space for the slow processes of 
negotiating identities. Lastly, reintegration programming that dovetails with broader 
reconciliation-based initiatives help build trust and acceptance in the community (Malan et 
al 2003). However, reintegration programming can only serve as an enabler by helping to 
shape the context in which social reintegration processes take place, arguably in an even 
more indirect way than as with economic processes, and it remains ex-combatants 
themselves who navigate these complex social processes.  
 
4.2.3.2 Marriage: A Key Social Reintegration Mechanism 
 
When ex-combatants leave armed groups, one of the first places that they may be begin the 
process of reshaping their identity and weaving themselves into the broader fabric of society 
is with their pre-existing familial networks – the other obvious place where this transition 
begins being DDR programming itself, which may or may not precede return to family 
settings. Of course, due to the widespread dynamics large-scale loss of life and displacement 
in the GLR countries, not all ex-combatants have, or have contact with, their prewar familial 
networks. However, with the exception of DRC (see §4.3.1.1), ex-combatants across the GLR 
countries report generally high levels contact with familial networks. Recalling our discussion 
of social identity in §2.1.1, we can say that the family is among the one of the most 
important fields where ex-combatants have the chance to reconcile gaps between, as 
Goffman (1968a) puts it, their “virtual” and “actual” identities.  This is one of ex-combatants’ 
most important opportunities to reestablish their sense of self as an individual in relation to 
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others in their family networks - what Jenkins (2001)(2002)(2014) calls the “individual order” 
of identity. In this step, ex-combatants create the space to confront, and if they are 
successful, to begin to erode, possible stigma and fear associated with their “actual” status 
as former member of an armed group. This is what building bonding social capital in ex-
combatant social reintegration is all about.  
 
How do ex-combatants that are successful in negotiating social identity and acceptance with 
their familial networks leverage these gains towards broader acceptance in the community? 
In the GLR it appears that those ex-combatants that are able to expand their familial 
networks through marriage are more likely to have higher levels of bridging social capital. 
Through marriage, ex-combatants signal a clear adherence to broader societal norms in the 
community, including those related to gender. In the GLR countries an important part of 
being seen as a man (female gender dynamics are discussed at length in §4.2.4.), and as a 
member of the community more broadly, may revolve around having a wife, a family, a 
house, and land to cultivate on – being a provider and a protector. As ex-combatants marry 
they are signaling a shift - eroding the differences, and building the similarities, between 
themselves and the broader community. As with the negotiation of identity and acceptance 
visive the family, marriage is an important step in the negotiation with the broader 
community to erode stigma and establish the ground in which bridging social networks can 
take root. For Jenkins (2001) (2002) (2014) this is the negotiation of the “interaction order” 
of identity. 
 
With these dynamics in mind we can conceptualize marriage not as directly caused by 
acceptance in bonding familial networks - though familial acceptance appears to be a near 
necessary condition for marriage – as almost none of the ex-combatants without familial 
connections in the GLR are go on to marry. Nor is marriage the only pathway to the 
establishment broader bridging social networks. There are some ex-combatants without 
family networks that do build moderate bridging social capital in the community. However, 
missing in family networks leave these ex-combatants more exposed to economic hardship 
in terms of food, housing, and income security – gaps that bridging social capital alone does 
not fill. Marriage is a mechanism through which ex-combatants can leverage existing familial 
networks as a platform for building the broader community acceptance that allows bridging 
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social networks to grow. Marriage may not be the only way to build the trust necessary for 
bridging social networks to thrive, but in the GLR is an important and regularly observable 




Figure 4.5 – Social Identity Dynamics 
 
Lastly, bonding and bridging social capital can, as Putnam (2000) argues, create the collective 
interests that spark the civic engagement that is then the basis for linking social capital. 
Again, we are limited in terms of data when it comes to linking capital, however what little 
we can glean supports the general idea that those ex-combatants in the GLR with smaller 
bonding and bridging networks are less likely to engage with local government authorities, 
and if they do, they do so less frequently. In terms of the connections to social identity, 
linking social capital is analogous to Jenkins’ (2001) (2002) (2014) notion of the “institutional 
order” of social identity. Figure 4.5 displays our conceptualization of the dynamic 
relationship between social capital and social identity; combining the individual, interaction, 
and institution orders of social identity with bonding, bridging, and linking social capital. 
 
As discussed in §4.2.2., overall social capital is an important component of a sustainable 
livelihood. Social networks represent a resource in terms of access to informal economic 
support and to economic opportunities that can grant income security (financial capital). In 
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addition, social capital appears to correspond closely to the empowerment side of human 
capital. Those ex-combatants who are better integrated into social networks, and thus have 
a stronger sense of social identity rooted in the community, perceive themselves as more 
able to affect change in their lives. However, perhaps the most essential way in which social 
capital appears to be connected to the other sustainable livelihood dimensions is through 
access to arable land (natural capital). Indeed, access to land in the GLR appears to be 
dictated through social connections for around half of all ex-combatants, and even more so 
for young (aged 18-30) and female ex-combatants.  
 
About half of ex-combatants in the GLR countries report accessing arable land by purchasing 
or renting it. These ex-combatants tend to be those who are over the age of 30 and with a 
track record of engaging in natural capital based livelihood strategies prior to mobilization 
into armed groups. In contrast, younger ex-combatants who have missed the opportunities 
for establishing land access and an economic track record while in armed groups tend to be 
granted access to, or inherit, family owned land. Perhaps not surprisingly, the vast majority 
of ex-combatants that access land via their family networks display higher levels of familial 
acceptance (bonding social capital). Another important pathway to land access for younger 
ex-combatants, but especially for female ex-combatants, is marriage. Through marriage, ex-
combatants can expand their bonding networks and in turn expand their access to socially 
allocated arable land resources. In this way, marriage is also a means through which ex-
combatants can leverage bonding social capital towards tangible economic resources. 
Indeed, the centrality of marriage as a mechanism for achieving social acceptance in the 
community and in turn for access to arable land is underscored in the following discussion of 
female ex-combatants in the GLR, who face distinct gender-based barriers in these regards. 
 
 
4.2.4 Female Ex-Combatants in the GLR: Gender, Stigma, & Marginalization 
 
Across the GLR countries female ex-combatants, almost without exception, stand out as the 
most disadvantaged segment of ex-combatants across the parameters of social and 
economic reintegration processes in the community. The mechanisms through which male 
ex-combatants reintegrate are often stalled in a state deadlock for female ex-combatants. In 
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this way female ex-combatants remain at clear risk for social isolation and economic 
marginalization.  
 
Across the GLR countries female ex-combatants are more likely to be mobilized under the 
age of 18, though they spend notably less time with armed groups. As with male ex-
combatants, the legacies of mobilization and wartime experiences are important for 
understanding the pathways to reintegration. For female ex-combatants in the GLR the 
challenges these legacies present are acute. The widespread experience of abduction, 
socialization in norms of violence, and exposure to sexual and gender-based violence that 
female ex-combatants may experience in conflict create extensive stigma based barriers to 
reintegration upon their return. In the eyes of communities,  female ex-combatants may 
have stepped outside of societal gender norms through their roles as roles within armed 
groups, whether forced or complicit in their actions, and face the prospect of severe social 
and economic marginalization as a result. Indeed, in many contexts across the GLR this 
stigma is so strong that some female ex-combatants avoid self-identifying as ex-combatants 
– in turn forfeiting access to the valuable assistance for that reintegration programming 
represents.  
 
One case in the GLR that reflects this issue is Rwanda, where as soldiers and refugees trickle 
back into the country from DRC they are set into tracks for assistance. Anecdotal evidence 
combined with the extremely low number of self-identifying female ex-combatants 
returning to the country suggests that many female ex-combatants choose to avoid ex-
combatant labeling due to the stigma associated with it. In the case of Rwanda special 
attention to the dynamics of return is essential to help illuminate this issue. The conflicts 
that Rwandan ex-combatants took part in during the Second Congo War, and subsequent 
local conflicts in North and South Kivu provinces, occurred almost wholly in Eastern DRC (see 
§1.2.1). This, combined with the fact that returning soldiers in Rwanda have spent a long 
time away from home (average 9.09 years), is what allows them to return to communities 
and, in a sense, choose their identity. Essentially community members cannot really know 
what ex-combatants were up to in DRC – whether they were soldiers or are the displaced 
persons (having fled west in the wake of the Rwandan genocide) that they sometimes return 
under the guise of. The truth may often be a mix of both. In this way female ex-combatants 
154 
 
returning to Rwanda maintain a strong control over both their “virtual” and “actual” 
identities. 
 
Stigma related issues might be even more detrimental for those female ex-combatants that 
return to settings where they have less control over the narrative of their experiences and 
actions. Kelly et al (2011) outline the dynamics of stigma in eastern DRC surrounding 
survivors of sexual violence – many of them ex-combatants. Female ex-combatants who are 
survivors of sexual violence may avoid being seen in public (e.g. going to the market or to 
church) or participating in economic activities for fear of being gossiped about. In doing so 
female ex-combatant survivors of sexual violence can become isolated from potential 
sources of social support in the community. Stigma may also come at them from within their 
family networks. Female ex-combatant survivors of sexual violence may return to husbands 
who believe that sexual contact with another man, irrespective of consent, means the 
marriage is void. Fear of sexually transmitted infections combined with external pressure 
from the community to reject female survivors of sexual violence can push husbands to 
reject their wives, depriving them of vital social and economic support. Indeed, Kelly et al 
(2011) note that husbands themselves can become targets of stigma and shame in the 
community for failing to protect their wives from abduction or sexual violence and can be a 
factor which can contribute to their decision to reject female ex-combatants upon their 
return. Stigma also shapes female ex-combatants prospects of marriage in the future. 
 
Indeed, lower levels of access to marriage is perhaps the core of the disadvantages that 
female ex-combatants hold. While female ex-combatants in the GLR countries generally 
report acceptance into existing familial networks upon return to communities, they face 
distinct barriers in expanding these networks through marriage. Female ex-combatants are 
the least likely demographic group, from ex-combatants or community members alike, to be 
married and the most likely to be divorced, separated, or widowed. Indeed, while male ex-
combatants in the GLR see a positive trajectory of improved marriage rates over time, 
female ex-combatants marriage rates are near stagnant. Male ex-combatants and 
community members alike communicate their general unwillingness to consider marriage 
with female ex-combatant, primarily due to stigma and fear related issues – lending 
explanation to female ex-combatants’ near stagnant access to marriage over time. It is likely 
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that economic considerations for attitudes towards marrying female ex-combatants play a 
role here too – as evidence suggests that female ex-combatants are disconnected from 
inheritance structures and may thus carry little economic value for male ex-combatants or 
community members through marriage. 
 
This social disadvantage in terms of marriage for female ex-combatants dynamically 
interacts with economic factors – notably access to arable land. As discussed in §4.2.2.2, 
movement into small-scale agriculture is the dominant economic trajectory for all ex-
combatants across the GLR. As such, access to arable land is an important control parameter 
shaping ex-combatants ability to actuate a sustainable livelihood through the mechanism of 
natural-capital based livelihood strategies. For male ex-combatants marriage and inheritance 
are important pathways to increasing land access. However, female ex-combatants, as the 
least marrying demographic across the GLR countries, do not access this pathway to 
increased land access and generally do not inherent land. In combination these factors 
contribute to an overall shallow reintegration trajectory for female ex-combatants in the 
GLR. This dynamic interaction of gender, stigma, marriage and access to arable land in the 
GLR countries is among the core structural barriers to reintegration processes that female 
ex-combatants must face. 
 
Further, female ex-combatants across the GLR have lower literacy, education, and skills 
levels (i.e. capacity side of human capital) than male ex-combatants; a factor which they 
identify as a barrier to engaging in human-capital based livelihood strategies. While female 
ex-combatants are more likely to be economically inactive they are also less likely to be a 
sole household breadwinner, and thus less exposed to the economic risk that this status 
represents in the GLR countries. It is likely that female ex-combatants are less commonly 
sole breadwinners because of their heavy reliance on immediate familial networks. Indeed, 
while female ex-combatants report general acceptance from their immediate family 
networks, they have few other social or economic networks and their overall bridging social 
capital in the community is weak.   
 
Female ex-combatants report lower levels of trust in the community and lower perceptions 
of improvement in trust over time than male ex-combatants. With a lack of social capital and 
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a lack of trust in the community, female ex-combatants report weaker perception of 
empowerment compared to male ex-combatants. Further, female ex-combatants across the 
GLR countries understand the range of disadvantages that they face; reflected in the fact 
that they consistently report perceptions of their overall weaker situation compared to 
others in society. Despite the expansive range of disadvantages that female ex-combatants 
face across nearly all parameters of social and economic reintegration processes, they 
consistently report a stronger sense of overall happiness, overall life satisfaction, and a 
better overall outlook on the future compared to male ex-combatants. These are curious 
findings indeed.  
 
While in almost every regard female ex-combatants are disadvantaged to male ex-
combatants, this is only half the story. To truly appreciate the context of the gender 
dimensions of reintegration in the GLR, and the possible programming related impacts, we 
to have to include a comparison of female ex-combatants to female community members in 
our analysis – rooting it the wider context of gender dynamics in the GLR countries. 
 
4.2.4.1 A Broader Transformation of Societal Gender Dynamics 
 
Across the GLR countries female community members have a very similar range of 
disadvantages to male community members as female ex-combatants do to male ex-
combatants. In effect, the space between female ex-combatants and female community 
members across parameters of social and economic processes is often little – though female 
ex-combatants are almost always disadvantaged to female community members. Perhaps 
the core advantage that female community members hold is their higher rates of marriage, 
better prospects for marriage in the future, and overall better integration into extended 
familial networks that contributes to stronger bonding social capital in the community. In 
other dimensions, such as gender discrimination in the livelihood related activities, female 
community members and ex-combatants have similar experiences of gender-based 
disadvantages – though it appears that ex-combatant status and the stigma that it carries 
can have an amplifying effect on the deeply ingrained gender inequalities that exist across 




There are of course subtleties to this overall picture of female disadvantage in the GLR 
countries. For example, female ex-combatants express senses of empowerment to control 
their lives and everyday activities at levels skewed slightly higher than female community 
members. This finding supports research that suggests that in some circumstances conflict 
can actually create opportunities for female empowerment - at the same time as it shapes 
predominantly negative gender and stigma based disadvantages (see e.g. Specht 2013). For 
example, female ex-combatants may have new identities of social and economic 
independence thrust upon them during their time with armed groups, and upon their return 
to communities who do not fully accept them. These new identities may represent a new 
forms of empowerment not possible within the confines of traditional gender norms, and at 
the same time cement female ex-combatants as violators of traditional norms – thus subject 
to stigma, rejection, and social and economic marginalization. For female ex-combatants 
returning to traditional gender identities may not be an option, or even desired. That is to 
say, reintegration into traditional gender norms may mean a return to gender-based social 
and economic marginalization (i.e. non-integration). 
 
Another subtlety worth mentioning is that female ex-combatants and community members 
in the GLR countries are more likely to be involved in microeconomic activities than males. 
This also aligns with previous research (see International Alert 2010) in the region that 
suggests that the large scale mobilization of men into conflict, and overall displacement 
dynamics may create an opportunity vacuum that females can exploit to attain 
microeconomic support programming - which they might have otherwise had to compete 
with males to a greater extent for. 
 
The fact remains that in the GLR countries female ex-combatants and community members 
share a broad range of gender-based disadvantages. These disadvantages are structurally 
ingrained and culturally reproduced. In this sense, the landscape that female ex-combatants 
in the GLR countries face as they navigate is fraught with the challenges of overarching 
gender disadvantages. If female ex-combatants are to gain parity with female community 
members, the amplifying effects of stigma-based gender disadvantages will no doubt serve 
as a barrier to entering the community. However, if female ex-combatants are rather to 
reach parity with male community members, a much deeper set of social-structural barriers 
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stand in their way – barriers that they and their female community member counterparts 
face together.  
 
Reintegration programming can play some role in addressing gender-based disadvantages to 
reintegration for female ex-combatants. The main way reintegration programming does this 
is through attempts to remain gender conscious and inclusive in all programming elements. 
This means, for example, that information and sensitization campaigns to the community 
about ex-combatants’ return can include special information about gender issues, and 
support of civic organizations can include specific provision for women’s groups. Economic 
reintegration programming delivering education or training, food and material resources, or 
financial support can do so with consideration to the societal expectations of women, and 
thus the limits and barriers women may face in participating in programming. The idea is 
through being gender conscious in program planning and implementation practitioners will 
be able to identify opportunities to contribute to the transformation local gender norms. 
However, this ambitious task may lie outside the ability of reintegration programming to 
directly affect. In a way reintegration is caught in the middle when it comes to gender based 
disadvantages. Reintegration programing must simultaneously take on a balance of 
recognizing traditional gender norms and reflecting them in programming, at the same time 
it must use reintegration programming as an opportunity to address the negative 
implications of those local gender dynamics for affecting the reintegration of female ex-combatants 
and contributing to the transformation of societal gender norms more broadly. 
 
 
4.2.5 Integrated Reintegration Processes 
 
In this sub-section we draw together the strands of argument from our previous discussions 
on mobilization & wartime experiences, sustainable economic livelihoods, social capital and 
social identity formation, and gender dimensions of reintegration to elaborate an integrated 
model of ex-combatant reintegration processes in the GLR.  
 
In Figure 4.6 (below) our previous schema of ex-combatant livelihoods pathways in the GLR 
(based on the asset pentagon) is visible on the right. Within the pentagon we can see 
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human-capital based livelihood pathways in red (from §4.2.2.1). Those ex-combatants with 
stronger human capital (in terms of capacity and empowerment) tend to, especially when 
combined with stronger social capital (blue arrow), have stronger financial capital (in terms 
of their incomes security and access to informal credit). With this improved financial capital 
ex-combatants are able to improve their physical capital (in terms of food and housing 
security), which in turn tends be associated with stronger human capital (in terms of 
empowerment). In green we see natural-capital based livelihood pathways (from §4.2.2.2). 
Those ex-combatants with natural capital (in the form of access to arable land) tend to have 
markedly stronger physical capital in terms of food and housing security. This physical capital 
improves ex-combatants’ financial capital in terms of income security by relieving food and 
housing related expenses. At the same time, as with human-capital based livelihood 
pathways in red, the physical capital security associated access to natural capital (in the form 
of access to arable land) is also strongly associated with stronger human capital in terms of 
empowerment. In terms of financial, physical, human, and natural capital, those ex-
combatants that achieve the most “sustainable” livelihoods in the GLR are those that 
combine some form of human-capital based (red arrows) and natural-capital based (green 
arrows) livelihood strategies. However, it appears that ex-combatants’ ability to flourish in 
either or both of these two livelihood pathways tends to plateau, and further progress is at 
least partially dictated by the slower moving processes of building social capital in terms of 






Figure 4.6 – Integrated Reintegration Processes 
 
To the left of the asset pentagon in Figure 4.6 we see the triangular schemata of social 
capital (from §4.2.3.1.) and of social identity (from §4.2.3.2.) combined into a diamond. 
Bonding, bridging, and linking social capital dynamically interact to produce an ex-
combatant’s overall level of social capital (blue arrows) in terms of their overall social 
connections in the community and their perception of trust and cohesion within these 
networks. Though, there tends to be an upward logic to the accumulation of bridging, 
bonding, and linking social capital, this pathway is not unidirectional. Those ex-combatants 
with stronger social capital tend of have four advantages within the sustainable livelihoods 
asset pentagon (blue arrows). First, those ex-combatants, especially younger and female ex-
combatants with stronger social capital see better natural capital in terms of access to arable 
land – which some extent a socially allocated resource. Second, ex-combatants with stronger 
social capital see stronger financial capital in terms of access to labor opportunities, loyal 
customer bases, and informal credit. Third, ex-combatants with stronger social capital tend 
to have stronger human capital in terms of their sense of empowerment. Fourth, ex-
combatants with stronger bonding social capital tend to have better physical capital in terms 




Orange arrows on the left side of the diamond show the pathways connecting social capital 
and social identity – the iterative dialogue of identification of similarity and difference 
between individuals and collectives. The three levels of social capital are highly congruent to 
the individual, interaction, and institutional orders of social identity (from §4.2.3.2.). In this 
way social capital, and the social networks that it represents, contribute to shaping 
individual ex-combatants’ sense of identity. This is the space where the negotiation of 
identity occurs. However, social identity is a complex and encompassing construct. Social 
capital is not the only factor that is important for identity. The other four forms of capital in 
the asset pentagon (orange arrows) are also important for shaping individual ex-combatants’ 
identity (discussed in §2.3.2.) in their eyes and the eyes of the community.  
 
A single black arrow in Figure 4.6 denotes a gender specific pathway. Marriage is a key 
mechanism through which all ex-combatants in the GLR countries expand bonding social 
capital into bridging social capital, and leverage these gains towards improvements in 
financial, human, and natural capital. However, for female ex-combatants in the GLR 
countries it appears that marriage is almost the only path to natural capital gains in terms of 
access to arable land. Troublingly, stigma based the barriers mean that female ex-
combatants face the lowest marriage rates of any ex-combatant or community member 
demographic group across the GLR countries. This dynamic of lack of access to marriage, 
when combined with the fact that female ex-combatants have the lowest skewed human 
capital in terms of both capacity and affect, means female ex-combatants face barriers to 
both of the predominant livelihood pathways (natural-capital based or human-capital based) 
in the GLR countries. The result is that female ex-combatants face not only economic 
insecurity, but these livelihood dimensions may feed back into female ex-combatants’ social 
identity and social capital. This negative feedback loop puts female ex-combatants in the 
GLR countries at extreme risk for continued social and economic marginalization. 
 
It is important that we take a moment to explicitly frame the model presented in Figure 4.6 
within the complex realist paradigm of science presented in §3.2.3, for doing so will add 
considerable continuity to our analysis. We conceptualize that each of the nine nodes in 
Figure 4.6 are control parameters in the individual-level system of ex-combatants in the GLR. 
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Each of these control parameters is made of sub-control parameters, and these are made up 
of further parameters. For example, we understand physical capital as a control parameter 
that is made up of (primarily) the two sub-control parameters of food and housing security. 
The sub-control parameters of food and housing security are defined by their component 
parts in a constellation of more specific parameters such as the regularity that members of a 
household go hungry or the type and tenure of housing. Collectively, all parameters 
constitute the “range of the possible” (or system space) in the system of ex-combatant 
reintegration as it is constructed in the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset. What we observe 
within these parameters (empirical domain) are the system traces (actual domain) for each 
individual ex-combatant. The system of ex-combatant reintegration is complex in that every 
control parameter directly or indirectly affects every other control parameter in a dynamic 
and near simultaneous manner. The position of all system traces together constitute the 
system state for each individual ex-combatant. In this mode of thinking, the lines between 
the social and economic spheres to reintegration are constructs (empirical domain) that 
simplify the complex and interconnected nature of all system traces (actual domain). Behind 
the inherent veil of our own gaze, in the real domain, the divisions between the social and 
the economic disintegrate – they are one and the same. 
 
Essentially what we are saying in Figure 4.6 is that everything is causing, and being caused 
by, everything else - embracing the ontological stance that reality is complex. However, 
there are patterns in this complexity. Each ex-combatant’s position in the processes of 
reintegration (system state) is in a constant and dynamic evolution (i.e. emergent, recall 
§2.1.1). However, where ex-combatants start their journey in the process of reintegration is 
determined by a number of factors. Demographic factors such as age, gender, and physical 
disability; historical factors such as mobilization and wartime experiences; and broader 
structural features of the post-conflict landscape such as the economic, political, and 
security contexts all play important roles in shaping ex-combatants’ “system states” at the 
outset of reintegration – and continue to serve as structuring forces that shape the ongoing 
processes of reintegration as they evolve. Within this multidimensional context, the control 
parameters identified in Figure 4.6 are important because they serve as, to use Bourdieu’s 
words, “structuring structures” that dynamically interact to observably shape the 
“dispositions” (Bourdieu’s phrasing), “tendencies” (Bhaskar’s phrasing), or “propensities” 
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(Popper’s phrasing) of system states over time. That is, those forces that regularly shape the 
trajectory of reintegration processes for individual ex-combatants over time. The causal 
interaction of these control parameters with broader contextual features of the GLR county 
settings is what allows mechanisms to produce reintegration processes. We have identified 
three mechanisms that occur when ex-combatants have the requisite properties within the 
control parameters, and when the context allows, that drive reintegration processes. 
Human-capital based and natural-capital based livelihood strategies are mechanisms 
through which ex-combatants in the GLR actuate the potential inherent in their skills and 
education, access to land, and other resources towards sustainable economic livelihoods. 
Marriage is a mechanism through which ex-combatants in the GLR leverage their acceptance 
in familial networks, and its implicit connection to their social identity, towards solidifying 
acceptance in the community, asserting their renegotiated social identity, and gaining access 
to socially allocated economic opportunities and resources (both tangible and intangible).  
 
In a sense, what we offer in Figure 4.6 is a map - a map of the system of individual ex-
combatant reintegration processes in the GLR. Like a map of the physical world is 
constructed as a representation of the features of the physical landscape, so too is our map 
a constructed representation of the landscape of ex-combatant reintegration processes in 
the GLR. Like the maps of explorers, there are still places unknown and paths uncharted. 
Inevitably our map will see revisions as we explore forward through continued scientific 
inquiry. The positions of geographic features in relation to one another may become more 
accurate, passages between them that may have remained hidden from view may be 
revealed. Also, just as a map of one valley in the physical world is not necessarily useful for 
understanding all valleys, so too our map of social and economic reintegration processes in 
the GLR may prove of limited usefulness in other regions where the context of reintegration 
processes vary. Most importantly, our view of the landscape (system) of ex-combatant 
reintegration is bounded by the lens through which we view it. In this sense, the specific 
data in the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset creates our lens – i.e. the “range of the 
possible”. Thus, not matter how much we attempt to pull back the veil to glimpse the “real” 
structures and mechanisms of reintegration processes, our map will always remain 
reflexively produced. Nonetheless, this map gives us a frame for thinking about the about 
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the broad strokes of the complex and dynamic individual level processes of ex-combatant 
reintegration in the GLR, and the causal mechanisms that underlie them. 
 
With this map of individual-level processes in hand, we now turn to an exploration of the 
collective trajectories of ex-combatants at a country level. It is at this point that we shift our 
focus away from each individual ex-combatants as a case, and instead refocus on each of the 
GLR countries as a case. At this point there is also a shift in the predominant mode of 
inquiry. We move from a predominantly process tracing-based mode of inquiry that has 
allowed us to explore the individual-level processes of reintegration, to predominantly 
comparative based mode of inquiry that will help us to explore the broader implications of 
these individual-level processes for understanding reintegration at a country level. In making 
this shift in focus paradoxes ensue. 
 
 
4.3 Country-Level Trajectories & Paradoxes 
 
In this section we shift our focus from the individual level processes and mechanisms of ex-
combatant reintegration to an exploration of the overall trajectories of ex-combatants at a 
country-level of analysis as they progress, or do not, relative to the trajectories of 
communities more broadly. The comparison of ex-combatant and community trajectories 
within and between each of the five GLR countries plays an especially important role in this 
effort. When viewed through a programmatic lens the insights gained through comparing 
the five GLR countries are especially paradoxical. This section precedes in two main 
subsections. First, we focus specifically on the case of DRC to explore the discord between 
the individual-level ex-combatant reintegration processes and mechanisms outlined in §4.2, 
and the programmatic assumption of parity between ex-combatants and community 
members (i.e. civilianization) along social and economic parameters as an indicator of those 
processes happening at a country level. We call this discord the paradox of parity. We argue 
that beyond mere parity, the country-level trajectories of communities play a structuring 
role that shapes and constrains ex-combatants’ trajectories at a country level. Second, to 
further illuminate the paradox of parity we use a complex realist framework to reframe 
country-level reintegration trajectories as comprised of three parts: ex-combatant 
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trajectories, community member trajectories, and parity trajectories. We use these three 
factors to elaborate a taxonomy of possible country-level reintegration trajectories and 
explore the implications for understanding the scope of possible reintegration programming 
impacts.  
 
4.3.1 The Paradox of Parity 
 
The idea that the level of parity between ex-combatants and community members across a 
broad range of social and economic reintegration parameters is an indicator of the extent of 
reintegration processes occurring is core to the logic by which reintegration policy and 
programming has been planned, executed, and evaluated in the GLR (discussed in §3.3.2.1). 
However, in this regard DRC presents a paradox. While ex-combatants in DRC do best across 
the GLR countries to move towards parity with community members, the processes of 
reintegration that are observable across the rest of the GLR countries (see §4.2.5) are only 
occurring to a very limited extent. How do we reconcile this discord between the relative 
absence of reintegration processes and the presence of high levels of parity?  
 
We approach this quagmire in two steps. First, we explore the unique dynamic of 
reintegration in the context of ongoing local conflict and insecurity in Eastern DRC. In this 
context barriers emerge, blocking reintegration processes from taking root. However, the 
social and economic challenges that exist in the context of ongoing local conflict and 
insecurity in Eastern DRC are not wholly unique to ex-combatants. Community members in 
Eastern DRC are also deeply disadvantaged in this volatile setting. Thus, secondly, we 
explore the role of community member trajectories in the core social and economic 
processes that underlie reintegration as a structuring force that enables or limits the 
possible trajectories of ex-combatant reintegration processes. 
 
4.3.1.1 DRC: Reintegration in the Context of Ongoing Local Conflict & Insecurity 
 
Since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003 DRC has been on a path of peacebuilding 
and slow recovery from the social and economic legacies of colonialism and the widespread 
corruption of the 1970’s and 80’s. Indeed, in 2006 and 2011 free elections were held 
peacefully in DRC, and security in Kinshasa has improved greatly. However, in Eastern DRC 
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insecurity and violence have persisted – shaped by a range of local and international actors 
(see §1.2.1). Indeed, the complex constellation of violent actors in Eastern DRC is a challenge 
to keep track of. Since 2004 the Government of DRC has worked to demobilize and 
reintegrate ex-combatants involved in the local conflicts in the eastern parts of the country, 
especially Kivu provinces, and has made considerable programming gains in this effort. 
However, due to the context of continued and quickly shifting local violence in Eastern DRC, 
many of the ex-combatants that go through reintegration programming begin the process of 
reintegration in the context of ongoing conflict and insecurity. This dynamic is unique across 
the GLR countries during the 2010-2012 period in which the TDRP GLR data was captured. As 
a result, ex-combatants and community members in DRC are significantly worse off in almost 
all social and economic parameters, despite the small space between them, than those in 
the rest of the GLR countries.  
 
Ex-combatants in DRC have spent the longest amount of time with armed groups before 
demobilization and are more likely to have been mobilized under the age of 18 compared to 
the other GLR countries. Despite this, ex-combatants in DRC do not appear to have 
significant disadvantages to the community at the outset of reintegration. Together ex-
combatants and community members in DRC perform worst compared to others in the 
other GLR countries in terms of human capital (education, skills, and empowerment) or 
natural capital (access to arable land and livestock ownership) - both which are essential 
components to the two primary livelihood pathways in the GLR. Indeed, ex-combatants in 
DRC engage in overall livelihood pathways towards human-capital based or natural-capital 
based livelihoods, or a combination of the two, that fits with that of the rest of the GLR 
countries. However, in the context of ongoing local conflict ex-combatant and community 
members in DRC are less successful in actualizing these livelihood strategies into stronger 
financial capital (in terms of income security) or physical capital (in terms of food and 
housing security). Ex-combatants and community members remain in a situation of ongoing 
food, housing, and income insecurity. In this regard, it appears that while ex-combatants 
may not have not missed out on much relative to the community while away in conflict 
because the community itself has missed out on so much through bearing the weight of 




Indeed, in the context of continuing insecurity in the Eastern DRC, ex-combatants and 
community members alike are exposed to a level of economic hardship considerably worse 
than that characteristic of the rest of the GLR countries. These are challenges ex-combatants 
and community members in DRC face together. However, the crux of understanding the 
weight of both ex-combatant and community member disadvantages in the context of 
ongoing conflict is in terms of social capital. Ex-combatants in DRC have the weakest familial 
networks in the GLR (bonding social capital). This is likely an effect of both the challenging 
social geography of eastern DRC, in which severely dilapidated transport infrastructure and 
mountainous terrain combined with heavy seasonal rains can make travel near impossible, 
and the large scale nature of displacement in the context of continuing violence and 
insecurity. Essentially, familial networks are physically dispersed by displacement, and this 
dispersion is maintained by ongoing insecurity and geographic factors. Even if ex-combatants 
have existing family networks that might be willing to accept and support them, they may 
have no way of knowing if they are alive or where they have been displaced to and how to 
contact them. In this sense, ex-combatants in DRC are often missing the basic social footing 
that many ex-combatants in the other GLR countries are afforded – a basic familial network 
to which to return.  
 
Though ex-combatants in DRC build new family networks through marriage on a similar level 
to community members, the absence of foundational familial networks appears to have 
serious consequences for ex-combatants in DRC in terms of social capital and the social 
cohesion in the community that it enables. Ex-combatants in DRC are the most likely group 
among the GLR countries to have no one to turn to for economic help; have the weakest 
feeling of togetherness with the community; feel they have the least amount of power to 
make important decisions in their life; perceive the weakest ability to control their everyday 
activities; are the least likely to perceive that they make a positive impact on the community; 
are the least likely to gather to express political concerns; the least likely to feel their voice is 
taken into account by leaders; the most likely to think their overall situation will deteriorate 
in the future; and have the lowest level of life satisfaction across the GLR countries. In terms 
of social change, DRC is the only GLR country where ex-combatants see drops in their 
perception of their overall situation relative to the rest of the community even though they 




However, the detrimental effects of ongoing local conflict and insecurity in DRC on social 
capital are not limited to ex-combatants in DRC. In contrast to the rest of the GLR countries, 
community members face similar dynamics of broken social networks. As a result, not only 
do ex-combatants lack the social capital necessary to leverage social and economic 
outcomes, but community members do as well. Thus, in the parts of Eastern DRC facing 
continued conflict and insecurity there is very little in the way of social capital, and in turn 
social cohesion, for ex-combatants or community members to leverage. In sense, these parts 
of Eastern DRC have very little in the way of a social fabric for ex-combatants to reintegrate 
into at all.  
 
It appears that the upward logic of bonding, bridging, and linking social capital (see §4.2.3.1.) 
does not function in the context of continued insecurity prevalent in Eastern DRC. Ex-
combatants and community members in DRC remain economically marginalized and socially 
incohesive (Horn 2013b; Kelly et al 2011; Lamb 2011). Large-scale displacement and the 
social geography of Eastern DRC keep bonding familial networks dispersed, and they thus 
cannot serve the role as a springboard by which ex-combatants and community members 
can interweave their social networks together. Even when ex-combatants in DRC marry a 
community member, which they do so at similar rates as ex-combatants in other GLR 
countries, they are more likely to be marrying a community member who is also lacking 
familial networks. Thus, marriage ceases to serve as a key mechanism for expanding social 
networks in the way that it does in the other GLR countries. In this context much of what we 
think of as the community loses analytical meaning - there is little social capital and little 
social cohesion in which to reintegrate.  Paradoxically, ex-combatant reintegration as parity 
in Eastern DRC may end up meaning return to settings of social and economic 
marginalization (i.e. non-integration). This is the paradox of parity.  
 
It is worth revisiting a passage from Colletta and Cullen (2002: 279) that we previously cited 
in §2.2.2.2., for it speaks well to the challenges that exist across society as a whole in the 




“Intrastate conflict divides the population, undermines interpersonal and 
communal group trust, and destroys norms and values that underlie cooperation 
and collective action for the common good, decimating social capital stocks – 
and, thus, exacerbating communal strife. This damage to a nation’s social fabric 
impedes the ability of states and communities to recover after hostilities cease. 
Even if other forms of capital are replenished, economic and social development 
will be hampered unless social capital stocks are restored. “ 
 
Indeed, in the context of ongoing local conflict characterized by extreme violence, sexual 
violence, displacement, abduction, and overall insecurity in Eastern DRC the undermining of 
trust, destruction of social norms and values, and decimation of social capital persist – 
perpetuating an ongoing cycle of social and economic marginalization.  
 
4.3.1.2 The Structuring Role of Community Trajectories 
 
Here we step back for a moment and attempt to distill the essence of the paradox of parity 
in DRC and to try to understand what this paradox means for our broader understanding of 
ex-combatant reintegration processes in the GLR. We argue that the case of DRC reveals the 
role of broader community trajectories as a structuring force that shapes ex-combatant 
trajectories themselves.   
 
Ex-combatants in DRC start the process of reintegration the least disadvantaged to the 
community in terms of parity compared to the other GLR countries. From this starting point, 
ex-combatants in DRC see slight improvements across social and economic parameters over 
time. These improvements are the smallest compared to those that ex-combatants in other 
GLR countries make. However, even though the improvements they make are slight, ex-
combatants in DRC quickly achieve the highest level of parity across core social and 
economic parameters with community members of any country in the GLR. Despite the 
strong parity between ex-combatants and community members in DRC, the underlying 
processes of ex-combatant reintegration that are consistently visible across the other GLR 
countries are only occurring to a limited extent. In the context of ongoing local violence, ex-




The core of understanding barriers that ex-combatants in DRC face revolve around the 
effects of continued local conflict and insecurity on the broader communities to which they 
return. Community members in DRC see a slightly negative trajectory in core social and 
economic parameters over time. So ex-combatants start not so far behind community 
members and make slight improvements, while at the same time community members make 
a slight decline. In this way, ex-combatants quickly hit the roof of their possible trajectory of 
improvement. The trajectory of communities serves as a structural limiter to the processes 
of reintegration. Even though parity is high, there is arguably no space for reintegration 
processes to progress forward.  
 
The structuring role of community trajectories on possible ex-combatant trajectories is 
driven home when we contrast DRC against the other GLR counties. In the other GLR 
countries ex-combatants start more disadvantaged to communities than in DRC. However, 
both ex-combatants and community members see positive trajectories with significant 
improvement over time. Even though ex-combatants in Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and 
Republic of Congo remain more disadvantaged to the communities over time in terms of 
parity, they have a continually expanding space for improvement. The roof of ex-combatants 
social and economic position is always moving up. In the more stable peacetime 
environments in the other GLR countries ex-combatants have been able use the upward 
trajectory of communities as a springboard for their own trajectory of improvement. In this 
way, community trajectories serve as a structural enabler in which the ex-combatant 
reintegration processes can take root. 
 
In some ways the idea that the broader social and economic trajectory of post-conflict 
societies is important for ex-combatant reintegration processes is no revelation. This may be 
what scholars and practitioners in the field of DDR mean when they say that context 
matters, even if they do not operationalize the analytical meaning of this idea – this is what 
we intend to do. As we will argue in the next section, taking the structuring role of 
community trajectories for ex-combatant reintegration seriously can have considerable 
implications for how we think about reintegration programming. Not least among these 
implications are those for how we understand reintegration programming impacts beyond 
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the notion of parity / civilianization. Specifically, how we think about the limits what it is 
possible for reintegration programming to achieve in certain contexts.  
 
 
4.3.2 Country-Level Reintegration Trajectories  
 
In this section we collect our insights on the nature of individual-level reintegration level 
processes and the role community trajectories as a structuring force on ex-combatants at a 
country-level to conceptualize the implications for our understanding of country-level 
reintegration outcomes, and the possible scope that exists for reintegration programming to 
affect these outcomes. This section proceeds in two subsections. Frist (4.3.2.1), we return to 
our meta-theoretical rooting in complex realism, and in doing so find a frame for 
conceptualizing the dynamics of ex-combatant reintegration at a country level. Second 
(4.3.2.2), with this conceptualization in place we move on to elaborate a taxonomy of 
possible country-level reintegration trajectories, and explore the programming related 
implications. 
 
4.3.2.1 Country-Level Trajectories in a Complex Realist Framework 
 
In our previous discussions in the methodology chapter (§3.2.3) we drew together two 
strands of thought, complexity science and critical realism, under the meta-theoretical 
banner of complex realism. Though the complex realist framework has implicitly guided our 
analysis throughout this chapter, it has only occasionally come to the fore. Now we return to 
complex realism to explicitly anchor our emerging understanding of country-level 
reintegration trajectories within this framework.  
 
Recall that at the country level we can think of ex-combatants and community members as 
existing within their own respective complex systems. These systems have a constructed 
“system space”, or in other words “range of the possible”, that is defined by the parameters 
by which we explore them. In our case, the variables of the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset 
define our construction of the system space for ex-combatant and community member 
systems in the GLR. Ex-combatant and community member systems are sub-systems that are 
distinct, yet have almost completely overlapping “system space”. Together they constitute 
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the larger super-system space of the country-level cases – because reintegration is about ex-
combatants and community members. Both ex-combatants and community member sub-
systems have a “system state”, which is the total of all actual observable positions of 
individual ex-combatants and community members (i.e. “system traces”) across the 
parameters that define their respective sub-system spaces.  
 
Over time, the position of traces in the system space move through causal processes. We 
have endeavored to explain the trajectories of these traces as they move over time by 
exploring the individual level processes and mechanisms of reintegration that are observable 
across the GLR countries. The combined trajectories of each pair of ex-combatant and 
community member sub-system states interactively produce the trajectories of each of the 
five country-level systems in the GLR (Rwanda, Uganda, DRC, RoC, and Burundi). As we have 
argued in in our discussion of the country case of DRC (§4.3.1.), the trajectory of the 
community member sub-system can have a structuring effect on possible trajectory of the 
ex-combatant sub-system. Another way to say this is that we think of the community sub-
system trajectory in a given country case itself as control parameter that shapes the possible 
trajectory of the ex-combatant sub-system, and in turn the trajectory of the broader country 
case super-system which they collectively constitute in a sort of “second order” process.  
 
Recall from our previous discussion of the TDRP approach to monitoring and evaluation 
(§3.3.2.1) that the extent of parity between ex-combatants and community members across 
key social and economic parameters is the predominant paradigm through which 
reintegration programming impacts are understood in the M&E of reintegration 
programming in the GLR. From the perspective of reintegration programming, a trajectory of 
improving parity between ex-combatants and community members would be grounds for a 
positive impact evaluation of reintegration programming. In the language of complex 
realism, parity is the amount of space between ex-combatant and community member sub-
system states. A trajectory of improving parity would mean that ex-combatant and 
community member sub-system states each have a trajectory towards the same part of the 
country-level super-system space. Complete parity would mean that ex-combatant and 
community member sub-system states occupied the same part system-space in the country-
level super-system. That is, there would cease to be any observable distinction between ex-
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combatant and community member. In this way, parity is indeed an important part of 
understanding reintegration impacts. 
 
However, as we outlined through the case of DRC (§4.3.1.), viewing programming impacts 
through the lens of parity alone is paradox inducing. In DRC, ex-combatants have the highest 
levels of parity across the GLR countries. Despite this parity, a closer examination of DRC 
reveals that the individual level processes of reintegration occurring in the other GLR 
countries are only visible to a very limited extent in DRC. In DRC ex-combatants return to 
contexts of continued insecurity, distrust, and pervasive poverty in which the social and 
economic processes that underlie reintegration all but absent. The negative effects of this 
context are also felt by community members, who themselves see a slightly negative 
trajectory over time. In this sense, the bar for parity is set low for ex-combatants in DRC. 
They may move towards parity quickly, but negative trajectory to the community represents 
a structural limit to their possible progress in reintegration processes. With these insights in 
mind, it appears that parity can obscure as much as it reveals, and that when used alone it 
may be an inadequate tool for understanding country-level reintegration. 
 
From the complex realist perspective parity itself implicitly points to the importance of 
understanding not only the trajectory of the amount space between ex-combatants and 
community members, but the position and trajectory of the ex-combatants and community 
members systems of which parity is a product of. This point may seem somewhat 
elementary, but it should not be discounted. As we have discussed in §3.3.2.1, the political 
incentives of the TDRP as a component of the broader World Bank institutions play an 
enormous role in shaping the overt focus on parity in programming impact evaluations, 
sometimes at the expense of other forms of relevant evidence.  To further develop this 
point, we move to elaborate taxonomy of possible country-level reintegration trajectories 
based on the trajectories of ex-combatants, community members, and the parity between 
them. Taking idea that all three of these factors are important seriously adds considerable 
nuance to how we understand country-level reintegration outcomes, and the scope of 





4.3.2.2 A Taxonomy of Possible Country-Level Reintegration Trajectories  
 
If we take the trajectories of ex-combatants, community members, and the parity between 
them as three control parameters that constitute overall country-level reintegration 
trajectories, then we can elaborate a basic taxonomy of possible country-level reintegration 
trajectories. If we dichotomize the trajectories of these three factors as either improving or 
declining then we have eight (23) possible combinations. These possible combinations are 




Figure 4.7 - Taxonomy of Country-Level Reintegration Trajectories 
 
We have broken the eight combinations into two 2x2 matrices, in the first matrix all 
combinations of ex-combatant (XC) and community member (CM) trajectories have 
improving parity, and in the second matrix all combinations have declining parity. We make 
two key assumptions: 1) we assume that ex-combatants always start disadvantaged to 
community members; and 2) that ex-combatant do not exceed community members in their 
social and economic position. These two assumptions are consistent within each of the GLR 
countries. With these assumptions in place, two cells in the matrices (shaded grey) are 
logically impossible combinations of the three factors. It is not logically possible for ex-
combatants and community members to see improving parity if ex-combatants, who always 
start disadvantaged to community members, see a declining trajectory while community 
members see and improving trajectory (matrix one, upper right-hand corner). Likewise, it is 
logically impossible for parity to decline, i.e. for the space between ex-combatants and 
community members to be growing, if ex-combatants are seeing a trajectory of 
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improvement while community members are seeing a trajectory of decline. With these two 
logically impossible combinations removed, there are six remaining cells for us to consider.  
 
We should reiterate here that the idea of trajectories of ex-combatant and community 
member populations in each of the GLR countries is a conceptual metaphor for their 
respective progress over time in the social and economic processes that underlie 
reintegration. These are the individual-level processes and mechanisms revolving around 
social identity, social capital, and sustainable livelihoods that we have outlined in the 
previous sections of this chapter.  
  
In the bottom right-hand cell in the first matrix (shaded green) in Figure 4.7, we see what 
from a reintegration programming perspective is an ideal country-level reintegration 
trajectory. As is presented in the schema in Figure 4.8 below, community members have a 
positive trajectory of change over time in social and economic processes over time, as do ex-
combatants. However, ex-combatants have a steeper trajectory of improvement and thus 




Figure 4.8 - Ideal Reintegration Trajectory 
 
We call this type of country-level reintegration trajectory an “embedded transition”. In this 
scenario, ex-combatants’ progress in in social and economic processes is embedded in the 
broader community’s improvements in the wake of peace. In this way, the community’s 
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upward social and economic trajectory serves as the springboard through which ex-
combatants can move towards parity. Ex-combatants’ negotiation of social identity and 
social capital is embedded in the broader communal processes of improving trust and social 
cohesion. Likewise, ex-combatants’ navigation of economic livelihood pathways is embedded 
in the broader community’s improving economic stability with growing opportunities for 
commerce. This embedded transition is exactly the type of country-level reintegration 
trajectory visible in Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and RoC (i.e. all GLR countries except DRC). 
These are very positive findings indeed.  
 
In this embedded transition country-level trajectory, reintegration programming can play an 
important enabling role for ex-combatants’ as they navigate social and economic processes 
through approaches designed to enhance, to the extent that it is possible, ex-combatants 
human, financial, physical, natural, and social capital. However, while reintegration 
programming can help shape ex-combatants’ positions in the various control parameters 
that are important for individual-level reintegration processes, it is still individual ex-
combatants themselves that are the agents of change in their lives. There are essential parts 
of individual-level reintegration processes, for example the negotiation of social identity and 
social capital, that reintegration programming can only peripherally affect. Further, the 
upward trajectory of communities in an embedded transition country-level trajectory means 
there is a constantly expanding space for improvement in ex-combatants’ social and 
economic position. For reintegration programming, this translates as a moving goalpost 
successful reintegration in terms of parity. It may be that reintegration programming in an 
embedded transition trajectory may play an important enabling role for ex-combatants, 
even if absolute parity is never achieved. Indeed, absolute parity at a country-level likely 
remains an intergenerational project that exceeds the temporal boundaries of reintegration 
programming.  
 
It is important to highlight that when an embedded transition trajectory is occurring, i.e. the 
social and economic positions of both ex-combatants and community members are 
improving, the trajectory of parity between ex-combatants and community members may 
actually be a reasonable standalone indication that individual-level reintegration processes 
are occurring. This may be one contributing factor for why organizations involved in 
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assessing the impacts of reintegration programming put such a heavy emphasis on parity. 
Organizations implicitly assume that with the establishment of peace, communities will 
rebound in positive trajectory of social and economic recovery and that reintegration 
programming will be able to help close the gaps ex-combatants and those rebounding 
communities. 
 
Moving on, all cells in the matrices in Figure 4.7 where ex-combatants see a negative 
trajectory over time (shaded in red) represent problematic country-level trajectories from a 
reintegration programming perspective. These three possible trajectories are presented in 
Figure 4.9 below. We call the country-level trajectory in the upper left-hand cell of the first 
matrix a trajectory of “community-led decline”. Both ex-combatants and community 
members see declining trajectories over time, i.e. they regress in social and economic 
processes, however community members do so more quickly. Similarly, we call the country-
level trajectory in the upper left-hand cell in the second matrix a trajectory of “ex-
combatant-led decline”. In this type of country-level trajectory, instead of community 
members, ex-combatants decline more quickly. Lastly, we call the country-level trajectory in 
the upper right-hand cell of the second matrix a trajectory of “ex-combatant rejection”. 
While community members achieve social and economic improvements, ex-combatants see 
extensive exclusion from these processes and an ultimate rejection from communities more 








There are no country cases in the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset that display any one of 
these three country-level trajectories. Thus, we must approach these three trajectories and 
the possible factors shaping them, speculatively. The ex-combatant rejection trajectory is 
easiest place to start. This trajectory is the antithesis of the embedded transition trajectory 
outlined above, and indeed is for what reintegration programming exists to prevent. In an 
ex-combatant rejection trajectory, communities would benefit from peace and engage in 
processes of social and economic improvement. Ex-combatants, however, remain excluded 
from these processes, and become ever more socially and economically marginalized from 
society. As outlined in the previous sections of this chapter, ex-combatants generally face a 
comprehensive range of social and economic disadvantages to the community. Missed 
opportunities for socialization, building a family and social connections, education, and 
establishing an economic livelihood; along with the legacies of mobilization and wartime 
experiences that manifest as psychosocial trauma and social stigma in the community that 
reduce their capacity to take part in and contribute to community are the starting points 
that ex-combatants may face in reintegration processes. If these disadvantages become 
ingrained, an ex-combatant rejection trajectory could emerge. 
 
There is an important role for reintegration programming to play in helping to address the 
disadvantages that ex-combatants face by serving as an enabler that, if successful, may help 
to turn an ex-combatant rejection trajectory into an embedded transition trajectory. So at 
the outset of reintegration programming an ex-combatant rejection trajectory would mean 
that there was an important job for reintegration programming to do, and a large scope for 
potential programming impacts. However, if an ex-combatant rejection trajectory were 
visible at the end of reintegration programming, it would be a clear indication of the failure 
of reintegration programming to impact reintegration processes. Moreover, this trajectory 
could represent a warning signal of the prospect for the remobilization of ex-combatants 
into armed groups, which in the context of rejection from communities could represent their 
best, if not only, social and economic opportunities. 
 
At first glance, community-led decline and ex-combatant-led decline trajectories seem more 
likely to be characteristic of the lead up to the outbreak of grievance-based conflict than the 
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period of recovery after the immediate cessation of conflict. Indeed, a country-level 
trajectory in which not just ex-combatants but communities more broadly, regardless of 
which declines more quickly, see a social and economic decline hardly seems characteristic 
of the establishment of peace – where one might expect to see a rebound in the trajectory 
of communities. Though DRC does not fit into either a community-led decline or ex-
combatant-led decline trajectories, it is illustrative as the only GLR country where 
communities do see a trajectory of decline over time. In DRC this negative community 
trajectory is precisely a result of the fact that peace has not been established. Ongoing local 
violence and insecurity mean that overall situation continues to deteriorate for both ex-
combatants and community members. It may be that a community-led decline or ex-
combatant-led decline trajectories could be characteristic of such settings of ongoing 
violence. Alternatively, community-led decline or ex-combatant-led decline trajectories 
could be a signal that even though violence may have been halted and security improved, 
underlying social and economic structural violence (see Galtung 1996) that may have driven, 
and perhaps transformed during, conflict may remain unresolved – pushing communities 
and ex-combatants into a negative trajectory despite that fact that the guns have stopped 
firing.   
 
In both community-led decline and ex-combatant-led decline trajectories the scope of 
possible reintegration programming impacts appears somewhat limited. While reintegration 
programming may play an enabling role in helping ex-combatants to make social and 
economic improvements, the broader community remains outside the mandated beneficiary 
group of reintegration programming. Thus, the trajectory of communities remains outside 
the potential of reintegration programming to directly affect. The best outcome that 
reintegration programming could hope to affect in such a setting is to turn a community-led 
decline or ex-combatant-led decline trajectory into the type of “limited transition” trajectory 
visible in DRC (discussed below). However, even this is a mixed success. Thus, the scope for 
potential reintegration programming impacts are limited. If visible at the end of 
reintegration programming, both community-led decline and ex-combatant-led decline 
trajectories would be causes of serious concern, and would be a clear signal that 
reintegration programming had failed to impact ex-combatant reintegration processes - to 
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the limited extent this is possible. The fact that none of these trajectories is visible across the 
GLR countries is a positive finding indeed.  
 
It is important to highlight that the in a trajectory of community-led decline, parity between 
ex-combatants and community members would actually be improving, while the overall 
situation would be clearly deteriorating. This observation reinforces the idea that in many 
contexts parity alone may be insufficient for understanding the strength of reintegration 
processes.  
 
Returning to Figure 4.7, from a reintegration programming perspective the cells in shaded 
orange represent mixed success trajectories. These two trajectory types are presented in 
Figure 4.10 below. We call the type of country-level trajectory in the lower left-hand cell of 
the first matrix of Figure 4.7 a “limited transition” trajectory - in contrast to the embedded 
transition trajectory. Ex-combatants see improvements through social and economic 
processes, however communities more broadly see a decline in these same processes. The 
broader societal upswing which ex-combatants are able to implant themselves within in the 
embedded transition trajectory is not present. Thus, ex-combatants quickly hit the roof of 
their possible improvement. As discussed at length in §4.3.1.1., this is exactly the trajectory 
that is visible in DRC. In DRC we attribute the subtle decline of communities to a dynamic of 
ongoing local conflict and insecurity that continually undermines social cohesion and 
economic activity.  
 
 




From a programmatic perspective, a limited transition trajectory can be thought of as a 
mixed success. The structuring role that the trajectory of the broader community plays for 
limiting the upward trajectory of ex-combatant reintegration processes means that there is 
also a limit to the scope of possible reintegration programming impacts. In a limited 
transition trajectory, reintegration programming may be able to play an important enabling 
role in helping ex-combatants get back on their feet. Indeed, in such a setting of broader 
community decline ex-combatants themselves might see a trajectory of decline without the 
targeted support of reintegration programming. In this way there is scope for reintegration 
programming to serve as an important factor that drives a country away from community-
led or ex-combatant-led decline trajectories (described above).  However, due to the 
trajectory of the broader community, it is appears unlikely that programming can achieve 
the more transformational impacts of the embedded reintegration trajectory. Even if, with 
the support of reintegration programming, ex-combatants were to meet the community 
trajectory and achieve absolute parity, they might then join the overall trajectory of decline 
once targeted assistance ceased.  
 
Indeed, if ex-combatants did exceed the social and economic positon of the community this 
would be of equal cause for alarm. Indeed, even if communities only perceive ex-combatants 
as better off than themselves, or even as receiving more or undeserved assistance, this can 
breed serious resentment in the community that and actually create social barriers to 
reintegration. The experiences of numerous reintegration programs speak well to this point 
(Schelhofer-Wohl & Sambanis 2010). As Shibuya (2012: 134) points out, this is a precarious 
line for reintegration programming to walk:  
 
“As the distinction between “combatant” and “civilian” becomes less meaningful 
within the community, financial and other assistance should be disbursed 
towards the larger community rather than to individual combatants. In post-
conflict situations where this distance is not great in the first place, reintegration 
assistance that targets individual combatants can cause resentment, and even in 
situations where special incentives for combatants is a good idea, over time 
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doing so will perpetuate the distinction that the assistance is meant to 
eliminate.” 
 
Though second generation DDR programs have taken on a broader set of responsibilities and 
agendas, no reintegration program alone will solve the large-scale dynamics that drive 
conflict afflicted communities into negative trajectories. Indeed, it is not even in the 
mandates of reintegration programs, whose primary beneficiaries remain ex-combatants, to 
affect communities directly. In the worst case, a limited transition trajectory may mean that 
ex-combatants “reintegrate” back into a setting of insecurity, distrust, and poverty that may 
have played a role in the grievances that drove mobilization into armed groups in the first 
place. That is to say, a setting of marginalization or non-integration. This is risky prospect, as 
without broader improvements across communities armed groups may continue to 
represent the best, if not only, modes of social and economic survival for ex-combatants. If 
the factors that limit ex-combatants upward trajectory exist outside the mandate, or even 
ability, of reintegration programming to affect, then even the best planned and executed 
reintegration program could only achieve a limited impact. It may be that limited transition 
trajectories, like in DRC, where high levels of parity between ex-combatants and community 
members is achieved, but this parity is shrouded in the veil of broader community decline, 
represent a mixed success or a “level of acceptable failure” for reintegration programming. 
The impacts are suboptimal, but it is likely that the sort of embedded transition that 
reintegration programs implicitly assume is happening is not yet possible in such a setting. 
 
Lastly, we call the country-level trajectory in the cell in the lower right-hand corner of the 
second matrix in Figure 4.7 a trajectory of “long-term exclusion”. While both ex-combatants 
and community members see improvements through social and economic processes, 
community members do so to a greater extent than ex-combatants, and thus gap between 
them grows over time (declining parity). Again, as with three problematic reintegration 
trajectories described above, there are no country cases in the GLR that reflect this 
trajectory and so our ideas remain somewhat speculative. In contrast to “community-led 
decline” and “limited transition” trajectories, which show that parity between ex-
combatants and community members can be improving while the overall situation is 
disintegrating, the “long-term exclusion” trajectory shows that the overall situation can be 
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improving for both ex-combatants and community members while at the same time gap 
between them is widening. This trajectory would be a mixed success in terms of 
reintegration programming impacts. The risk is that even though ex-combatants are seeing 
social and economic improvements, in the long-run they end up as becoming solidified as a 
marginalized segment of society. However, if in this context of social and economic 
improvement ex-combatants perceive themselves as included in the broader societal 
transformation, even though there is a widening gap in their actual social and economic 
positions, this may buy considerable breathing space for reintegration programming to help 
address special barriers that ex-combatants face in catching up to community members. 
Perceptions, however, can prove fickle, and reintegration programming will still have an 
important job to do even if the immediate urgency is somewhat relieved.  
 
An important take away from reflecting on these six different country-level reintegration 
trajectories is that collectively they emphasize the equifinality (and for that matter 
multifinality) of parity outcomes. There are multiple pathways to parity between ex-
combatants and community members, but not all of these pathways represent reintegration 
in a meaningful way beyond the idea of civilianization (see §2.1.2). The trajectories of ex-
combatants, community members, and the parity between them in combination are 
important for understanding the different contexts in which parity does or does not occur. 
This insight offers a framework for contextualizing reintegration programming impacts 
beyond this overarching emphasis or parity alone. However, here we can segue to another 
fundamental question that we have let hang in the background of our analyses. Namely, 
does reintegration programming “cause” country-level reintegration trajectories? 
 
We should emphasize that there has been no systematic capture of reintegration 
programming in the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset, and thus our ability to draw causal 
connections between reintegration programming and ex-combatant trajectories through 
systematic analysis is negligible. However, what our previous discussion of the underlying 
social and economic processes reveals is some of the key control parameters of ex-
combatant reintegration processes which reintegration programming can affect. The extent 
to which reintegration programming in the GLR countries actually has affected these key 
control parameters has not been the focus of our analysis. However, the lack of empirical 
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capture of reintegration programming may not stand in the way of reasoning logically about 
the extent of possible causal impact from reintegration programming on country-level 
reintegration trajectories. In light of our taxonomy of possible country-level reintegration 
trajectories, we can reason that reintegration programming can affect, at most, half of the 
equation that determines country-level reintegration trajectories. No reintegration program 
can affect the broader social and economic trajectories of post-conflict societies. At the 
same time, the scope of possible reintegration programming impacts is highly dependent on 
the very community trajectories that it can only peripherally affect. This insight underscores 
the point that reintegration programs must be situated in the context of the broader 
peacebuilding and development initiatives in a given setting that may actually play a more 
significant role in steering community trajectories. Indeed, expanding the scope of possible 
reintegration program impacts is dependent on doing so. 
 
For as long as there has been war ex-combatants have faced the challenges of reintegration, 
with or without external help. In the wake of conflict, ex-combatants must navigate a 
complex and interconnected set of social and economic processes as they return to society. 
Ex-combatants’ paths in these processes may be limited by their personal traits and 
histories, the legacies of mobilization and wartime experiences, and the broader structural 
context of the post-conflict environment. As we argue in §1.3.2, in a critical or complex 
realist framework, the processes that ex-combatants navigate exist independently of the 
normative policy and programming that are meant to affect them. With this perspective in 
mind, the role of reintegration programming can be understood as an enabler. Reintegration 
programming may shape, and then capitalize on, the momentum of reintegration processes 
by affecting the control parameters of individual-level reintegration processes (e.g. human 
capital). Indeed, effective reintegration programming may ease the unique social and 
economic barriers that ex-combatants face, and may not have otherwise overcome without 
assistance. However, it remains ex-combatants themselves who navigate these processes. In 
this sense, it may be a combination of reintegration programming and ex-combatants’ own 
agency in navigating a context of opportunities and barriers that the individual-level ex-




Even though reintegration programming may play an important role for ex-combatants as 
they navigate reintegration trajectories, it does not directly do so for community members. 
Indeed, as highlighted in the discussion above, the trajectory of community members may 
play a role as a structuring force on the possible extent of ex-combatant trajectories. 
Communities are the context into which ex-combatants must reintegrate, and the trajectory 
of this context matters enormously for the overall country-level reintegration trajectory. 
Though reintegration programming can peripherally improve the position of community 
members, for example through community-based approaches programming delivery, 
programming directly targeting community members directly is outside the mandate of 
reintegration programming. The primary beneficiary group of reintegration programming 
remains ex-combatants. In this way, half of the equation of country-level reintegration 
trajectories is outside the ability of reintegration programming to affect directly. So, the 
extent of causal force that we can attribute directly to reintegration programming is 
somewhat limited. Reintegration programming can play an enabling role in ex-combatant 
trajectories, but because it cannot shape community trajectories, it is ultimately unable to 
wholly steer country-level trajectories. In this way, reintegration may not be the 
“determinate” causal force behind country-level trajectories, but it is an important part of 
the equation.  
 
 
4.4 Summary of Analysis  
 
In this chapter we have endeavored to describe and interpret the individual-level social and 
economic processes by which ex-combatants reintegrate into communities. Further, we 
have endeavored to move beyond mere description to consider the broader implications 
these individual-level social and economic reintegration processes hold for how we 
understand ex-combatant reintegration at a country-level, and the possible role that 
reintegration programming can play. 
 
The process of reintegration that ex-combatants across the GLR face entails numerous 
transformations along social and economic lines. These ex-combatant transformations are 
embedded in larger the larger transformations of post-conflict societies. To understand 
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reintegration processes requires understanding the context in which they occur. The 
processes by which ex-combatants build sustainable economic livelihoods is be understood 
when contextualized within broader economic trajectories of the communities to which they 
return. The processes by which ex-combatants build social capital is best understood when 
contextualized in the broader project building social cohesion and of reweaving the social 
fabric of communities. The processes by which female ex-combatants approach gender 
based disadvantages is best understood when contextualized in the broader gender 
dynamics in the communities to which they return. The challenges of reintegration, of 
transitioning from war and moving towards peace, are challenges that ex-combatants and 
communities across the GLR face together.  
 
Adopting an analytical approach to acknowledging the interconnected nature of ex-
combatants and the communities they return to is important. The taxonomy of country-level 
reintegration trajectories presented in this chapter helps us understand the scope of 
reintegration programming impacts at the outset of reintegration programming, the ways in 
which country-level trajectories and possible impacts may shift during programming life 
cycles, and the extent to which we can directly attribute these shifts in country-level 
















5 Summary & Conclusions 
 
This chapter proceeds in two sections. First (§5.1), a summary of the context, core issues, 
theoretical and methodological approaches, and findings of this doctoral thesis is presented. 
Second (§5.2), we delve into a deeper discussion of the analytical contributions to 
reintegration research that the findings in this doctoral thesis represent, and in turn discuss 




Since the early 1990’s, the Great Lakes Region (GLR) has been devastated by a wave of 
interconnected interstate, intrastate, and local conflicts involving hundreds of thousands of 
soldiers in dozens of armed groups. An important part of the international community’s 
approach to peacebuilding in the region has involved the disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration of armed groups. Because of the transnational nature of many armed groups in 
the GLR, a regional approach to DDR has been adopted. The World Banks Multi-Country 
Reintegration Program (MDRP) and Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program 
(TDRP) have been key institutions involved in facilitating national efforts for the 
demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants across the region through their role as a 
funding mechanism, a technical advisor, and as responsible for monitoring and evaluation 
(M&E). 
 
While DDR has evolved considerably since 1990’s, the reintegration component remains 
among the cruxes. One reason for the enduring challenge of reintegration is that while 
technical approaches to the delivery of reintegration programming have become ever more 
refined, the nature of the fundamental social and economic reintegration processes that 
reintegration programs aim to affect have remained largely unproblematized. We call this 
the programming - process divide. The mixed track record of DDR programs in the GLR, and 
around the world, speaks to the idea that without a deep understanding of the endogenous 
social and economic processes of reintegration, reintegration programs might risk becoming 




Through the M&E of reintegration programming in the GLR, the TDRP has collected vast 
amounts of social and economic survey data on ex-combatants and community members. 
Previously, this data has been used to evaluate the extent of reintegration programming 
impacts in specific GLR country contexts. However, in 2013 the TDRP merged a series of 
survey datasets from across five GLR countries (Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, DRC, and RoC) 
captured between 2010 and 2012. The merged TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset allows for 
the investigation of reintegration beyond single cases - opening the door to systematic 
comparative analyses of the social and economic reintegration processes that individual ex-
combatants navigate across GLR as a whole. Through exploring the similarities and 
differences of reintegration processes across and within the GLR countries, fundamental 
components of those processes that exist across differing country contexts may emerge. 
Identifying common threads and key differences in reintegration processes across the GLR 
countries can help refine approaches to delivering reintegration programming as well as 
shed light on our understanding of the scope of past and possible future programming 
impacts. These prospects have been the point of departure for this doctoral thesis. 
 
5.1.2 Theoretical & Methodological Approaches 
 
In approaching the endeavor of exploring the social and economic processes of ex-
combatant reintegration in the GLR we have employed a concert of theoretical perspectives 
from the social sciences. Ex-combatant reintegration is a complex and multifaceted 
transition along social, economic, and political lines. However, reintegration is no new 
phenomenon. While there is a tendency in the literature on ex-combatant reintegration to 
ignore the vast wealth of existing social scientific literature on reintegration of different 
groups (e.g. veterans and ex-prisoners) - we need not start from scratch. In this vein, we 
adopt social identity theory, social capital theory, and sustainable livelihoods theory as three 
complementary conceptual frameworks for exploring ex-combatant reintegration processes 
in the GLR.  
 
From social identity theory we learn that individual ex-combatants’ transitions from soldier 
to civilian identities is a process of iterative negotiation between ex-combatants and the 
communities they return to. Ex-combatants that are successful in this process can build trust 
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in the community over time and eventually gain access to the broader platform of social 
cohesion that communities represent. Conversely, those ex-combatants that falter may find 
themselves stigmatized - pushed to the margins of society. The gender dimensions of social 
identity represent especially fraught territory for both male and female ex-combatants, who 
after prolonged participation in violent conflict may struggle to conform to traditional 
gender identities in their communities of return. The paradox for reintegration programming 
is that it puts the former members of armed groups out in the open and labels them as ex-
combatants. At the same time reintegration programming must attempt to transform the 
societal meaning of the ex-combatant label away from that of an inherent threat, instead 
redefining it to denote a trustworthy and contributing member of society.  
 
Deeply related to social identity theory is social capital theory. If social identity theory tells 
us about the processes by which ex-combatants negotiate identity and community 
membership, then social capital tells us about the importance of the networks of 
relationships that ex-combatants are able to build on the basis of trust and acceptance. To 
some extent, strong social networks in the community are a signal of the successful 
renegotiation of social identity. In the post-conflict settings across the GLR the state’s ability 
to provide support to ex-combatants is often extremely limited. In addition, economic 
opportunities to support oneself remain extremely limited. Social networks based on shared 
norms of trust and reciprocity represent an indispensable source of tangible and intangible 
social and economic support for ex-combatants. This informal support can mean the 
difference between remaining on the margins of society, or moving towards inclusion in its 
core. In this sense social capital and social identity are inextricably interrelated. Ex-
combatants must navigate the processes of negotiating social identity and community 
membership in order to gain access to social networks. At the same time without any social 
connections in the community, especially familial networks, ex-combatants’ ability to engage 
in the process of social identity negotiation may remain limited.  
 
Focusing more directly on the economic side of reintegration, the sustainable livelihoods 
framework helps us to move beyond understanding poverty as merely a lack of income. In 
the sustainable livelihoods framework we are able to explore a more inclusive set of 
resources that ex-combatants struggle to attain. Forms of financial, physical, natural, human, 
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and social resources are important for ex-combatants’ overall ability to establish a 
“sustainable” economic livelihood that can cope with the volatility of the post-conflict 
environment. Expanding our understanding of livelihoods allows us to see the economic 
opportunities, as well as barriers, that exist for ex-combatants as they reintegrate. The 
sustainable livelihoods framework pairs well with social capital theory and social identity 
theory through its emphasis on the importance of social connections in informal settings for 
actualizing economic outcomes, and the ways in which economic outcomes can feed back 
into social identity and social capital.  Collectively the theories of social identity, social 
capital, and sustainable livelihoods form the backbone of conceptual approach utilized in 
this doctoral thesis. 
 
Like the conceptual approach, the methodological approach utilized in this doctoral thesis is 
a synthesis of diverse philosophical, conceptual, and operational approaches from across the 
social sciences. At the outset we take seriously the idea that reintegration is a complex 
phenomenon. With this in mind, we elaborate complex realism as a meta-theoretical 
framework that can help us understand what exactly complexity is, and the demands it 
creates for the scientific investigation of reintegration processes. With this meta-theoretical 
framework in place, we explore the origins of the TDRP-GRL Reintegration Dataset, the 
primary data source in this doctoral thesis. The dataset was produced through the M&E of 
reintegration programming in the GLR. Thus, we explore the nature and logic of M&E, as 
well as the political forces that shape the TDRP’s approach to the M&E of reintegration 
programming in the GLR. In the end, we argue that we cannot consider the TDRP-GLR 
Reintegration dataset as a neutral or objective representation of reality, but rather that it is 
a constructed representation that carries with it certain inbuilt positionalities in terms of the 
form and scope of data. Going forward, the comparative case-study approach that we 
outline is a conscious attempt to shed, to the extent that it is possible, some of this inbuilt 
positionality.  
 
We argue that case-study research approaches are appropriate for our inquiry into the 
processes of ex-combatant reintegration for two main reasons. First, case-study research is 
particularly attuned to the goals of understanding causal processes and the mechanisms that 
govern them. This is especially important considering our research focus on ex-combatant 
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reintegration processes. Second, case-study research seats well within the realist paradigms 
of science, both critical and complex varieties, which we developed as the meta-theoretical 
foundation of our inquiry. This analytical continuity proves especially important as we 
develop the idea of reintegration trajectories later in the analysis. With these arguments in 
place, we outline the comparative case-study strategy utilized in this doctoral thesis, 
including the specific method of processes tracing from quantitative data. Thus, it is the 
combination of complex realism, case study methods, and processes tracing that forms the 




The findings are divided into two parts. First (§5.1.3.1), the bulk of the findings surround 
identification of some of the social and economic processes and mechanisms by which 
individual ex-combatants across the GLR countries reintegrate into communities. Second 
(§5.1.3.2), based on the outlier case of DRC we develop the concept of country-level 
reintegration trajectories as a higher-order component of country-level reintegration 
processes across the GRL.  
 
5.1.3.1 Processes & Mechanisms 
 
Despite the unique trends within each of the five GLR countries, as well as the differentiated 
experiences of special subgroups like disabled ex-combatants and female ex-combatants, ex-
combatants across the five GLR countries as a whole display a remarkably similar range of 
social and economic reintegration experiences. This in itself is a significant finding, as it 
speaks to the idea that though individual ex-combatant experiences are unique, there is a 
generalizable range of reintegration processes across the region. It is apparent that lengthy 
participation in armed groups costs ex-combatants in the GLR much in terms of missed 
opportunities. Indeed, many ex-combatants across the GLR, especially younger ex-
combatants who are especially likely to have been mobilized as children, have missed 
normal opportunities for education, building an economic track record, socialization, and 
marriage. Thus, ex-combatants begin the processes of reintegration with significant 
disadvantages to their community members counterparts. However, the legacies of 
mobilization and wartime experience go beyond missed opportunities. Ex-combatants with 
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physical disabilities can never leave their wounds of war behind. Likewise, psychosocial 
trauma represents an enduring legacy of mobilization and wartime experiences that may 
serve as a barrier to ex-combatants’ full reintegration into society. The dynamics of 
psychosocial trauma are poorly understood in the context of ex-combatant reintegration, 
and represent an important topic in emerging and future research.  
 
In terms of the processes of economic reintegration in the GLR, the majority of ex-
combatants have been able to get on their feet quickly, though they remain disadvantaged 
to community members. Ex-combatants tend to follow one, or a combination, of two distinct 
livelihood strategies that serve as mechanisms through which sustainable livelihoods are 
achieved. First, human-capital based livelihood strategies revolve around small business and 
skilled or unskilled wage labor. We call these human-capital based because it appears that 
ex-combatants’ levels of education and skills training can play an important role in 
determining their capacities for business or labor. Those ex-combatants with more 
education and training that take human-capital based livelihood strategies tend to have 
more secure income, food, and housing, and also tend to have a stronger sense of 
empowerment. However, the broader features of severe underdevelopment pervasive 
across the post-conflict landscapes of the GLR countries mean that, despite individual 
capacities, there are few opportunities for small business or wage-based labor. Social 
connections become extremely salient accessing economic opportunities. Those ex-
combatants with weaker familial and communal networks may have trouble accessing 
socially allocated labor opportunities or establishing a loyal customer base, and can fall into 
an unstainable loop of informal subsistence borrowing (primarily from familial networks – to 
the extent they exist) to cover their income, food, and housing shortages. In contrast, those 
ex-combatants with stronger familial and community networks, who in turn are more 
successful in accessing human-capital based livelihood opportunities, are more likely to 
borrow through formal channels and to reinvest in their livelihood or overall living situation.  
 
A second livelihood strategy consistently visible across the GLR countries is that of natural-
capital based livelihood strategies. Natural-based livelihood strategies are based around 
small-scale farming, making access to arable land paramount. Most ex-combatants in the 
GLR only participate in subsistence-level agriculture, but even this is associated with stronger 
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food, housing, and income security, as well as empowerment. However, because of the 
seasonal nature of agriculture in the GLR subsistence-level agriculture is rarely a viable 
stand-alone livelihood pathway for the vast majority of ex-combatants in the GLR. However, 
those ex-combatants with greater access to arable land are more likely to be able to produce 
enough yield to move beyond subsistence and turn a small profit that can help carry them 
through the off-season. In some cases, profits can even facilitate the purchase or rent of 
more arable land. However, for many ex-combatants and community members alike access 
to arable land is socially allocated through inheritance or marriage. Thus, acceptance within 
familial and communal social networks is extremely important for natural-capital based 
livelihood pathways.  
 
An important finding from our examination of economic reintegration is that stronger social 
capital, especially bridging social capital, appears to be a differentiating factor between 
those ex-combatants that are more successful in their livelihood strategies and those who 
are less so. While there are many ex-combatants that take one livelihood pathway or the 
other, those ex-combatants that take a combination of human-capital based and natural-
capital based livelihood strategies which achieve the most “sustainable” livelihoods in the 
GLR. Overall ex-combatants across the GLR make quick progress in economic reintegration 
processes, but tend to plateau without also engaging in the slower set of social reintegration 
processes. In this way, the social and economic dimensions of reintegration processes are 
deeply intertwined. To some extent, social reintegration processes may even appear as a 
necessary condition for more meaningful economic reintegration.  
 
Generally speaking, communities across the GLR have provided a positive social setting for 
ex-combatants to return to. Community members express less fear of ex-combatants over 
time and are more likely to describe them as positive contributors to the community. 
Despite this, social barriers for ex-combatants persist. Most ex-combatants are quick to 
develop a base of bridging social capital within their pre-existing family networks, to the 
extent that they have them. However, ex-combatants are slower to build bridging social 
connections within the community more broadly. Ex-combatants’ weaker bridging social 
capital can have direct consequences for their economic prospects. Marriage is an important 
mechanism through which ex-combatants expand their bonding and bridging networks. 
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However, residual stigma in the community means that ex-combatants face social barriers to 
accessing marriage. The paradox for social reintegration is that marriage is a key mechanism 
for expanding social capital, and in turn improving economic prospects, as well as signaling a 
shift in social identity within the community. However, marriage remains blocked for most 
ex-combatants until they can erode stigma, build acceptance, and renegotiate identity - the 
very thing marriage itself is a mechanism to achieving. Thus, for most ex-combatants social 
reintegration remains a slow process of building trust and acceptance in the community. The 
stakes are high, if ex-combatants are not successful in engaging in the slow processes of 
social reintegration the risk is that they may become cemented as a socially and economic 
marginalized segment of society. Due to missed opportunities for socialization in peacetime 
societal norms, and the additional weight of possible psychosocial trauma, some ex-
combatants may be inept in interacting with communities to build trust and acceptance. On 
the other side of the equation, communities may be resistant to fully accepting ex-
combatants due to cultural stigma.  
 
The social barriers to reintegration are especially pronounced for female ex-combatants, 
who face unique identity and stigma based barriers to social reintegration. Female ex-
combatants in the GLR are more likely to be mobilized as children, and particularly likely to 
have been mobilized through forced abduction. Wartime experiences such as missed 
opportunities for normal personal social and economic development, indoctrination in 
violent social norms, and extreme exposure to sexual violence and slavery are particularly 
acute for female ex-combatants. Many female ex-combatants may have been coerced into 
indirect roles in violent conflict as cooks, messengers, or bush wives. However, upon their 
return to communities these female ex-combatants may still be perceived as willing 
collaborators – stigmatized as untrustworthy, of no economic value, undesirable, and 
unmarriageable. There are also those female ex-combatants that may adopt hyper-
masculine norms of violence and take an active role in combat. Upon returning to 
communities these female ex-combatants may be perceived as breaking traditional 
community norms of femininity – leaving them equally stigmatized.  
 
As a consequence of stigma, female ex-combatants are the most socially and economically 
disadvantaged subgroup across the GLR countries, facing profound barriers to reintegration 
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and continued risk for marginalization. However, reintegration for female ex-combatants 
may not be as simple as a return to traditional gender roles. A dynamic may emerge during 
reintegration where female ex-combatants are forced to take on traditionally masculine 
social and economic roles (e.g. head of household or sole-breadwinner) to cope with their 
overall marginalization in the community, in doing so female ex-combatants may perpetuate 
the perception that they are violators of traditional gender norms. However, despite their 
absolute disadvantages some female ex-combatants may find forms of independence and 
empowerment thrust upon them that were not available under traditional patriarchal 
gender norms. Essentially, a return to traditional gender norms may not be desirable, let 
alone possible. For female ex-combatants reintegration may cease to be about “catching up” 
to female community members, but about establishing new gender identities – identities 
that could lead to a broader transformation of societal gender norms. 
 
Based on the discussion of mobilization and wartime experiences, social and economic 
processes, and gender dimensions to reintegration, we elaborate an integrated model of the 
system of reintegration processes visible across the GLR countries. This model is explicitly 
conceptualized within the complex realist meta-theoretical approach. In a sense, the 
integrated model is as a map of the possible individual-level reintegration processes, and 
mechanisms through which ex-combatants tend to navigate these processes in the GLR. 
Each ex-combatant’s pre-war personal history, mobilization and wartime experience, as well 
as the broader social and economic structural features of the contexts into which they 
attempt to reintegrate coalesce to influence individual path through the landscape of 
possible reintegration processes. In this way, reintegration paths are the product of the 
dynamic, non-linear, and simultaneous interaction of multiple factors. Reintegration paths at 
the individual-level are variable and highly idiosyncratic - though bounded within a clear 
range of possible reintegration processes. Given the similar contexts of reintegration across 
the GLR countries, it is perhaps not so surprising that there are broad tendencies (or 
propensities) in the paths that ex-combatants take as they navigate reintegration processes - 
despite the unique reintegration experiences in the different GLR countries, specific 




5.1.3.2 Trajectories  
 
We devote special attention to the country case of DRC, the only GLR country experiencing 
continued local violence during the 2010-2012 period in the areas of data sampling. While 
ex-combatants in DRC do make some social and economic gains relative to the community, 
moving quickly towards parity, the processes of reintegration visible across the rest of the 
GLR countries are only happening to a very limited extent. Essentially, in the context of 
ongoing local violence and insecurity in Eastern DRC, ex-combatants face a range of social 
and economic barriers to reintegration processes. However, ex-combatants are not the only 
ones affected by ongoing local violence in Eastern DRC, and communities themselves face 
many of the same challenges of social and economic marginalization (i.e. non-integration).  
In fact, DRC is the only country were communities see a slight decline in social and economic 
situation over time. The core issue for both ex-combatants and community members is the 
broad sense of distrust and social fragmentation driven by the dynamics of violence, 
insecurity, and displacement in Eastern DRC.  
 
The outlying case of DRC highlights the importance of overall community trajectories as a 
structuring force that shapes country-level reintegration processes across the GLR. In 
Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and RoC, communities see a trajectory of broad and continuous 
social and economic improvements over time. In this sense, the possible space for ex-
combatants’ own improvement has continued to expand. Even though ex-combatants in 
these countries may remain significantly disadvantaged to community members, it appears 
that ex-combatants in these counties have been able to root themselves in the broader 
upswing of post-conflict societies. In contrast, while ex-combatants in Eastern DRC “catch 
up” to the community quickly, the bar is set very low. Thus, ex-combatants in Eastern DRC 
quickly approach the roof of their possible progress in social and economic reintegration 
processes .This may end up meaning that ex-combatants return to settings of broader social 
and economic marginalization in the community – that is, they return to settings of non-
integration.  
 
Country-level reintegration has traditionally been conceptualized and evaluated in terms of 
parity between ex-combatants and community members. However, the contrast between 
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the case of DRC and the four other GLR countries highlights the importance of two other 
factors beyond parity alone that are important for understanding country-level reintegration 
- country-level ex-combatant trajectories and country-level community member trajectories. 
Though parity implicitly acknowledges the importance of ex-combatant and community 
member trajectories, after all it is a product of them, sole focus on parity can obscure as 
much as it reveals about country-level reintegration. To illustrate this point we develop a 
taxonomy of possible country-level reintegration trajectories based on ex-combatant 
trajectories, community trajectories, and the trajectory of parity between them. This 
taxonomy carries significant implications for our understanding of what successful 
reintegration is at a country level, as well as for our understanding of the scope of possible 





This section is broken into two subsections. First (§5.2.1), we outline the analytical 
contributions of this doctoral thesis by situating the findings within the field of reintegration 
research. Second (§5.2.2), we explore the implications of the findings for future 
reintegration research and programming.  
 
5.2.1 Analytical Contributions to Reintegration Research 
 
The findings in this doctoral thesis represent a contribution to our understanding of the 
social and economic processes ex-combatants navigate as they reintegrate into communities 
across Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, DRC, and RoC. Utilizing an eclectic range theory from 
across the social sciences, our findings emphasize the fact that though ex-combatants’ 
reintegration experiences are highly individual, they adhere to a regular range of trends 
across the GLR. There are consistent social and economic processes that are visible across 
the GLR countries. These processes are not linear, but rather the emergent product of the 
dynamic interaction of numerous individual and structural factors. Individual ex-combatants’ 
identity, acceptance in familial and communal networks, and economic resources and 
opportunities are deeply interrelated. We have been able to identify specific processes and 
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mechanisms that connect these overlapping elements, adding some clarity to exactly what 
we mean when we talk about social and economic reintegration processes in the GLR. This is 
a significant analytical contribution to our understanding of ex-combatant reintegration.  
 
Within the field of reintegration studies, the findings in this doctoral thesis represent a 
contribution to three fundamental shifts. First, the findings in this doctoral thesis contribute 
to a shift in focus away from the predominant emphasis in scholarly and institutional 
literature on reintegration programming, and is instead almost entirely focused on exploring 
the very reintegration processes that those reintegration programs mean to affect. This shift 
in focus involves, secondly, a change in the unit of analysis to the individual ex-combatant. 
Though the analysis in this doctoral thesis moves between exploring reintegration processes 
at the level of demographic subgroups, countries, and the GLR as a whole, all these levels of 
analysis are built upon individual-level experiences of the nearly 10,000 ex-combatants and 
community members surveyed in the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset. Thirdly, this doctoral 
thesis contributes a complementary methodological shift in reintegration studies towards 
reliance on systematic survey data. This shift in unit of analysis and mode of data collection 
has facilitated the comparative case-study approach utilized in this thesis. As far as we are 
aware, at the time of publishing no other systematic survey-based comparative studies of ex-
combatant reintegration processes across multiple countries have been completed. In this 
sense, the findings in this doctoral thesis sit on the cutting edge of research in the field of ex-
combatant reintegration. 
 
Further, the comparative case-study approach utilized in this doctoral thesis leaves the 
findings uniquely situated in the field of reintegration research – attempting to find a 
balance between the general and the specific. Previous research on reintegration processes 
has generally prioritized either internal or external validity in their findings. For example, 
qualitative-based studies on the experiences of a few ex-combatants in highly specific 
settings have contributed much to our understanding of individual reintegration experiences 
in specific contexts (see e.g. Baas 2012 or Baxter & Burrall 2011). These studies have 
produced findings with a high level of internal validity, but that may be so specific that they 
are inapplicable to different individual reintegration contexts. On the opposite end of the 
spectrum, most quantitative-based research (see e.g. Humphreys & Weinstein 2005; 2007 or 
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Kaplan & Nussio 2012; 2013) have tended to focus on producing generalized findings that 
speak to the average experiences of a sample of ex-combatants, even if their individual 
experiences may differ considerably – i.e. high external validity. We have endeavored to 
walk a tightrope between these two poles, aiming to produce an analysis of ex-combatant 
reintegration processes that is internally valid for individual ex-combatants and 
differentiated demographic subgroups, but also externally valid in each of the five GLR 
countries and across the GLR as a whole. This is a lofty task. At times we have glossed over 
detail in favor of a more coherent narrative, and in doing so have sacrificed internal validity. 
Inversely, there are also times when we have sacrificed external validity in favor of 
differentiating processes for demographic subgroups (e.g. young ex-combatants and female 
ex-combatants) or for specific GLR countries (e.g. DRC). However, we view the underlying 
tension between the general and the specific in this doctoral thesis not as an issue to be 
resolved, but as a core strength inherent to our research aims and approach. We are 
continuously engaged in a dialogue between the individual processes of ex-combatants in 
the GLR countries, and what these individual processes allow us to say about the broader 
nature of reintegration as a social and economic phenomenon in the GLR - and perhaps even 
more broadly.  
 
Integration and reintegration are phenomena that exist beyond the context of ex-
combatants, and beyond the context of the GLR. If integration is a process that involves 
shaping identity, building social connections of trust, establishing economic stability, and 
finding a sense of empowerment, then other groups such as internally displaced persons, 
returning refugees, and members of communities in general may face these challenges. 
Indeed, if these are a set of more fundamental human processes, then this may help explain 
why we see such a consistent range of reintegration processes across the different country 
contexts in the GLR. While ex-combatants’ individual experiences are unique, they are 
bounded within a range of more general human processes that exist beyond the context of 
ex-combatant reintegration and the GLR. This means that the findings in this doctoral thesis 
may have analytical value, and normative implications, beyond the specific context of the 
GLR. For example, the insight that gender-based disadvantages that female ex-combatants 
face must be understood within the broader context of patriarchal gender dynamics in the 
GLR is useful when thinking about gender and integration / reintegration for a variety of 
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groups beyond ex-combatants, and a variety of settings beyond the GLR. In turn, these 
generalized understanding can shape the way normative interventions, like DDR, understand 
and approach gender dynamics in a diverse range of contexts and settings (discussed further 
in §5.2.2).  
 
In this doctoral thesis we have attempted to critically situate our data and findings within 
the broader political incentives of the TDRP and its approach to the M&E of reintegration 
programming. Indeed, the broader intellectual frameworks, political incentives, and 
methodological approaches taken in M&E directly influence the shape of our possible 
analysis in this doctoral thesis. That being said, we can use the data to highlight paradoxes in 
these underlying normative perspectives.  This critical inquiry comes into focus through the 
analysis of country-level reintegration trajectories. Reintegration programming impacts have 
traditionally been conceptualized as being indicated by the level of parity between ex-
combatants and community members. This conceptualization is deeply rooted the broader 
intellectual frameworks and political incentives of the TDRP. However, by pushing the idea of 
trajectories beyond metaphor and towards operationalized concept, we are able to argue 
that parity alone is insufficient for understanding country-level reintegration impacts. The 
trajectories of ex-combatants, community members, and the parity between them are 
essential metrics when attempting to understand country-level reintegration impacts. More 
specifically, the trajectory of community members plays a structuring role that influences ex-
combatants’ possible progress in reintegration processes. These findings go beyond the 
ubiquitous assertion that “context matters”, to offer an operationalization of specifically 
how it matters. These findings carry considerable policy implications (to be discussed in 
§5.2.2). 
 
Here we can step back for a moment to situate our finding within broader theoretical 
debates about the nature of peacebuilding. While not the true focus of this doctoral thesis, 
we have periodically alluded indirectly to the role of the broader “liberal peace” intellectual 
framework in our analysis (see e.g. §1.3.1; §2.1.2; & §3.3.2). Essentially the liberal peace 
thesis is the idea that economically and politically liberal democratic states are best for both 
domestic peace and world order. This over-arching intellectual framework has implicitly 
informed the way in which humanitarian interventions, international peacebuilding, and 
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even international wars are conceptualized and executed (see e.g. Newman et al 2009). In 
critical discourse, liberal peacebuilding has been criticized for discounting the role of local 
power and agency, instead imposing western values on recipient societies and creating 
power structures that favor the global north (see e.g. Richmond & Mac Ginty 2015, 
Richmond 2012, Mac Ginty 2011, or Pugh et al 2008). For the most critical scholars (e.g. 
Duffield 2008) the power asymmetries between donor and recipient countries “both in 
terms of political and material resources, expose external actors to accusation of neo-
colonialism, paternalism and self-interested imposition” (Schroeder & Chappuis 2014: 136).  
 
The critiques of liberal peacebuilding can be extended to DDR, and to reintegration 
programming more specifically. Muggah (2009) notes that reintegration programming has 
amounted to a sort of social engineering – implicitly open to the same critiques that the 
liberal peace normative framework faces of externally imposed norms and power structures 
that neglect local perspectives. The overt focus on reintegration programming over local 
reintegration processes in the literature is an embodiment of the prioritization of the 
operational and technical needs of external DDR stakeholder institutions. For example, as we 
outlined in §3.3.2, the broader political incentives of the World Bank have shaped the way 
that the TDRP has conceptualized just what reintegration is, how it should be approached 
programmatically, and thus how to go about studying it through M&E. This has a profound 
effect on the range of data collected, as well as the broader frameworks and perspectives 
through which that data is conceptualized in M&E. The risk is that through prioritizing their 
own liberal normative understandings and external knowledge needs, those organizations 
involved in the M&E of reintegration programming may risk producing knowledge that 
reflexively reinforce their own framing of what reintegration is, while as the same time 
continuing to discount local perspectives. Though M&E is part of a distinct effort to create 
evidence-based reintegration policy, it may be that political incentives, and the broader 
liberal normative ideas they reflect, shape the approach to M&E into a producer of policy-
based evidence. This matters tremendously. Because reintegration is a deeply normative 
activity, the production of self-referential forms of knowledge can have profound 
consequences for how the aims of reintegration programming are understood, affecting the 
lives of hundreds of thousands of ex-combatants, as well as their families and communities - 




The shift towards reintegration processes over programming in this doctoral thesis is 
precisely an effort to shed the political incentives in M&E and to refocus, to the extent 
possible, on the experiences of individual ex-combatants as they navigate the social and 
economic processes of reintegration. However, as noted, we are still bound by the data in 
TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset. The data available for us to explore reintegration processes 
is implicitly grounded in western liberal ideas. For example, the conceptualization of linking 
social capital and civic participation as important parts of a functioning state are deeply 
rooted in western ideas of the liberal democratic state that may not reflect local power 
structures. Identity and belonging are conceptualized within western traditions and local 
perspectives are absent. The examples go on, and ultimately at no point have the 
perspectives of ex-combatants themselves on what they believe reintegration processes to 
be been included. Thus, while we have attempted to remain critical to the overarching 
liberal peace framework and specific political incentives of M&E in the World Bank TDRP, we 
can never truly escape them. In this sense, in this doctoral thesis we are complicit in the near 
complete neglect of local perspectives and the reproduction of elements of the international 
community’s discursive framing of ex-combatants, the processes through which they 
reintegrate, and their role in post-conflict peacebuilding and development.  
 
Perhaps most egregious, is the complete absence of the role of local politics for reintegration 
processes. The local social, political, and economic grievances that have driven, and resulted 
from, violent conflict that persist or transform in the post-conflict landscapes of the GLR are 
a missing piece in the analysis in this doctoral thesis. For example, a deeper understanding 
reintegration in some parts of Eastern DRC might require taking into account the Hutu-Tutsi 
socio-cultural divide in the region, and the social, political, and economic grievances over 
issues like land, tax, mineral resources, competing local and state power structures, and 
social status that are embedded within it (Autesserre 2009 & 2010). The social and economic 
dimensions of reintegration are just as inseparable from the political as they are from each 
other. If reintegration is going to be conceptualized beyond parity as part of a broader 
transformation of post-conflict landscapes, then local understandings of that very landscape 
will be essential. By neglecting the local perspectives and grievances that ex-combatants 
hold, we are complicit in this doctoral thesis in perpetuating the simplified logic built into 
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DDR programs - “overstating [ex-combatants’] violent agency in a causal chain linking their 
dissatisfaction and unemployment to war making” (McMullin 2013: 247). Mobilization, 
demobilization, and reintegration are complex social, economic, and political processes that 
defy this rudimentary reasoning (Baas 2012). 
 
A final analytical contribution to reintegration research has been in the rigorous exploration 
of complexity; what it means for reintegration to be complex, and what that complexity 
means for how we go about the scientific investigation of reintegration processes. To these 
ends we have applied a complex realist meta-theoretical framework that has directly shaped 
our selection and interpretation of theory and methods, and which has ultimately played a 
key role in our analysis and findings. We would go as far as to argue that our analysis of 
country-level reintegration trajectories might not have been possible outside of the complex 
realist paradigm. Though challenging and abstract meta-theoretical ideas, like those in 
complex realism, may seem esoteric and ultimately irrelevant to normative policy issues, like 
the reintegration of ex-combatants, we are steadfast in the assertion that ideas matter. How 
we understand the act of science, and what we see when we perform the act of science, can 
carry meaningful consequences for the real world policy and programming. In our case, 
taking complexity and its consequences for science seriously can shape how we understand 
ex-combatant reintegration processes, and the policy and programming approaches that 
attempt to steer them- ultimately affecting the lives of hundreds and thousands of ex-
combatants and the communities they return to in GLR.  
 
5.2.2 Implications for Future Reintegration Research and Programming 
 
The findings in this doctoral thesis carry immediate implications for continued reintegration 
policy and programming in the GLR. Through anchoring reintegration policy and 
programming in the individual-level reintegration processes they mean to affect, it should be 
possible to refine the focus of current programming and explore possibilities for new 
approaches. Essentially, processes and mechanisms can serve as a sort of priority list that 
can highlight important programming goals. For example, our elaborations of human-capital 
based and natural-capital based livelihood strategies as mechanisms for achieving 
sustainable economic livelihoods highlight a clear set of programming imperatives. Creating 
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approaches to reintegration programming rooted in endogenous social and economic 
processes would require early mapping of those processes in the planning, and even pre-
planning, phases similar to the way in which scenarios for the technical and logistical 
components of DDR programming are run prior to planning of programming – even while 
conflict is still ongoing. Indeed, preplanning studies and mapping local social and economic 
processes could prove invaluable when the time for DDR comes, and could contribute to a 
more sophisticated overall planning process than the currently exists. 
 
Human-capital based livelihood pathways confirm the importance of education and 
vocational training, already a central component of most, if not all, reintegration 
programming in the GLR. However, reintegration programming in the GLR must 
acknowledge that developing ex-combatants’ capacities through education and vocational 
training are not enough - social reintegration processes play an essential role in ex-
combatants’ access to economic opportunities. At least in the GLR, progress in social 
reintegration processes may, to some degree, serve as a necessary condition for more 
meaningful progress in economic reintegration processes. Though generally acknowledged 
as an important component of reintegration, social reintegration processes have not 
typically received much prioritization in reintegration programming in the GLR. This may be a 
product of the elusive prospect of actually affecting social processes. After all, reintegration 
programming cannot make communities trust and accept ex-combatants. Likewise, 
reintegration programming cannot build familial and communal networks for ex-
combatants. Ex-combatants themselves must face these endeavors.  
 
However, what reintegration programming can potentially do is to facilitate social 
reintegration by creating the settings where these processes can occur. This can be done 
through supporting community organizations such as civic, religious, trade, labor, or sport 
groups with special provisions for the inclusion of ex-combatants. Community development 
projects that provide labor for community members and ex-combatants can also be 
beneficial. Furthermore, reintegration programming can focus on taking a leading role in 
broader transitional and / or restorative justice measures. Reintegration programming that 
supports all these elements could help to create the space where social reintegration 
processes can occur. All this is nothing new, and most of these ideas have played some role 
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in reintegration programming in the GLR. However, what taking the importance of social 
reintegration seriously would mean is to acknowledge that without engaging in social 
reintegration processes, programming may risk undermining its education and vocational 
training contributions to human-capital based livelihood pathways. Considering this, a 
substantial increase in the prioritization of social reintegration in terms of material and 
financial resources would seem an imperative. However, selling a focus on social 
reintegration to program donors, who prefer to fund hard and quantifiable outcomes, may 
represent a barrier to serious engagement.   
 
Natural-capital based livelihood strategies, and specifically access to arable land, represent 
challenging terrain that reintegration programming in the GLR has typically shied away from. 
Instead of engaging with land access issues, reintegration programming has typically 
supported natural-capital based livelihoods through the provision of tools, seed, and training 
in agricultural techniques. The distribution of and access to arable land is a highly complex 
political issue that may exceed the traditional boundaries of reintegration policy and 
programming. Indeed, land access issues have been among the many local sources of 
conflict across the GLR. In effect, reintegration programming’s approach to land access has 
been fairly hands off, essentially waiting for land access to be granted through broader land 
access reform initiatives, or through social allocation mechanisms as a part of social 
reintegration. Indeed, meddling in land access could shape as many new problems as it 
solves. However, considering that natural-capital based, i.e. small-scale agriculture, 
livelihoods are the primary economic pathway across the GLR countries, it may be that 
without directly engaging in land access issues reintegration programming may risk 
undermining its own effectiveness. Thus, it is worth playing with ideas of what creative 
approaches to supporting broader local and national land access reforms could look like. 
 
It may be possible to support ex-combatants’ access to land through facilitating the 
negotiation of access to communal land as a part of agricultural cooperatives that would 
benefit ex-combatants and the community more broadly. This approach could have the 
collateral benefit of creating space for social networking and trust building between ex-
combatants and community members. However, such an approach would be highly 
dependent on the community’s willingness to share communally distributed resources with 
206 
 
ex-combatants. In the absence of such goodwill from communities, another, more assertive, 
approach to support land access could be for national DDR commissions to lease or purchase 
plots of land from local communities. This land could then be used as the basis for 
temporary land access grants to ex-combatants - giving them the chance to get on their feet. 
Some ex-combatants may later be able to establish more permanent land access elsewhere, 
and others may move into more human-capital centered livelihood strategies. For those ex-
combatants that do not secure land access elsewhere, provisions could be included for the 
possibility of renegotiating of land access later through individual lease, purchase, grant 
extension, or other local custom. In order to avoid creating perception in communities that 
ex-combatants are being unfairly rewarded with access to resources, it would be important 
to make these land access grants were accessible to landless portions of the community as 
well. Such an approach could give ex-combatants an economic kick-start, and could create 
greater incentive for communities to interact with ex-combatants in settings where 
communal will does not exist. Again, such an approach would also with a much larger price 
tag in terms of financial and organizational resources; and donors may be hesitant to fund 
programming that meddles in deeply divisive issues like land access - which have 
unavoidable political dimensions. 
 
As reintegration programming in the GLR continues, there are numerous elements of 
reintegration processes that remain poorly understood and in need of continued research. 
Two research priorities highlighted in this doctoral thesis emerge. First, the role of 
psychosocial trauma in reintegration processes is poorly understood. While it is well 
established that those who are exposed to intense traumatic experiences during conflict 
may go on to face weakened social and economic performance, what is less understood is 
how to support mental healing and over-all psychosocial well-being. A key part of this 
challenge is that many psychosocial support techniques with origins in western intellectual 
tradition may not be applicable to the vast and varying social and cultural landscapes of the 
GLR. As such, continued research into local psychosocial dynamics is essential. Horn’s 
(2013a, 2013b, 2014) work on developing psychosocial metrics anchored in local 
understandings of psychosocial well-being in the GLR is a noteworthy example of research 
on this issue. By developing the tools to understand local contexts of psychosocial well-
being, work like Horn’s may help provide the insights needed to shape adequate 
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reintegration programming approaches. There is another dimension to consider here too. It 
is generally acknowledged that the effects of psychosocial trauma are worst for those that 
experience intense trauma during the formative periods of childhood and adolescence. This 
is why the bulk of current psychosocial support programming is aimed at child soldiers. 
However, a group that shares many of the same psychosocial traumas as child soldiers, but 
that does not receive access to targeted support, is that of those ex-combatants who were 
mobilized as children but demobilized as adults (see Slegh et al 2014). Future research on 
psychosocial trauma would do well to expanding our understanding of the special challenges 
this demographic sub-group faces and the varieties of support necessary.  
 
A second area that is in need of continued research is that of gender dynamics in 
reintegration. As is illustrated in this doctoral thesis, we know a good deal about the ways in 
which female ex-combatants in the GLR are disadvantaged. However, what we have a 
comparatively weak understanding of is the new pathways to social and economic prosperity 
that may exist for them. As discussed above (§5.1.3.1.), with new self-reliance thrust upon 
them, a return to traditional gender norms may not be possible or desirable for many female 
ex-combatants. Research into understanding new gender identities and opportunities that 
exist within them can help us to understand which female ex-combatants are successful and 
why, and in turn, can inform gender sensitive reintegration programming that can bolster 
these new identities. In this way, female ex-combatants represent an inroad to developing 
broader approaches to supporting the societal transformation of gender norms across the 
GLR and should continue to see prioritization in future research. The World Bank’s LOGiCA 
research program is leading example of gender research in Africa. However, female 
identities are only half the equation, and gender focused research must also develop a 
deeper understanding of the role of traditional masculine identities for reintegration. 
Indeed, when the term gender is used in development program settings it almost 
automatically means female. Male gender identities are equally important, despite the 
lesser range of disadvantages males face compared to females. Research focused on 
masculine identities in reintegration is only just emerging (see e.g. Slegh et al 2014 or 




While select research initiatives can play an important role in enhancing our understanding 
of specific issues, creating future reintegration programming explicitly anchored in processes 
may require developing a broader infrastructure for systematically observing and analyzing 
individual reintegration processes at all phases of programming life-cycles. Much of the 
capacity needed to execute such a large-scale and continuous study of reintegration 
processes already exists in monitoring & evaluation systems. However, for M&E to reach its 
full potential as a tool for informing reintegration programming based on individual 
reintegration processes it would need to be rethought as more than execution of pro forma 
impact evaluations. The monitoring side of M&E is almost wholly focused on programming 
elements, and typically the only place where processes come out is the evaluation side. 
While there are baseline and tracer studies that explore reintegration processes carried out 
throughout programming life-cycle, these are still primarily aimed at bolstering final impact 
evaluations and tend to play a limited role in program planning and adjustment. If the 
observation and analysis of reintegration processes was reconceived as an ongoing 
monitoring activity, as opposed to periodic evaluation, that played a mandated role in 
steering programming activities, this could help to anchor reintegration programming in the 
individual reintegration processes it is meant to affect. Strong information capture and 
analysis platforms, like the World Bank’s ICRS and the UNDP’s DREAM systems, could play a 
key role in a shift towards the continuous monitoring of reintegration processes. Such a shift 
would most of all require the allocation of much, much more funding to M&E activities - 
which typically only receive 3-7% of budgeted program resources.  
 
However, the ultimate success of such a reconceptualization of the aim of M&E would be 
highly dependent on reintegration programming frameworks that were actually flexible 
enough to adjust course in light of evolving understandings of endogenous reintegration 
processes. Too often DDR is like a train departing on a fixed route to a predetermined 
destination. It is up to those involved in planning and executing programming to hold tight as 
the momentum of DDR carries them forward through, sometimes poorly understood, social, 
political, and economic landscapes – they grasp what they can as the train moves forward. 
Occasionally, unable to alter course for unseen obstacles, the train derails. No amount of 
knowledge of reintegration processes will improve reintegration programming if it cannot 




If a focus on reintegration processes has the potential to help to anchor programming and 
policy in impacts they mean to affect, then the analysis of country-level reintegration 
trajectories could be a part of the framework though which programming successes and 
failures are evaluated. Parity alone is an insufficient point around which to organize the logic 
of reintegration impact evaluations. Indeed, parity can obscure as much as it reveals. By 
contrast, the concept of trajectories can help us to contextualize ex-combatants progress, or 
lack thereof, within the broader trajectory of post-conflict communities. Future impact 
evaluations would do well to utilize and build on the taxonomy of possible country-level 
reintegration trajectories. Indeed, by acknowledging the limits of reintegration programming 
the concept of reintegration trajectories could add nuance to our understandings of 
programming successes and failures. 
 
Beyond improving impact evaluations, the true potential of studying country-level 
reintegration trajectories revolves around the insights they offer for understanding the 
scope of possible programming impacts – the limits and opportunities. In line with the 
discussion above of shifting the study of reintegration processes to an ongoing monitoring 
activity, if country-level reintegration trajectories were continuously monitored through a 
robust M&E system from the planning phase of programming, they could play an important 
role in steering reintegration programming, and adjusting when necessary, based on realistic 
expectations of what there is space to achieve. After all, ex-combatants remain the primary 
beneficiaries of reintegration programming – only half of the equation of country-level 
trajectories. Community members, the other half, remain peripheral beneficiaries that 
reintegration programming is not mandated or equipped to directly support. Thus, at least 
half of that which makes country-level reintegration trajectories is out of the hands of 
reintegration programming to directly affect.  
 
Having a continuously updated picture of reintegration trajectories throughout the 
programming lifecycle could do much to ground reintegration programming in a clear 
understanding of the opportunities and limits inherent in the broader trajectory of 
communities. For example, in settings where communities are on a positive trajectory, and it 
appears that ex-combatants are able to anchor themselves in this general upswing 
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(embedded transition trajectory), a focused and minimalist approach to reintegration 
programming may be sufficient to close parity gaps. Alternatively, if ex-combatants find 
themselves excluded from this broader societal upswing (ex-combatant rejection trajectory), 
more expansive efforts to bring ex-combatants and communities together may be necessary. 
In contrast, if communities are on negative trajectories (limited transition trajectories and 
dual decline trajectories) then more maximalist approaches to reintegration programming 
that incorporate broader sections of the community in addition to ex-combatants may be 
appropriate. Thus, early mapping of community member trajectories in the planning phase 
of programming could prove extremely valuable for building programming grounded 
understandings of the scope of possible programming impacts in a given context. 
 
However, and this is key, even a maximalist approach to reintegration programming alone 
will not turn around communities on a negative trajectory. In such an instance reintegration 
programming would need to be seen not as a discrete effort, but as one element in a much 
larger investment in peacebuilding and development. However, this sort of large-scale 
investment has remained generally elusive in the GLR, and instead a focus on discrete 
programming has persisted. McMullin (2013: 242-3) quotes an MDRP official in 2010 who 
surmises the issue well: 
 
“DDR is a fallback because the international community does not want to provide 
longer-term financial support to post-conflict states. DDR becomes development 
on the cheap. We’re not willing to support states sufficiently to deal with security 
challenges, to build a state effective in security (or welfare) provision, so DDR is 
the default option. And we’re willing to invest considerable sums in DDR but 
nothing compared to what is required to build a state that provides security and 
services…” 
 
Indeed, if the international community remains unwilling to make the level of financial 
investment needed to support states in recovering from conflict and facing extreme 
development challenges, then DDR programming will face inevitable disappointments – 
continuously burdened with impossible expectations that discount the importance of 
broader peacebuilding and development initiatives for shaping the context in which they act. 
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This is especially relevant in the new geographies of organized violence that are rapidly 
emerging today. 
 
Today DDR is fast approaching a third generation (Muggah & O’Donnell 2015). While in the 
past DDR programs have almost always been initiated after a comprehensive peace 
agreement, today DDR programs are being undertaken in highly fragmented settings of 
ongoing conflict in which armed groups may be linked to organized crime or international 
terrorism. DDR programs are having to rapidly adapt to this new role in offensive 
interventions, often in conjunction with counterinsurgency tactics (COIN) and emerging 
approaches to countering violent extremism (CVE) (for DDR and COIN see Molloy 2013; for 
DDR and CVE see Cockayne & O’Neil 2015). Instead of being based on purely voluntary 
participation, next generation DDR programs are being conceptualized as one side of a “stick 
and carrot” approach to military interventions in places like Somalia, Mali, and DRC (Muggah 
& O’Donnell 2015). The case of DRC is of special interest for us. Since 2012, the FDLR and 
M23 armed groups have entered DDR programming as a part of more forceful military 
interventions from UN forces in Eastern DRC. However, how successful these ex-combatants 
will be in navigating reiteration processes remains to be seen. Unless the broader 
communities see social and economic improvements, it may be the latest groups of ex-
combatants in Eastern DRC will face a fate similar to those that have come before them – 
quickly reaching the roof of their possible social and economic progress as they return to 
communities that themselves continue to bear the weight of ongoing and local violence and 
insecurity in the region. That is, ex-combatants will continue to return to settings of social 
and economic marginalization – non-integration.  
 
If DRC is any bellwether, then the “limited transition” type country-level trajectory 
presented in this doctoral thesis may represent an outline of the inherent limitations of the 
emerging third generation of DDR in offensive operations. Ex-combatants may reach parity 
with the communities they return to, but meaningful progress in social and economic 
reintegration processes may remain elusive if communities themselves remain economically 
retarded and socially fragmented. Indeed, offensive interventions may inherently represent 
settings of continued insecurity, and unless such offensive interventions can create the 
space in which social, political, and economic prosperity can emerge, it may be that the next 
212 
 
generation of DDR programming faces a hard road ahead. Acknowledging this point can help 
to root next generation reintegration programming in realistic expectations of the scope of 
possible programming impacts, the strategies and levels of investments needed to support 
individual ex-combatants in the processes of reintegrating into society - ultimately aiding 




























6 Introduction to the Annexes 
 
The two data presentation annexes that follow this introduction (§7 & §8) utilize the TDRP-
GLR Reintegration Dataset, which merges previously collected data from studies on ex-
combatant reintegration in Rwanda, Uganda, DRC, RoC, and Burundi carried out by the TDRP 
as a part of M&E baseline and tracer studies in the 2010-2012 period.  
 
The total sample contributions from each of the five GLR countries in this study varied 
considerably and are visible below in Table 0.1. The samples from each country were drawn 
with certain purposive sampling biases and all encountered barriers to achieving their ideal 
sample compositions. For further details on these points see the individual ex-combatant 
and community member studies from within each of the five GLR countries.1 Information 
concerning more specific details of the demographic compositions of each sample, and 
certain instances where data from certain countries is excluded or missing, is available at the 
start of each annex (§7.1 & §8.1).  
 
Table 0.1: Raw GLR Country Sample Contributions 
  
GLR Raw Sample N 
Burundi DRC RoC Rwanda Uganda GLR Total 
Ex-Combatants 1256 3625 668 517 410 6476 
Community Members 510 722 1456 510 182 3380 
Subtotal 1766 4347 2124 1027 592 9856 
 
 
To avoid biasing effects of the uneven sample sizes from each of the five GLR countries the 
data has been weighted for the analysis here. The ex-combatant and community member 
samples, respectively, from each GLR country have been weighted evenly. It appears that ex-
combatants experience a relatively homogenous set of reintegration processes, and as such 
the data weighting rarely makes a difference to the analysis of overall trends in the region. 
However, in several key fields it has proved an essential component of an accurate and 
nuanced analysis.  
 
 
                                                     
1 For Burundi see World Bank (2011a); for RoC see World Bank (2011c); for Rwanda see World Bank (2012); and for Uganda 
see World Bank (2011d). 
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6.1 Structure of the Annexes 
 
There are two annexes presented here. The first annex (§7) explores the social and economic 
processes through which ex-combatants across the GLR countries reintegrate. The second 
annex (§8) explores community members’ social and economic positions, and has two roles. 
First, community members serve as a group which to compare ex-combatants in an effort to 
better glean their unique social and economic experiences. Second, to explore community 
members’ perceptions of ex-combatants as they attempt to reintegration.  
 
The analysis in the two annexes examine the following areas: 
 
Demographics: 
Information pertaining to a standard range of demographic factors such as age, gender and 
disability in addition to marital status and levels of educational achievement and vocational 
skills. 
 
Housing, Land, Livestock, and Food Security: 
Analysis of current living situation including housing type and tenure, access to arable land 
and measures of general food security 
 
Economic Issues: 
Analysis of current economic status as well as actual and perceived vulnerability and outlook 
for the future. In addition, further analysis on income, savings, access to credit, and 
economic associations is undertaken and a special focus on the dimensions gender and 
disability in economic reintegration is explored.  
 
Social Capital: 
Analysis of the dynamic components of social capital including: sociability; trust and 







Analysis of ex-combatant and community member experiences of the initial phases of ex-
combatants’ reinsertion and return to the community – including initial levels of trust, 
acceptance and stigma.  
 
6.2 Data Limitations and Challenges 
 
This study has faced a range of challenges revolving around comparing data from the 
different survey formats, sample compositions, and contexts for analysis across the five GLR 
countries. In general these challenges creates a range of limitations that fall into two 
categories: (i) the compatibility of survey data collected from across the GLR countries; and 
(ii) the comparability of the different reintegration contexts across the GLR countries.  
 
6.2.1 Individual GLR Country Survey Comparability 
 
The format of the GLR ex-combatant and community member surveys has been a process of 
iterative learning and refinement. Rwanda was the first GLR country in which the survey 
format was tested and developed. The data and learning that came out that original format 
then influenced the design of a consolidated second format that has seen customization to 
the specific M&E needs in Burundi, Uganda, DRC and RoC –however its base components 
have remained consistent since this consolidated second format. In effect the data that 
exists in the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset for Rwanda covers a similar range of topics as 
the second format used in the rest of the GLR countries, but often is often formatted in such 
a way that the data from Rwanda is not directly comparable to that from the other GLR 
countries. For this reason including Rwanda in the full range of analysis in this study has 
proved challenging.  
 
The survey data in the TDRP-GLR Reintegration Dataset for community members in Burundi 
has also created some issues. In Burundi, community members were survey using a 
shortened version of the complete survey format – further; this format did not include a 
capture of basic demographic details. Due to this “missing data” including community 




Because of these two factors, data formatting differences in Rwanda surveys and missing 
data in Burundi community member surveys, it can at times appear as thouyghthese 
annexes approach becoming a comparative study of only DRC, RoC, and Uganda. Further, at 
times there is extended analysis nuancing specific points in the survey data drawn 
specifically from Uganda. This does not reflect an overt focus on Uganda, but is a product of 
the fact that the range of survey data collected in Uganda is the most expansive – and in 
many instances in the only GLR country with data available to make such further nuances in 
data analysis. This makes sense, as the Uganda survey format is the most recent iteration 
used in this study and holds the most comprehensive range of data. 
 
There are also two issues of sample validity that limit the analysis in the annexes. First, there 
is no analysis of ex-combatants under the age of 18 in the annexes. Across the total sample 
of ex-combatants from across the five GLR countries there were 326 respondents under the 
age of 18 (300 ex-combatants and 26 community members). These 326 have been omitted 
from the analysis in the annexes for two main reasons: (i) the systematic capture of 
information pertaining to the specific dynamics of reintegration facing minors was absent 
from the surveys used across the GLR countries – with the exception of DRC, where 291 of 
the total 300 ex-combatants under the age were sampled; and (ii) the validity issues that the 
small sample of ex-combatants under the age of 18 (again, almost entirely from DRC) make 
meaningful and valid comparative analysis infeasible.   
 
Data along health and disability demographics also presents challenges in the total GLR 
community member sample. Health and disability data for community members were only 
collected in Rwanda and Uganda – absent from Burundi, DRC and RoC. However, even the 
data from Rwanda and Uganda is limited as only n=58 disabled community members were 
sampled (n=49 from Rwanda and n=9 from Uganda). Thus, drawing valid comparisons 
between these two samples of 49 and 9 disabled community members is judged as 
infeasible – furthermore, comparing these 58 disabled community members to the 454 
disabled ex-combatants in this study presents further issues for validity. For these reasons 





6.2.2 Individual GLR Country Context Comparability 
 
While the conflicts that have occurred in the GLR countries are deeply intertwined, the 
contexts in which they have occurred, and in turn the contexts to which ex-combatants 
reintegrate into, are fundamentally unique. The idiosyncrasies of the GLR country contexts 
create challenges for comparing reintegration processes at a fine-grained level. For this 
reason, a number of areas have been judged as outside the scope of this study – possibly 
warranting focused inquiry on their own. 
 
In in the two annexes there is no analysis of reintegration processes differentiated along the 
lines of armed group. There have been dozens of armed ground that have partaken in TDRP 
facilitated reintegration programming across the GLR. Differentiating our analysis here 
would increase the scope of analysis by an order of magnitude, and is judged as outside the 
bounds of this study. One dimension that future studies could focus on is the range of 
reintegration processes that members of regular versus irregular armed groups go through – 
if they differ and to what extent.  
 
In this study there is no direct analysis of the reintegration processes that ex-combatants 
encounter by subnational geographic region. This is an important dimension to 
understanding varying reintegration processes at a national-level. However, similar to as 
with analysis by armed group, taking this frame at the regional-level would increase the 
scope analysis by an order of magnitude, and is thus judged as outside the bounds of this 
study. 
 
In this study there is no systematic periodization of the reintegration processes occurring 
across the GLR countries. While the data analyzed in these annexes was all collected in a 
similar period of time between 2010 and 2012, questions in the surveys refer to events (such 
as demobilization) that have occurred in various proximity to the time of sampling. Due to 
the unique dynamics of reintegration in each of the GLR countries a synchronization of 




Lastly, this study does not include a systematic comparison of DDR programming 
components in the GLR countries. The focus of this study is the processes of ex-combatant 
reintegration occurring in the GLR countries as distinct from the range of policy and 
programming aiming to affect these processes in each country. Programming components 
are relevant for understanding these processes and they are brought in for contextualization 
where necessary. However, there is no systematic capture as this is outside the fundamental 






























The following is a capture of the demographics of the ex-combatant sample for this 
comparative study. The demographics reflected in the sample here are not those of the 
overall ex-combatant populations in each of the five GLR countries at the time of study, but 
rather reflect certain purposive sampling biases. For more information about the specific 
sampling methods and decisions in each of the GLR countries please see the individual 
survey studies for ex-combatants in each of the five GLR countries.2  
 
The unweighted ex-combatant sample contributions from the five GLR countries for the total 
sample of 6,475 ex-combatants in this study is as follows: Burundi comprises 19.4% 
(n=1,256) of the total raw sample, DRC 56% (n=3,625), Republic of Congo 10.3% (N=667), 
Rwanda 8% (N=517) and Uganda 6.3% (N=410). However, in an effort to create valid cross-
country analysis of ex-combatants across the GLR, and especially for comparison to the 
community member sample, which contains proportionally different sample contributions 
from the five GLR countries, the raw sample contributions from each country have been 
weighted evenly.  
 
Integrating the full range of data from Rwanda has proved challenging in this study. The 
evolving format for the individual GLR country surveys has been a continual process of 
learning and iterative refinement. The Rwanda survey format is the starting point from 
which surveys evolved in RoC, Burundi, Uganda, and DRC. So, while data content in the 
Rwanda surveys is very much in line with the rest of the GLR countries, much of the specific 
question formatting is often different enough that a direct comparison of data is not 
feasible. Such instances are explained in footnotes.  
 
Collectively the data restrictions present in this study of ex-combatants across the GLR 
countries mean that the task of this study is to present a mosaic of findings. Up close, the 
                                                     
2 For Burundi see World Bank (2011a); for RoC see World Bank (2011c); for Rwanda see World Bank (2012); and for Uganda 
see World Bank (2011d). 
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pieces of the picture are not always complete and data is not always congruent. 
Nonetheless, there are clear data trends that represent a distinct narrative of ex-combatant 
reintegration across the GLR countries.  
 




Burundi DRC RoC Rwanda Uganda GLR Total 
Male 91.6% 86.1% 91.0% 97.5% 74.6% 88.1% 
Female 8.4% 13.9% 9.0% 2.5% 25.4% 11.9% 
Subtotal 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Age 18-30 65.4% 39.4% 31.3% 22.6% 38.6% 39.5% 
Age 31-40 26.9% 29.0% 40.6% 53.4% 24.6% 35.0% 
Age Over 40  7.7% 31.6% 28.1% 24.0% 36.9% 25.6% 
Subtotal 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Disabled 7.8% 4.6% 4.7% 24.1% 17.1% 10.9% 
Not Disabled 92.2% 95.4% 95.3% 75.9% 82.9% 89.1% 
Subtotal 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Of the total sample of ex-combatants 88.1% were male and 11.9% were female. While 
across all individual countries the disparity of representation of males and females was high, 
this is most true in Rwanda where only 2.5% of the country sample was female. The sample 
contribution from Uganda was comprised of the largest proportion of women (25.4%). The 
remaining countries fell closer to the overall sample composition.3 Table 1 above gives a 
cross-tabulated breakdown of the age, sex and disability of the ex-combatant sample from 
each of the five GLR countries.4  
 
In the total sample of ex-combatants 10.9% were categorized as disabled, the remaining 
89.1% were categorized as not disabled. Most GLR countries were composed of a similar 
proportion of disabled ex-combatants, though Rwanda and Uganda had higher 
representations of disabled ex-combatants – 24.1% and 17.1% respectively. However, these 
                                                     
3 It is important to note that a portion of ex-combatants never participate in formal reintegration programming. This is 
especially true of female ex-combatants who are hyperaware of the heavy stigmatization that can accopmony self-
identification as an ex-combatant. As such, the actual proportion of female ex-combatants in the GLR is likely higher than 
the figures above suggest.  
4 For the purposes of this comparative study, the demographic breakdown of the Ex-combatant sample by armed group will 
not be included for systematic analysis. The contexts of the different armed groups within the five GLR countries are seen 
as unique to each country context thus, while important units of analysis within each GLR country, not systematically 
comparable across the GLR countries. Further details on the Ex-combatant sample by armed group within each country are 
available in some of the five GLR country survey reports.  
221 
 
higher compositions of disabled ex-combatants may be an artifact of the process by which 
disability categorizations were combined across the total sample.5 
 
Of the total sample of ex-combatants 39.5% are between the ages of 18 and 30, 35% are 
between 31 and 40 years of age, and 25.6% are over the age of 40.6 Most of the GLR 
countries’ age compositions follow the trend of the total sample split, with two notable 
exceptions. Burundi’s age composition is heavily skewed towards those aged 18-30 (65.4%), 
and Rwanda is particularly heavy in the 31-40 years of age category (53.4%). In the case of 
Rwanda this age composition is likely a result of ex-combatants prolonged time spent 
participating in conflict – 50.9% of ex-combatants in Rwanda having spent between 10 and 
20 years participating in conflict.   
 
The aspects of the lives of ex-combatants discussed in the following sections are key 
indicators of the process that ex-combatants experience in accessing pathways to 
reintegration across the GLR countries.  Within the following sections of these annexes age, 
gender and disability dimensions to these processes to reintegration are explored to extract 
key trends across the GLR countries. The family and community, education and training, and 
addressing health needs are all seen as key pathways to reintegration of ex-combatants that 
will temper this discussion.  
 
7.1.1 From Mobilization to Demobilization 
 
The following is a brief snapshot of the ex-combatants’ time with armed groups and the 
ways in which pertinent demographic details play in their experiences. Indeed, 
understanding the dynamics of the pathways into mobilization can add considerable nuance 
                                                     
5 Criteria for disability varied slightly from country to country across the GLR. To create a consistent categorization of 
disabled ex-combatants across the GLR countries, disability status was computed using the disability criteria from the 
Ugandan Amnesty Commission which included: (i) amputees; (ii) blind and partially blind; (iii) paralysis and partial paralysis; 
and (iv) body and head injury. 
6 Across the total sample of ex-combatants from across the five GLR countries there were 300 under the age of 18. These 
300 have been omitted from the analysis in this study for two main reasons: (i) the systematic capture of information 
pertaining to the specific dynamics of reintegration facing minors was absent from the surveys used across the GLR 
countries – with the exception of DRC, where 291 of the total 300 ex-combatants under the age were sampled; and (ii) the 
validity issues that the small sample of ex-combatants under the age of 18 (again, almost entirely from DRC) make 
meaningful comparative analysis infeasible.   
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to our understanding of the specific challenges that ex-combatants can face at the time of 
demobilization.  
 
While obtaining reliable information about ex-combatants’ age at mobilization, especially 
younger ex-combatants who may have been only adolescents, is a challenging endeavor we 
can pull out general trends for comparison across the GLR countries. The following data 
should be treated with caution and be regarded as a rough picture rather than concrete 
truth of age of mobilization in the GLR countries.7 The average age at mobilization was 23.8 
across the GLR countries, however this figure masks considerable nuance in the age at 
mobilization.8 There are two steps to understanding age at mobilization more deeply. First is 
to understand the proportion of ex-combatants mobilized in different age brackets and then 
to understand the average age at mobilization within each bracket – this data is displayed 
below in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Ex-Combatant Age at Mobilization9 
 
The largest proportion of ex-combatants across the GLR countries (46.1%) was between the 
ages of 18 and 30 at the time of mobilization (on average aged 22.6). Indeed, with all GLR 
countries the 18-30 group is the largest. However, it is important to note the sizable number 
of ex-combatants who were mobilized under the age of 18 (38.9%) and who were very 
                                                     
7 For example, in Uganda 41.95% of ex-combatants were unsure of their age at the time of mobilization. However, working 
backwards from the current age of ex-combatants we can subtract away the time since demobilization and the time spent 
with armed groups to calculate an approximate age at mobilization for all ex-combatants.  
8 Rwanda is excluded from all findings on age at mobilization due to lack of directly comparable data. 
9 In this table the use of XXX indicates a logically impossible field. 
  
Age at Mobilization 
Mobilized Under Age 
18 

















Male 32.30% 13.83 48.40% 22.64 10.50% 34.71 8.70% 51.71 
Female 40.10% 13.58 30.90% 22.74 11.80% 35.07 17.30% 50.11 
Age 18-30 64.10% 13.75 35.90% 20.86 XXX XXX XXX XXX 
Age 31-40 8.80% 15.09 78.40% 23.41 12.90% 33.41 XXX XXX 
Age Over 40 3.90% 15.52 30.30% 24.01 27.00% 35.51 38.80% 51.34 
Disabled 30.10% 13.39 41.50% 22.67 8.30% 34.02 20.10% 51.18 
Not Disabled 33.60% 13.82 46.60% 22.65 10.80% 34.79 9.00% 51.39 
Burundi 35.20% 14.53 59.30% 21.85 4.30% 33.97 1.20% 45.01 
DRC 43.00% 13.96 48.10% 22.21 7.00% 34.53 1.90% 48.69 
RoC 32.40% 13.3 46.00% 23.36 13.30% 34.8 8.30% 56.07 
Uganda 22.00% 12.87 29.80% 24.08 18.80% 35.02 29.50% 50.43 
GLR Average 33.40% 13.79 46.10% 22.66 10.60% 34.76 9.90% 51.34 
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young at the time (on average at age 13.79) – a factor that can have a profound impact on 
their psychosocial wellbeing and in turn prospects for reintegration. The under 18 category 
was second largest within all GLR countries and in some almost even with the 18-30 category 
– for example in DRC where 43% of ex-combatants were aged under 18 at the time of 
mobilization (on average 13.79) and 48.1% were aged 18-30 (on average 22.21).10  
 
Mobilization into violent conflict at an adolescent age can have a profound impact on the 
social and psychological development of individuals as they mature and, in turn, carry 
considerable weight for their ability to interact with communities upon their return. While 
data on abduction versus voluntary mobilization was not available for comparison across the 
GLR countries, this data may have added considerable nuance in exploring further gendered 
dynamics of mobilization. For example in Uganda, the only GLR country in which such data is 
available, where abduction is a well-known tactic for recruitment and mobilization 92.9% of 
females sampled between the age of 18 and 30 reported being abducted. Though as a 
counterpoint, there is reason to be cautious to such data. There are enormous social 
pressures at work and ex-combatants may fear stigma, retribution, or denial of amnesty as a 
result identifying themselves as willing participants in conflict – possibly inflating the 
proportion of ex-combatants that report abduction.  
 
As illustrated in Table 2, it appears that there are certain gendered dynamics to the age of 
mobilization. Across the GLR sample, female ex-combatants were more frequently mobilized 
under the age of 18 (40.1%, average age 13.58) when compared to male ex-combatants 
(32.3%, average age 13.83), and with decreasing frequency as the age at mobilization 
increases – 64.1% between the ages of 18 and 30, 8.8% between the ages of 31 and 40, and 
3.9% over the age of 40. This trend holds true in all of the GLR countries except for the 
Republic of Congo in which the pattern of age at mobilization follows more closely to the 
male ex-combatants’ trend in which the majority of ex-combatants are mobilized between 
the ages of 18 and 30. Thought he exact reason for this gendered dimension to the age of 
                                                     
10 Disaggregation of the average age at mobilization in Uganda by armed group provides some necessary nuance here. The 
average age at mobilization for members of the LRA in Uganda, known for their strategy of youth abduction for 
mobilization, was 18.38 years. This stands in contrast to the ADF who had an average age of mobilization at 31.02 years, 
West Nile Bank Front with 41.34 years, and UNRF with 42.18 years. Further examination reveals that 51.3% of LRA ex-
combatants were mobilized under the age of 18, with an average age of 12.78. 
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mobilization is unclear, it is likely related to the benefits of mobilizing child soldier from an 
armed group’s perspective – though child soldiers may be less effective soldiers in the 
traditional sense they are also easier to intimidate, indoctrinate, and misinform than 
adults.11 
 
Not surprisingly current age showed a positive correlation to age at mobilization – meaning 
that on average the older an ex-combatant was at the age of mobilization the older they 
were at the time of sampling. Disability did not show any relationship to age at mobilization. 
 
Across the GLR countries the average number of years ex-combatants had spent with armed 
groups varied. At a cross-country level ex-combatants in the GLR countries spent an average 
of 7.08 years with armed groups. DRC and Rwanda stand out on the high end of this cross-
country average with 11.16 years and 9.09 years spent with armed groups on average 
(respectively). Ex-combatants in Uganda spent the least amount of time on average with 
armed groups (4.38 years). A full table of the average time spent with armed groups is 
presented in Table 3. Drawing from DRC and Rwanda we can observe that those ex-
combatants that were members of national armed forces (FAC in DRC and RPA in Rwanda) 
spent longer on average participating in conflict than those in other irregular armed groups 
(mean 18.99 years vs. 5.27 years in DRC and mean 12.57 vs. 8.15 years in Rwanda).12 
 
The number of years spent with armed groups displayed a gendered trend across the GLR 
countries. Female ex-combatants spent a lower average number of years (mean = 4.95 
years) with armed groups compared to their male ex-combatant counterparts (mean = 7.37 
years). This trend holds across the GLR countries with the exception of Uganda – in which 
female ex-combatants spent on average slightly more years (mean = 4.84 years) than their 
male ex-combatant counterparts (mean = 4.22 years). A more detailed breakdown of years 
spent with armed groups across cross-cutting demographic lines can be found below in Table 
3. 
 
                                                     
11 See Beber and Blattman (2013). 
12 The caseload of ex-combatants in Uganda and RoC consisted almost wholly of ex-combatants from irregular armed 
groups (such as the LRA and ADF in Uganda and the Ninjas in RoC), thus a valid comparison of their average time spent with 
armed groups compared to national armed forces is not feasible here.  
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Table 3: Ex-Combatant Average Years Spent with Armed Group  
 
  
Average Years with Armed Group 
Burundi DRC RoC Rwanda Uganda GLR Total 
Male 6.4 12.12 4.55 9.11 4.22 7.37 
Female 4.67 5.19 4.27 8.08 4.84 4.95 
Age 18-30 5.01 4.3 4.62 8.51 5.88 5.4 
Age 31-40 7.14 8.48 4.77 8.56 3.79 6.77 
Age Over 40 13.85 24.74 4.17 10.81 3.27 10.58 
Disabled 8.43 12.57 4.5 13.24 6.41 9.4 
Not Disabled 6.07 11.09 4.54 12.48 3.96 7.27 
Country Average 6.25 11.16 4.55 9.09 4.38 7.08 
 
Again, as with age at time of mobilization, current age showed a positive correlation to years 
spent with armed groups at a cross-country level. Though RoC and Uganda stood apart from 
this trend – in Uganda there was even a negative relationship between current age and 
average years spent with armed groups. Those ex-combatants who were categorized as 
disabled spent slightly longer on average (mean = 9.40 years) compared to their non-
disabled counterparts (mean = 7.27 years). 
 
On average across the GLR countries it had been 4.05 years since ex-combatants were 
formally demobilized at the time of sampling. In Uganda the time since demobilization was 
about half the cross-country average (1.87 years) while in RoC it was roughly twice the cross-
country average (8.07 years).13 It is important to remember that some ex-combatants may 
spontaneously self-demobilize during conflict, leaving behind their armed groups. In 
addition, after the cessation of violence, ex-combatants may leave armed groups and return 
to their home community, or another place, on their own initiative. A considerable amount 
of time may pass between these ‘informal’ demobilizations and the point at which ex-
combatants take part in a formal demobilization process. Being able to measure this gap 
may prove an important indicator in assessing dynamics of return within the GLR countries. 
Unfortunately, while there is data on formal demobilization across the GLR countries, there 
is only data in Uganda on both informal and formal demobilization collected – 42.1% having 
informally demobilized as much as a decade or more before participating in formal 
demobilization processes. These findings however are most likely relevant to the specific 
dynamics of return and reintegration in Uganda where ex-combatants escape from armed 
                                                     
13 Though examination of trends by armed group is not included in the analysis here, it is worth noting that in Uganda 
membership to different armed groups appeared to play an important role in the time since demobilization and could serve 
as a valuable line of inquiry for more focused analysis within each of the individual GLR countries. 
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groups (primarily the LRA) and return directly to their communities and then retroactively 
applying for amnesty, reinsertion assistance and possibly attain further referral to 
reintegration programming – often with a lengthy time-lapse. In contrast, other 
reintegration programs in the GLR leave few opportunities for accessing reintegration 
benefits without participating in a formal demobilization process and a fairly linear supply of 
reinsertion and reintegration assistance upon their return. 14   
 
7.1.2 Marriage and Household 
 
Marriage dynamics are an important indicator of ex-combatants’ basic social standing. 
Indeed, marriage dynamics can tell us much about ex-combatants’ ability to leverage 
familial, economic, and social networks towards the attainment of marriage and in turn their 
ability redouble their engagement in these social structures through marriage – all indicators 
of a strong footing in the community. 
 
Across the GLR countries there is a clear trend of increasing marriage and cohabitation rates 
among ex-combatants at three time points: before demobilization, at demobilization, and at 
sampling. As is visible in Table 4, the proportion of ex-combatants that were married across 
the GLR countries increased from 33.9% prior to demobilization, to 36% at demobilization, 
and 46.8% at the time of sampling. 15 These increases in marriage (and cohabitation) rates 
among ex-combatants are matched by an even clearer decline in the proportions that were 
single and or never married.   
 
There are two noteworthy trends in regards to the trajectory of ex-combatant marital status 
with the specific GLR countries. First, in RoC the proportion of married ex-combatants at all 
three time points was much lower than the GLR cross-country average (6.7% prior to 
demobilization, 5.6% at demobilization, and 5.6% at the time of sampling), instead the 
decrease in the proportion of ex-combatants that were single / never married were 
absorbed into the category ‘living together’ (47.1% prior demobilization, 60.1% at 
                                                     
14 For a thorough examination of trends of formal and informal demobilization in Uganda see World Bank (2011d).  
15 Rwanda is excluded from findings on marital status before demobilization and at demobilization due to lack of 
comparable data. In addition, Burundi is excluded from findings on marital status at demobilization due to lack of directly 
comparable data.  
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demobilization, and 75.3% at the time of sampling). Second, Rwanda is the only GLR country 
in which ex-combatants are more frequently married than community members at the time 
of sampling (77.4% vs. 46.9%) – a point that will receive attention in the summary of the ex-
combatant portion of this study.  
 
There are certain demographic trends that can be extracted regarding marriage. Concerning 
gender, female ex-combatants are less likely to be married at all time points than male ex-
combatants. As is visible in Table 4, this disparity between female and male ex-combatants 
grows from 7.7% prior to demobilization, to 13.2% at the time of demobilization, and 24.2% 
at the time of sampling. This growing disparity between male and female ex-combatants can 
be explained in part by looking at the proportion of female-combatants who were divorced, 
separated, or widowed compared to male ex-combatants – female ex-combatants are the 
most likely to be divorced, separated, or widowed at any time period.  
 
Essentially it appears that while male ex-combatants’ marital trajectory across the three 
time points is primarily one of moving from single / never married to married or living 
together, female ex-combatants by contrast see only very marginal increases in marriage 
and cohabitation – instead their decreases in the single / never married category are 
absorbed into the divorced or separated, or widowed categories. These differing trajectories 
flag female ex-combatants across the GLR countries as facing clear barriers to accessing 
marriage and in turn the primary social unit for reintegration, the family, leaving them at 
increased risk for social isolation and marginalization. It is likely that stigma plays a core role 
in female ex-combatants very shallow trajectory towards marriage compared male ex-
combatants.16 While male and female ex-combatants alike carry the burden of stigma and 
distrust as perpetrators of violence, female ex-combatants can face the additional cultural 






                                                     




Table 4: Ex-Combatant Marital Status at Three Time Points17 
 
  
Marital Status Before Demobilization 






Male 35.00% 15.10% 1.00% 0.30% 48.60% 
Female 27.30% 14.30% 4.50% 9.10% 44.80% 
Age 18-30 14.40% 8.10% 0.60% 0.40% 76.50% 
Age 31-40 38.80% 23.20% 2.10% 0.70% 35.30% 
Age Over 40 65.00% 18.60% 2.30% 4.80% 9.20% 
Disabled 36.10% 10.10% 1.30% 3.10% 49.40% 
Not Disabled 33.80% 15.30% 1.50% 1.40% 47.90% 
Burundi 29.90% 4.50% 0.20% 0.10% 65.30% 
DRC 45.50% 7.40% 2.00% 1.50% 43.60% 
Republic of Congo 6.70% 47.10% 3.40% 1.30% 41.50% 
Uganda 51.20% 3.70% 0.70% 3.40% 40.90% 
GLR Average 33.90% 15.00% 1.60% 1.60% 48.00% 
  Marital Status at Demobilization 
Male 38.20% 24.10% 3.80% 1.30% 32.70% 
Female 25.00% 15.00% 11.30% 19.10% 29.60% 
Age 18-30 15.70% 17.70% 4.70% 1.70% 60.30% 
Age 31-40 38.50% 32.90% 5.60% 2.00% 21.00% 
Age Over 40 60.70% 19.70% 5.10% 9.60% 4.90% 
Disabled 30.60% 13.10% 7.60% 12.20% 36.50% 
Not Disabled 36.70% 23.40% 4.80% 3.30% 31.80% 
DRC 51.20% 8.60% 3.90% 1.90% 34.40% 
Republic of Congo 5.60% 60.10% 5.00% 3.10% 26.20% 
Uganda 48.40% 2.70% 6.40% 7.40% 35.10% 
GLR Average 36.00% 22.70% 5.10% 4.20% 32.10% 
  Marital Status at Sampling 
Male 55.90% 23.30% 2.90% 1.20% 16.60% 
Female 31.70% 17.60% 13.00% 16.30% 21.30% 
Age 18-30 40.00% 21.50% 4.00% 1.10% 33.40% 
Age 31-40 60.90% 27.30% 4.10% 1.60% 6.10% 
Age Over 40 66.90% 18.40% 4.70% 8.10% 2.00% 
Disabled 57.70% 16.50% 6.10% 7.70% 12.10% 
Not Disabled 51.00% 23.90% 4.00% 2.60% 18.50% 
Burundi 60.00% 11.50% 0.80% 0.60% 27.00% 
DRC 59.90% 9.30% 4.10% 2.70% 24.00% 
Republic of Congo 5.60% 75.30% 7.40% 2.80% 9.00% 
Rwanda 77.40% 13.00% 1.70% 0.60% 7.40% 
Uganda 60.70% 5.90% 6.80% 8.30% 18.30% 
GLR Average 46.80% 25.10% 4.80% 3.60% 19.60% 
 
Turning now to age demographics, at all time points age shows a positive relationship to the 
likelihood of being married and accordingly a negative relationship to the likelihood of being 
single / never married (as is visible in Table 4). While those aged 18-30 are the least likely 
age demographic to be married at all time points they have the most positive trajectory 
towards marriage across age demographics – there is a 25.6% increase in the rate of 
marriage between prior to demobilization and the time of sampling among those aged 18-30 
versus a 22.1% increase in those 31-40, and only 1.9% increase in those over the age of 40. 
So while it appears that younger ex-combatants face considerable challenges in accessing 
                                                     
17 Rwanda is not calculated into the cross-country statistics for marital status at the time of sampling. Essentially, even with 
the sample weighting, including Rwanda in cross-country figures on marital status at the time of sampling can make it 
appear as though across the entire GLR ex-combatants marry more often than community members – even though Rwanda 
is the only country in which this is actually true.  
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reintegration pathways through marriage compared to other age demographics, their rate of 
change towards the near stagnant levels of marriage among those over 40 is the greatest – 
giving credence to the idea that one dimension to younger ex-combatants’ lag behind their 
elder peers, struggling to make up for time lost in conflict.  
 
As seen above divorce was low across the GLR countries, however of those who were 
divorced 26% of ex-combatants across the GLR countries said that their divorce was related 
to their ex-combatant status.18 When asked to explain more specifically the most common 
responses were: (i) Stigma or the influence of the spouses family (19%); (ii) the emotional 
abuse and fear that spouses married with ex-combatants faces; (iii) lack of tools or money. 
Female ex-combatants most notably cited that they were in the bush with their spouse, but 
escaped leaving them behind (29.9%).  
 
On average across the GLR countries, 13.5% of ex-combatants who were married had a 
spouse who either was then, or had at one point been a combatant.19 The GLR countries 
deviating notably from this trend were RoC, in which a slightly higher proportion of ex-
combatants had a spouse who was or had at one point been a combatant (24%), and 
Rwanda where rates of marriage with other ex-combatants were considerably lower (3%). 
The proportion of ex-combatants with a current or past spouse who is or was a combatant 
was fairly even across all demographics except for sex. Female ex-combatants were vastly 
more likely to currently have, or at one point have had, a spouse who was a combatant 
(53%) compared to male ex-combatants (9.1%). There are two dynamics which likely play 
some role in these findings: (i) in conflict where the proportion of females to males is 
relatively low it may be that female combatants marry at a higher rate than male 
combatants and (ii) upon return to the community female ex-combatants may face higher 
barriers (e.g. stigma) to marriage with non ex-combatants (see below).  
 
Across the GLR countries, ex-combatants’ attitudes towards marrying another ex-combatant 
varied considerably – in DRC as low as 25% would consider marrying another ex-combatant, 
and as high as 54.2% in Uganda. However, on average 32.2% of ex-combatants across the 
                                                     
18 Burundi is excluded from findings on ex-combatant divorce due to lack of directly comparable data. 
19 Burundi is excluded from findings on combatant status of spouse due to lack of directly comparable data.  
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GLR countries would consider marrying another ex-combatant.20 Concurrent to the rate at 
which ex-combatants marry other ex-combatants outlined above, attitudes towards 
marrying ex-combatants in the future display a distinctly gendered dynamic – 50.2% of 
female ex-combatants across the GLR countries would consider marrying an ex-combatant 
versus 29.8% of males.  
 
When asked to explain negative attitudes towards marrying another ex-combatant 
respondents most commonly cited the misbehavior of ex-combatants (22.7%) or stigma 
related the perceived criminality of ex-combatants (16.7%).21 Uganda was the only GLR 
country that departed from this trend – as stigma was only cited by 3.1% of ex-combatants 
and instead risk associated with living with ex-combatants (12.5%) was cited most 
commonly. Of female ex-combatants that would not consider marrying an ex-combatant, 
28.4% cited stigma due to their perceived criminality as an explanation, compared to 15.6% 
of male ex-combatants.  
 
Across the GLR countries ex-combatants most commonly saw themselves as the household 
head (52.8%) – responsible for household food and finances – followed by those who saw 
themselves and their spouse as responsible (19%) and those who saw only their spouse as 
responsible (6.7%).22 Across demographic lines there are clear trends: (I) female ex-
combatants are less than half as likely as male ex-combatants to cite themselves as the 
household head (25.4% vs. 57%); (ii) female ex-combatants are vastly more likely to cite 
solely their spouse as the household head than male ex-combatants (21.9% vs. 4.4%); and 
(iii) both disabled ex-combatants and those aged 18-30 are far more likely to cite their 
parents and grandparents than non-disabled and other age demographic ex-combatants 
(14% of disabled vs. 5.7% of non-disabled, and 15.3% of those aged 18-30 vs. 1.3% of those 
31-40 and 0.5% of those over 40). 
                                                     
20 Burundi is excluded from findings on attitudes towards marrying an ex-combatant due to lack of directly comparable 
data. 
21 Burundi is excluded from findings on explanations of attitudes towards marrying an ex-combatant due to lack of directly 
comparable data. 
22 In Burundi, DRC, and RoC inquiry about household head as constituted by who was primarily responsible for household 
finance and food was asked in one question, whereas in Uganda these were two separate questions (finance and food 
respectively). However, due to the high correlation between the two answers in Uganda (over 80%) they were recoded as 
one question for direct comparability with the other GLR countries. Rwanda is excluded from findings on household food 




7.1.3 Literacy, Education, and Vocational Training 
  
Levels of literacy, educational achievement, and vocational training are important indicators 
of ex-combatants’ basic life chances and their ability to engage with educational and 
vocational structures, to the extent they exist, in the different GLR country contexts and to 
leverage the dividends of this engagement towards further economic and social 
opportunities – in the end solidifying their footing in the community.   
 




Neither Read nor Write Read Only Read and Write 
Male 17.30% 8.60% 74.10% 
Female 36.90% 6.30% 56.80% 
Age 18-30 22.60% 7.80% 69.60% 
Age 31-40 15.60% 8.20% 76.10% 
Age Over 40 20.60% 8.40% 70.90% 
Disabled 27.40% 10.20% 62.40% 
Not Disabled 19.40% 8.10% 72.60% 
Burundi 11.90% 4.20% 83.90% 
DRC 13.10% 8.50% 78.50% 
Republic of Congo 18.70% 13.10% 68.30% 
Uganda 37.00% 7.40% 55.60% 
GLR Average 20.10% 8.30% 71.60% 
 
While literacy was generally high across the ex-combatant samples in the GLR countries 
(71.6 % could read and write), female ex-combatants had the lowest literacy rate (56.8%) 
and were most likely to be completely illiterate (36.9%) compared to any other crosscutting 
demographic (17.3% of males for example).23 Disabled ex-combatants and ex-combatants 
age 18-30 also scored notably lower on literacy. Across the GLR countries these three 
categories (female, disabled and age 18-30) of ex-combatants were consistently poor 
performers on literacy, though they closely switch places for worst performer within the 
individual GLR countries. These trends are displayed in Table 5. 
 
Regarding educational achievement there was very little change across all demographic 
groups between level of educational achievement at demobilization and at the time of 
sampling. The largest portion of all ex-combatants had some primary level of education 
(33.6%) at the time of demobilization and at the time of sampling (34.2%), followed by some 
                                                     
23 Rwanda is excluded from findings on literacy due to lack of directly comparable data. 
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secondary education (26.3% at demobilization and 23.4% at sampling).24 However, as is 
visible in Table 6, there is considerable variation in the individual GLR countries as far as the 
levels of ex-combatant educational achievement. Generally speaking, ex-combatants in 
Burundi and Uganda had educational achievement levels skewed more towards partial or 
complete primary education, while those in DRC and RoC were more skewed towards partial 
or complete secondary education.  
 
Table 6: Ex-Combatant Educational Achievement Levels  
 
  



























































































































Male 7.7% 1.5% 32.2% 20.3% 27.8% 7.9% 1.1% .6% .9% 
Female 15.6% 4.9% 41.2% 12.2% 18.6% 6.1% .8% .2% .5% 
Age 18-30 9.4% 1.0% 39.4% 20.6% 25.2% 3.2% .9% .0% .2% 
Age 31-40 6.0% 1.7% 28.2% 19.7% 30.7% 11.5% 1.2% .6% .4% 
Age Over 40 10.4% 4.3% 28.2% 15.2% 25.0% 11.7% 1.4% 1.5% 2.3% 
Disabled 12.5% 2.4% 42.2% 21.6% 16.7% 2.5% 1.6% .3% .3% 
Not Disabled 8.6% 2.0% 32.8% 18.8% 27.3% 8.1% 1.0% .6% .8% 
Burundi 8.4% 2.5% 27.2% 34.8% 24.0% 2.0% .9% .1% .2% 
DRC 8.5% .2% 21.4% 14.0% 38.2% 12.9% 1.6% 1.7% 1.5% 
RoC 3.9% 0.0% 12.8% 20.7% 26.3% 31.8% 1.1% 0.0% 3.4% 
Uganda 11.3% 3.9% 58.0% 7.9% 16.7% 1.5% .7% 0.0% 0.0% 
GLR Average 8.9% 2.0% 33.6% 19.0% 26.3% 7.6% 1.1% .5% .8% 
  Education Level at Sampling 
Male 7.7% 2.0% 32.8% 19.5% 24.8% 5.7% 1.3% .9% 5.4% 
Female 17.4% 6.0% 42.1% 9.6% 16.2% 2.7% .9% .6% 4.6% 
Age 18-30 7.9% 1.1% 35.3% 19.2% 26.5% 5.3% 1.2% .4% 3.3% 
Age 31-40 6.2% 2.6% 34.4% 21.1% 19.9% 5.4% 1.9% 1.1% 7.3% 
Age Over 40 15.7% 6.6% 33.3% 12.8% 18.4% 4.3% .8% 1.7% 6.4% 
Disabled 13.9% 2.8% 40.2% 19.1% 16.0% 2.1% 1.1% 1.0% 3.8% 
Not Disabled 8.6% 2.6% 33.5% 17.8% 24.4% 5.6% 1.3% .8% 5.4% 
Burundi 8.4% 2.5% 26.8% 33.8% 24.5% 2.8% .9% .2% .2% 
DRC 3.0% .4% 4.7% 2.8% 32.4% 17.6% 2.6% 2.3% 34.3% 
RoC 5.1% 0.0% 6.8% 5.1% 23.7% 33.9% 3.4% 1.7% 20.3% 
Uganda 12.4% 3.7% 53.5% 7.7% 19.6% 1.2% 1.0% 1.0% 0.0% 
GLR Average 9.2% 2.6% 34.2% 17.9% 23.4% 5.2% 1.2% .8% 5.3% 
 
Again, while there was generally very little change in ex-combatants’ educational 
achievement levels in the time between demobilization and sampling (which as discussed 
above was on average 4.05 years) DRC and RoC stand out in that ex-combatants across all 
levels of educational achievement at the time of demobilization were absorbed substantially 
into professional level achievement at the time of sampling (visible in Table 6), though this 
                                                     
24 Rwanda is excluded from findings on educational achievement at demobilization and the time of sampling due to lack of 
directly comparable data.  
233 
 
was especially true for male ex-combatants in DRC.25 Across the GLR countries female ex-
combatants educational achievement levels were skewed lower than their male 
counterparts at demobilization and the time of sampling. Ex-combatants aged 18-30 were 
also more clearly represented in slightly lower levels of educational achievement than their 
older counterparts as were disabled in relation to non-disabled.  
 
In line with the very low levels of mobility in ex-combatants’ levels of educational 
achievement between demobilization and sampling, only 15.2% of ex-combatants across the 
GLR countries reported that they were continuing education since demobilization.26 DRC, 
where 30.2% of ex-combatants were continuing education, was the only GLR country that 
stood out significantly from this trend. Ex-combatants aged 18-30 were the most likely 
(18.8%) demographic group across the GLR countries to be continuing education since 
demobilization.  Of those who were continuing education since demobilization across the 
GLR countries, the most notable pathways were: (i) pursuing professional qualifications 
(34.8%), or (ii) pursuing normal academic qualifications (34.1%).  
 
Across the GLR countries the majority of ex-combatants (58.1%) did not partake any form of 
vocational training as part of the reintegration process. This is not to suggest that vocational 
training was not available as all reintegration programs in the GLR offer, or in some cases 
serve as a referral to, some form of vocational training. 27 However, as visible in Table 7 
below, there is considerable variation between the respective GLR countries. Notably in DRC, 
where vocational training was a large component of reintegration programming, ex-
combatants had indeed received vocational training at a higher rate. Rwanda also displayed 
higher rates of vocational training – though it is unclear whether this is due to reintegration 
programming.28 By contrast in Uganda, where reintegration services merely served as a 
                                                     
25 Movement into professional level educational achievement is likely related to vocational training provided as a part of 
reintegration programming. Vocational training is a component of most reintegration programs in the GLR countries, 
however they were an especially large component in DRC specifically – where vocational training was given to ex-
combatants and community members together in combination with the formation of related economic associations. 
26 Uganda is excluded from findings on rates and varieties of continuing education due to lack of directly comparable data. 
27 Burundi is excluded from findings on vocational training received due to lack of directly comparable data. 
28 In Rwanda entrepreneurship training, with the end result of a business plan and small grant were a core part of 




referral to existing vocational programs for the general population, there was considerably 
lower reported participation. 
 
While at a cross-country level it appears as though there is a slight positive relationship 
between age and the likelihood of receiving vocational training, this is only truly evident in 
DRC. Female ex-combatants, however, are slightly more likely to receive vocational training 
compared to male ex-combatants (47.3% vs. 41.2%), with the exception of RoC where they 
pair only slightly lower (18% vs. 20.6%).  
 
Table 7: Ex-Combatants’ Participation in Skills & Vocational Training 
 
  
Participated in Skills or Vocational Training 
Yes No 
Male 41.20% 58.80% 
Female 47.30% 52.70% 
Age 18-30 39.90% 60.10% 
Age 31-40 42.40% 57.60% 
Age Over 40 44.30% 55.70% 
Disabled 47.10% 52.90% 
Not Disabled 41.40% 58.60% 
DRC 66.10% 33.90% 
Republic of Congo 20.20% 79.80% 
Rwanda 76.40% 23.60% 
Uganda 32.60% 67.40% 
GLR Average 41.90% 58.10% 
 
Of those ex-combatants who had received skills or vocational training, the majority (62.7%) 
were utilizing these skills and training.29 Female ex-combatants were using skills and training 
slightly less than male ex-combatants (61.3% vs. 63%). In addition ex-combatants were using 
their skills and training progressively more across age demographics (53.9% for ages 18-30, 
56.8% for ages 31-40, and 76.3% for those over 40). Disabled ex-combatants utilized their 
skills and training at a lesser frequency (54.5%) than their non-disabled counterparts 
(63.8%).30 Of those ex-combatants who were not using their skills and vocational training the 
most common explanations were: (i) 29.4% lost necessary tools and have no money for new 
ones, (ii) 21.6% lack of capital, and (iii) 10.9% lack of facilities for carrying out the vocation 
and skills they were trained in.  
 
                                                     
29 Burundi is excluded from findings on use of vocational training due to lack of directly comparable data. 
30 Though unclear, it is possible that this trend is an indication of inadequate targeting of disabled ex-combatants for skiling 





Conflict represents an immense social disruption that often results in the disintegration of 
families, communities, and the broader fabric of society. The process of DDR is aimed at 
reconnecting the fractured pieces of these social entities so that collective norms and 
processes can be re-solidified. For ex-combatants facing this transition from conflict to peace 
by returning to families, gaining economic independence and participating in their 
communities represent the core challenges of reintegration. While there are few that do not 
feel the effects of conflict across the GLR countries, it is noteworthy that ex-combatants face 
a range of distinct challenges in the process of reintegration.  
 
A large proportion of ex-combatants across the GLR countries were mobilized into conflict 
under the age of 18 (who were on average only early adolescents around 13 years old) and 
spent a number of their formative years as adults socialized in a context of violence. One 
way to view this is that a significant proportion of ex-combatants have missed the 
opportunity of the socialization of adult norms and behavior during normal peacetime, 
setting them with a steep learning curve upon return for socializing to these norms and 
values that they may have never learned in the first place – due to their absence from 
traditional family and community structures during their formative adult years in conflict. 
Further study into the specific modes of mobilization, for example abduction, may add 
considerable explanatory power to the specific challenges the ex-combatants who were 
mobilized at a young age face. While the evidence presented on the age at mobilization is 
not conclusive, this line of inquiry deserves further attention in future studies. 
 
Ex-combatants across the GLR countries, with the exception of Rwanda, are married less 
frequently than community members. However, ex-combatants generally show a positive 
trajectory towards marriage and cohabitation over time. It appears that across the GLR, ex-
combatants’ largest obstacle in reintegrating into, or in most cases building the familial unit 





Ex-combatants’ levels of educational achievement and literacy are skewed slightly lower 
than community members’ – with lower levels of partial secondary, secondary, partial 
tertiary, or complete tertiary level achievement. While educational mobility was very low in 
general, it appears as though time lost while in conflict is a significant barrier to educational 
achievement – especially for younger ex-combatants who are a step behind their older 
peers, but are more aggressive about closing this gap through continuing education since 
demobilization. 
 
7.1.4.1 Vulnerable Subgroups 
 
As discussed above, while younger ex-combatants (aged 18-30) tend to be a step behind 
their older peers as far as access to marriage and educational achievement, this appears to 
be a product of the time lost while in conflict. In addition, though younger ex-combatants 
tend to be a step behind, they share the same general positive trajectory as their older 
peers. Female ex-combatants, however, show a widening gap in relation to male ex-
combatants – who themselves generally have a positive trajectory in terms of education and 
marriage. 
 
In assessing trends in marriage across the GLR countries we can summarize several key 
points regarding female ex-combatants: (i) female ex-combatants are less likely than male 
ex-combatants to be married or cohabitate; (ii) the gap in marriage and cohabitation rates 
between male and female ex-combatants has grown over time from prior to demobilization 
to the time of sampling; and (iii) female ex-combatants are the most likely group to be 
divorced, widowed, or separated. The weight of female ex-combatants’ disadvantage in 
these regards is exaggerated further when compared to female community members’ 
marriage rates – who themselves rank lower in marriage rates than male community 
members, though still notably higher than female ex-combatants (31.7% of female ex-
combatants are married versus 38.1% of female community members). Essentially while 
male ex-combatants are making steady progress towards parity with community members in 




Female ex-combatants also have the lowest prospects for marriage in the future, as 
attitudinal indicators reveal that male ex-combatants are much less likely to be willing to 
marry another ex-combatant than female ex-combatant (29.8% vs. 50.2%). When analyzed 
against the back drop of community members’ ranking on the same attitudinal indicator 
(25.7% of male community members and 25% of female community members would 
consider marrying an ex-combatant) we can see that female ex-combatants have a 
considerably smaller pool of individuals who are attitudinally open to marrying them 
compared to male ex-combatants.  
 
Collectively these findings cement the fact that in the GLR countries female ex-combatants 
are not only the least likely group across all demographics (ex-combatants and community 
members alike) to be married and have a family, but also the group that faces the largest 
barriers to accessing marriage in the future – placing them outside of the primary unit of 
reintegration and at substantial risk for marginalization and social isolation. 
 
As an additional note, female ex-combatants lag behind male ex-combatants with lower 
levels of literacy, and educational achievement – also lagging behind the female community 
members on both measures as well. As with those aged 18-30, female ex-combatants are 
slightly more aggressive than their male counterparts (16.5% vs. 15.1%) in pursuing further 
education to close this gap. 
 
7.1.4.2 Unique Country Trends 
 
Rwanda stands out from the rest of the GLR countries as the only country where ex-
combatants appear to be more frequently married than community members – and to a 
considerable extent (77.4% versus 46.9%). However, there are reasons to be skeptical to 
these figures. In the Rwandan sample female ex-combatants (a group that consistently 
displayed the lowest marriage rates across the other GLR countries) were severely under 
represented (only 2.5% or n= 13 of the total 517 Rwandan ex-combatants) compared to 
female community members (31.2% or n=159 or the total community member sample). In 
addition, those ex-combatants aged 18-30 (who across all other GLR countries were the least 
likely age demographic to be married) were more than twice as represented in the 
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community member sample (57% or n=290) as in the ex-combatant sample (22.6% or 
n=132). In effect, these facets of the demographic representations in the ex-combatant and 
community member samples may have inflated the rate at which it appears that ex-
combatants marry, and deflated the rate at which community members appear to marry.  
 
However, there are further contextual details to consider in terms of marriage in the case of 
Rwanda. In Rwanda males are required to have access to adequate housing in order to get 
married. However, the formal regulations for what qualifies as adequate housing in Rwanda 
are somewhat narrowly defined under the policy of imidugudu – a large scale body of 
housing policy aimed at consolidating dispersed land and housing in an overall effort toward 
villagization. The result has been inflation in adequate housing prices and in turn a severe 
crisis in the availability of adequate housing overall that in effect is locking many Rwandans 
out of official marriage – though they may cohabitate without formalized marital status.31 
This dynamic may further deflate the rate of marriage in Rwanda for community members. 
 
In contrast to community members, most ex-combatants are returning to Rwanda from 
Eastern DRC, where they have been away for an average of nine years. In this time some ex-
combatants have married and when returning to Rwanda bring their spouse with them. The 
legal status of these marriages in Rwanda is unclear, however it is possible that some ex-
combatants unwittingly navigate past the formal barriers to marriage that community 
members face – in turn accounting for their slightly higher marriage rates. While it is likely 
that the interaction of housing policy, marriage, and dynamics of return are key in 
understanding why ex-combatants marry more than community members in Rwanda, this 
exact narrative must be treated as conjecture. In the future a more focused inquiry into the 
dynamics of ex-combatant and community member marriage in Rwanda could prove 
prudent. For if indeed ex-combatants have been more successful than community members 
in accessing pathways to marriage in Rwanda the details of this finding could hold 
considerable explanatory value in analyzing other cases and, not least, in developing 
reintegration programming in the future. 
 
                                                     




RoC, where marriage rates for both ex-combatants and community members alike were 
drastically lower than in other GLR countries (5.6% of ex-combatants and 18.5% of 
community members at the time of sampling were married versus 60.2% and 64.3% on 
average of the remaining respective ex-combatants and community members), stood out as 
well. What is notable in RoC is that while marriage rates are much lower than average across 
the GLR countries, a much higher proportion of both ex-combatants and community 
members are cohabitating, but are not married, than on average across the GLR countries 
(75.3% of ex-combatants and 53.5% of community members in RoC were cohabitation 
versus 8.9% and 4.9% on average of the remaining respective ex-combatants and community 
members across the GLR).  
 
It appears that while community members do access marriage at a higher rate than ex-
combatants in RoC, community members also face considerable barriers to accessing 
marriage themselves. Instead the most significant marital status for both community 
members and ex-combatants alike is cohabitation. As ex-combatants’ levels of cohabitation 
in RoC increase from 47.1% prior to demobilization, to 60.1% at demobilization, and 75.3% 
at sampling, it would appear as though this is the primary pathway to accessing the familial 
unit. Further study to explore the dynamics of formal and informal marriage in RoC would 
prove illuminating – especially if formal marriage, largely understood as the primary 
pathway to accessing the familial unit, is not necessary for reintegration in the RoC context. 
It should also be noted that without a clear explanation or triangulation for RoC’s departure 
in terms of marriage rates the data should also be treated carefully. It is possible that there 
are unbeknownst errors in data capture or coding that have produced these findings.  
 
Lastly, in Uganda ex-combatants are considerably more likely than average across the GLR 
countries to report willingness to marrying an ex-combatant in the future. Though there is 
no direct explanation it is possible that the specific dynamics of combatant mobilization in 
Uganda may play a role in this trend. In Uganda abduction was a well-known tactic of 
mobilization, especially by the LRA. Though abductees may have committed violent acts 
against their communities, often forcibly, there is evidence that ex-combatants are 
simultaneously understood as victims and perpetrators by community members – a factor 
that has reportedly contributed to a general willingness to accept returning ex-combatants 
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back into communities.32 This dynamic, combined with the extensive use of traditional 
reconciliation ceremonies (not necessarily part of reintegration programming), may 
contribute to community members in Uganda’s openness to marriage with ex-combatants. 
Futures studies could flag this conjecture for further analysis.  
 
 
7.2 Housing, Land, Livestock and Food Security 
 
The following is an examination of the core dimensions of: (i) the types of dwellings that ex-
combatants live in and related issues such as ownership and tenure; (ii) access to land for 
agricultural production and (iii) its connection to food security.  
 
7.2.1 Dwelling, Living Conditions and Land Security 
 
In examining who ex-combatants live with across the GLR countries the three most common 
categories are: (i) with the same family as before conflict (29.2%), (ii) with a family but 
different to that from before conflict (24.3%), and (iii) with a partner (19.9%). Two countries 
across the GLR stood out from this general trend. First in RoC the majority ex-combatants 
reported living with a partner (43.6%) at a proportion more than double the cross-country 
average. Second, in Rwanda the majority of ex-combatants reported living with a family that 
was different from the one before conflict (57.7%) at a proportion more than double the 
cross-country average.  
 
As is visible in Table 8 below, female ex-combatants were more likely to be living with a 
family either the same or different to the one before conflict than male ex-combatants – 
though less likely to be living with a partner or a family that consisted of a partner and 
children. It is also noteworthy that disabled ex-combatants were the least likely 
demographic group to be living with a partner – at a proportion less than half the cross-
country average.  
 
                                                     
32 See for example: Finnegan (2010). 
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Table 8: Ex-combatant Household Membership33 
 
  
















/ Partner and 
children 
Other 
Male 5.00% 20.00% 28.40% 23.80% 3.50% 17.70% 1.50% 
Female 3.30% 18.90% 35.20% 27.60% 2.20% 12.00% 0.80% 
Age 18-30 5.70% 20.20% 24.70% 17.20% 4.00% 26.60% 1.50% 
Age 31-40 4.80% 20.10% 25.40% 31.10% 2.00% 15.10% 1.60% 
Age Over 40 3.40% 20.20% 41.10% 27.10% 1.30% 5.70% 1.10% 
Disabled 5.80% 8.40% 38.30% 32.60% 1.80% 12.40% 0.70% 
Not Disabled 4.70% 21.20% 28.10% 23.40% 3.50% 17.70% 1.50% 
Burundi 4.50% 11.50% 0.00% 0.00% 3.20% 78.90% 1.80% 
DRC 5.60% 22.40% 41.70% 21.50% 8.20% 0.00% 0.60% 
RoC 8.20% 43.60% 16.60% 25.70% 1.70% 0.90% 3.30% 
Rwanda 4.40% XXX% 32.80% 57.70% 3.60% 0.00% 1.60% 
Uganda 1.20% 16.20% 56.00% 26.50% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
GLR Average 4.80% 19.90% 29.20% 24.30% 3.30% 17.00% 1.50% 
 
Regarding housing types, there were diverse compositions across the GLR countries; 
however at a cross-country level ex-combatants were most commonly living in: (i) a house 
(48.2%); or (ii) in a hut or tent (30.8%). Only Uganda stood out significantly from this trend, 
with the majority of ex-combatants (77.6%) living in a hut or tent.  Across demographic 
categories there was fairly even membership to types of housing categories. Though, female 
ex-combatants were notably less likely to live in a house compared to male ex-combatants 
(41.8% vs. 49.1%) and more likely to live in a hut or tent (43.7% vs. 29%). 
 
There were varying rates of housing ownership across the GLR countries. Generally speaking 
self-ownership was the most common across the GLR countries (41%), followed by family 
ownership (17.8%). However, in RoC family member ownership was most common (29.7%) 
followed by self-ownership (24.7%). 
 
As is visible in Table 9, housing ownership rates were consistently lower for female ex-
combatants than male ex-combatants across the GLR countries; 22.8% of female ex-
combatants owned their land versus 43.7% of male ex-combatants – though Rwanda is an 
exception from this trend where 63.9% of female ex-combatants owned their land versus 
39.1% of male ex-combatants. In contrast female ex-combatants were more likely to cite 
                                                     
33 In Table 8 the use of XXX indicates that respondents in Rwanda were not given the option to respond that they live with a 
partner or spouse – the responses that would have been in the feild are likely absorbed into the categories of those who 




that their housing was owned by their spouse (17.6% vs. 1.7%) or by family that they live 
with (13.7% vs. 6.8%) when compared to male ex-combatants. Concerning age dynamics of 
housing ownership, there was a positive correlation visible between age and rate of housing 
ownership. Inversely, as age increased ex-combatants were less likely to rely on their 
relatives or family.  
 
Table 9: Ex-Combatant Housing Ownership 
 
  
Who Owns the Housing You Currently Live In? 














Male 43.70% 1.70% 4.20% 6.80% 2.10% 18.10% 23.40% 
Female 22.80% 17.60% 3.00% 13.70% 0.60% 16.30% 25.90% 
Age 18-30 31.10% 4.30% 3.20% 11.40% 1.90% 26.90% 21.10% 
Age 31-40 44.20% 3.10% 4.70% 4.40% 2.60% 13.00% 27.90% 
Age Over 40 55.10% 3.80% 4.70% 4.90% 1.10% 8.30% 22.10% 
Disabled 40.40% 5.30% 3.10% 15.00% 3.40% 14.20% 18.60% 
Not Disabled 41.20% 3.60% 4.20% 6.80% 1.80% 18.30% 24.20% 
Burundi 51.00% 2.00% 0.40% 0.00% 1.00% 21.70% 23.90% 
DRC 28.60% 3.80% 4.40% 10.20% 2.40% 17.00% 33.70% 
RoC 24.70% 3.50% 11.30% 1.80% 2.00% 29.70% 27.00% 
Rwanda 39.80% 1.40% 0.00% 12.70% 5.40% 13.80% 26.80% 
Uganda 59.80% 7.40% 3.20% 15.20% 0.00% 5.90% 8.60% 
GLR Average 41.00% 3.70% 4.10% 7.70% 2.00% 17.80% 23.70% 
 
When housing ownership was cross-tabulated against marital status a clear trend emerged. 
Of those ex-combatants who reported self-ownership of their housing, 68.4% were married 
and 16.9% were cohabitating – only 5.8% of those who reported self-ownership were single 
/ never married. Inversely, when we look at the marital status of those who reported family 
ownership of their housing, 52.2% of those who reported their housing as owned by family 
they live with and 39.8% of those who reported family ownership were single / never 
married. Marriage rates show a clear correlation to housing ownership. This evidence 
supports the idea that marriage is a key pathway to housing, land access and security.   
 
Ex-combatants had a standard distribution of perceptions of their current living situation 
relative to perceptions at the time of demobilization across all the GLR countries – 21.8% of 
ex-combatants saw their current living situation as better than at the time of demobilization, 
49% saw it as the same, 26.2% saw it as worse, and only 2.9% pointed out that they did not 
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have housing at the time of demobilization.34 Across demographic categories these 
perceptions were remarkably even as well.  
 
When examining ex-combatants’ perceptions of their own living situation compared to their 
neighbors, the majority saw themselves as well off, or worse off.35 Only 10.9% of ex-
combatants saw their neighbors as having a better living situation, 47.8% saw it as the same, 
and 40.8% saw it as worse. There was some notable variation in ex-combatants’ perceptions 
of their living situation relative to their neighbors within specific GLR countries. In Uganda 
and Rwanda ex-combatants were more likely to have seen their living situation as worse 
than their neighbors (53.7% and 52.6% respectively) than in DRC and RoC (31.4% and 29.1% 
respectively). Looking at specific demographic differences it is apparent that disabled ex-
combatants more commonly saw their situation as worse than their neighbors (59.6%), than 
non-disabled ex-combatants (38.3%). 
 
7.2.2 Land Access and Food Security 
 
Gaining access to land for agricultural production is seen as a key pathway to both economic 
mobility and food security for ex-combatants. However, comparing land ownership across, 
and even within, the GLR countries can prove challenging. In many areas land ownership 
structures vary considerably and thus across the context of findings. For example, in many 
areas land ownership is organized around clans and infrequently owned on a private basis. 
However, land tenure can be very secure because of the clan structure despite the absence 
of deeds or titles. Though there is no systematic capture of the types of ownership 
structures across the GLR countries, these must be kept in mind when viewing the findings in 
this section. 
 
Land access for cultivation purposes was universally high across GLR countries and within 
crosscutting demographic categories, with 92.6% of ex-combatants having access to land for 
cultivation purposes. In Uganda a more in-depth questioning of the tenure status of the land 
ex-combatants used for cultivation showed ex-combatants aged 18-31 were more likely to 
                                                     
34 Rwanda is excluded from findings on perceptions of current living situation compared to at the time of demobilization 
due to lack of data directly comparable data. 
35 Burundi is excluded from findings on perceptions of current living situation compared to neighbors due to lack of data. 
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have a title for the land they cultivated (58.6%) compared to those 31-40 (29%) and those 
over 40 (30%). However these older age demographic groups were more likely than their 
younger counterparts to use communally owned land: 40% of those aged over 40, 28% of 
those aged 31-40, and 16.6% of those 18-31. Disabled ex-combatants also more frequently 
accessed communally owned land than non-disabled counterparts (35.7% vs. 26.5%). 
Though there is no comparable data for the other GLR countries these findings from Uganda 
may lend some nuance to the land ownership dynamics across demographic lines.  
 
Of the ex-combatants who did not have any access to land for cultivation at all in the DRC 
and RoC, lack of interest (29.9%) and lack of capital (27.2%) were the most common 
explanations.36 Other notable trends were that female ex-combatants more commonly cited 
fear of conflict (35.7%) than male ex-combatants (13.5%). Also, disabled ex-combatants 
more commonly cited distance / living in the city (28.6%) as an explanation for their lack of 
access to land for cultivation than their non-disabled counterparts (8.1%). 
 
In examining changes in ex-combatants’ access to arable land over a two-year period it was 
found that a significant proportion of ex-combatants (38%) had experienced an increase in 
their access to arable land over the last two years.37 Despite this general trend, the GLR 
countries vary considerably on this point – see Table 10 below. On the one hand, in DRC and 
RoC the majority ex-combatants had seen an increase in their access to land and, on the 
other hand, in Burundi and Uganda the majority had not seen an increase in their access to 
land.38 On average female ex-combatants had less often experienced an increase in their 
access to land (26.5%) than male ex-combatants (39.8%) – though Uganda was the only 
country where this trend was not displayed (12.4% of female ex-combatants having an 
increase vs. 9.7% of males). Similarly, disabled ex-combatants also tended to less often have 
experienced increases in their access to arable land (22.3%) when compared to non-disabled 




                                                     
36 DRC and RoC are the only GLR countries with data available on reasons for lack of access to arable land.  
37 Rwanda is excluded from findings on changes in access to arable land due to lack of directly comparable data. 
38 With specific reference to Uganda, a more finely grained scale reveals that 10.4% had more land access, 63.4% had the 
same level of access, and 26.3% had less access. 
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Table 10: Ex-Combatant Change in Access to Arable Land 
 
  
Change in Access to Arable Land 
More Access Same or Less Access 
Male 39.80% 60.20% 
Female 26.50% 73.50% 
Age 18-30 34.70% 65.30% 
Age 31-40 43.50% 56.50% 
Age Over 40 35.50% 64.50% 
Disabled 22.30% 77.70% 
Not Disabled 39.40% 60.60% 
Burundi 30.40% 69.60% 
DRC 63.50% 36.50% 
Republic of Congo 72.20% 27.80% 
Uganda 10.40% 89.60% 
GLR Average 38.00% 62.00% 
 
There is a diverse range of findings across the GLR countries when looking at ex-combatants’ 
explanations for gains in access to land for cultivation. 39 In general it appears as though 
capital gained through strong agricultural yields has served as ex-combatants’ primary 
pathway to increased access to land for cultivation across the GLR countries. Looking to DRC, 
RoC, and Uganda we can observe that 42.2% of ex-combatants explained their increased 
access to land as a result of a combination of factors: (i) capital accrued from bountiful 
agricultural yields and (ii) the desire to produce more agriculturally for both subsistence and 
commercial purposes. Likewise, when explaining unchanged or decreased access to land for 
agricultural production in DRC and RoC 48.3% of ex-combatants cited lack of capital or 
resources as their primary barrier to land access mobility.  
 
While capital, especially that acquired through strong agricultural production, appears to be 
an important explanation for ex-combatants’ upward land access mobility across the GLR 
countries, two other explanations also deserve attention: (i) inheritance dynamics and (ii) 
marriage. These two pathways to land mobility appear especially relevant to female ex-
combatants and young ex-combatants (age 18-30). 
 
In DRC and RoC 28.7% of ex-combatants (40.3% in DRC alone) cited inheritance as their 
pathway to increased land access. This was especially true for younger ex-combatants (aged 
18-30), of which 32.8% cited inheritance. Further, while inheritance was only cited by 19.3% 
of ex-combatants in Uganda as their explanation for upward land access mobility, 53.5% 
                                                     
39 Burundi and Rwanda are excluded from findings regarding explanations for access to more or less arable land due to lack 
of directly comparable data.  
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cited regulated division of their land, such as inheritance, sharing and dividing, as the reason 
for their decreased access to land for cultivation. Female ex-combatants were significantly 
less likely than male ex-combatants (19.7% vs. 29.6%) to cite inheritance as a pathway to 
increased land access – which could suggest a lack of access to inheritance structures. Ex-
combatants aged 18-30 were the most likely age demographic to cite inheritance (32.3%) as 
their pathway to increased land access. 
 
In terms of marriage, while in Uganda only 12.9% of ex-combatants cited marriage as a 
pathway to increased land access an examination of demographic subgroups reveals that 
only 3.4% of male ex-combatants cited marriage as their pathway to increased land access 
compared to 36.4% of female ex-combatants. In addition, 38.5% of those aged 18-30 cited 
marriage as their pathway to increased land access compared to 0.0% of those aged 31-40 or 
over 40. Though findings are scattered across the GLR countries, collectively they form a 
mosaic that suggests that capital is a primary enabler of ex-combatant land access mobility. 
For young ex-combatants and female-combatants, the two demographic subgroups least 
likely to see increases in land access, inheritance and marriage also appear to play a distinct 
role. 
 
Livestock ownership excluding poultry was at 35.7% across the GLR countries, though 
generally higher in Burundi (40.2%) and Uganda (52.7%). 40 Age showed a positive 
relationship to the likelihood of owning livestock across the GLR countries – 33.5% of those 
aged 18-30, 35.1% of those aged 31-40 and 42.2% of those over 40. Increases in livestock in 
the last two years were cited by 54.2% of ex-combatants across the GLR with a similar 
distribution across demographic lines. Of those ex-combatants who had no livestock, 
poverty and lack of resources was the most common explanation (56.7%) followed by 
insecurity due to conflict (11.8%).  
 
Beyond access to land for cultivation and the ownership of livestock, another important 
indicator of food security is the level of household hunger and nutrition – presented in Table 
11. Across the GLR countries 13% of ex-combatants explained that people in their household 
always go hungry, 37.3% they often went hungry, 28.7% that they seldom went hungry and 
                                                     
40 Rwanda is excluded from findings regarding livestock ownership due to lack of directly comparable data.  
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16.1% that they never went hungry.41 The exception to this distribution is Uganda, where 
the majority seldom went hungry (45.3%). In general rates of household hunger were very 
even across demographic lines.  
 
Table 11: Ex-combatant Household Hunger 
 
  
How Frequently Do People in Your Household Go Hungry? 
Always Often Seldom Never 
Male 13.50% 37.20% 27.80% 21.60% 
Female 10.00% 38.10% 33.90% 18.00% 
Age 18-30 12.50% 40.80% 26.40% 20.30% 
Age 31-40 12.60% 37.80% 27.90% 21.70% 
Age Over 40 14.50% 32.40% 32.30% 20.80% 
Disabled 9.80% 38.10% 33.60% 18.50% 
Not Disabled 13.20% 37.20% 28.30% 21.30% 
Burundi 11.60% 49.10% 20.70% 18.60% 
DRC 21.00% 35.50% 24.50% 19.00% 
Republic of Congo 16.70% 43.20% 24.00% 16.10% 
Uganda 2.70% 21.60% 45.30% 30.40% 
GLR Average 13.00% 37.30% 28.70% 21.00% 
 
In regards to household nutrition 24.6% of ex-combatants said that in the last two years 
nutrition had improved, 43.8% that nutrition was unchanged and the remaining 31.6% that 
nutrition had worsened.42 Again, the only exception is Uganda, in which the proportion of 
ex-combatants with improvements in household nutrition was greater (36.9%). Of those ex-
combatants for which household nutrition had gotten worse in the last two years disabled 
ex-combatants (39.2%) were more commonly represented compared to non-disabled ex-




Ex-combatants display a very high level of access to housing and land for cultivation across 
the GLR countries. The majorities of ex-combatants across the GLR countries are living in 
permanent housing, with a family or spouse and see their living situation as equal to their 
neighbors – and in this sense have reached considerable parity with community members. 
Assessing the security of their housing tenure, however, is more challenging. The variety of 
housing ownership structures that exist across, and within, the GLR countries create unique 
contexts to land tenure security. Owing to a lack of systematic capture of land ownership 
structures a direct comparison is not possible here. However, what we can note is that lack 
                                                     
41 Rwanda is excluded from findings regarding household hunger due to lack of directly comparable data. 
42 Rwanda is excluded from findings regarding household nutrition due to lack of directly comparable data. 
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of housing and land title does not necessarily indicate a lack of tenure security – there are 
other structures such as clans that can insure land tenure.  
 
While at a cross-country level ex-combatants have exhibited a significant level of upward 
mobility in terms of their access to land for cultivation there remains a divergence between 
DRC and RoC, on the one hand, which showed very high rates of increased access to arable 
land and Burundi and Uganda, on the other, which displayed much lower rates of increased 
access to arable land. Accounting for this divergence is puzzling. While the absolute 
availability of land is important dimension of increased land access (for example in Rwanda 
land scarcity is a well identified issue, while in DRC there are large tracts of uninhabited land) 
it is likely that the local dynamics of negotiating access to land through various pathways is 
equally if not more important component (for example in DRC ex-combatants and 
community members alike must navigate between both customary and statutory land access 
regimes that can stand in direct contradiction to each other).43 As gaining access to land is a 
key pathway to ex-combatants’ economic stability, food security, and contribution to the 
community then further investigation of this divergence could prove important for future 
programming. 
 
While access to arable land and livestock ownership are generally considered important 
indicators of the food security of ex-combatants, it appears as though there is little 
correlation between these indicators and ex-combatants’ levels of household hunger and 
nutritional improvement. While ex-combatants’ access to arable land was very high across 
the GLR countries, nearly on par with community members, they were significantly more 
likely to face hunger and nutrition problems. Future inquiry into the sources and nature of 
household hunger and nutrition problems to nuance these findings could prove insightful. 
 
7.2.3.1 Vulnerable Subgroups 
 
Female ex-combatants face a unique set of challenges in regards to access to arable land. 
Female ex-combatants across the GLR are less likely than male ex-combatants to see 
                                                     
43 Some scholars have posited that local – national contradictions in land access and ownership structures have played a 
role in shaping new power structures in effect shaping and sustaining insecurity in some parts of the GLR. See for example: 
Huggins and Clover (2005). 
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increases in their access to land for cultivation (26.5% vs. 39.8%) – the low level of female 
ex-combatants’ land access mobility is even more stark when they are compared to female 
community members (45.4%), who are themselves on par with male community members. 
Scattered evidence suggests that, as with male ex-combatants, female ex-combatants view 
capital as their primary pathway to increased land access. However, as female ex-
combatants are the least likely group to see increases in their access to land this could 
suggest that they also face considerable barriers in access to capital. There is evidence to 
suggest that female ex-combatants experience additional barriers to land access mobility, 
especially in terms of (I) inheritance dynamics and (ii) marriage.   
 
Female ex-combatants less frequently cite inheritance as a pathway to land access mobility 
than male ex-combatants and female community members – who are on par with male 
community members. This could suggest that female ex-combatants face challenges in 
accessing land inheritance structures that are open to not only community members, but 
male ex-combatants as well. Lack of access to capital and inheritance structures for female 
ex-combatants is accentuated further when contextualized against marriage dynamics. 
Female ex-combatants in Uganda are more than ten times as likely to cite marriage as their 
pathway to increased land access compared to males – however (as discussed in §7.1.2) 
female ex-combatants remain the least marrying demographic group with the weakest 
prospects for marriage in the future. Collectively this evidence suggests that female ex-
combatants face a diverse range of barriers to land access. Future study to confirm and 
nuance these findings could prove beneficial for developing gender focused reintegration 
programming. 
 
Young ex-combatants (aged 18-30) tend to be a step behind their elder peers in terms of 
many housing, land access, and food security indicators. Young ex-combatants are less likely 
to own their housing, less likely to have livestock, and less likely to see increases in their 
access to land. However it appears that these disadvantages, as with marriage and 
education, may be a product of their years lost in conflict – as they now struggle to make 
parity with elder ex-combatants and show a clear trajectory of improvement – most notably 
in terms of accessing marriage, and in turn the familial unit, and access to land for 
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agricultural production, which is tied to the primary economic pathway for ex-combatants 
across the GLR: small scale agriculture.  
 
Supporting the findings that disabled ex-combatants are slightly more likely to be married, 
so too are they slightly more likely to be living in household with a family. It appears that the 
majority of disabled ex-combatants fall in line with line with their non-disabled peers in 
terms of housing, access to land, and livestock. However, few those who do fall behind do so 
at varying levels – likely commensurate to their particular level of disability. Overall, disabled 
ex-combatants saw similar levels of access to land for cultivation, but fewer increases in 
their land access in the years prior to sampling.  
 
7.2.3.2 Unique Country Trends 
 
While across the GLR countries ex-combatants were most likely to be living with the same 
family as prior to conflict, Rwanda and RoC stand out from this trend. In Rwanda ex-
combatants were more likely to be living with a family, but one different from prior to 
conflict. Have ex-combatants in Rwanda faced challenges in reintegrating into the same 
familial unit as prior to conflict? While there is no clear evidence in this study, it is possible 
that this may in part be a product of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, and the prolonged period 
of time that ex-combatants have been away from communities since the first and second 
Congo Wars. By contrast, in RoC ex-combatants were more likely to be living with a spouse 
(though unmarried, as detailed in §7.1.2). Have ex-combatants in RoC been more successful 
in accessing the familial unit, even if it is not officiated in marriage? As accessing the familial 
unit is understood as a key pathway to reintegration, further investigation into these 
diverging trends could prove instrumental. 
 
 
7.3. Economic Issues  
 
Attaining a level of economic stability through employment, access to credit and 
participation in economic associations are seen as key elements to the economic prospects 
of ex-combatants and essential for peace and development. As such, the analysis here is 
presented in five main parts: (i) an examination of ex-combatants’ employment statuses and 
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general outlooks on employment; (ii) an examination of the barriers that non-economically 
active ex-combatants face to gaining a stable economic status;  (iii) an examination of female 
ex-combatants’ specific economic issues; (iv) an examination of ex-combatants’ levels of 
income, savings, and access to credit as indicators of their general economic stability and 
ability to leverage economic opportunities; and (v) an examination of ex-combatants’ level of 
engagement with economic associations as an extended support / opportunity network. 
 
In the context of the severe development challenges that characterize the GLR countries, 
attaining economic reintegration (parity with community members) and economic stability 
may not necessarily be the same thing. Thus, to truly identify the economic challenges that 
are specific to ex-combatants, we must understand ex-combatants economic prospects in 
relation to the wider community. As such, this section should be read in conjunction with 
§8.3 on economic issues in the Community Dynamics Annex of this study.  
 
7.3.1 Economic Status and History 
 
Concerning employment status, at a cross-country level prior to conflict ex-combatants were 
most commonly studying or training (37.6%), self-employed in agriculture (26.3%), or 
unemployed (12.9%).44 At the time of demobilization the number of ex-combatants studying 
or training had dropped to 2.2%. Those who had previously been studying or training prior to 
conflict were effectively absorbed into the categories of self-employed in agriculture (which 
grew to 33.3%), unemployment (which grew to 31.1%), and employed working in the public 
sector (which grew from 3.1% prior to the conflict to 11% at demobilization. At the time of 
sampling unemployment had shrunk to 21.3% and the number of ex-combatants working in 
the public sector had shrunk to 1.7%. These changes in ex-combatant employment status 
continued to be absorbed into the categories of self-employed in agriculture which grew to 
36.7% and other self-employed in non-agricultural services categories which had grown to 
10.4% from the time of demobilization (see Table 12 below) – RoC is an exception to this 
trend towards self-employment in agriculture with retail instead being the primary pathway. 
 
                                                     
44 Rwanda is excluded from findings regarding employment status prior to demobilization and at demobilization and 
Burundi is excluded from findings regarding employment at demobilization due to lack of directly comparable data.  
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Though levels of employment varied from country to country, with each GLR country ex-
combatants followed the same arc in their employment trajectory – a spike of 
unemployment at the time of demobilization, to a drop in unemployment at the time of 
sampling that was slightly worse than pre-conflict levels. This unemployment trend coupled 
with a continual growth in self-employment in agriculture, services, and retail. 
 
In examining the demographic trends in employment status across the GLR countries at 
these three time points we can observe some trends. Female ex-combatants are slightly 
more frequently unemployed than male ex-combatants prior to conflict and at 
demobilization, though slightly less so at the time of sampling. Though Rwanda, where 
54.5% of female versus 38.2% of male ex-combatants were unemployed at the time of 
sampling, stood apart in this regard. Younger ex-combatants (age 18-31) are most frequently 
studying compared to other age groups at all time points. Older ex-combatants (over the age 
of 40) are most frequently in the self-employed agriculture group at all time points. Disabled 
ex-combatants were more frequently unemployed at the time of demobilization and the 
time of sampling compared to non-disabled ex-combatants. These trends are visible in Table 



























Table 12: Ex-Combatant Economic Status at Three Time Points45 
 
 
                                                     
45 The use of the phrase “at three time points” indicates that respondents were surveyed at one time point with questions 
regarding three different time points. 
  













































































































































































































































































































































































Employment Status Prior Conflict 
Male 12.80% 3.90% 5.60% 3.40% 26.20% 6.10% 3.20% 0.60% 0.10% 0.00% 37.20% 0.70% 0.00% 
Female 13.00% 2.30% 2.50% 1.30% 26.90% 4.00% 2.90% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 40.20% 5.30% 0.00% 
Age 18-30 12.20% 3.30% 3.90% 0.80% 16.90% 3.80% 2.10% 0.30% 0.00% 0.00% 55.00% 1.80% 0.00% 
Age 31-40 14.10% 4.90% 6.50% 3.20% 28.80% 7.10% 4.50% 0.70% 0.30% 0.00% 29.20% 0.80% 0.00% 
Age Over 
40 
10.70% 3.20% 6.60% 7.40% 43.00% 8.80% 4.20% 1.10% 0.30% 0.30% 13.10% 1.40% 0.00% 
Disabled 7.80% 3.60% 3.30% 1.90% 32.00% 4.10% 2.40% 0.20% 0.80% 0.80% 40.30% 2.90% 0.00% 
Not 
Disabled 
13.30% 3.70% 5.30% 3.20% 25.80% 6.00% 3.30% 0.60% 0.10% 0.00% 37.50% 1.30% 0.00% 
Burundi 7.10% 2.50% 5.90% 1.80% 26.60% 7.60% 4.00% 0.60% 0.00% 0.00% 42.80% 1.20% 0.00% 
DRC 26.50% 2.30% 5.30% 2.90% 9.60% 7.00% 5.00% 1.40% 0.00% 0.00% 37.70% 2.20% 0.00% 
RoC 8.60% 25.40% 15.10% 9.20% 41.60% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Uganda 6.10% 0.20% 1.50% 2.90% 38.60% 4.40% 1.50% 0.00% 0.50% 0.20% 42.80% 1.20% 0.00% 
GLR 
Average 
12.90% 3.70% 5.20% 3.10% 26.30% 5.80% 3.20% 0.60% 0.10% 0.10% 37.60% 1.40% 0.00% 
  Employment Status at Demobilization 
Male 30.30% 1.60% 5.00% 12.30% 32.70% 6.40% 4.00% 0.50% 0.20% 0.00% 5.40% 0.90% 0.60% 
Female 34.10% 0.40% 2.10% 5.90% 35.70% 5.70% 2.60% 0.60% 1.30% 0.00% 4.10% 7.60% 0.00% 
Age 18-30 43.00% 0.60% 4.70% 8.20% 21.80% 4.80% 2.80% 0.40% 0.00% 0.00% 9.40% 4.10% 0.20% 
Age 31-40 29.30% 1.20% 3.40% 10.60% 34.20% 8.20% 6.00% 0.90% 0.00% 0.00% 4.20% 1.30% 0.60% 
Age Over 
40 
16.40% 2.40% 3.10% 13.60% 49.20% 7.20% 3.40% 0.50% 1.10% 0.00% 1.40% 1.10% 0.60% 
Disabled 42.30% 0.50% 1.30% 5.20% 35.80% 2.60% 0.50% 0.30% 2.30% 0.00% 3.80% 2.60% 2.80% 
Not 
Disabled 
29.60% 1.40% 4.80% 11.70% 33.10% 6.70% 4.10% 0.60% 0.10% 0.00% 5.30% 2.20% 0.20% 
DRC 32.20% 2.20% 7.70% 21.30% 12.20% 8.40% 6.90% 1.10% 0.00% 0.00% 4.80% 2.80% 0.40% 
RoC 28.60% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 14.30% 42.90% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 14.30% 0.00% 0.00% 
Uganda 30.00% 0.50% 1.20% 0.70% 54.80% 3.70% 0.50% 0.00% 0.70% 0.00% 5.50% 1.70% 0.50% 
GLR 
Average 
31.10% 1.40% 4.50% 11.00% 33.30% 6.30% 3.70% 0.60% 0.40% 0.00% 5.20% 2.20% 0.50% 
   Employment Status at Current 
Male 21.70% 4.50% 6.90% 1.70% 35.80% 10.60% 7.00% 1.40% 0.50% 1.70% 6.70% 0.80% 0.60% 




Age 18-30 19.40% 3.10% 7.50% 1.10% 33.60% 10.60% 7.90% 1.00% 0.60% 1.20% 10.40% 3.50% 0.00% 
Age 31-40 23.30% 5.70% 5.50% 2.00% 35.80% 10.50% 8.60% 1.70% 0.20% 2.30% 3.10% 1.10% 0.30% 
Age Over 
40 
20.00% 4.50% 4.80% 2.60% 45.90% 10.50% 3.80% 1.90% 1.10% 1.30% 0.90% 0.80% 1.90% 
Disabled 29.20% 5.10% 3.70% 1.00% 38.00% 5.40% 5.20% 1.90% 1.10% 2.50% 3.30% 2.20% 1.50% 
Not 
Disabled 
20.10% 4.10% 6.50% 1.80% 36.60% 11.10% 7.30% 1.40% 0.50% 1.40% 6.90% 2.00% 0.40% 
Burundi 13.70% 4.10% 11.00% 2.30% 34.50% 12.20% 13.60% 1.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.70% 1.60% 0.20% 
DRC 28.40% 3.60% 5.90% 1.70% 20.40% 16.40% 7.80% 2.50% 0.00% 0.00% 9.10% 3.50% 0.60% 
RoC 12.50% 0.00% 12.50% 0.00% 25.00% 50.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Rwanda 38.70% 10.40% 4.10% 1.10% 22.30% 3.60% 2.50% 2.20% 1.60% 6.30% 5.80% 1.10% 0.30% 
Uganda 9.20% 0.50% 2.70% 1.70% 66.20% 6.70% 2.70% 0.20% 1.00% 1.20% 5.00% 1.70% 1.00% 
GLR 
Average 
21.30% 4.20% 6.10% 1.70% 36.70% 10.40% 7.00% 1.40% 0.60% 1.50% 6.40% 2.10% 0.60% 
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Of those ex-combatants who were unemployed at the time of sampling the explanations 
most commonly given were lack of work opportunities (61.2%) followed by financial 
problems (12.2%).46 Uganda departed from this cross-country trend and instead health and 
disability (46.9%) was most commonly cited as the reason for not working, followed by 
financial problems (21.9%).  
 
Within demographic categories female ex-combatants were slightly less likely to perceive 
their unemployment as a result of a lack of opportunity (44.1%) and slightly more likely to 
view it as a result of financial problems (21.3%) or lack of skills (14.5%) than male ex-
combatants (63.8%, 10.9% and 7.6% respectively). Disabled ex-combatants were much more 
likely to perceive health and disability constraints (58.4%) as their primary reason for 
unemployment compared to non-disabled ex-combatants (3.2%). 
 
On average across the GLR countries 31.7% of ex-combatants relied on more than one 
income earning activity.47 RoC, where 93.6% of ex-combatants relied on more than one 
income generating activity, departed dramatically from this cross-country trend. Female ex-
combatants were slightly less likely to rely on multiple income generating activities (27.1%) 
compared to male ex-combatants (32.5%). Again, RoC is the exception to the gendered trend 
for multiple income sources as 100% of female ex-combatants relied on multiple income 
sources as compared to 92.8% of males. Disabled ex-combatants were slightly less likely to 
rely on multiple income generating activities (25.6%) compared to non-disabled ex-
combatants (32.1%). 
 
On average across the GLR countries, 40.6% of ex-combatants returned to their pre-conflict 
employment / type of work. On average younger ex-combatants were less likely to return to 
their previous field of work or employment: 28.9% of those aged 18-31 versus 40.1% of 
those 31-40 and 56.4% of those over 40. Viewed in the context of age at mobilization into 
conflict, though approximate, it is perhaps understandable that younger ex-combatants do 
not return to the same employment type – indeed, as 64% of ex-combatants aged 18-30 
were under the age of 18 at the time of mobilization they may not yet have had an 
                                                     
46 Rwanda is excluded from findings regarding reasons for unemployment due to lack of directly comparable data.  
47 Rwanda is excluded from findings regarding multiple incomes sources due to lack of directly comparable data. 
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established employment type. Further, those ex-combatants aged 18-30 were also slightly 
more likely to be studying or training at the time of sampling, likely returning to study 
interrupted by mobilization (10.4% vs. 3.1% of those aged 31-40 and 0.9% of those aged over 
40). 
 
When asked to explain why they had chosen to return to their previous line of work after 
conflict in DRC and RoC ex-combatants most commonly cited three key explanations: (i) lack 
of other opportunities (51.8%); followed by (ii) that it was a reliable job (18.6%); and (iii) out 
of economic necessity to take care of the family (16.4%).48  
 
Across the GLR countries ex-combatants communicated that they on average would be very 
willing to move to another part of their own country for a better job (75.4%) – though 
significantly lower in Uganda (40.7%).49 Though there is no cross-country data for 
comparison on explanations for ex-combatants’ attitudes towards migration, looking at 
Uganda alone may provide some initial insights. The most common explanation for 
willingness to migrate in Uganda was that ex-combatants were willing to move for financial 
reasons and the prospect of improving their standard of living (58.4%). A smaller proportion 
of ex-combatants (15.5%) was bored of their environment and wanted a life change. In 
Uganda of those ex-combatants who were not willing to move for a better job the most 
common explanation (29.6%) was that they had a lack of education or qualifications 
followed by having family responsibilities that prevent them from moving (26.6%). Across 
the GLR countries female ex-combatants were considerably less likely to be willing to 
migrate for a job than male ex-combatants (57.6% vs. 78.4%) – though there is no clear 
explanation for why.50 
 
                                                     
48 Questions regarding ex-combatants reasons for returning to the same job as prior to conflict were only asked in DRC and 
RoC. 
49 This lower willingness to migrate among ex-combatants in Uganda may be related to their overall higher levels of social 
capital compared to other GLR countries – discussed more in depth in §7.4. Rwanda is excluded from findings regarding 
willingness to migrate for work due to lack of directly comparable data. 
50 In Uganda both male and female ex-combatants both identify lack of education / qualifications and familiy responsibities 
as the primary reasons for unwillingness to migrate at almost identical levels. Uganda is the only GLR country in which this 
question was asked. 
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Across the GLR countries, 64.6% of ex-combatants perceived that they have a harder time 
finding a job than community members.51 It appears as though there is a division between 
Burundi and Uganda on the one hand, where ex-combatants frequently perceived that they 
have a harder time than community members, and DRC and RoC on the other, where this 
frequency was still significant but considerably lower than in their neighbors to the east. 
These findings here are presented in Table 13 above. Age showed a negative relationship to 
the likelihood of thinking that ex-combatants have a harder time finding employment. 
 
Table 13: Ex-Combatant Perception of Relative Difficulty of Finding Employment  
 
  
Do you think ex-combatants find it harder than others to get a job? 
Yes No 
Male 65.20% 34.80% 
Female 61.20% 38.80% 
Age 18-30 71.50% 28.50% 
Age 31-40 63.00% 37.00% 
Age Over 40 56.50% 43.50% 
Disabled 72.90% 27.10% 
Not Disabled 64.00% 36.00% 
Burundi 83.60% 16.40% 
DRC 50.30% 49.70% 
Republic of Congo 42.70% 57.30% 
Uganda 78.70% 21.30% 
GLR Average 64.60% 35.40% 
 
Table 14: Ex-combatant Stigma / Distrust as a Barrier to Gaining Employment 
 
Stigma / Distrust is the Reason Ex-Combatants Find it Difficult to Gain Employment  
  Burundi DRC RoC Uganda GLR Total 
Male 59.1% 43.9% 88.5% 18.5% 52.5% 
Female 53.9% 40.0% 100.0% 14.3% 52.5% 
Age 18-30 60.8% 39.3% 91.9% 9.5% 50.4% 
Age 31-40 54.3% 46.5% 88.0% 26.3% 53.8% 
Age Over 40 53.5% 45.2% 86.0% 20.4% 51.3% 
Disabled 41.8% 42.3% 90.0% 14.8% 48.1% 
Not Disabled 60.0% 43.4% 88.7% 18.1% 52.6% 
Country Average 58.7% 43.4% 88.9% 17.6% 52.2% 
 
Of those ex-combatants who thought that ex-combatants find it more difficult to find a job 
than community members there were diverse explanations across the GLR countries 
however, the common thread through all countries was stigma or distrust towards ex-
combatants at varying levels – though in Uganda the most common explanation was ex-
combatants’ low education levels (59.7%).52 A table of the proportion of ex-combatants from 
each GLR country that cited stigma or distrust of ex-combatants as the reason why they find 
                                                     
51 Rwanda is excluded from findings regarding perceptions of relative challenges of finding a job due to lack of directly 
comparable data. 
52 Rwanda is excluded from findings regarding explanations for why ex-combatants find it more difficult to find a job due to 
lack of directly comparable data. 
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it more difficult than non-ex-combatants to find a job is presented in Table 14. On average 
across the GLR countries, 52.2% of ex-combatants saw stigma / distrust as a barrier to 
employment – though this was higher in RoC (88.9%) and lower in Uganda (17.6%).53 
 
Concerning outlook for economic prospects in the future, across the GLR countries 73.7% of 
ex-combatants perceived that their economic situation would improve in the near future. 
Across demographic lines the perceptions of ex-combatants about their economic prospects 
in the future were remarkably even. However, across and within the GLR countries, disabled 
ex-combatants perceived slightly weaker economic outlooks (66.5% versus 74.3% at a total 
sample level).  
 
When asked to explain the main reasons for if they perceived their economic situation 
improving in the future ex-combatants across the GLR countries gave a wide range of 
responses.54 Very generally speaking, we can say that in Uganda ex-combatants with both 
positive and negative outlooks for the future saw this as tied to their ability to participate 
and produce in agriculture. In contrast, in Burundi, DRC and RoC ex-combatants more 
commonly expressed a range of explanations for positive and negative outlooks more closely 
tied to their attainment of employment and capital. Across all countries disabled ex-
combatants saw health as a key barrier to their economic future.  
 
Looking specifically across Burundi, DRC and RoC we can observe that on average ex-
combatants work 9.34 months of the year in paid employment – a proportion roughly 
reflected across all three countries.55 However in contrast, when looking at the number of 
months that ex-combatants spend participating in unpaid labor, for example subsistence 
farming or labor in trade for food or housing, there is a division that emerges. In DRC and 
RoC the majority of ex-combatants spend on average 3.97 months in unpaid labor through 
                                                     
53 The analysis throughout the two annexes (§7 & §8) suggest that stigma and distrust are considerably less prominent in 
Uganda – it is possible that this is related to the dynamics of ex-combatant return in Uganda – where ex-combatants who 
were abducted return to communities and are seen as both victims and perpetrators. In some communities this dynamic 
can play a role in greater overall acceptance of ex-combatants in Uganda. In addition, the extensive use of traditional 
reconciliation ceremonies in Uganda, though not a part of reintegration programming, may play a role in explaining this 
stark contrast against RoC. 
54 Rwanda is excluded from findings regarding reasons for outlook on future economic situation due to lack of directly 
comparable data. 
55 Rwanda and Uganda are excluded from findings regarding annual time spent working for pay and without pay due to lack 
of directly comparable data. 
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the year. However in Burundi the ex-combatants work 10.93 months a year in unpaid labor; 
in fact the vast majority (78.4%) spend 12 months of the year working in unpaid labor. By 
cross tabulating months of the year spent in paid versus unpaid labor we find that 83.8% of 
those who spend 12 months of the year in unpaid labor (heavily represented in Burundi) do 
this in addition to working 12 months of the year for paid labor. Of those who work for paid 
labor for 9 months of the year (heavily represented in DRC and RoC), 96.2% do so in addition 
to working 9 months of the year for unpaid labor. These trends are likely indicative of 
regional and seasonal farming and employment practices. 
 
7.3.2 Non-Economically Active Ex-Combatants on Employment Issues 
 
When non-economically active ex-combatants across the GLR countries are asked how they 
get by when they are not working the most common responses are: (i) 29.3% reply that they 
rely on their family cash contributions; (ii) 18.6% have to borrow money; and (iii) 12.8% say 
they just find a way to cope.56 Looking within gender demographics we can see that female 
ex-combatants more commonly rely on family cash contributions (49.9%) compared to male 
ex-combatants (26.4%). Younger ex-combatants (age 18-30) are also more likely to rely on 
family cash contributions (37.1% vs. 22.1% of those 31-40 and 26.8% of those over 40).    
 
At a cross-country level of those ex-combatants that are not economically active, 33.2% of 
them feel that being an ex-combatant contributes to them not working. However, a closer 
examination of these perceptions within individual GLR countries show a sharp split between 
Burundi and Uganda in which 70.9% and 66.7%, respectively, felt that their ex-combatant 
status contributed to their unemployment, versus DRC and RoC where only 22% and 21.1% 
respectively. Future investigation into the reason for this divergence in ex-combatants’ 
perception of ex-combatant status playing a role in unemployment would add considerable 
explanatory value in future studies.57 Across and within the GLR countries male ex-
combatants and younger ex-combatants more commonly see their ex-combatant status as 
contributing to their unemployment. The extent of these trends can be seen in Table 15. 
                                                     
56 These are only the three most common explanations across the GLR countries. Rwanda is excluded from findings on how 
non-economically active ex-combatants get by due to lack of directly comparable data. 
57 To further complicate these findings on the role that ex-combatant status plays in gaining employment for those who are 
non-economically active, they stand in contrast to the similar findings on the role that stigma / distrust plays in gaining 




Table 15: Ex-combatant Status Contributes to Unemployment  
 
  
Do you feel that being an ex-combatant contributes to you not 
working? 
Yes No 
Male 34.50% 65.50% 
Female 25.00% 75.00% 
Age 18-30 38.90% 61.10% 
Age 31-40 32.10% 67.90% 
Age Over 40 27.60% 72.40% 
Disabled 43.50% 56.50% 
Not Disabled 31.90% 68.10% 
Burundi 70.90% 29.10% 
DRC 22.00% 78.00% 
Republic of Congo 21.10% 78.90% 
Uganda 66.70% 33.30% 
GLR Average 33.20% 66.80% 
 
Attempting to account for the sharp split between Burundi and Uganda, on the one hand, 
and DRC and RoC, on the other, in the perception of ex-combatant status playing a 
contributing role in the unemployment of non-economically active x-combatants is 
challenging. In Burundi the most common explanation for why ex-combatant status 
contributes to unemployment is unspecified political problems (44.6%) followed by stigma 
and distrust in ex-combatants (34.7%). In Uganda, lack of skills and education are the most 
common explanations (43.5%), followed by poor health (26.1%) and stigma/ distrust in ex-
combatants (21.7%). By contrast, in DRC and RoC stigma accounts for the vast majority of 
explanations for why ex-combatant status contributes to unemployment (80.2% in DRC and 
79.6% in RoC).  In summary, in DRC and RoC where the likelihood of perceiving ex-
combatant status as contributing to unemployment was dramatically lower than in other 
GLR countries – the perception that stigma and distrust in ex-combatants was the reason 
why ex-combatant status contributed unemployment was dramatically higher. While the 
relationship between perceptions of stigma and the perception of ex-combatant status 
playing a contributing role to being non-economically active is unclear here, stigma should at 
the very least be flagged as an important dimension.  
 
At a cross-country level there is a very even split in the perceptions of non-economically 
active ex-combatants on their future prospects of gaining employment – 50.4% saying that 
they had a good chance of finding a job in the future, 2.4% saying they had a neither good or 
bad chance, and 48.6% saying that they had a poor chance. Disabled ex-combatants 
consistently expressed a less positive outlook towards future employment – 25.4% of 
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disabled ex-combatants across the GLR countries having a positive outlook versus 54.3% of 
non-disabled ex-combatants. While there is no data to directly compare across GLR 
countries, it is notable that in Uganda 100% of disabled ex-combatants explained their 
positive outlook on gaining employment in the future on improved health and/or healing.  
 
7.3.3 Female Ex-Combatants on Employment Issues 
 
Of female ex-combatants who were not economically active 36.5% feel that they are 
discriminated against as a female – though in Burundi this number was significantly higher 
(66%) and in Uganda significantly lower (16.7%).58 Similarly, of female ex-combatants who 
are economically active 24.5% feel they are discriminated against as a female in the 
workplace. In both instances female ex-combatants between the ages of 18 and 30 are the 
most likely age demographic to perceive discrimination (44.7% of those unemployed and 
23.2% of those employed). In addition, in both of these instances 34.8% perceive their status 
as not just a female, but a female ex-combatant is related to the discrimination they 
encounter.  
 
While there is no data for direct comparison across GLR countries as to who female ex-
combatants see as the main people discriminating against them, Uganda can offer some 
leads for further investigation. In Uganda 50% of unemployed female ex-combatants see 
female employers or bosses as the main group discriminating against them, the other 50% 
see everyone as discriminating against them. Of those female ex-combatants who were 
employed 30% saw female co-workers as the main group discriminating against them, 
followed by 15.4% who saw all employers at the main group discriminating against them, 
15.4% who saw male co-workers discriminating against them, and 15.4% who saw 
everybody discriminating against them. What is notable is that, at least in the case of 
Uganda, in both instances of female ex-combatants who are employed and those who are 
unemployed, the group most commonly perceived as discriminating against them is other 
females – be they employers or co-workers. This point could be related to female 
                                                     
58 Rwanda is excluded from findings regarding perceptions of discrimination among both economically active and non-
active female ex-combatants due to lack of directly comparable data. 
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community members’ overall higher levels of fear, and perhaps in turn discrimination, 
surrounding the return of ex-combatants discussed in §8.5.2. 
 
7.3.4 Disabled Ex-Combatants on Employment Issues 
 
Of disabled ex-combatants who are not economically active 62.4% feel they are 
discriminated against as a disabled person and 37.6% feel they are not.59 Of those disabled 
ex-combatants who are economically active the proportions of those who feel they are 
discriminated against is almost perfectly inverse, with 34.2% saying that they perceived 
being discriminated against and 62.5% saying they did not. When asked if discrimination was 
related to their ex-combatant status 51.1% of disabled ex-combatants perceive that this 
discrimination has to do specifically with them being a disabled ex-combatant rather than 
merely disabled. Female disabled ex-combatants were less likely to perceive discrimination 
linked to their ex-combatant status, 37.5% versus 58.7%. 
 
Again, as with the case of female ex-combatants on employment issues, there is no data to 
directly compare across the GLR countries as to who disabled ex-combatants see as the main 
groups discriminating against them. However, again looking at data from Uganda can offer 
some initial insights. In Uganda 80% of non-economically active disabled ex-combatants who 
perceived discrimination see all employers or bosses as discriminating against them, with the 
remaining 20% seeing everyone as discriminating against them. Of those economically active 
ex-combatants who perceived discrimination 40% saw the discrimination as coming 
primarily from all employers or bosses, 20% from male co-workers, 20% from all co-workers, 
and 20% from everybody. Confirming these trends across the GLR countries would require 
further triangulation.  
 
7.3.5 Income, Savings and Access to Credit 
 
In the context of the severe development challenges that characterize most of the Great 
Lakes Region, ex-combatants’ economic statuses are a good starting point for understanding 
                                                     
59 Rwanda is excluded from findings regarding perceptions of discrimination among both economically active and non-
active disabled ex-combatants due to lack of directly comparable data. 
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basic individual and household economic stability. However, a deeper examination of ex-
combatants’ income, savings and access to credit can begin to reveal some about their 
ability, or inability, to move beyond mere subsistence by leveraging economic opportunities. 
 
Table 16: Ex-Combatant Sole Breadwinner Status 
 
  
Are you the sole, or only, breadwinner or do others in your 
household also earn an income? 
Sole Others Assist 
Male 53.00% 47.00% 
Female 29.10% 70.90% 
Age 18-30 41.10% 58.90% 
Age 31-40 56.10% 43.90% 
Age Over 40 56.70% 43.30% 
Disabled 42.40% 57.60% 
Not Disabled 50.80% 49.20% 
Burundi 42.90% 57.10% 
DRC 71.60% 28.40% 
Republic of Congo 63.80% 36.20% 
Rwanda 79.60% 20.40% 
Uganda 40.40% 59.60% 
GLR Average 49.60% 50.40% 
 
Across the GLR countries 49.6% of ex-combatants identified as the sole breadwinner of their 
household with the remaining 50.4% saying that their household relied on multiple incomes. 
As is visible in Table 16, in Rwanda and DRC ex-combatants are notably more likely to 
identify themselves as the sole breadwinner (79.6% and 71.6% respectively) – generally an 
indicator of household income instability. Across the GLR countries female ex-combatants 
were dramatically less likely to identify as the sole breadwinner (29.1%) when compared to 
male ex-combatants (53%). In some GLR countries this disparity between male and female 
ex-combatants was even more accentuated – for example in Rwanda 100% of female ex-
combatants said their household relied on multiple incomes compared to 19.6% of male ex-
combatants.  
 
Of those ex-combatants who identify themselves as the sole breadwinner in their household 
across the GLR countries 39.3% say that they usually have to borrow money to meet their 
monthly household expenses, 22.4% say that they usually break even, 20.4% rely on family 
money transfers, 13.5% usually have to use past savings, and only 4.4% have money left 
over.60 As displayed in Table 17, these trends were remarkably durable within each of the 
GLR countries with the exception of RoC in which a similar proportion of ex-combatants 
                                                     
60 Rwanda is excluded from findings regarding sole household breadwinners due to lack of directly comparable data. 
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(41.2%) had to borrow to meet monthly expenses, but in contrast to the cross-country trend 
41.2% of ex-combatants usually had money left over.61  
 
Table 17: Ex-Combatant Sole Breadwinner Meeting Monthly Expenses 
 
  



















Male 4.80% 21.50% 14.60% 19.10% 40.10% 
Female 2.80% 27.20% 7.80% 27.20% 35.10% 
Age 18-30 3.60% 17.60% 14.10% 27.80% 36.90% 
Age 31-40 5.20% 22.30% 17.30% 12.40% 42.80% 
Age Over 40 5.10% 30.80% 8.70% 15.40% 40.00% 
Disabled 5.10% 28.90% 9.30% 22.60% 34.10% 
Not Disabled 4.30% 21.50% 14.10% 20.10% 40.00% 
Burundi 1.40% 13.90% 20.50% 18.90% 45.30% 
DRC 6.80% 22.60% 20.40% 14.60% 35.70% 
Republic of Congo 41.20% 0.00% 11.80% 5.90% 41.20% 
Uganda 2.50% 32.70% 6.50% 24.20% 34.10% 
GLR Average 4.40% 22.40% 13.50% 20.40% 39.30% 
 
Across the GLR countries, female ex-combatants were more likely to rely on family money 
transfers (27.2%) when compared to male ex-combatants (19.1%), and less likely to use past 
savings to meet monthly expenses (7.8%) when compared to male ex-combatants (14.6%). 
Younger ex-combatants were also more likely to rely on family money transfers than their 
elder peers (27.8% vs. 12.4% of those 31-40 and 15.4% of those over 40). 
 
Of those ex-combatants who were sole breadwinners and did not earn enough to meet 
monthly household expenses across the GLR countries, they were on average short by 41% 
of their income.62 DRC and, to a larger extent, RoC sat below this cross-country average, with 
average sole breadwinner income shortages of 23% and 7% respectively. Across 
demographic lines these disabled ex-combatants had notably higher income shortages on 
average (52%) compared to non-disabled ex-combatants (40%). Of those ex-combatants 
who were sole breadwinners and did meet monthly household expenses there was a clear 
                                                     
61 Also notable in the RoC figures is that no ex-combatants report that they usually break even. Considering that 41.2% 
report having a surplus it seems unlikely that none would break even. Thus, figures on sole breadwinner ex-combatants 
meeting monthly expenses from RoC should be treated with some caution. There may be unknown data capture or coding 
errors at play.  
62 Rwanda is excluded from findings regarding monthly income deficits due to lack of directly comparable data. 
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trend in which ex-combatants had a surplus on average of 22%.63 However, as is visible in 
Table 18, in RoC income surpluses were on average only 5%.  
 
Table 18: Ex-Combatant Sole Breadwinner Average Monthly Income Surpluses and Deficits 
 
  
Average Monthly Income Shortage Average Monthly Income Surplus 
Male 40% 22% 
Female 45% 21% 
Age 18-30 42% 22% 
Age 31-40 39% 22% 
Age Over 40 41% 22% 
Disabled 52% 23% 
Not Disabled 40% 22% 
Burundi 40% 26% 
DRC 23% 24% 
Republic of Congo 7% 5% 
Uganda 50% 31% 
GLR Average 41% 22% 
 
Of those 49.6% of ex-combatants across the GLR countries who say that their household 
relies on multiple incomes, there was an average contribution of 46% of their total 
household income. As is visible in Table 19, Rwanda and DRC stand out with smaller average 
non-sole breadwinner household income contributions (35% and 37% respectively). 
Generally speaking female ex-combatants and younger ex-combatants contributed less on 
average of total household income (39% and 42% respectively).  
 
Table 19: Ex-Combatant Average Non-Sole Breadwinner Household Income Contributions 
 
  Average Non-Sole Breadwinner Household Income Contribution Percentage 
Male 47% 
Female 39% 
Age 18-30 42% 
Age 31-40 51% 
Age Over 40 48% 
Disabled 41% 
Not Disabled 47% 
Burundi 50% 
DRC 37% 
Republic of Congo 48% 
Rwanda 35% 
Uganda 43% 
GLR Average 46% 
 
 
Since reintegration programming  31.7% of ex-combatants have had to borrow money to 
help meet their daily needs.64 Across age, gender and disability demographics all groups lay 
                                                     
63 Rwanda is excluded from findings regarding monthly income surpluses due to lack of directly comparable data. 
64 Due to the varying contexts of reintegration programming across the GLR countries this question should be treated as a 
broad indicator of the rate at which ex-combatants need to borrow money after the bulk of immediate reintegration 
assistance (including reinsertion) has passed. Rwanda is excluded from findings regarding money borrowing due to lack of 
directly comparable data. 
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very closely to the total sample trend. In Burundi, DRC and RoC, of those who did borrow 
34.6% borrowed from a friend, 28% borrowed from family, 11.7% borrowed from 
community leaders – only 4% borrowed from some form of formal credit institution. Ex-
combatants aged 18-30 were most likely to borrow from family (34.8%) compared to those 
31-40 (22.7%) and those over 40 (19.7%).  
 
In terms of the use of funds borrowed since reintegration programming packages there were 
three key uses: (i) subsistence; (ii) business investment; and (iii) familial support. 34.6% of 
ex-combatants identified their first use of borrowed funds as mere subsistence, 22.5% as 
business investments, and 18.9% as assistance for their family.65 Similarly, 27.8% of ex-
combatants identified their second use of borrowed funds as to assist their family, 24.7% as 
subsistence, and 11.3% as a business investment. As a third use of borrowed funds 17.1% 
used funds as subsistence, 15.1% as assistance to their family, and 10.9% as business 
investments. The drops in these categories were absorbed into, among others, education for 
children (10.1%) and medical expenses (7.6%) – especially among disabled ex-combatants. 
These spending patterns for borrowed money overlap strongly with the spending patterns of 
reinsertion payments in §7.5.1 – indicating a key set of immediate costs those ex-
combatants across the GLR countries face.  
 
Only 6.7% of ex-combatants across the GLR countries have ever applied for micro-credit 
from a financial institution. This figure is reflected in all GLR countries except for Uganda and 
Rwanda where higher proportions of ex-combatants (18.4% and 13% respectively) had at 
some point applied for micro-credit. Ex-combatants over the age of 40 were the most likely 
age demographic to have applied for micro-credit (11%) when compared to those aged 31-
40 (6.5%) and those aged 18-40 (4.6%). This trend is further accentuated in the cases of 
Uganda (27.9% vs. 13.6% and 9.8%) and Rwanda (18.6% vs. 11.5% and 10.3%) where the 
overall proportion of ex-combatants who had at some point applied for micro-credit was 
significantly higher.  
 
                                                     
65 Rwanda and Uganda are excluded from findings on the most common uses of reinsertion payments due to lack of directly 
comparable data.  
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Of those ex-combatants who had applied for micro-credit at some point, 76.6% had had a 
successful application. The only GLR country that did not reflect this average was RoC in 
which only 28.6% of micro-credit applications were successful – the explanation for this is 
unclear. Female ex-combatants more commonly had successful micro credit applications 
(86.9%) than male ex-combatants (78.5%). There were no other consistent demographic 
trends across the GLR countries.  
 
7.3.6 Economic Associations 
 
Across the GLR countries 37.3% of ex-combatants were currently involved in some form of 
micro-economic activity.66 Burundi departed most significantly from this trend with 78.6% of 
ex-combatants being involved in a micro-economic activity. In Uganda and Burundi female 
ex-combatants (39.4% and 100% respectively) were more likely to be currently participating 
in some form of micro-economic activity than male ex-combatants (32.5% and 76.9% 
respectively). In contrast, in DRC and RoC female ex-combatants (22.2% and 0.0% 
respectively) were less likely to be involved in some form of micro-economic activity (46.2% 
and 80% respectively).  
 
Since receiving reinsertion packages, 72.2% of ex-combatants across the GLR countries have 
never been a member of an economic association, 21.9% are currently members, and 5.9% 
have previously been members but are not currently.67 Across all GLR countries ex-
combatants aged 18-30 were least frequently currently a member of an economic 
association (15.6%) compared to those aged 31-40 (23%) and those over 40 (29.1%). This 
could be an indication of older ex-combatants’ generally longer economic track record with 
economic associations and access to credit. Looking to Rwanda and Uganda we can see that 
local savings and credit associations and farmers associations are the varieties of economic 





                                                     
66 Rwanda is excluded from findings regarding current participation in micro-economic activities due to lack of directly 
comparable data. 









Table 20: Ex-Combatant Economic Association Membership 
 
  
Since reinsertion, have you ever been a member of an Economic 
Association? 
Yes, have been a 
member previously, 
but not now 
Yes, am currently a 
member now 
No, have never been a 
member of an 
economic association 
Male 6.10% 21.60% 72.40% 
Female 4.60% 24.40% 71.00% 
Age 18-30 4.20% 15.60% 80.30% 
Age 31-40 6.50% 23.00% 70.50% 
Age Over 40 7.20% 29.10% 63.80% 
Disabled 7.10% 24.60% 68.40% 
Not Disabled 5.80% 21.60% 72.60% 
DRC 2.30% 19.70% 78.00% 
Republic of Congo 7.90% 12.10% 80.00% 
Rwanda 13.00% 36.60% 50.40% 
Uganda 2.70% 21.80% 75.50% 
GLR Average 5.90% 21.90% 72.20% 
 
Across the GLR countries the most common benefits that ex-combatants identified receiving 
as a member of their economic associations were economic networking (34.2%) followed by 
social networking (21.1%) and financial support (17.9%).68 Ex-combatants in Uganda were 
the least likely to cite social and economic networking as the primary benefit of economic 
associations (3.1% and 4.6% respectively) and more likely to cite financial support as the 
primary benefit (42.4%). Female ex-combatants across the GLR countries were more likely to 
identify economic networking (42.5%) and less likely to identify social networking (12.1%) 
than male ex-combatants (33% and 22.4% respectively). 
 
Of those ex-combatants across the GLR countries who were members of an economic 
association, there were varying compositions of ex-combatant versus non-ex-combatant 
membership in the given economic association.69 As is visible in Table 21 below, at a cross-
country level there was a typical bell curve distribution between categories of economic 
association membership composition. However, closer inspection within countries shows 
that there are diverging trends. What is noteworthy is that the level at which ex-combatants 
move into economic associations with only other ex-combatants is low – suggesting that the 
                                                     
68 Burundi is excluded from findings regarding the benefits of economic associations due to lack of directly comparable 
data. 




majority of those ex-combatants who do join an economic association have the benefit of 
social interaction with community members, building social and economic networks, in 
addition to the economic benefits of associations.  
 
Table 21: Ex-Combatant Economic Association Members Breakdown 
 
  
















DRC 18.0% 57.1% 0.0% 24.9% 0.0% 
RoC 8.9% 26.8% 0.0% 62.5% 1.8% 
Rwanda 12.6% 32.3% 3.9% 51.2% 0.0% 
Uganda 6.7% 2.2% 91.1% 0.0% 0.0% 




Across the GLR countries the general economic trajectory of ex-combatants is positive. The 
number of ex-combatants who are unemployed is shrinking – these ex-combatants are most 
commonly being absorbed into self-employment in agriculture, followed by self-employment 
in non-agricultural business. In line with this positive trajectory, ex-combatants generally 
have a positive outlook on their economic situation in the future; 76.3% saying that they 
expected their situation to improve in the future. When ex-combatants explain this positive 
outlook they generally cite improved agricultural production and improved access to capital 
and credit – two explanations that can be tied to ex-combatants’ main paths of economic 
reintegration: self-employment in agriculture and small business. This signals that ex-
combatants’ perceptions of their future economic situation and the pathways to attaining it 
are rooted in their collective trajectory towards self-employment in agriculture or small 
business.  
 
This generally positive economic trajectory has seen ex-combatants reach near parity, but 
slightly weaker across all indicators, in levels of economic stability compared to community 
members. Ex-combatants are more likely to be unemployed, less likely to meet their 
household expenses, and more likely to borrow from family than formal economic 
institutions to close this income gap than community members. Ex-combatants are 
considerably less likely to participate in micro-economic activities or belong to economic 
associations than community members – an indication of their considerably shortened 
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economic track record and the time lost while in conflict for establishing themselves in 
formal economic institutions.  
 
Regarding ex-combatants perceptions of the barriers they face to gaining productive 
economic status, the majority of ex-combatants cite lack of opportunity, signaling that they 
generally identify the barriers to economic improvement as contextualized in larger 
development challenges that affect the entire community. Simultaneously, ex-combatants 
perceive themselves as a disadvantaged group that have a harder time finding a job and are 
subject to stigma and distrust in the community. By contrast community members are much 
more likely to cite lack of access to credit and lack of skills as key barriers to their economic 
stability.  
 
It appears that ex-combatants understand the dual dimensions of the barriers they face to 
gaining a productive economic status – the larger context of severe development challenges 
that characterize the GLR countries, and the context of being an ex-combatant in this 
development setting – facing challenges with stigma and distrust in the community. Indeed, 
ex-combatants are far more likely to identify the social networking value of economic 
interactions, bringing about the slow set of social interactions that erode stigma and 
facilitate social reintegration, than community members. However, in this it appears that 
with weaker economic track records ex-combatants also fail to recognize capital and credit 
barriers to economic prosperity to the same extent as community members.  
 
In summary, ex-combatants’ economic trajectories are generally positive though in absolute 
terms they are disadvantaged to community members. The barriers to reaching true parity 
with community members revolve around: (i) closing literacy, education and skill gaps with 
community members; (ii) establishing an economic track record; (iii) accessing credit and 
other financial institutions; and (iv) eroding stigma and distrust through the slow process of 






7.3.7.1 Vulnerable Subgroups 
 
In this analysis of the economic dimensions of reintegration, female ex-combatants continue 
to stand out as a key vulnerable group. Female ex-combatants are more likely to be 
unemployed than male ex-combatants and more likely to see lack of skills as among their 
core barriers to reaching economic stability – this aligns with earlier analysis revealing that 
female ex-combatants have significantly lower literacy and educational achievement levels 
compared to male ex-combatants. Female ex-combatants and community members alike 
report significant levels discrimination on the basis of gender as a barrier to gaining 
employment, though female ex-combatants report this at twice the rate of community 
members. This may suggest that stigma associated with ex-combatant status may have an 
amplifying effect on already entrenched gender inequalities present in the community. 
Interestingly while female community members that experienced gender-based 
discrimination identified it as coming primarily from males, female ex-combatants identified 
female community members as the main sources of discrimination. This point may be 
related to female community members’ overall higher levels of fear surrounding the return 
of ex-combatants to their community discussed in §8.5.2 of the community dynamics annex 
of this study. Collectively, these issues represent a clear set of challenges for female ex-
combatants in achieving economic reintegration. 
 
Health is a key barrier to economic reintegration for disabled ex-combatants who are the 
most likely demographic group, of ex-combatants and community members alike, to be 
unemployed at the time of sampling across the GLR countries. Accordingly disabled ex-
combatants are the least likely demographic group to have a positive outlook on their 
economic future. In addition disabled ex-combatants who are unemployed report high levels 
of discrimination in seeking employment on the basis of their disability (twice the proportion 
of females that perceive discrimination). However – those who are employed perceive 
discrimination on the basis of their disability at half the rate (on par with females). This may 
suggest that while there is clearly discrimination in terms of gender and disability, there is an 





7.3.7.2 Unique Country Trends 
 
In terms of economic reintegration ex-combatants in the Republic of Congo display a 
number of unique trends – though they do not necessarily depart from the dominant 
narrative of economic reintegration for ex-combatants across the GLR. Most notably perhaps 
is that while self-employment in agriculture is still an important economic pathway for ex-
combatants in RoC, self-employment in non-agricultural services is the dominant economic 
path. It is possible that migration to the urban capital of Brazzaville among ex-combatants 
has removed agriculture as a viable economic activity – lending some explanation to this 
trend of economic status tending away from the self-employment in agriculture.  
 
 
7.4 Social Capital 
 
Examining the social dynamics of ex-combatant reintegration requires the exploration of a 
range of concepts including: (i) social networks, (ii) trust, (iii) social cohesion, (iv) social 
inclusion, and (v) empowerment. Collectively these various concepts come together to 
represent social capital, essentially the idea that social networks have value, both tangible 
and intangible, for individuals and communities and are a key indicator of the overall social 
health of ex-combatants – and in turn their ability to leverage this social capital towards 
social and economic outcomes. Examining social capital can allow us some insights into the 
process of social reintegration that ex-combatants go through upon return to their 
communities. However, when looking at the complex social dynamics that ex-combatants 
experience we cannot draw meaningful insights without contextualizing these social 
dimensions with that of the community at large. Thus for optimal analytical value this 
section of the report should be read in conjunction with §8.4 on social capital in the 
community dynamics annex of this study. 
 
7.4.1 Networks and Sociability 
 
Across the GLR countries ex-combatants and community members are unlikely to be in many 
social groups – though community members are in slightly more. On average ex-combatants 
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were in 0.46 social groups, while community members were in 0.63.70 Uganda stood apart 
from this overall GLR trend – community members averaging 0.93 social groups. Age showed 
a positive relationship to the average number of social groups among ex-combatants and 
community members alike, however this trend was much more pronounced among ex-
combatants – in which young (18-30) ex-combatants have the lowest average number of 
social groups across all demographic groups (0.37).  
 
Across the GLR countries, 38.5% of ex-combatants said that the current number of social 
groups to which they are a member is greater than that of one year ago, 50.8% said the 
number is the same as one year prior and 10.7% said that their current number of social 
groups is less than it was one year ago. These proportions were reflected well within the GLR 
countries with the exception of Uganda, in which 85.3% said that their number of social 
groups had stayed the same in the last year. Across the GLR countries, female ex-combatants 
less frequently saw an increase in their number of social groups (23.1%) when compared to 
male ex-combatants (41.4%). Similarly, disabled ex-combatants less frequently saw an 
increase in their number of social groups (24.4%) when compared to non-disabled ex-
combatants (40.1%). 
 
Of ex-combatants, 32.6% were on a management or organizing committee for a local group 
or organization. Female ex-combatants were significantly less likely to be on a management 
committee (25.9%) compared to male ex-combatants (34%). Ex-combatants over the age of 
40 are most frequently on management or organizing committees (37.4%) compared to 
those 31-40 (36.8%) and those 18-30 (24.3%). The fact that older ex-combatants (over 40) 
have the most social groups on average and are most frequently on management 
committees is a broad indication of their social footing in the community. Inversely it flags 
younger ex-combatants as lagging behind in building a social foundation in the community.   
 
Generally speaking a large proportion of ex-combatants across the GLR countries had 
contact with their families (91.3%). However, DRC is a clear standout in this trend of high 
familial contact – only 62.1% reported having contact with their families. What is even more 
                                                     
70 Rwanda is excluded from findings regarding social networks due to lack of data. 
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notable though is that DRC is the only GLR country in which ex-combatants have 
dramatically more contact with their families than community members have with their own 
families (62.1% vs. 31%).  
 
Of those ex-combatants who did have contact with their families, 67% across the GLR 
countries had daily contact with their family, 12.4% had weekly contact, 10.2% had monthly 
contact, and the remainder had less frequent contact.71 As visible in Table 22, Uganda stands 
out most clearly from the cross-country trend in this instance, as 92.7% of ex-combatants in 
Uganda who had contact with their family had daily contact with their family. In general 
female ex-combatants had slightly higher levels of daily contact than male ex-combatants 
(76.5% vs. 64.9%). The only standout along gender demographic lines is in RoC, in which only 
11.1% of female ex-combatants had daily contact with their family and 45.5% had contact 
with their family less frequently than monthly – as compared to male ex-combatants of 
whom 30.4% had daily contact and 22.2% had contact less frequently than monthly. 
Disabled ex-combatants were more likely to have daily contact with their families (88.2%) 
than non-disabled ex-combatants (64.7%). In all, ex-combatants across the GLR countries 
had daily contact with their families slightly more frequently than community members (67% 
vs. 63.9%). 
 
Table 22: Ex-Combatant Frequency of Familial Contact 
 
  
Frequency of contact between community member and immediate family these days 
Daily Weekly Monthly Half yearly Once a year Occasionally Never 
Male 64.90% 13.10% 11.60% 1.20% 1.00% 7.70% 0.40% 
Female 76.50% 9.70% 4.20% 1.40% 1.50% 6.20% 0.50% 
Age 18-30 71.00% 10.00% 8.80% 1.50% 2.00% 5.90% 0.80% 
Age 31-40 59.90% 13.40% 13.60% 1.60% 0.30% 10.50% 0.60% 
Age Over 40 71.90% 13.20% 7.80% 0.30% 1.00% 5.80% 0.00% 
Disabled 88.20% 6.80% 1.10% 0.00% 0.00% 3.90% 0.00% 
Not Disabled 64.70% 13.20% 11.20% 1.40% 1.30% 7.90% 0.40% 
DRC 35.30% 20.00% 23.50% 1.10% 2.20% 17.90% 0.00% 
RoC 28.90% 24.30% 22.10% 3.00% 2.50% 18.00% 1.40% 
Uganda 92.70% 4.80% 1.80% 0.30% 0.30% 0.30% 0.00% 
GLR Average 67.00% 12.40% 10.20% 1.20% 1.10% 7.50% 0.50% 
 
Across the GLR countries 27.2% of ex-combatants thought that contact with their family 
could be more frequent and 72.8% felt that their current level of contact with their family 
was the most they would prefer (see Table 23). In DRC, where ex-combatants had the lowest 
                                                     
71 Rwanda and Burundi are absent from findings on levels and frequency of familial contact, as well as preferred levels of 
familial contact, due to lack of directly comparable data. 
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actual levels of familial contact, ex-combatants were dramatically more likely than average 
to think that their frequency of familial contact could be more – even though those who did 
have contact had it at a similar level to other GLR countries. 
 
Interestingly, ex-combatants across the GLR were more likely to think the level of contact 
that they had with their families was the maximum they would want than community 
members (72.8% vs.29.3%). Additionally, although in RoC female ex-combatants had notably 
lower contact with their families than male ex-combatants (as outlined above), they actually 
less frequently expressed that they thought they could have more frequent contact with 
their family (41.9%) than their male ex-combatant counterparts (48.4%).  
 
In DRC and RoC, the GLR countries where ex-combatants most frequently thought they could 
have more contact with their families, 30.9% of those who thought they could see their 
family more frequently cited the distance of travel as the main reason they do not see their 
family more often, 20.4% cited lack of time, and 17.1% cited the cost of travel – flagging the 
geographic spread of families as a dimension to reintegration in these countries. 
 
Table 23: Ex-Combatant Desired Level of Familial Contact 
 
  
Is the current level of contact the maximum you wish or could it be 
more frequent? 
Maximum Could be more frequent 
Male 71.00% 29.00% 
Female 80.40% 19.60% 
Age 18-30 71.10% 28.90% 
Age 31-40 69.10% 30.90% 
Age Over 40 83.40% 16.60% 
Disabled 83.00% 17.00% 
Not Disabled 71.40% 28.60% 
DRC 36.70% 63.30% 
Republic of Congo 52.30% 47.70% 
Uganda 92.80% 7.20% 
GLR Average 72.80% 27.20% 
 
Across the GLR countries, 49.1% of all ex-combatants had lots of friends, 30% had a few, 
good friends and 20.9% did not have many friends.72 This trend is well reflected within the 
GLR countries with the exception of Rwanda – where 23% had lots of friends, 44.2% had a 
few good friends and 32.8% did not have many friends. On average female ex-combatants 
slightly less frequently had lots of friends (44.3%) and more frequently had a few good 
                                                     
72 Burundi is excluded from findings regarding number of friends due to lack of directly comparable data. 
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friends (33.4%) or not many friends (22.3%) than male ex-combatants (49.9%, 29.5% and 
20.6% respectively). Rwanda is the exception to this gender demographic trend in which 
female ex-combatants slightly more frequently than male ex-combatants had lots of friends 
(27.3%) or a few good friends (54.5%) than male ex-combatants (22.9% and 43.9% 
respectively). 
 
Across the GLR countries there were clear and consistent trends in terms of the age, gender, 
ex-combatant status and educational background of the friends of ex-combatants.73 The 
majority of ex-combatants across the GLR countries were likely to have friends within the 
same age and gender categories, but less likely to have friends who were ex-combatants or 
shared the same education level. These trends are displayed in Table 24.   
 
What is perhaps most noteworthy in these findings is that ex-combatants’ friend groups 
appear to be fairly diversified, especially in terms of having friends who are ex-combatants. 
Indeed, only 26.7% of ex-combatants say that most of their friends are fellow ex-
combatants, 23.6% say some, 36.4% say few and 13.3% say none. This suggests that ex-
combatants are not becoming an isolated social group – only socializing with each other. 
 
Table 24: Ex-Combatant Friend Group Demographics Summary. 
 
  
Most friends are 
the same age 
Most friends are the 
same gender 
Most friends are ex-
combatants 
Most friends have 
the same 
education level 
Male 52.3% 65.4% 27.7% 24.0% 
Female 53.5% 63.6% 21.2% 21.7% 
Age 18-30 55.3% 67.0% 23.9% 25.5% 
Age 31-40 50.3% 63.7% 28.7% 19.4% 
Age Over 40 49.0% 63.2% 26.7% 23.7% 
Disabled 50.5% 61.2% 21.0% 26.6% 
Not Disabled 52.6% 65.4% 27.1% 23.4% 
GLR Average 52.5% 65.1% 26.7% 23.6% 
 
Across the GLR countries, when asked who they would turn to for help if they were to 
encounter an economic problem 39.7% of ex-combatants responded that they would turn to 
                                                     
73 Burundi is excluded here from findings regarding the proportion of other ex-combatants in ex-combatants’ social groups 
due to lack of data. Rwanda is excluded from findings on age, gender, and ex-combatant makeup of ex-combatant’s social 
groups due to lack of data. However, the case of ex-combatant status of ex-combatants’ social groups Rwanda is excluded 
from direct comparison due to a scaling issue in the data. In Rwanda 68.9% said that some of their friends were ex-
combatants, 22.9% said that most of them were ex-combatants, 7.6% said none were ex-combatants and only 0.5% said 
that all their friends were ex-combatants. 
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their family; 30.9% responded that they would turn to a friend; 13.5% would turn to no one; 
and 10% would rely on a range of business, communal, or formal financial resources. 
Generally across the GLR countries older ex-combatants were more likely to rely on friends 
for economic help than younger ex-combatants – who were, themselves, more likely to rely 
on family than older ex-combatants. This lends evidence to the idea that, in general, ex-
combatants’ primary pathway to economic assistance is through their families and extended 
social circles as opposed to formal institutional pathways. Indeed, while as a whole ex-
combatants would turn to similar sources as their community member counterparts for 
economic help, community members were slightly more likely (7.5% vs. 3.3%) to rely on 
formal institutions.  
 
7.4.2 Trust and Solidarity 
 
Drawing from Rwanda and Uganda we can see that ex-combatants have generally high levels 
of trust in their communities.74 Of the respondents, 58% said that they trust people in their 
community to a great extent, 31.2% said to neither a great nor small extent, and the 
remaining 10.8% said they trusted those in their community to a small extent. In Rwanda 
and Uganda female ex-combatants generally trusted less than male ex-combatants (18.5% 
vs. 9.5% trusted those in their community to a small extent). Age displayed a positive 
correlation to high trust in others in the community (47% of those 18-30, 62% of those 31-
40, and 64.3% of those over 40). Overall ex-combatants displayed a similar level of trust, 
though slightly weaker than community members. 
 
Across the GLR countries, 18.3% of ex-combatants felt that if they were to disagree with 
what everyone else in their area agreed on, they would not at all feel free to speak out, 
60.2% felt that they would definitely feel free to speak out and 19.5% felt that they would 
only feel free to speak out on certain matters.75 This trend was visible within each of the GLR 
countries; only in Uganda was willingness to speak out slightly higher – 9.6% feeling they 
would not speak out, 71.3% feeling they would definitely speak out and 19.1% feeling that 
                                                     
74 This specific question regarding the overall extent of community trust was asked to ex-combatants only in Rwanda and 
Uganda. 
75 Rwanda is excluded from findings regarding willingness to speak out due to lack of directly comparable data. 
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they would only speak out on specific matters. Community members were slightly more 
likely to feel they could definitely speak out.  
 
Across the GLR countries, 52% of ex-combatants felt that in the last year / two years the 
level of trust between people in the area that they lived in had improved, 38.3% felt that 
trust had stayed the same and the remaining 9.7% felt that trust had deteriorated (displayed 
in Table 25).76 Female ex-combatants less frequently thought that trust had improved 
(42.3%) than male ex-combatants (53.4%). Disabled ex-combatants also slightly less 
frequently felt that trust had improved (45.8%) compared to non-disabled ex-combatants 
(52.7%). Community members were less likely to see trust as improved than ex-combatants 
(43.4% vs. 52%) but more likely to think it had stayed the same (47.9% vs. 38.3%). 
 
Table 25: Ex-Combatant Perceptions of Change in Trust 
 
  
In the past year/ past two years has the level of trust in your area got better, 
worse, or stayed about the same? 
Better Same Worse 
Male 53.40% 36.90% 9.80% 
Female 42.30% 48.50% 9.20% 
Age 18-30 51.50% 37.90% 10.50% 
Age 31-40 54.30% 36.30% 9.40% 
Age Over 40 50.70% 40.40% 8.80% 
Disabled 45.80% 43.60% 10.60% 
Not Disabled 52.70% 37.70% 9.60% 
Burundi 62.70% 24.00% 13.20% 
DRC 23.30% 67.70% 9.00% 
Republic of Congo 73.70% 19.70% 6.60% 
Rwanda 59.30% 28.00% 12.70% 
Uganda 43.60% 48.60% 7.70% 
GLR Average 52.00% 38.30% 9.70% 
 
When those ex-combatants who felt that trust had improved were asked to explain why 
they thought it had improved the most common responses were: (i) 25.4% of ex-combatants 
across the GLR countries felt that peace in general was the reason for improved trust; and (ii) 
22.5% thought communal living and growing understanding were the reasons for improved 
trust.77  
 
                                                     
76 In Uganda and Rwanda this question was asked with reference to the last year, where as in DRC and RoC it was asked in 
reference to the last two years. This creates some issues with periodization and comparability. These figures should be 
treated with caution. Interestingly, though the question refers to a longer period of time in DRC, this does not appear to 
translate to greater perceptions of improved trust among community members. In the case of DRC this may be the product 
of continuing insecurity. 
77 It is unclear whether ex-combatants being charged for their behavior is in formal or informal charging / accountability. 




It is important to note that while these trends give a general picture of the perceived drivers 
of trust across the GLR countries, within each country there were unique trends as well that 
deserve further investigation – for example in Burundi the charging of ex-combatants for 
their behavior was seen as the main driver of improvements in trust by 56% of the ex-
combatants sample.78 One demographic trend that does endure across the GLR countries is 
that those ex-combatants aged 18-30 most frequently see the charging of ex-combatants for 
their behavior as the central driver of improved trust – 32.2% of those 18-30 compared to 
15.8% of those 31-40 and 5% of those over the age of 40.  
 
When those ex-combatants who felt that trust had gotten worse were asked to explain why 
they thought trust had deteriorated, 27.8% cited dishonest people and 21.9% cited political 
problems or distrust in authorities. While the internal proportions of these two driving 
factors behind worsening perceptions of trust among ex-combatants varied within the 
individual GLR countries they were consistently the two most common explanations. 
 
7.4.3 Social Cohesion and Inclusion  
 
When asked about the level of diversity in the area in which they live ex-combatants 
displayed a spread of responses across the GLR countries almost identical to community 
members.79 35.2% of ex-combatants described the people in the area in which they live in as 
characterized by many differences (diverse), 24% characterized them as having neither a 
great or small extent of differences, and 40.8% said there were few differences between 
people (not diverse). As visible in Table 26, Rwanda stood out from this trend – 61.4% saw 
high diversity, 17.8% average, and 20.8% low diversity.80  
                                                     
78 Further information regarding trends within each of the countries can be found in each of the individual survey reports 
from the GLR countries.  
79 Here the percpetion of diversity in consttuted but the perception of unsepcified differences among people in the 
community. Another way to phrase this would be the level of ”differentness” that ex-combatants percieve in their 
community. 
80 It is possible that the perception of differences (or diversity) can have a varying range of meanings across the contexts of 
different GLR countries. For example DRC is a country with rich diversity along cultural, ethnic, and linguistic groups. 
However, the difficulty of movement in eastern DRC means that many such socio-linguistic groups live in isolation from 
each other. The community members may accurately perceive low diversity in their community, though at a national level 
diversity may be high. In contrast, the perception of differences (or diversity) may be high in Rwanda due to the centrality 
of the Hutu / Tutsi divide in the social history of the country and conflict there. Deciphering the role of perceived 




Table 26: Ex-Combatant Perceptions of Community Diversity 
 
  
To what extent do differences between people characterize your community? 
To a great extent, i.e. lots 
of differences between 
people 
Neither great nor small 
extent 
To a small extent, i.e. 
few differences 
between people 
Male 36.20% 24.00% 39.80% 
Female 29.10% 23.80% 47.10% 
Age 18-30 35.20% 25.60% 39.20% 
Age 31-40 37.60% 23.20% 39.20% 
Age Over 40 32.30% 21.70% 46.10% 
Disabled 36.50% 21.60% 42.00% 
Not Disabled 35.10% 24.30% 40.60% 
Burundi 30.30% 25.20% 44.50% 
DRC 42.40% 37.10% 20.50% 
Republic of Congo 28.80% 21.30% 49.90% 
Rwanda 61.40% 17.80% 20.80% 
Uganda 20.90% 16.40% 62.70% 
GLR Average 35.30% 24.00% 40.80% 
 
When asked whether or not the differences between people (level of diversity) were a 
source of problems such as disagreement, arguments, and disputes there were split results. 
In DRC and RoC, a low portion of ex-combatants saw differences between people (diversity) 
as a problem (13.7% and 13.6%, respectively), whereas in Burundi and Uganda these 
differences were much more likely to be perceived as the source of problems (72.7% and 
55.4%, respectively). A similar split was seen in the community member sample. In DRC and 
RoC, when questioned further as to the type of problems that these differences can cause, 
27.8% of ex-combatants said that envy, slander, and taunts were the most common 
problems, 17.8% said misunderstandings were the main problem, and 10.8% said that 
mistrust was the result of differences (diversity) between people in the area they live. 
Unfortunately there is no data available from Burundi and Uganda on the types of problems 
associated with diversity. 
 
When questioned as to the level of togetherness that ex-combatants feel with other people 
(unspecified who) in the area they live the response across the GLR countries was generally a 
high level of togetherness / closeness that was on par with community members. 76.6% felt 
close with others, 16.6% felt neither close nor distant and 6.8% felt distant from others in 
the area they lived – this trend was well reflected within the individual GLR countries – 
though in DRC, ex-combatants were slightly less likely to report high levels of togetherness 
(63.1%). Across demographic dimensions only age stood out – which showed a slight positive 
relationship to the likelihood of feeling close to the community (75.3% of those 18-30, 77.6% 




Across the GLR countries, 69.3% of ex-combatants had at some point in the past year 
worked with others in the place where they live to do something for the benefit of the 
community. Burundi and Rwanda stand out with even higher levels of working with the 
community – 79.3% in Burundi and 90.8% in Rwanda.81 Female ex-combatants less 
frequently took part in community projects (57.5%) when compared to male ex-combatants 
(71%) across the GLR countries – again, with the exception of Rwanda where female 
participation in community projects in the last year was absolute (100%), exceeding male ex-
combatants (90.5%).  
 
When ex-combatants were asked whether there were any penalties for those who did not 
participate in community activities, 33.3% responded that penalties were very likely, 23.9% 
that they were somewhat likely, 16.9% that they were neither unlikely nor likely, 7% that 
they were somewhat unlikely, 14.3% that they were very unlikely and 4.7% that total social 




Empowerment is an important indicator of overall levels of social capital and is understood 
as a result of individuals’ levels of social connection and their ability to leverage the benefits 
of these connections in the community and the larger context of society. Collectively, the 
extent of these benefits, and in turn the functions that they fulfill for individuals, play a role 
in the psychosocial concept of empowerment – the individual or collective ability to affect 
change in one’s life. In exploring issues around empowerment this study builds on survey 
data regarding: (i) the extent to which ex-combatants feel generally happy; (ii) the extent to 
which they perceive that they can make important decisions; (iii) the extent to which they 
have control over decisions in their daily life; (iv) the extent to which they feel valued by the 
community; and (v) the extent to which they engage in collective political action. 
 
                                                     
81 In the case of Rwanda, higher levels of working for the benefit of the community is very likely a result of the 
institutionalized practice of Umuganda – a practice dating back to Rwanda’s colonial era in which on the last Saturday of 
every month all able bodied adults participate in unpaid communal labor – with enforced penalties for non-participation. In 
Burundi this trend is likely related to the similar policy of Travaux Communataires. 
82 Rwanda and Uganda are excluded from these findings due to lack of directly comparable data. 
281 
 
Across the GLR countries when asked about their level of happiness 57.2% of all ex-
combatants said that they were generally happy, 23.7% were neither happy nor unhappy, 
and 19.1% were generally unhappy. In this regard ex-combatants were considerably less 
likely to report themselves as happy than community members (57.2% vs. 71.8%). This trend 
was well displayed with the individual GLR countries with the exception of Burundi in which 
the spread of responses from ex-combatants was much more even (31.6% happy, 39.7% 
neither happy nor unhappy, and 28.7% unhappy). Generally speaking, female ex-combatants 
were slightly less happy across the GLR countries than male ex-combatants in terms of 
happiness within the GLR countries with the exception of Rwanda where female ex-
combatants were considerably more happy (90.9%) compared to male ex-combatants 
(61.6%). Across the GLR countries there was a slight positive relationship between age and 
happiness – 54% of those aged 18-30, 58.1% of those 31-40, and 60.7% of those over 40 
identified as happy. 
 
Table 27: Ex-Combatant Empowerment (Power, Ability, Control) 
 
  
Do you feel that you have the power to make important decisions that can change the 
course of your life? 
Large extent Medium extent Small extent 
Male 62.50% 24.60% 12.90% 
Female 44.10% 32.80% 23.10% 
Age 18-30 59.80% 23.20% 16.90% 
Age 31-40 66.10% 25.00% 9.00% 
Age Over 40 56.50% 29.90% 13.60% 
Disabled 49.00% 26.40% 24.60% 
Not Disabled 61.00% 25.50% 13.50% 
GLR Average 59.90% 25.70% 14.40% 
  
  
Do you feel that you have the ability to make important decisions that can change the 
course of your life? 
Able to change life Neither able nor unable Unable to change life 
Male 84.80% 10.40% 4.80% 
Female 73.00% 15.80% 11.30% 
Age 18-30 80.70% 13.30% 6.00% 
Age 31-40 85.40% 10.80% 3.80% 
Age Over 40 84.30% 8.20% 7.50% 
Disabled 68.80% 14.90% 16.30% 
Not Disabled 84.00% 11.00% 5.00% 
GLR Average 82.90% 11.20% 5.90% 
  
How much control do you feel you have over decisions that affect your everyday 
activities? 
Lots of Control 
Neither a lot nor a little 
control 
Little Control 
Male 73.40% 18.40% 8.20% 
Female 55.00% 28.90% 16.00% 
Age 18-30 68.90% 20.20% 10.90% 
Age 31-40 76.60% 16.80% 6.50% 
Age Over 40 70.30% 22.00% 7.70% 
Disabled 63.50% 21.10% 15.50% 
Not Disabled 72.10% 19.50% 8.50% 




When questioned about the extent to which they felt that they had the power to make 
important decisions that change the course of their lives 59.9% of all ex-combatants across 
the GLR countries responded that they felt that they had this power to a large extent, 25.7% 
to neither a large nor small extent, and 14.4% to a small extent.83 This trend was consistently 
displayed within all of the GLR countries. In examining demographic subgroups both female 
ex-combatants and disabled ex-combatants showed considerably lower perceptions of 
power in shaping their lives (see Table 27). Overall, 44.1% of female ex-combatants 
compared to 62.5% of male ex-combatants felt they had the power to make important 
decisions in their lives to a large extent. Similarly, 49% of disabled ex-combatants compared 
to 61% of non-disabled ex-combatants felt they had the power to make important decisions 
in their lives to a large extent.  
 
While in the case of female ex-combatants the disparity with males was absorbed into both 
the categories “neither to a large nor small extent” and “to a small extent,” however in the 
case of disabled ex-combatants this difference with non-disabled ex-combatants was almost 
absolutely absorbed into the category “to a small extent” (28.1% of disabled vs. 16.1% of 
non-disabled). This may perhaps suggest that there is a more polarizing dynamic to the 
nature of empowerment for disabled ex-combatants than female ex-combatants, or any 
other demographic subgroup for that matter. 
 
Ex-combatants were asked the extent to which they felt they had the ability to make 
important decisions that change their lives.84 Across the GLR countries, 82.9% felt they were 
able to change their lives, 11.2% felt that they were neither able nor unable, and 5.9% felt 
that they were unable to make important decisions to change their lives. As with sense of 
power to change their lives, female and disabled ex-combatants less frequently reported 
having the ability to change their lives (73% and 68.8% respectively). 
 
When questioned as to the extent to which ex-combatants felt they had control over 
decisions that affect their everyday activities, 71.1% of all ex-combatants across the GLR 
                                                     
83 Rwanda is excluded from findings regarding ability to make large decisions due to lack of directly comparable data. 
84 Rwanda and Burundi are absent from findings on ability to make important decisions in life due to lack of directly 
comparable data.  
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countries expressed that they felt that they had a high level of control, 19.7% felt that they 
had neither a little nor a lot of control, and 9.2% felt that they had little control over 
decisions.85 This decreasing trend is present in all the GLR countries, however the peak is 
slightly shifted in Uganda where the curve is slightly different (52.1%, 31.4%, 16.5%). Female 
ex-combatants were consistently less likely to feel they had lots of control over decisions in 
their lives (55%%) when compared to male ex-combatants (73.4%). Disabled ex-combatants 
also were consistently less likely to feel they had a high level of control over decisions in 
their lives (63.5%) when compared to non-disabled ex-combatants (70.3%). Overall ex-
combatants felt slightly higher levels of empowerment than community members in all three 
(power, ability, and control) measures.86  
 
Table 28: Ex-Combatant Perception of Individual Impact on Community 
 
  
Do you personally have a positive or negative impact on the place that you live? 
Positive impact 
Neither positive nor 
negative impact 
Negative impact 
Male 59.90% 27.20% 12.90% 
Female 56.60% 29.90% 13.50% 
Age 18-30 52.40% 33.30% 14.30% 
Age 31-40 64.40% 24.30% 11.20% 
Age Over 40 67.80% 21.00% 11.20% 
Disabled 74.10% 18.80% 7.20% 
Not Disabled 57.80% 28.60% 13.70% 
Burundi 41.50% 42.80% 15.70% 
DRC 38.80% 37.90% 23.40% 
Republic of Congo 47.10% 32.60% 20.30% 
Rwanda 99.20% 0.00% 0.80% 
Uganda 82.10% 16.50% 1.50% 
GLR Average 59.50% 27.50% 13.00% 
 
When asked to gage the impact that they have on the place they live, 59.5% of ex-
combatants across the GLR countries feel that they have a positive impact, 27.57% feel that 
they have neither a positive nor negative impact, and 13% feel that they have a negative 
impact.87 This trend is well reflected in Burundi, DRC and RoC – however, in Uganda and 
Rwanda perceptions of positive impact were much more frequent (82.1% of ex-combatants 
in Uganda perceived that they had a positive impact and 99.2% of those in Rwanda) – see 
Table 28. Across age demographics lines there was a positive relationship visible between 
                                                     
85 This question regarding community members’ levels of control over everyday decisions has been recoded from a five 
point scale to a three point scale for increased comparability to the other two measures of empowerment (power and 
ability) presented here. 
86 The analytical distinction between senses of empowerment in terms of power vs. ability is not clear. Interpreting any 
meaning to the disparity in levels of power and ability is therefore problematic and these data should be treated as a broad 
indicator of a positive sense of empowerment rather than as exact measures of different components of empowerment. 




age and ex-combatants perception of having a positive impact on the area in which they 
lived – 52.4% of those aged 18-30, 64.4% of those 31-40, and 67.8% of those over 40. 
 
Across the GLR countries, 72.1% of all ex-combatants felt that people in the area in which 
they live valued them, the remaining 27.9% did not feel valued. Uganda was the only country 
that departed slightly from the cross-country trend, displaying higher levels of perceived 
value among ex-combatants (94.6%). Female ex-combatants were slightly less likely to feel 
valued (62.3%) compared to male ex-combatants (73.6%).  
 
Table 29: Ex-Combatant Frequency of Public Gathering to Express Concerns 
 
  
In the past year, how often have you joined other people to express concerns to officials 
or local leaders on issues benefiting the community? 
Never Once 
A few times, five or 
less 
Many times, more 
than five 
Male 40.80% 12.70% 18.30% 28.30% 
Female 58.80% 12.80% 16.80% 11.60% 
Age 18-30 46.10% 13.10% 18.00% 22.70% 
Age 31-40 38.80% 10.70% 17.20% 33.30% 
Age Over 40 40.90% 14.20% 20.30% 24.60% 
Disabled 37.00% 7.40% 15.90% 39.70% 
Not Disabled 43.70% 13.30% 18.40% 24.70% 
Burundi 25.60% 9.20% 30.70% 34.50% 
DRC 64.10% 15.50% 12.80% 7.60% 
Republic of Congo 62.30% 17.00% 14.50% 6.10% 
Rwanda 1.90% 0.30% 6.80% 91.00% 
Uganda 49.60% 17.90% 22.10% 10.30% 
GLR Average 43.00% 12.70% 18.10% 26.30% 
 
Regarding collective political action, ex-combatants were asked how often they had joined 
with other people to express concerns to government officials or local leaders on issues 
concerning the community. Across the GLR countries 43% of all ex-combatants said that they 
had never done so in the last year, 12.7% that they had once, 18.1% that they had a few 
times (five or less), and 26.3% that they had many times (more than five times) – levels very 
similar to community members. Burundi to some extent, and Rwanda to a greater extent, 
broke from this trend and displayed higher levels of collective political action (visible in Table 
29). In Burundi, 34.5% of ex-combatants had joined to address local leaders many times 
(more than 5) and 30.7% had a few times (less than five). In Rwanda, 91% of ex-combatants 
had joined to address local leaders many times in the last year.88 Across the GLR countries 
                                                     
88 This high rate of public gathering to express concerns in Rwanda is likely another effect of Umuganda. While the main 
purpose of Umuganda is community work it also serves as a platform for leaders to communicate important news on a 
national and local level as well as for individuals and communities to express concerns and plan for future Umuganda. 
Further, every community has an ex-combatant representative who is responsible for relaying specific communication. 
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female ex-combatants were less likely to have gathered for collective political action then 
male ex-combatants, though at a very similar level to female community members– 58.8% of 
female ex-combatants having never gathered and 11.6% having gathered many times versus 
40.8% and 28.3.2% respectively of male ex-combatants.  
 
When asked to what extent local government and leaders take into account the concerns 
voiced by their community when they make decisions, 17.6% of all ex-combatants across the 
GLR countries felt that local leaders took them into account a lot, 41.2% felt their voices 
were taken into account a little, and 41.2% felt that their concerns were not taken into 
account at all – nearly identical levels to those expressed by community members.89 Across 
gender and disability dimensions, ex-combatants’ responses were approximately even. 
However concerning age, older ex-combatants (aged over 40) were the most likely age 
demographic group (54.7%) to feel that their concerns were not taken into account, while 
younger ex-combatants (aged 18-30) were most likely of age demographic groups to feel 
that they were taken into account a lot (19.2%). This is likely related to older ex-combatants 
overall higher levels of social capital. 
 
7.4.5 Social Change 
 
When asked about their outlook on the likelihood of their overall situation improving in the 
future, responses were quite polarized between those who thought that things would 
improve in a few years and those that thought that their situation would deteriorate in the 
future.90 Overall, only 1.2% of all ex-combatants across the GLR countries thought that their 
situation would improve within some weeks, 5.2% thought it would improve in some 
months, 43.7% thought that it would hopefully improve in some years, 8.7% thought that 
their situation would not improve in the future but stay the same, and 41.2% expressed that 
they thought that their situation would deteriorate in the future. The only GLR country that 
stepped away from this trend was Uganda in which 71.7% of ex-combatants were hopeful 
                                                     
89 Rwanda is excluded from findings regarding ex-combatants’ perceptions of whether leaders take their voices into account 
due to lack of directly comparable data. 




that their situation would improve within a few years.91 In general, these findings suggest 
that ex-combatants across the GLR countries have a good understanding of the time 
horizons of social change, but that a significant proportion remains pessimistic for the 
future. Overall, ex-combatants had slightly less optimistic outlooks compared to community 
members. 
 
Interestingly, ex-combatants’ outlook on their economic situation (see §7.1.1) was 
considerably better (73.7% reported seeing their economic situation improving in the future) 
than their overall outlook (a total of 58.8% reporting expected improvement at various time 
scales). This evidence tacitly supports the idea that while ex-combatants can make 
improvements relatively quickly in economic terms, the diverse set of challenges that exist in 
the social sphere are slower to resolve. 
 
When asked about whether or not they were satisfied with their life in general up until then, 
30.6% of all ex-combatants across the GLR countries said they were satisfied, 7.5% that they 
were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, and 61.9% were dissatisfied.92 This trend of the 
overwhelming majority of ex-combatants expressing dissatisfaction with their life was 
consistent in all the GLR countries except for Uganda where the spread of responses was 
much more even – 33.2% were satisfied, 30.7% were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, and 
36.1% were dissatisfied. These findings are perhaps not surprising, considering the heavy toll 
conflict can take on the lives of individuals. However, these effects are not isolated to ex-
combatants – community member displayed a similar range of responses about life 
satisfaction. However, these findings stand in contrast to those on overall happiness (see 
§7.4.4) in which nearly 60% of ex-combatants indicated that they were generally happy. 
Understanding the interplay between ex-combatants levels of happiness and their overall 






                                                     
91 While there is no direct evidence for explaining why in this case ex-combatants in Uganda have more optimistic outlooks 
for their future, it is possible that this is linked to the relative stability of Northern Uganda and the overall pace of 
improvement away from a context of widespread displacement due to conflict and humanitarian intervention.  
92 Rwanda is excluded from findings regarding life satisfaction due to lack of directly comparable data. 
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Table 30: Ex-Combatant Social Change Ladder – One Year Ago and Today 
 
Consider a 9-step ladder 
where on the bottom, the 
first step, stand the poorest 
people, and on the ninth 
step, stand the richest - On 
which step were you one 
year ago in relation to: 






























































Male 3.17 2.97 3.20 2.70 3.39 3.23 3.33 
Female 2.95 2.76 3.00 2.55 3.39 3.25 3.08 
Age 18-30 3.02 2.89 3.09 2.57 3.25 3.09 3.17 
Age 31-40 3.23 2.99 3.28 2.82 3.46 3.34 3.36 
Age Over 40 3.18 2.93 3.17 2.62 3.54 3.37 3.43 
Disabled 2.73 2.62 2.71 2.33 3.28 2.90 2.99 
Not Disabled 3.18 2.97 3.22 2.71 3.40 3.26 3.32 
Burundi 3.22 3.03 3.42 2.79 2.94 3.08 2.92 
DRC 3.45 3.39 3.65 2.91 3.81 3.30 3.79 
Republic of Congo 3.28 3.05 3.14 2.95 3.42 3.33 3.18 
Uganda 2.60 2.28 2.47 2.06 XXX XXX XXX 
GLR Average 3.14 2.94 3.17 2.68 3.39 3.24 3.30 
Consider a 9-step ladder 
where on the bottom, the 
first step, stand the poorest 
people, and on the ninth 
step, stand the richest - On 
































































Male 3.30 3.15 3.34 2.77 3.51 3.36 3.41 
Female 2.99 2.80 3.25 2.62 3.38 3.32 3.07 
Age 18-30 3.13 3.08 3.28 2.68 3.37 3.24 3.26 
Age 31-40 3.40 3.15 3.41 2.90 3.56 3.42 3.43 
Age Over 40 3.18 2.97 3.25 2.62 3.56 3.39 3.43 
Disabled 2.76 2.64 2.77 2.34 3.30 3.01 2.95 
Not Disabled 3.31 3.14 3.38 2.79 3.51 3.38 3.40 
Burundi 3.40 3.25 3.56 2.88 3.04 3.20 2.98 
DRC 3.38 3.46 3.61 2.84 3.82 3.34 3.79 
Republic of Congo 3.51 3.22 3.38 3.14 3.65 3.54 3.35 
Uganda 2.75 2.48 2.75 2.14 XXX XXX XXX 
GLR Average 3.26 3.10 3.33 2.75 3.50 3.36 3.37 
 
Ex-combatants were questioned using a 10-step ladder response prompt. Their responses 
are tabulated below in Table 12 by mean score.93 The lower the mean score is the closer the 
ex-combatant is to the bottom rung of the ladder – where the poorest people tend to be. 
Generally speaking, across and within the GLR countries ex-combatants consistently 
identified themselves in the poorest half of society (between steps 2 and 4). 
 
When looking across the GLR countries as a whole, there is a slight improvement in mean 
scores in all question categories from one year ago to the time of sampling. This trend is 
almost completely consistent within the individual GLR countries with the only exception 
being DRC – in which there was a slight decrease in mean scores from one year ago and time 
                                                     
93 Rwanda is excluded from findings regarding ex-combatants’ perceptions of change within specific categories due to lack 
of directly comparable data. 
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of sampling in the categories of finance, clothing and food. When focusing on demographic 
subgroups, however, there are less consistent results. Three demographic subgroups 
standout in particular: female ex-combatants, ex-combatants aged 31-40, and disabled ex-
combatants. Though female ex-combatants saw near unanimous improvements across all 
categories, leisure being the only exception, they consistently ranked a rung lower than male 
ex-combatants. Those aged 31-40 rank higher or equal than other age demographics across 
all categories. Similar to the trend of female ex-combatants, disabled ex-combatants saw 
improvements across all categories, leisure being the only exception. However disabled ex-




The social-fabric of communities endures great detriment in the course of violent conflict. 
Indeed, it is no wonder that ex-combatants and community members alike struggle to mend 
their damaged social footing. However, consistent with analysis presented throughout much 
of this study, ex-combatants experience a range of additional challenges in the process of 
social reintegration that collectively entail their disadvantage to community members. While 
collectively ex-combatants display a positive trajectory in terms of social reintegration, 
rebuilding social capital, and connecting into the social fabric of the community, the angle of 
this trajectory is considerably more shallow than in other dimensions of reintegration, such 
as economic – i.e. though ex-combatants are catching up to community members in terms of 
social indicators, the rate at which they are doing so is considerably slower than in other 
dimensions of reintegration. This evidence supports the idea that social reintegration is a 
slow process of social confrontation and atonement with no shortcuts. Though trust with 
community members may improve quickly, as outlined in §8.5, ex-combatants still struggle 
to recover from the damage done to their social networks, solidarity with the community, 
their cohesion and inclusion in the community, as well as their overall sense of 
empowerment and positive social change.  
 
Ex-combatants have fewer social groups than community members and slightly less familial 
contact than community members overall. Though, ex-combatants who do have contact 
with their families have it much more frequently than community members indicating their 
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heavy reliance on their immediate family for social support. Accordingly ex-combatants are 
more likely to turn to their family for economic help than friends or community / formal 
institutions. In terms of ex-combatants’ friend base there is a clear split in the GLR countries. 
In Uganda and Rwanda, on the one hand, ex-combatants have fewer friends than 
community members and thus an extremely focused social support network relying heavily 
on the family. However, by contrast, in DRC and RoC ex-combatants had larger friend bases 
than community members, indicating a good extended social support network – despite the 
clear presence of a range of social limitations in relation to community members. 
Collectively these findings indicate the extent to which ex-combatants’ social networks are 
more limited than those of community members and in turn the extent to which the 
functions of those social networks are limited as well – i.e. the psychosocial and economic 
value of social and familial networks.  
 
Despite the challenges that ex-combatants face in the process of rebuilding interpersonal 
social ties within the community, they are generally well integrated and have a very similar 
understanding of the dynamics of their community. Ex-combatants and community 
members alike have generally high levels of trust – though ex-combatants perceive larger 
improvements in trust. The frequency at which ex-combatants work for the improvement of 
the community and feel an overall sense of togetherness is similar to community members.  
 
Ex-combatants generally feel similar if not stronger senses of empowerment to affect 
changes in the direction of their lives and control their everyday circumstance than 
community members. This is further evidenced in ex-combatants’ similar level of political 
engagement in community issues to community members. However, it is interesting to see 
that higher senses of empowerment among ex-combatants does not necessarily translate to 
higher levels of overall happiness or better perceptions of impact on the community. Indeed 
ex-combatants across the GLR countries report being much less happy than community 
members and are less likely to view themselves as having a positive impact on the 
community. It is possible that ex-combatants’ overall happiness and senses of self-worth 
may be more tied to the personal psychological trauma ex-combatants carry with them in 
the wake of conflict than their absolute conditions (which while worse than community 
members in absolute terms, do display a clear positive trajectory) at the time of sampling. If 
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this is so, it would lend considerable support to the idea of social reintegration as a slow, 
long-term process of interpersonal exchange and in turn intrapersonal betterment.  
 
Despite ex-combatants’ lower levels of happiness and sense of positive impact on the 
community, their outlook on the future and understanding of the temporal dynamics of 
social change are similar to community members. Ex-combatants and community members 
alike understand that positive change in their overall situation will happen on the scale of 
years – not weeks or months. This makes sense, as both community members and ex-
combatants have seen slight improvement in their overall conditions in the past years / since 
demobilization, ex-combatants less so in absolute terms, but still consistently identify 
themselves in the worst off half of society.  
 
7.4.6.1 Vulnerable Subgroups 
 
When examining social reintegration female ex-combatants continue to represent the most 
clearly and consistently vulnerable demographic group among ex-combatants. Female ex-
combatants have fewer and less diverse social networks, tending to rely even more 
exclusively on their immediate family than the rest of ex-combatants – who do so to a 
greater extent than community members. In this sense, female ex-combatants face the 
highest risk of social isolation and marginalization across the GLR countries. This weak social 
capital in terms of the number and diversity of social groups corresponds to lower levels of 
trust, lower perceptions of improvement in trust, dramatically weaker senses of 
empowerment, and lower perceptions of their overall situation than the rest of ex-
combatants.  
 
Despite the clear and consistent rage of vulnerabilities that female ex-combatants exhibit, 
their overall levels of happiness, life satisfaction and general outlook for the future are on 
par if not better than the rest of ex-combatants. Developing a clear understanding of the 
social and psychological coping strategies that female ex-combatants have developed to 
maintain even, if not more positive, senses of self worth, worth in the community, and 
outlook for the future – effectively mitigating against their heightened vulnerability across 
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almost all social indicators – could prove relevant the development of future programming 
for female ex-combatants and male ex-combatants alike.  
 
Disabled ex-combatants exhibit a complex range of disadvantages in terms of social capital. 
In general disabled ex-combatants report far lower levels of personal empowerment and 
control of their lives. However, this is counterbalanced against their unexpectedly higher 
levels of political engagement in the community and stronger sense of positive impact on 
the community in comparison to non-disabled ex-combatants. In terms of social change 
disabled ex-combatants perceive a positive trajectory of social change over time across a 
broad range of categories. However despite this perceived positive trajectory, disabled ex-
combatants consistently rank themselves a step below non-disabled ex-combatants. 
 
7.4.6.2 Unique Country Trends 
 
Despite the many ways in which the individual GLR countries come together to represent a 
consistent collective narrative of the process of reintegration, there are also many ways in 
which they diverge – especially in terms of social reintegration. Here we can highlight a 
selection of unique country trends focused in DRC that represents an alternate narrative of 
reintegration than the one consistent across the other GLR countries.  
 
When examining the many dimensions of social reintegration across the GLR countries, DRC 
stands out most consistently and sharply. As presented above, the dominant narrative of 
social reintegration reflected across the GLR countries was one where ex-combatants had 
high levels contact with the family, though slightly less than community members, but 
stunted development in terms of social networks, friends, and connections to the broader 
community – in turn correlating to lower levels of happiness and perceptions of worth in the 
community. In DRC however, we see a distinctly different narrative emerge.  
 
Ex-combatants and community members alike in DRC have dramatically lower levels of 
familial contact than other GLR countries. DRC stands out even further in this regard because 
it is the only GLR country where ex-combatants are more likely to have contact with their 
family than community members – twice as much so. Further, those ex-combatants who do 
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have contact with their families have it at a much lower frequency (split between daily, 
weekly and monthly contact) than in other GLR countries where daily contact was the norm 
(this divergence is also visible in RoC). As such, it makes sense when ex-combatants in DRC 
are the most likely to say that their contact with their family could be more frequent.  
 
When pared with findings on marriage rates in §7.1.2, what emerges is an image of ex-
combatants in DRC who are isolated from their immediate family though are on par with 
other GLR countries in terms of building new familial connections (marriage / cohabitation). 
However, as mentioned, when ex-combatants in DRC are compared to community members 
in DRC in terms of contact with the immediate family, community members are half as likely 
to be in contact with their immediate family. This is a perplexing trend to explain. While ex-
combatants in DRC have weaker family networks than ex-combatants in other GLR countries, 
they are the only GLR country that has stronger familial connections than community 
members – which could simultaneously suggest that ex-combatants in DRC have been 
exceptionally successful in terms of rebuilding social capital relative to community members; 
and that community members in DRC are a key vulnerable group across the GLR countries in 
terms of social capital.  
 
A hint to understanding the overall lower levels of familial contact in DRC is that of those few 
ex-combatants who did have familial contact and felt that this contact was the maximum 
that they would desire – the distance, time and cost of travel were all cited as reasons for 
not seeing their family more often. Indeed, the social geography of eastern DRC is 
particularly troubling. While countries across the GLR have experienced varying scales of 
war, and in turn levels of impact on society both economically and socially, the incessant 
insecurity in eastern DRC can perpetuate a series of dynamic forces that disperse pre-conflict 
social networks through displacement and migration. Persistent conflict and can trap 
individuals, due difficulty of travel due to zones continued insecurity. When these dynamic 
forces are coupled with static forces such as the mountainous topography of eastern DRC 
and heavy rains that can render roads impassable it is understandable that social networks 
are separated. Future study into this line of inquiry could prove valuable for explaining why 
ex-combatants and community members alike in DRC have considerably weaker familial and 




It appears that though ex-combatants in DRC have strong connections to their immediate 
family relative to community members this does not compensate for the overall lower levels 
of familial contact in absolute terms relative to other GLR countries in terms of overall social 
capital. Indeed ex-combatants in DRC are the most likely group among the GLR countries to 
turn to no one for economic help; have the weakest feeling of togetherness with the 
community; feel they have the least amount of power to make important decisions in their 
life; perceive the weakest ability to control their everyday activities; are the least likely to 
perceive that they make a positive impact on the community; are the least likely to gather to 
express political concerns; the least likely to feel their voice is taken into account by leaders; 
the most likely to think their overall situation will deteriorate in the future; and have the 
lowest level of life satisfaction across the GLR countries. In terms of social change, DRC is the 
only country where ex-combatants see drops in their perception of their situation relative to 
the rest of society in the last year in the categories of food, clothing, and finance – though 
beyond weak social capital ongoing insecurity in eastern DRC likely plays a role in this. 
 
 
7.5 DDR Experiences 
 
DDR processes across the GLR countries have taken place in a diverse range of contexts, as 
such the amount of validly comparable data on all phases of disarmament, demobilization, 
and reintegration is limited. As such, offering a comprehensive comparison of across the GLR 
countries of ex-combatants’ experiences of the process and dynamics of return, reception, 
demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration is unfortunately not feasible in this study – 
primarily as a result of data validity challenges.94 However, drawing from the select data we 
can offer comparative insights on: (i) ex-combatants’ experiences of reinsertion process 
across the GLR countries, and (ii) a limited range of comparative insights regarding initial 
experiences with the community. 
 
                                                     
94 Essentially, the contextual differences between the different programming components of the entire DDR process in the 
various GLR coutnries are at at times great – thus the range of captured data on ex-combatants’s experiences of these 
processes is equally diverse. A valid systemmatic comparison of the different data from each context is judged as infeasible 





In examining ex-combatants’ attendance to a range of information sessions on various topics 
from general information to sessions on how to apply for credit or loans, and information on 
peace and reconciliation processes as part of the reinsertion phase of programming there 
were quite unique trends in each GLR country, though approximately even across all types of 
information sessions within each country.95 As a general indication, 96.3% of ex-combatants 
attended a general presentation of information related to the reinsertion process in Burundi, 
85.7% in DRC, 68.5% in RoC, and 39.2% in Uganda. Looking at demographic subgroups, 
female ex-combatants and disabled ex-combatants were noticeably less likely to have 
attended information sessions – 63.5% of all female ex-combatants versus 74.8% of all male 
ex-combatants, and 59.5% of all disabled ex-combatants versus 74.5% of all non-disabled ex-
combatants. Within each GLR country the disparities between demographic subgroups were 
very similar to those at a cross-country level, though fitting to the overall attendance level 
with each country.  
 
When asked whether or not they thought they had received enough information about the 
reinsertion package and its contents there was a clear correlation between the level of 
participation in information sessions within GLR countries and the perception of receiving 
sufficient information. In Burundi 81.4% of ex-combatants felt they received sufficient 
information regarding reinsertion, in DRC 65.2%, in RoC 45.8%, and in Uganda 19%. Further, 
it is perhaps not surprising then that female ex-combatants and disabled ex-combatants, the 
two demographic subgroups least likely to attend information sessions on reinsertion 
package and process, were the most likely to feel that they received insufficient information 
surrounding the reinsertion process and package – 44.4% of female ex-combatants versus 
55.9% of male ex-combatants, and 41.7% of disabled ex-combatants versus 55.6% of non-
disabled ex-combatants.   
 
Not only did the level of attendance to information sessions about the reinsertion package 
and process correlate to the perceived level of information sufficiency among ex-
                                                     
95 Rwanda is excluded from all findings regarding the reinsertion process due to incompatible data. For a review of the key 
trends in Rwanda see the Rwanda comparative study report.  
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combatants, but also to the actual frequency at which they received reinsertion payments. 
The same descending trend can be observed again in Burundi, as 99.7% of ex-combatants 
received payments as a part of reinsertion, in DRC 88.3%, in RoC 56.2%, and in Uganda 
35.6%.96 Collectively these findings suggest that across the GLR countries attaining a 
sufficient level of information and sensitization regarding the reinsertion process is a key to 
reaping the benefits of reinsertion payments and support.  
 
Female ex-combatants also showed a visible correlation between information and 
sensitization exposure and actual reception of reinsertion payments at a cross-country level, 
though they were less likely to receive reinsertion assistance than male ex-combatants 
overall - 62.9% of female ex-combatants versus 73.2% of male ex-combatants received 
reinsertion payments. Interestingly, disabled ex-combatants – though they attended 
information sessions on reinsertion less frequently and were less satisfied with the 
information they received – were nearly evenly as likely (68.4%) compared to non-disabled 
ex-combatants (72%) to receive reinsertion payments at a cross country level. 
 
When those ex-combatants who did not receive reinsertion payments were asked why they 
thought that they had not received payments, a large number connected this to lack of 
information. In Uganda 44.4% of all ex-combatants identified lack of information at some 
level as the primary reason they did not receive a reinsertion payment. Female ex-
combatants identified information more frequently than male ex-combatants in Uganda 
(55.1% vs. 43.7%). A similar trend along gender lines existed across Burundi, DRC and RoC, in 
which 35.5% of females identified information as the reason they did not receive reinsertion 
payments as compared to 13.7% of male ex-combatants.  
 
Both ex-combatants who had received reinsertion payments and those who had not were 
question about their levels of satisfaction with those payments. Surprisingly, there was no 
                                                     
96 The especially low reception of reinsertion payment in Uganda warrents some contextualization. Most ex-combatants in 
Uganda receive amnesty and reinsertion / reintegration assistance retroactively after returning to their communities. This 
”trickle in” model in the context of Uganda means that many ex-combatants demobilize informally and thus the bottleneck 
for information and sensitization that formal demobilization processes represent is largely absent – making information and 
sensitization a key programming challenge. In addition, this data does not necessarily mean that those ex-combatants that 
have not received reinsertion payments have not received amnesty – as of 2011 (the time of sampling) the UgDRP still had 
a considerable backlog of upaid reinsertion assistance.  
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clear correlation between the rate at which ex-combatants received reinsertion payments 
and their satisfaction with those payments. Across the GLR countries, 32.3% of ex-
combatants were satisfied with their reinsertion payments, 33.9% were neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied, and 33.9% were dissatisfied. This trend was well reflected across the GLR 
countries with the exception of Uganda where levels of satisfaction were more clearly 
polarized (41.3%, 14.3%, and 44.3%, respectively). With the exception of RoC, female ex-
combatants were generally more satisfied with reinsertion payments than male ex-
combatants (41.8% vs. 30.8% at a cross-country level), even though the rate at which they 
actually received reinsertion payments was lower.  
 
Similarly, when questioned further to their overall level of satisfaction with the totality of 
the reinsertion package contents ex-combatants were generally satisfied. Across the GLR 
countries, 47.1% of ex-combatants said that they were satisfied, 29.2% said that they were 
neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, and 23.7% were dissatisfied. This trend towards general 
satisfaction is reflected within all of the GLR countries. Again, this is somewhat puzzling, as 
one would expect some correlation between overall satisfaction of reinsertion packages and 
the rate at which they are actually received. Female ex-combatants are more likely to be 
satisfied at a cross-country level (54.1%) when compared to male ex-combatants (46%) – this 
is reflected in all GLR countries with the exception of DRC. Examining age demographics 
reveals some interesting contrasts. In Uganda and Burundi, there is a clear trend that as age 
increases likelihood of satisfaction with the overall contents of the reinsertion package 
decreases. However this trend was reversed in DRC, as age increased likelihood of being 
satisfied increased as well. 
 
A comprehensive analysis of the uses of reinsertion payments across the GLR countries is 
challenging, however we can extract several general observations here.97 Generally speaking 
the most consistently cited use of reinsertion payments was meeting immediate food and 
subsistence needs, suggesting that perhaps food security is among the most pressing needs 
for ex-combatants at the time of demobilization. Assistance to family, parents, spouse or 
partner was also among the most common uses of the reinsertion payments. Additionally, 
                                                     
97 The main barrier to a comprehensive analysis lay in the different scales used to capture data on the use of reinsertion 
payments across the GLR countries. Rwanda is excluded from general trends due to lack of data.  
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investment of some sort, for example for business or in livestock, ranked high among the 
uses of reinsertion payments. 
 
 
7.5.2 Experiences of Return 
 
Drawing from DRC, RoC, and Uganda we can see that the vast majority of ex-combatants 
(90.1%) report being welcomed home by their families immediately after demobilization.98 
This proportion was high in both DRC in Uganda, but notably lower (81.4%) in RoC. This 
finding supports analysis across this study that ex-combatants generally experience high 
levels of acceptance and support from their immediate families.  
 
In accordance, after receiving reinsertion packages the majority (76.5%) of ex-combatants 
reported that they had no problems with their families, however again in RoC this 
percentage was slightly lower – 63% of ex-combatants had no problems with their family 
after reinsertion packages. In RoC female ex-combatants and disabled ex-combatants were 
especially more likely to encounter problems with their families – 48.1% of female ex-
combatants having problems with their families after reinsertion payments versus 35.2% of 
male ex-combatants, and 53.6% of disabled ex-combatants versus 35.7% of non-disabled ex-
combatants.  
 
When those ex-combatants who did encounter problems with their families after receiving 
reinsertion packages were asked to explain the specific nature of these problems a distinct 
range of answers was given. Although there is little data that is comparable across the GLR 
countries on this we can look at Uganda for a precursory survey of the kinds of problems 
that ex-combatants may face. The range of explanations of the problems that ex-combatants 
face with their families after receiving reinsertion packages in Uganda often reflected a 
perceived sense of animosity from families and communities towards ex-combatants. 
Common explanations included: (i) family wanted to take reinsertion money (19%), (ii) 
accusation of unfairness of payments to ex-combatants (14.3%); (iii) undermined and 
                                                     
98 Rwanda and Burundi are absent from all findings on immediate reintegration experiences with the family and community 
due to lack of directly comparable data.  
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ridiculed by community (9.5%); (iv) accused of seeking government handouts (9.5%); and (v) 
attacked by neighbor for being an ex-combatant (9.5%).  
 
Drawing from data on DRC and RoC we can observe that in general ex-combatants feel that 
most people in their community treat them the same as they do everyone else – though this 
was slightly more so in DRC. This trend was reflected in reference to a range of different 
social categories, e.g. elders, male peers, female peers, work colleagues, people in authority, 
youth, and strangers. Younger ex-combatants (aged 18-30) were slightly less likely across 
almost all categories to feel that people in their community treated them the same as other 




This limited examination of the DDR experiences of ex-combatants across the GLR countries 
reveals two key findings of substantial analytical value related to: (i) the importance of 
information and sensitization campaigns; and (ii) the considerably different levels of 
acceptance and welcome that ex-combatants perceive from family members versus the 
wider community upon initial return.  
 
In terms of information sensitization, ex-combatants’ levels of participation in various 
information sessions about the reinsertion and reintegration process has a clear correlation 
to ex-combatants’ levels of satisfaction with the level of information they receive. This in 
itself is perhaps not surprising, but what is more so is that ex-combatants’ levels of 
participation in information and sensitization sessions have an equally clear correlation to 
the actual rate at which ex-combatants receive reinsertion payments. Indeed, those ex-
combatants who did not receive payment most commonly cited lack of information as the 
reason why. The majority of ex-combatants are using reinsertion funds for their intended 
purpose of meeting immediate subsistence needs. As such, It appears as though effective 
information and sensitization campaigns, reaching a large proportion of ex-combatants, can 
play a key role in assuring that ex-combatants do indeed receive reinsertion funds to meet 
their immediate subsistence needs upon return to their communities – mitigating the 




Throughout this study there has been considerable evidence to show that ex-combatants 
experience very high levels of acceptance and support from their immediate families upon 
return, in both social and economic dimensions. However, by contrast, there is also 
considerable evidence to suggest that they face only a relatively moderate level of 
acceptance from the broader community upon their immediate return. As outlined in §8.5.2 
of the community dynamics portion of this survey, community members hold high levels of 
fear surrounding the return of ex-combatants and the range of negative behaviors 
associated with them before ex-combatants’ return. However, community members’ fear 
surrounding ex-combatants all but disappears in the time before their arrival in communities 
to the time of sampling (4.05 years on average across the GLR countries). These findings are 
part of a dispersed range of evidence that suggest that while the vast majority of ex-
combatants are quick to reach acceptance and reintegrate into the family, they experience a 
slower, though positive, trajectory towards acceptance in the broader community.  
 
7.5.3.1 Vulnerable Subgroups 
 
In terms of the limited range of DDR experiences explored here, female ex-combatants and 
disabled ex-combatants experience a clear and continuous range of disadvantages. Female 
and disabled ex-combatants are the demographic groups that are least likely to attend all 
varieties of information sessions about the reinsertion and reintegration processes. In turn 
female and disabled ex-combatants are not only the groups least satisfied with the level 
information that they received, but also the least likely groups to actually receive reinsertion 
payments – destabilizing their ability to meet their immediate subsistence needs. 
 
7.5.3.2 Unique Country Trends 
 
As outlined repeatedly in the analysis in this section, the varying levels of ex-combatants 
participation in information and sensitization sessions related to reinsertion and 
reintegration processes displayed a clear correlation to the rate at which ex-combatants 
actually received reinsertion funds and presumably affected their ability to meet immediate 
subsistence needs. With this we can ask: how were more ex-combatants exposed to 
information and sensitization in Burundi and fewer in Uganda (the rest of the GLR countries 
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falling in between)? What strategies were successful in some instances and unsuccessful in 
others? A more explicit understanding of the considerable variation in information and 
sensitization exposure across the GLR countries and its relationship to actual reinsertion 
payment reception and meeting of subsistence needs then would hold considerable 




This study has found that ex-combatants in the GLR countries have been largely successful in 
reintegrating with community members across numerous dimensions. While across the 
range of core social and economic indicators explored in this study ex-combatants 
collectively represent a disadvantaged group, they show a clear trajectory towards reaching 
economic and social parity with community members – in many cases having already 
reached equal footing or occasionally exceeding community members’ performance across 
core indicators of reintegration processes. This study has found that among ex-combatants 
across the GLR countries, female ex-combatants and young ex-combatants (18-30) both 
male and female encounter a distinct range of additional challenges in reintegration 
processes and in this represent key vulnerable groups. While young ex-combatants lag 
behind their older peers, their overall trajectory is indeed positive. There is evidence to 
suggest that, however, for female ex-combatants across the GLR countries there is a 
consistent range of structural barriers that at the very least could slow down the processes 
of reintegration further, and at the very worst could leave them locked out of certain 
economic and social processes – at a high risk for economic marginalization and social 
isolation.  
 
There is no one driver or determinant of reintegration. Instead reintegration is understood 
here as embodied by a diverse range of simultaneous and overlapping processes (e.g. social, 
psychological, political, economic) that dynamically interact with one another. In viewing the 
product of these multiple reintegration processes and their interaction we can grasp the 
overall trajectory of reintegration that ex-combatants hold in their return to and interaction 




Violent conflict throughout the Great Lakes Region has damaged the social and economic 
fabric of society; disrupting economies, disintegrating families, and fragmenting social 
networks for ex-combatants and community members alike. Thus understanding the 
challenges of reintegration must in part be understood in the context of larger post-conflict 
peacebuilding and development processes. However the challenges that ex-combatants face 
in rebuilding and reintegrating into the damaged social and economic fabric of society are 
immediate and acute. It is ex-combatants’ ability to re-enter and make functional the familial 
unit and larger social networks in the community, in turn the social and economic functions 
these social units play, that constitute evidence of successful reintegration processes.  
 
With this in mind, it appears that ex-combatants have been successful in reintegrating into 
the family unit. Ex-combatants’ families have been open and accepting, serving the core 
function of the social and economic support while ex-combatants gain footing. While 
families appear to have played an especially important role in the immediate return of ex-
combatants, the process of confrontation and exchange with the broader community 
appears to have progressed much more slowly. Rebuilding social networks is not only 
essential for acceptance and participation in the community, but for economic opportunity. 
In this, ex-combatants lag behind community members in their broader social footing and 
economic security – remaining especially reliant on the familial unit.  
 
It is with the support of the familial unit, and through their positive trajectory in terms of 
access to marriage, that ex-combatants have reached parity with community members in 
terms of housing, access to land, and upward mobility in land access. Though, ex-combatants 
continue to face challenges in terms of household hunger and nutrition.  
 
Despite ex-combatants’ positive trajectory, they perceive themselves as worse off than 
others in the community and see overcoming stigma and distrust in the community as the 
primary barrier to reintegrating with the community, followed by education and 
qualification barriers that may exist as a result of time lost in conflict. Community members 
corroborate ex-combatants’ perceptions, explaining a range of fears and stigma associated 
with ex-combatants upon their immediate return that, however, dissipate quickly over time 
leaving key barriers to ex-combatants’ reintegration as revolving around making up time for 
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missed education / skills qualification attainment and a broader social and economic track 
record in the community. Even with the diverse range of social and economic challenges that 
ex-combatants face, they have strong senses of empowerment to shape their situation going 
forward (with the exception of females).  
 
7.6.1 Ex-Combatants and Economic Reintegration 
 
This study has found that ex-combatants across the GLR countries show a positive trajectory 
towards gaining self-employment in agriculture or small business – though there is still 
considerable improvement that ex-combatants must make to reach parity with community 
members. The context of economic reintegration across the GLR countries is one of severe 
overall development challenges. As such, ex-combatants and community members alike 
identify their primary barrier to gaining employment as lack of opportunity in general. Ex-
combatants, however, face a range of additional barriers related to: (i) closing literacy, 
education and skill gaps with community members; (ii) establishing an economic track 
record; in order to (iii) access credit and other financial institutions; and (iv) to erode stigma 
and distrust through the slow process of confrontation that social reintegration entails.  
 
Collectively the unique barriers that ex-combatants face are a product of their overall 
stunted economic networks – leading to an overall higher exposure to economic insecurity 
and reliance on the familial unit compared to community members – who have more 
diversified economic networks and tend to be more integrated into formal and community 
based economic institutions.  
 
7.6.2 Ex-Combatants and Social Reintegration 
 
This study has found that ex-combatants across the GLR countries exhibit a positive, but 
shallow, trajectory of social reintegration. While ex-combatants are quick to reintegrate with 
their immediate family and to breakdown trust barriers with the wider community, their 
progress from there forward is slow – owing to their stunted social networks and track 
record in the community. In this sense the social and economic reintegration of ex-
combatants are strongly interrelated – their long-term success revolving around rebuilding 
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the networks that are instrumental to social and economic security. Mending the damaged 
social networks and in many cases building new ones from scratch, with the additional 
barriers of residual stigma and lack of social track record, is a slow process of confrontation 
and atonement. 
 
Though ex-combatants have remarkably high levels of social empowerment, often 
surpassing community members, they understand that the process of social reintegration 
has no shortcuts and will take place in the scale of years. With this ex-combatants remain 
significantly less happy and with lower levels of self worth than community members – 
leaving them exposed to risk of marginalization and social isolation from the wider 
community.  
 
7.6.3 Female Ex-Combatant Subgroup 
 
Throughout the analysis of the reintegration processes of ex-combatants across the Great 
Lakes Region presented in this study female ex-combatants have stood out as the most clear 
and consistent vulnerable subgroup. While young ex-combatants (aged 18-30) and disabled 
ex-combatants display a range of disadvantages related to a lack of social and economic 
track record and to health, respectively, they do not depart significantly from the overall 
positive trajectory of ex-combatant reintegration in the Great Lakes Region. Female ex-
combatants, however, encounter an extensive range of disadvantages that collectively paint 
a picture of the structural barriers they face in reintegration processes in terms of: (i) familial 
networks; (ii) economic networks; and (iii) broader social networks in the community. These 
structural barriers force a distinctly different trajectory of reintegration.  
 
As discussed above, rebuilding damaged social and economic networks in the community is 
a key dimension to the overall process of reintegration. Like male ex-combatants, female ex-
combatants have  done well to reintegrate into their immediate families. However, unlike 
male ex-combatants, female ex-combatants have been largely unsuccessful in building new 
familial connections through marriage – remaining the least marrying demographic group 
across ex-combatants and community members alike. While male ex-combatants have seen 
a sharp rise in marriage rates since demobilization, female ex-combatants have shown a very 
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shallow, and ultimately marginal, trajectory of increased marriage. Attitudinal indicators 
reveal that female ex-combatants have the smallest proportion of the population, both ex-
combatant and community member, that is open to marrying them due primarily to stigma 
related issues – lending some explanation for growing disparity in marriage rates between 
male and female ex-combatants. Both male and female ex-combatants experience stigma, 
however in the case of marriage it appears to likely be a key structural barrier to building 
new familial networks and in turn to accessing the social and economic resources that they 
represent.  
 
As discussed above, the context of economic reintegration in the Great Lakes Region is one 
of severe development challenges. The primary pathway to economic stability for ex-
combatants and community members alike is through self-employment in agriculture – this 
is even more so for female ex-combatants. As such, access to arable land is an important 
indicator of economic stability – in turn growth in access to arable land as an indicator of a 
positive economic trajectory. In this female ex-combatants lag behind male ex-combatants 
with slightly lower levels of both land access and improvement in access to land – which 
when combined indicate female ex-combatants’ shallower trajectory of economic 
improvement – despite their slightly lower unemployment rate. There appear to be three 
structural barriers to land access mobility for female ex-combatants: (i) capital; (ii) 
inheritance; and (iii) marriage.  
 
First, both male and female ex-combatants alike identify access to capital as the largest 
barrier to increased land access. However, for female ex-combatants, who have considerably 
lower literacy and educational achievement levels, the challenges to accumulating capital 
through bountiful agricultural production are acute. Indeed, females clearly identify lack of 
education and skills as among their key barriers to economic stability. Second, the challenges 
to capital accumulation that female ex-combatants face are amplified when inheritance 
dynamics are taken into account. Females who do experience increases in land access are 
much less likely than male ex-combatants to cite inheritance – indicating that this is a 
pathway to land access, and in turn a positive economic trajectory, that females are not 
accessing at the same level. Thirdly, marriage is an important pathway to increased land 
access for male ex-combatants. However, as outlined above, female ex-combatants 
305 
 
experience a set of distinct structural barriers to accessing marriage. When these three 
dimensions interact, the result is a dynamic structural barrier that female ex-combatants 
face in terms of building a positive economic trajectory and the economic networks 
associated with them. 
 
By effect of their structurally hindered familial and economic networks, female ex-
combatants face challenges in building social capital and broader networks in the 
community. This weak social capital in the community has consequences for female ex-
combatants in terms of lower levels of trust, lower perceptions of improvement in trust, 
dramatically weaker senses of empowerment, and lower perceptions of their overall 
situation than the rest of ex-combatants. These factors collectively interact to put females at 
risk of marginalization and isolation with the community – in turn potentially reinforcing the 
structural restraints that shape their weak familial and economic networks. 
 
It is the dynamic interaction of the familial, economic and broader social structural 
dimensions that shape the overall shallower trajectory of reintegration for female ex-
combatants across the GLR countries and constitute them as a distinctly disadvantaged 
group. Looking at the structural challenges that female ex-combatants face reveals much 
about the overlapping, interrelated, and simultaneous nature of reintegration processes – an 
insight that is not only relevant to female ex-combatants, but to all ex-combatants across the 








































The following is a capture of the community member sample for this comparative study. The 
demographics presented here are not representative of the overall community member 
populations of each of the five GLR countries of study, but instead reflect a range of 
purposive sampling biases. For more information about the specific sampling methods and 
decisions in each of the GLR countries please see the individual survey studies in each of the 
five GLR countries.99  
 
The total unweighted sample of community members from across the five GLR countries 
amounts to 3,380 respondents which, when combined with the ex-combatant sample of 
6,475 respondents, represents 34.3% of the total GLR sample. The total unweighted 
community member sample contributions from each of the five GLR countries are as follows: 
Burundi comprises 15.1% (n=510) of the total Community Member Sample, DRC 21.4% 
(n=722), RoC 43.1% (n=1456), Rwanda 15.1% (n=510), and Uganda 5.4% (n=182). However, 
in an effort to create valid cross-country analysis of community members across the GLR, 
and especially for comparison to the ex-combatant sample, which contains proportionally 
different sample contributions from the five GLR countries, the raw sample contributions 
from each country have been weighted evenly. Further, for reasons explained below the 
valid sample used for analysis in this study are often notably lower than the total sample of 
3,380 community members. 
 
Though Burundi does contribute 510 respondents to the total GLR Community Member 
sample no age, gender or disability details were collected for respondents as a part of the 
Third Beneficiary Assessment in 2011 – thus a systematic analysis of the Burundi portion of 
the total GLR community member sample along demographic lines is not possible. In 
addition, little data was collected in Burundi that is directly comparable to the rest of the 
GLR data anyways. In effect, with the exception of some short sections, data from Burundi 
                                                     
99 For Burundi see World Bank (2011a); for RoC see World Bank (2011c); for Rwanda see World Bank (2012); and for Uganda 
see World Bank (2011d). 
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will be absent from the analysis here thus leaving the unweighted valid sample of 
community members at n=2870. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, all cross country 
statistics from here forward refer to the valid sample excluding Burundi.  
 
In addition, as discussed in more detail in the first annex (§7), integration of the full range of 
data from the Rwanda Survey has proved challenging in this study. The evolving format for 
the individual GLR country surveys has been a continual process of learning and iterative 
refinement. The Rwanda survey format is the starting point from which surveys evolved in 
RoC, Burundi, Uganda, and DRC. So, while data content in the Rwanda surveys is very much 
in line with the rest of the GLR countries, much of the specific question formatting is often 
different enough that a direct comparison of data is not feasible. Such instances are 
explained in footnotes.  
 
Data along health and disability demographics also presents challenges in the total GLR 
community member sample. Health and disability data for community members were only 
collected in Rwanda and Uganda – absent from Burundi, DRC and RoC. However, even the 
data from Rwanda and Uganda is limited as only n=58 disabled community members were 
sampled (n=49 from Rwanda and n=9 from Uganda). Thus, drawing valid comparisons 
between these two samples of 49 and 9 disabled community members is judged as 
infeasible – furthermore, comparing these 58 disabled community members to the 454 
disabled ex-combatants in the first annex (§7) of this study presents further issues for 
validity. For these reasons analysis of community members along the lines of disability will 
be absent from this section of the study. 
 
Collectively the data restrictions present in this study of community members across the GLR 
countries mean that the task of this study is to present a mosaic of findings. Up close, the 
pieces of the picture are not always complete and data is not always congruent. However, 
there are clear data trends, nonetheless, that represent a distinct narrative of community 













Congo Rwanda Uganda GLR Total 
Male 52.2% 54.8% 68.8% 68.7% 61.2% 
Female 47.8% 45.2% 31.2% 31.3% 38.8% 
Subtotal 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Age 18-30 34.2% 20.3% 57.0% 46.7% 40.0% 
Age 31-40 26.7% 22.4% 25.9% 22.2% 24.3% 
Age Over 40 39.1% 57.3% 17.1% 31.1% 35.7% 
Subtotal 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Across the GLR countries, 61.2% of community members were male while 38.8% were 
female. In DRC and RoC there was a fairly close split between male and female community 
members within the sample, while Rwanda and Uganda were closer to the cross-country 
average split in gender. Table 31 above presents a cross-tabulated breakdown of age and 
gender demographics for the community member sample of each of the GLR countries.  
 
Of the total sample of community members, 40% were between the ages of 18 and 30, 
24.3% were between that ages of 31 and 40, and 35.7% were over the age of 40.100 The 
within-country age splits of each of the GLR countries do not necessarily follow cross-country 
trend. As is visible in Table 31 above, Rwanda and Uganda community members between 
the ages of 18 and 30 are most dominantly represented while in RoC those over 40 are most 
represented and DRC falls closer to the cross-country split.  
 
The dimensions of the lives of community members explored in the following sections are 
key indicators of community dynamics and furthermore relate to the basic units and 
processes in society: the family unit, and the process of marriage, in the community. The 
value of this section of the study is not just as a control group for which ex-combatant 
progress can be studied, but also as a key measure of the overall levels of social and 
economic stability of the core units of reintegration across society in the Great Lakes Region.  
 
 
                                                     
100 Across the total sample of community members from the GLR countries there were 26 respondents under the age of 18. 
For purposes of consistency in sample delimitation and comparative validity these 26 (3 from DRC and 23 from RoC) have 
been omitted from the sample for analysis here. 
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8.1.1 Marriage and Household 
 
Marriage dynamics are an important indicator of community members’ basic social standing. 
Indeed, marriage dynamics can tell us much about community members’ ability to leverage 
familial, economic, and social networks towards the attainment of marriage and in turn their 
ability redouble their engagement in these social structures through marriage – all indicators 
of a strong footing in the community. 
 
Across the GLR countries the most common groupings for marital status of community 
members are as follows: 48.6% are married, 16.9% are living with a partner but are not 
married, 22.3% are single and have never been married, 5.9% are separated or divorced, and 
the remaining 6.2% are widowed. These figures are very much an average as within each of 
the GLR countries community members displayed a more unique distribution of marital 
statuses (summarized in Table 32 below). In DRC and Uganda “married” is the most common 
marital status for community members – at over 60% in both countries. While in Rwanda 
“married” is still the most common marital status, it is almost evenly split with “single / 
never married”. The country that differs most from the general trend is RoC, in which “living 
together” but not married is the most common marital status.  
 
Table 32: Community Member Marital Status  
 
 
Marital Status at Sampling 






Male 55.40% 16.20% 2.70% 2.00% 23.70% 
Female 38.10% 18.00% 11.10% 12.80% 20.10% 
Age 18-30 35.80% 13.50% 2.60% 0.30% 47.70% 
Age 31-40 60.40% 19.10% 6.00% 3.30% 11.20% 
Age Over 40 57.30% 17.10% 9.60% 14.40% 1.60% 
DRC 66.10% 7.10% 7.30% 7.10% 12.50% 
RoC 18.50% 53.50% 12.30% 10.90% 4.90% 
Rwanda 46.90% 4.90% 0.40% 2.60% 45.30% 
Uganda 62.60% 2.70% 3.80% 4.40% 26.40% 
GLR Average 48.60% 16.90% 5.90% 6.20% 22.30% 
 
Across the GLR countries female community members were less likely to be married than 
male community members (38.1% vs. 55.4%). In DRC and Uganda this trend was exaggerated 
and the gap between male and female community members with the marital status 
“married” was as much as 38 percentage points (in Uganda). At a cross-country level the 
lower representation of married female community members was effectively absorbed into 
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the categories of separated or divorced and widowed (11.1% and 12.8% respectively) which 
were much less common among male community members (2.7% and 2.0% respectively). 
These findings should flag divorce, separation, and widowing as key dimensions to female 
community members’ absolute disadvantage in marriage rates across the GLR countries 
compared to male community members.  
 
There was a visible positive relationship between age and likelihood of being separated, 
divorced, or widowed. Of community members 18-30 years of age, 2.6% were separated or 
divorced and 0.3% were widowed, compared to 6% and 3.3% (respectively) of those aged 
31-40, and 9.6% and 14.4% (respectively) of those aged over 40.  
 
Drawing exclusively from Rwanda and Uganda we can observe that only 5.8% of community 
members had a spouse (married or unmarried) that was an ex-combatant, the remaining 
94.2% having civilian spouses – though this does not necessarily imply that their spouse was 
a combatant / ex-combatant at the time of marriage.101 On average female community 
members were more likely to have an ex-combatant or combatant spouse (11.1%) compared 
to male community members (3.9%). This could serve as at least a partial explanation for 
female community members’ higher levels of widowed marital status – while anecdotally 
this makes sense further study would be needed to confirm this relationship 
 
Across the GLR countries 74.7% of community members report that they would not consider 
marrying an ex-combatant, with the remaining 25.2% saying that they would consider 
marrying an ex-combatant. This trend was generally reflected within the individual GLR 
countries with the exception of Uganda, where 56.8% of community members said that they 
would consider marrying an ex-combatant and 43.2% would not.102 Across demographic 
lines age showed a positive relationship with unwillingness to consider marrying an ex-
combatant. Of those over 40 years of age, 85% were not willing to marry an ex-combatant, 
compared to 74% of those aged 31-40, and 66.7% of those aged 18-30. The most common 
                                                     
101 Rwanda and Uganda were the only GLR countries where surveys included questions on community members’ spousal 
ex-combatant status. 
102 It is possible that the greater openess in Uganda is related to the nature of mobilization and reurn in which many ex-
combatants were abducted or forcibly recruited into conflict – upon return being simultaniously understood as victims and 
perpatrators. This dyanmic plus the widespread employment of traditional reconciliation ceremonies in Northern Uganda 
(though not necessarily as a part of reintegration programming) may hold some explanitory wieght.  
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explanations for why community members were unwilling to marry an ex-combatant 
revolved around various forms of stigma or fear.  
  
Drawing exclusively from DRC and RoC, we can see that when community members 
observed other marriages in the community in which one member is an ex-combatant, 
44.9% of community members perceived these marriages as having a harder time than those 
without an ex-combatant.103 When asked to explain further as to why they thought these 
marriages were more difficult the most common explanations were as follows:  (i) 35% of 
community members cited misunderstandings; (ii) 22% cited brutality and fighting; and (iii) 
8.5% cited bad habits of ex-combatants acquired during combat (including drug use).  
 
Across the GLR countries 43.6% of community members see themselves alone as responsible 
for the financial and food need of the family, 16.8% see their spouse or partner as 
responsible, and 25.5% see food and financial needs as the shared responsibility of both 
themselves and their spouse or partner. The remaining 14.1% indicated that household food 
and finance responsibility were dispersed among various other family members.104 Male 
community members were significantly more likely to see household finance and food 
provision as solely their responsibility (56.6%) compared to female community members 
(21.8%). Inversely, female community members were dramatically more likely to see 
household finance and food provision as the sole responsibility of their spouse or partner 
(36.8%) compared to male community members (4.7%). This gendered trend was especially 
exaggerated in DRC (61.3 vs. 16.7% and 48.7 vs. 6.7 respectively). 
 
 As age increases community members are more likely to see themselves as solely 
responsible for household finance and food provision (32.7% of those age 18-30, 44.4% of 
those 31-40, and 51.5% of those over 40) and less likely to see their spouse or partner as 
solely responsible (22.7% of those age 18-30, 18.8% of those 31-40, and 10.3% of those over 
40). It appears that this age-based trend may be primarily descriptive of female community 
members. When looking at age trends in community members’ perceptions of household 
                                                     
103 DRC and RoC were the only countries where community members were asked about their perception of marriages in 
which one person was an ex-combatant. 
104 Rwanda is excluded from findings on household finance and food responsibility due to lack of directly comparable data.  
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finance and food provision further subdivided by gender there are distinct trends. Male 
community members see themselves as primarily responsible for their household finance 
and food provision at even levels across all age categories (55.3% of those 18.30, 59.4% of 
those 31-40, and 55.8% of those over 40). In contrast, as age increases for females so too 
does the likelihood of seeing oneself as solely responsible for household finance and food 
(9.2% of those 18-30, 20.1% of those 31-40, and 40.2% of those over 40). As discussed 
above, as age increase so too does the likelihood of being separated, divorced, or widowed. 
As such, those female community members who are separated, divorced, or widowed are 
highly likely to see household finance and food provision as solely their responsibility (62.1% 
of those who are widowed and 70.1% of those who are separated or divorced). These 
findings should flag female-headed households as exposed to particular economic 
instability.105 
 
8.1.2 Literacy, Education, and Vocational Training 
 
Levels of literacy, educational achievement, and vocational training are important indicators 
of community members’ basic ability to engage with educational and vocational structures, 
to the extent they exist in the different GLR country contexts, and further to leverage the 
dividends of this engagement towards further economic and social opportunities – in the 
end solidifying their footing in the community.   
 




Neither Read nor Write Read only Read and write 
Male 12.90% 4.10% 83.00% 
Female 32.40% 5.20% 62.40% 
Age 18-30 13.50% 3.50% 83.10% 
Age 31-40 17.60% 5.50% 76.90% 
Age Over 40 28.80% 4.30% 66.80% 
DRC 16.30% 4.30% 79.40% 
RoC 27.70% 7.30% 65.00% 
Uganda 19.30% 2.20% 78.50% 
GLR Average 21.10% 4.60% 74.30% 
 
                                                     




Literacy was generally high among community members across the GLR countries, and it was 
slightly higher than for ex-combatants; 74.3% of community members could both read and 
write, 4.6% could only read, and the remaining 21.1% were illiterate (compared to 71.6%, 
8.3% and 20.1% respectively in ex-combatants).106 Notably, RoC had the lowest literacy 
levels across the GLR countries. Female community members are notably less likely to be 
able to read and write (62.4%) compared to male community members (83%), and more 
likely to be illiterate (32.4% vs. 12.9%). After female community members, those aged over 
40 are the second most likely group to be illiterate (28.8%). These trends are displayed in 
Table 33. 
 
In regards to educational achievement, community members most commonly had either 
some secondary education (31%) or had completed secondary education (18.2); followed by 
some primary education (17.1%), completed primary education (11.2%), and no education 
(11.1%).107 As is visible in Table 34, in Uganda education levels were skewed lower overall. 
Across demographic lines there are a few interesting trends to extract. Female community 
members are the most likely group to have no education (18.3% vs. 6.1% of male community 
members) followed by those aged over 40 (17.3% vs. 8.4% of those aged 31-40 and 5.6% of 
those aged 18-30). Further, both female community members and those over 40 had 
educational achievement levels skewed lower overall. 
 
Table 34: Community Member Educational Achievement Levels 
 
 
























































































































Male 6.10% 1.60% 16.00% 11.20% 33.90% 18.10% 4.40% 6.90% 1.70% 
Female 18.30% 1.50% 18.70% 11.20% 26.90% 18.00% 1.80% 2.80% 0.90% 
Age 18-30 5.60% 0.00% 17.50% 10.30% 39.20% 17.90% 3.30% 5.10% 1.10% 
Age 31-40 8.40% 2.40% 15.30% 8.60% 32.90% 19.80% 4.70% 6.90% 0.90% 
Age Over 40 17.30% 2.20% 18.00% 13.30% 22.80% 17.00% 2.70% 4.80% 1.90% 
DRC 11.80% 0.40% 13.00% 8.00% 30.30% 22.60% 4.70% 6.80% 2.40% 
RoC 14.60% 0.70% 12.90% 17.10% 20.00% 28.00% 3.00% 1.90% 1.80% 
Uganda 7.30% 3.40% 25.10% 8.90% 41.90% 4.50% 2.20% 6.70% 0.00% 
GLR Average 11.10% 1.50% 17.10% 11.20% 31.00% 18.20% 3.30% 5.20% 1.40% 
 
                                                     
106 Rwanda is excluded from findings on literacy due to lack of directly comparable data.  
107 Rwanda is excluded from findings on education achievement levels due to lack of directly comparable data 
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Across the GLR, overall levels of educational achievement for community members were 
skewed higher than for ex-combatants – with higher levels of partial secondary education 
(31% vs. 23.4%), full secondary completion (18.2% vs. 5.2%), and partial or full higher 
education (8.5% vs. 2%). It is worth noting however that in DRC and RoC ex-combatants 
displayed much higher levels of professional educational achievement than community 
members (34.3% and 20.3% vs. 2.4% and 1.8% respectively).  
 
Most community members reflected an understanding of the educational achievement gap 
between community members and ex-combatants – (58.4%) of community members 
reported that they believe that ex-combatants have lower levels of education than other 
people in the area in which they live.108 Of the remaining community members, 40.3% 
believe that ex-combatants and civilians have the same level of education and only 1.3% 
perceives that ex-combatants have higher levels of education. In addition, 76.9% of 
community members said that the perceived difference in levels of education between 
community members and ex-combatants was a problem. When asked to explain further in 
Uganda community members most commonly pointed out that (i) ex-combatants wouldn’t 
be able to gain employment and thus look after their families (33.9%) and that (ii) low 
literacy was a problem. In DRC and RoC the most common responses from community 
members as to why ex-combatants’ lower education levels were a problem were: (i) 
Irresponsible behavior (36.9%) and (ii) misunderstandings that lead to arguments (31.4%). 
 
Across the GLR countries, 20.8% of community members received vocational training in the 
last years.109 Male community members more frequently (22.9%) received vocational 
training compared to female community members (17.6%). Age also showed a clear 
relationship to vocational training – the higher the age of community members the less likely 
they were to have received vocational training (26.2% of those aged 18-30, 24.7% of those 
aged 31-40, and 14.6% of those over the age of 40).  
 
                                                     
108 Rwanda is excluded from findings on community members’ relative perceptions of ex-combatants’ education levels.  
109 In Uganda this question referred to in the last five years, while in DRC and RoC it referred to only the last year. It makes 
some sense then that Uganda displays the highest rate of community member vocational training across the GLR countries 
(29.6%). Rwanda is excluded from findings on vocational training due to lack of data. 
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Of those 20.8% of community members who had received vocational training, 78.3% said 
that they were currently using the vocational skills that they had been trained in.110 When 
the 21.7% of community members who were not using their vocational training were asked 
to explain further the most common reasons cited were: (i) lack of tools or work facilities 
(27%); (ii) still completing training; and (iii) no opportunity. Interestingly, while ex-
combatants have received vocational training on average at twice the rate that community 
members do, in DRC as much four times the rate and in Uganda at a quite similar rate, they 
are still less likely to be utilizing that vocational training than community members (62.7% 
vs. 78.3%). This could be an indication that while ex-combatants display a positive trajectory 
in terms of closing education and skills gaps with community members, there may be 
additional barriers they face to reaching parity that, at least in part, may revolve around 





The analysis of community member demographics and core indicators presented in this 
section are useful not only as a backdrop against which to contextualize ex-combatant 
reintegration in the Great Lakes Region, but more generally as a baseline by which to 
understand the overall levels of societal stability and functionality of communities across the 
Great Lakes Region in the wake of violent conflict. 
 
Across the indicators explored in this section, community members consistently perform 
better than ex-combatants. Community members are more likely to be married than ex-
combatants – a fact that may help explain why community members are less likely than ex-
combatants to see themselves alone as responsible for the food and finances of their 
household. 
                                                     
110 Regardless of having received vocational training or not, 38.8% of community members across the GLR countries 
reported that they were currently working in their “field of skills”. Male community members were slightly more likely to be 
working in their field (40.1%) when compared to female community members (35.7%).  
111 Example of problems with vocational training components of reintegration programming design can include, for 
example, that vocational training paths offered are not based on market analysis, in turn creating an oversupply of a 
particular set of skills in one area. This phenomenon is well documented in a number of DDR programming contexts. See for 




Community members are married to ex-combatants at half the rate that ex-combatants are 
and attitudinally remain largely closed to the idea – citing stigma as core reason.112 Indeed, 
when community members observe marriages in which one member is an ex-combatant 
they commonly describe these marriages as problematic. These findings have two core 
implications: (i) stigma is a core barrier to community member / ex-combatant intermarriage 
across the GLR countries and (ii) beyond actual marriage rates the pool of partners who are 
attitudinally open to marriage with ex-combatants is largest among other ex-combatants. If 
stigma shapes a portion of ex-combatants marriage pathway as to one with only other ex-
combatants this could have consequences for these familial units’ ability to interact with the 
community – in a sense possibly facing compounded stigma barriers. The evolving nature of 
community member and ex-combatant intermarriage should be flagged as a key issue for 
future studies in the GLR. 
 
Community members across the GLR have education levels skewed significantly higher than 
ex-combatants – likely a result of ex-combatants’ time lost while mobilized in conflict. Yet, 
community members are far less likely than ex-combatants to receive vocational training as 
a part of reintegration related programming. Despite this, however, community members 
are actually more likely to be currently utilizing their vocational training – suggesting that 
there may be additional barriers to utilizing vocational training for ex-combatants including 
programming flaws. Developing a stronger understanding of this dynamic should be flagged 
for future studies in the region.  
 
8.1.3.1 Vulnerable Subgroups 
 
In the demographics analyses of the community member sample for this study the most 
vulnerable sub-group that emerges, as with the ex-combatant sample, is that of females. 
Generally speaking, female community members have a similar range of disadvantages to 
male community members as female ex-combatants do to male ex-combatants. However, 
the general gap between community member and ex-combatant samples is such that female 
                                                     
112 It is important to note that these findings do not differentiate between those community memebers who married 
combatants or ex-combatants and those who married a civilians who later became combatants / ex-combatants.  
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community members (and male community members for that matter) are almost always 
significantly better off than their ex-combatant counterparts.  
 
Female community members are less likely to be married than male community members 
(who are themselves similarly likely to be married as male ex-combatants), though they are 
slightly more likely to be married than their female ex-combatant counterparts. Female 
community members are three times more likely than male community members to be 
separated or divorced and six times more likely to be widowed – though it is unknown 
whether the male or female initiated the divorce or separation. Regarding marriage to ex-
combatants, female community members are three times more likely than their male 
counterparts to be married to an ex-combatant – though it is unknown whether these 
marriages pre-exist the combatant / ex-combatant status of their spouse. However, female 
ex-combatants are four times more likely than female community members to be married to 
an ex-combatant.  
 
Similar to the ex-combatant sample, female community members had significantly lower 
literacy levels than male community members. Both male and female community 
members displayed slightly higher levels of literacy than ex-combatants – in accord, 
community members education levels were skewed higher overall than ex-combatants. 
However, female community members’ educational achievement was skewed below that 
of male community members.  
 
8.1.3.2 Unique Country Trends 
 
There are several important marriage-related trends that stand out in individual GLR 
countries that merit further examination. Rwanda stands out as the only country where 
community members marry less frequently than ex-combatants. However, we can add 
considerable contextual detail here. In Rwanda males are required to have access to 
adequate housing in order to get married. However, the formal regulations for what 
qualifies as adequate housing in Rwanda are somewhat narrowly defined under the 
policy of imidugudu - a large scale body of housing policy aimed at consolidating 
dispersed housing in an overall effort toward villagization. The result has been inflation 
in adequate housing prices and in turn a severe crisis in the availability of adequate 
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housing overall that in effect is locking many Rwandans out of official marriage – though 
they may cohabitate without formalized marital status.113  
 
In contrast to community members, most ex-combatants are returning to Rwanda from 
Eastern DRC where they have been away for an average of nine years. In this time some 
ex-combatants have married and when returning to Rwanda bring their spouse with 
them. The legal status of these marriages in Rwanda is unclear, however it is possible 
that some ex-combatants unwittingly navigate past the formal barriers to marriage that 
community members face – in turn accounting for their slightly higher marriage rates. 
While it is likely that the interaction of housing policy, marriage, and dynamics of return 
are key in understanding why ex-combatants marry more than community members in 
Rwanda this exact narrative must be treated as conjecture. These topics should be 
flagged for future analysis on reintegration processes in Rwanda.  
 
Republic of Congo also stands out with unique marriage trends. In RoC marriage rates 
among community members, and ex-combatants, are a fraction of those in other GLR 
countries. Instead, cohabitation with a spouse without formal marriage is the primary 
marital status – even when disaggregated across age and gender groups. These findings 
are confounding and go without clear explanation in this study. It is possible that: (i) 
there has been an unbeknownst error in data capture and coding that produces these 
findings or (ii) that there is an unknown regional dynamic affecting marriage for 
community members and ex-combatants alike in RoC. Future study on reintegration 
processes in RoC should flag marriage as an area of special interest to further triangulate 
or refute these findings.  
 
Lastly, in Uganda community members are more than twice as likely as the GLR average 
to report willingness to marrying an ex-combatant in the future. Though there is no 
direct explanation it is possible that the specific dynamics of combatant mobilization in 
Uganda may play a role in this trend. In Uganda abduction was a well-known tactic of 
mobilization, especially by the LRA. Though abductees may have committed violent acts 
against their communities, often forcibly, there is evidence that ex-combatants are 
                                                     




simultaneously understood as victims (due to abduction and forced recruiting) and 
perpetrators (due to the violence committed as soldiers) by community members – a 
factor that has reportedly contributed to a general willingness to accept returning ex-
combatants back into communities.114 This dynamic may contribute to community 
members in Uganda’s openness to marriage with ex-combatants. Futures studies could 
flag this conjecture for further analysis.  
 
 
8.2 Housing, Land, Livestock and Food Security 
 
The context of communities in the Great Lakes Region is overwhelmingly one of severe 
development challenges where small-scale agriculture is instrumental to individual and 
familial well-being in terms of both economic security and food security. As such, 
understanding the pathways to land access among community members is a key contextual 
element for understanding the overall economic situation for community members in the 
Great Lakes Region and their capacity to absorb returning ex-combatants. The following is an 
examination of (i) the household characteristics of community members including issues of 
dwelling ownership and tenure; and (ii) the food security of community members including 
their levels of access to land for cultivation. 
 
Across the GLR countries community members are most likely to live with: (i) the same 
family as before conflict (38.3%); (ii) with a family but different to that from before conflict 
(27.3%), or (iii) with a spouse or partner (21.5%). These three categories were the most 
common across all GLR countries, but varied some in their distribution from country to 
country. Uganda, where 51.7% of community members live with the same family; 25% live 
with a different family; and 22.2% live with a spouse or partner, displays the most 
exaggerated version of this cross-country trend. As is visible in Table 35 below, Rwanda 
stands out as the only GLR country with a notable portion (15%) of community members 
who live with friends.115 
 
                                                     
114 See for example: Finnegan (2010). 
115 This trend in Rwanda is possibly related to housing shortages as a product of Imidigudu and overall urban migration. 
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Table 35: Community Member Household Membership116 
 
 




















Male 5.60% 23.60% 38.50% 25.70% 5.20% 0.20% 1.10% 
Female 7.30% 18.10% 38.20% 29.80% 3.30% 0.90% 2.40% 
Age 18-30 6.70% 18.40% 37.30% 27.90% 8.60% 0.30% 0.80% 
Age 31-40 3.60% 23.60% 34.80% 32.90% 3.20% 0.40% 1.60% 
Age Over 40 7.20% 23.00% 43.10% 22.90% 1.10% 0.60% 2.10% 
DRC 7.50% 29.40% 43.80% 17.50% 1.90% 0.00% 0.00% 
RoC 10.00% 33.80% 20.80% 26.60% 0.60% 1.80% 6.40% 
Rwanda 7.10% XXX 37.00% 40.70% 15.00% 0.00% 0.20% 
Uganda 0.60% 22.20% 51.70% 25.00% 0.60% 0.00% 0.00% 
GLR Average 6.30% 21.50% 38.30% 27.30% 4.50% 0.50% 1.70% 
 
Female community members were slightly more likely to be living with a different family 
than the one before conflict (29.8%) and slightly more likely to live alone (7.3%) than their 
male counterparts (24.3% and 5.6% respectively). In addition, female community members 
were less likely to be living with a spouse or partner than male community members (18.1% 
vs. 23.6%). 
 
In regards to housing, across the GLR countries community members were most commonly 
living in a house (42.3%), followed by a hut or tent (25.9%). This trend is generally reflected 
across the GLR countries with the clear exception of Uganda, where 67% live in a hut or tent, 
18.1% live in a daub or wattle, and 14.3% live in a house.117 Rwanda also stands out in that 
68% of community members live in a house and only 1.8% live in a hut or tent.  Across the 
GLR (including Uganda) female community members are more likely to live in a house 
(50.2%) than male community members (37.2%). Marital status does not show a directly 
discernable relationship to housing type. Age also shows a clear positive relationship to living 
in a house – 27.7% of those community members aged 18-30 live in a house, 45.1% of those 
aged 31-40, and 55.1% of those over the age of 40.118  
 
                                                     
116 In Table 35 the use of XXX indicates that respondents in Rwanda were not given the option to respond that they live with 
a partner or spouse – the responses that would have been in the feild are likely absorbed into the categories of those who 
live with a family either the same or different from the one before conflict.  
117 It is possible that the dominance of semi-permanent housing in Uganda is an indication of the overall development level 
in Northern Uganda. It is also possible that there is merely a reflection of traditional housing style preferences. 
118 This age demographic trend is not reflected in Uganda – where hut / tent was the most common housing type across all 
demographics. For a more in depth discussion of community member housing types see World Bank (2011d). 
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Turning to patterns of ownership for housing among community members we can observe 
that most community members either: (i) own the property they live on (43.2%); (ii) their 
relatives or parents own the property they live on (20.5%); or (iii) their spouse / partner 
owns the property that they live on (9.3%). This trend was remarkably durable across the 
GLR countries, though in Uganda there were much higher levels of self-ownership (61.7%) 
and in Rwanda renting was on par with self-ownership (36.9%).119 Despite the differences in 
housing ownership among community members in Uganda and Rwanda there are very clear 
trends across gender and age demographics. As visible in Table 36 Female community 
members are less than half as likely to own the property they live on compared to male 
community members (25.1% vs. 54.5%), and dramatically more likely to have their spouse / 
partner own the property they live on (20.9% vs. 2%).  
 
Table 36: Community Member Housing Ownership 
 
 
Who Owns The Housing In Which You Currently Live? 



















Male 54.50% 2.00% 4.30% 9.50% 0.00% 1.00% 8.40% 20.30% 
Female 25.10% 20.90% 5.50% 11.80% 0.00% 1.10% 12.40% 23.00% 
Age 18-30 23.20% 7.80% 2.90% 21.70% 0.00% 1.20% 12.70% 30.50% 
Age 31-40 44.70% 10.30% 6.10% 4.10% 0.00% 0.50% 10.70% 23.60% 
Age Over 40 64.60% 10.20% 5.90% 2.60% 0.00% 1.10% 5.70% 9.90% 
DRC 37.50% 11.10% 7.60% 7.20% 0.00% 0.80% 12.60% 23.10% 
RoC 38.20% 14.40% 6.90% 2.00% 0.00% 1.80% 19.20% 17.50% 
Rwanda 35.30% 4.10% 0.00% 14.50% 0.00% 1.60% 4.10% 40.40% 
Uganda 61.70% 7.80% 4.40% 17.80% 0.00% 0.00% 4.40% 3.90% 
GLR Average 43.20% 9.30% 4.70% 10.40% 0.00% 1.00% 10.10% 21.30% 
 
In regards to age demographics, as the age of community members increases the likelihood 
that relatives or family own their housing decreases (34.4% of those community members 
aged 18-30, 14.8% of those aged 31-40, and 8.3% of those over the age of 40) and the 
likelihood of self-ownership increases (23.2% of those aged 18-30, 44.7% of those aged 31-
40, and 64.4% of those over the age of 40).  
 
Community members across the GLR countries generally see themselves as equally as well 
off as their neighbors (57.3%), though 21.2% see themselves as worse off and 21.3% see 
                                                     
119 The higher rate of ownership in Uganda is likely a result of the lower barriers to owning the dominant housing type in 




themselves as better off. All of the GLR countries reflect this trend of the bulk of community 
members seeing themselves as on equal footing to their neighbors. In most countries the 
distribution is skewed towards seeing themselves as slightly better off, though RoC is the 
only country where this skewing goes the other direction. Female community members were 
more likely to see themselves as worse off than their neighbors compared to male 
community members (25.2% vs. 18.6%).  
 
In DRC and RoC, community members were asked how they perceived their living situation 
relative to two years prior. The majority of community members (65.9%) see their situation 
as the same, while 18.5% see it as better and 13.8% see it as worse. In Uganda the same 
question was asked, but instead of being asked about their current situation relative to two 
years ago, community members were asked to rate their current living situation relative to 
five years ago.120 In the case of Uganda, 62.6% of community members saw their current 
living situation as better than five years prior, 16.8% saw it as the same, and 20.7% saw it as 
worse.121  
 
8.2.1 Land Access and Food Security 
 
Access to land for cultivation among community members across the GLR countries is 
generally high – 89.8% report that they have access to land.122 This figure is characteristic of 
all the GLR countries except for RoC in which access to land among community members 
was considerably lower (55.9%) in addition to being the only GLR country where land access 
among community members was lower than for ex-combatants (94.2%) – though the reason 
behind these findings are unclear. Female community members were slightly less likely to 
have access to land for cultivation than male community members (87.3% vs. 91.3%).  
 
When those community members who did not have access to land for cultivation were 
asked to explain why in DRC and RoC the most common replies were: (i) all land was 
occupied (29.5%); (ii) fear for the return of conflict (19.7%); and (iii) bad memories 
                                                     
120 This question about community members’ perception of their current living situation relative to a previous point in time 
was not asked in Rwanda.  
121 These findings are particularly subject to periodization issues and should be treated cautiously. 
122 Rwanda is absent from findings related to land access, change in land access, and reasons for positive and negative 
changes in land access due to lack of directly comparable data.  
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associated with their land and they did not want to return (14.2%).123 Female community 
members were less likely to cite land occupation as the reason for their lack of access to land 
for cultivation than male community members (21.5% vs. 37.6%), and more likely to cite fear 
of conflict (25% vs. 14.3%) and lack of capital (12.5% vs. 5.3%). 
 
When community members who did have access to land for cultivation across the GLR 
countries were asked whether they had more than two years prior, 44.5% said that they did 
have more access. This level of increased access to land for cultivation is very much an 
averaged figure. There is a sharp split between DRC and RoC where increased land access 
was high (69.1% and 71.6% respectively), and Uganda in which only 15% reported increased 
access.124 However, a closer inspection of community members in Uganda with a more finely 
grained scaled shows that while only 15% had increased access to land for cultivation, 49.4% 
had the same level of access as two years prior and 36.5% had less access.  
 
Of those community members who had less access to land than two years prior across the 
GLR countries there were a range of explanations given. In Uganda the most common 
explanations were that there had been regulated division of land by their family (47.6%), 
followed by unregulated division of land such as grabbing, etc. (23.8%). In DRC and RoC lack 
of resources (25.8%), land infertility (20.8%), and land sale (20.8%) were the most common 
explanations.  
 
Across the GLR countries when community members were asked to explain why they had 
more access to arable land for cultivation than two years prior there was a range of 
explanations. In Uganda the most common explanation was that a household member had 
purchased more land for investment (40%) – this answer was especially prominent for 
female community members (50%) compared to male community members (38.1%). In DRC 
and RoC, inheritance was also an important pathway to increased access to land for 
                                                     
123 This question about why community members did not have access to land for cultivation was only asked in DRC and 
ROC. 
124 One possible explanation that has been put forth, anecdotally, for the relatively high increases in access to land in DRC 
and RoC is that access to land for cultivation in these countries has been so low to start with, due to displacement as a part 
of prolonged conflict and insecurity, that the consolidation of a relative peace in DRC and RoC has exposed a larger 
proportion of the population to the possibility of increases (effectively having started with no land access) than in other GLR 
countries where some land ownership may have persisted through conflict.  
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cultivation (29.1%), especially for female community members (33.4%) compared to males 
(26.7%).  
 
Table 37: Community Member Explanations for Lack of Livestock 
 
Explain the reason that your household does not have 




Congo Uganda Subtotal 
Insecurity due to conflict 12.0% 34.7% 3.6% 19.4% 
Lack of access to suitable land 23.0% 26.6% 29.1% 25.4% 
Ill health 16.6% 4.6% 5.5% 10.1% 
No male adult to look after livestock 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% .3% 
Experiences of crime (livestock stolen, etc.) 9.7% 31.8% 18.2% 19.7% 
Other 0.0% 0.0% 3.6% .6% 
Used for dowry 0.0% 0.0% 3.6% .6% 
Poverty (insufficient resources, etc.) 28.8% 1.2% 32.7% 18.8% 
Poor management 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% .3% 
Not interested / Not a Breeder 7.8% 1.1% 0.0% 3.9% 
Sale of livestock .4% 0.0% 0.0% .2% 
Moves and migration 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% .8% 
 
Across the GLR countries livestock ownership, excluding poultry, is generally low among 
community members (35.5%), with the exception of Uganda where livestock ownership is 
significantly higher (66.3%).125 Despite these differences female community members were 
the least likely demographic group to own livestock (25.4%), especially when compared to 
male community members (42.7%). 
 
When those who had no livestock were asked to explain further the four most common 
answers from community members across the GLR countries were as follows: (i) 25.4% cited 
lack of access to suitable land; (ii) 19.7% cited crime; (iii) 19.4% cited insecurity due to 
conflict (39.1% crime and insecurity collectively); and (iv) 18.8% cited poverty. While 
instructive of general trends, these cross-country figures do not fully depict the intricacies of 
the range of explanations given in each GLR country. For example, in DRC poverty was the 
most common explanation (28.8%) and livestock theft was less frequently cited (9.7%), while 
in RoC poverty was infrequently cited (1.9%) and livestock theft was much more frequent 
(31.8%). A summary of the range of explanations for lack of livestock among community 
members can be found above in Table 37.  
 
                                                     
125 Rwanda is absent from findings on livestock ownership, change in livestock ownership over time, and reasons for 
positive and negative changes in livestock ownership over time due to lack of directly comparable data. 
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Looking to overall change in the quantity of livestock in the last two years, 54.2% of 
community members across the GLR countries had seen an increase in their overall quantity 
of livestock – 8.5% stayed the same and 37.3% saw a decrease in livestock. Female 
community members were less likely in general to see an increase in their livestock (46.3%) 
and more likely to see a decrease (42.9%) than their male community member counterparts 
(57.5% and 35% respectively).  
 
The pervasive development challenges that characterize the GLR countries mean that food 
security is a key issue. As such, understanding the relationship between access to land for 
cultivation, in addition to livestock ownership and household hunger and nutrition, as core 
indicators of food security for community members, is important for understanding the 
overall development context of GLR countries. 
 
Table 38: Community Member Household Hunger 
 
 
How Frequently Do People in Your Household Go Hungry? 
Always Often Seldom Never 
Male 8.20% 27.20% 35.30% 29.30% 
Female 8.50% 30.90% 35.70% 24.90% 
Age 18-30 6.70% 24.80% 38.10% 30.40% 
Age 31-40 7.70% 27.20% 35.20% 29.90% 
Age Over 40 9.80% 32.50% 33.10% 24.70% 
DRC 11.60% 30.30% 27.00% 31.00% 
RoC 12.40% 45.20% 27.60% 14.80% 
Uganda 1.10% 11.60% 51.40% 35.90% 
GLR Average 8.30% 28.80% 35.40% 27.50% 
 
Across the GLR countries, 27.5% of community members reported that people in their 
household never went hungry, 35.4% seldom, 28.8% often, and 8.3% always.126 Uganda 
stood out from these dominant trends – the entire distribution of community members 
being shifted towards less household hunger (35.9% never, 51.4% seldom, 11.6% often, and 
11.1% always). Female community members across the GLR countries were slightly less likely 
to never go hungry than males (24.9% vs. 29.3%). Age showed a distinct relationship to 
household hunger - as age increases the likelihood of belonging to households where people 
always or often go hungry increases. In accordance, as age increases the likelihood of coming 
from a household that seldom or never goes hungry decreases (as visible in Table 38). 
 
                                                     
126 Rwanda is absent from findings on household hunger and nutritional change due to lack of directly comparable data.  
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Household nutrition and nourishment has largely been unchanged (41.9%) for community 
members over the last two years. Of those who have seen a change in household nutrition, 
32.5% have seen improvements and 25.6% have seen deterioration. Again, Uganda stood 
out from this trend with higher levels of nutritional improvement (55.2%), and less 
unchanged nutrition (19.9%) as well as deterioration of nutrition (24.9%). Across GLR 
countries female community members were slightly less likely to see improved nutrition and 
more likely to see worsening nutrition (28.8% and 28.3% respectively) when compared to 
male community members (35.2% and 23.6% respectively). Age showed a negative 
relationship to improved nutrition (38.6% of those 18-30 years of age, 37.9% of those 31-40 
years of age, and 24.8% of those over 40 years of age) and, in accord, a positive relationship 
to worsening nutrition (20% of those 18-30 years of age, 20.5% of those 31-40 years of age, 




Community members across the GLR countries display a range of unique trends in regards to 
their patterns of housing, property ownership, land access and livestock. Indeed, focused 
analysis reveals that there is much further variation along regional and factional lines within 
each individual GLR country. However, despite this variation there is a core set of trends that 
emerge. Community members are most likely to be living in some form of family structure – 
whether it is the same family that they lived with before conflict or a different one. 
Community members are most likely to be living in a house that they or someone in their 
family owns. This is a very similar picture to that of ex-combatants across the GLR countries.  
 
Access to land for cultivation is generally very high for community members as is the stability 
of this access – i.e. while there is variation from country to country as to increases in land 
access, there are relatively few community members who have seen decreases in land 
access since the years before sampling. Those who do see increased access to land do so 
most commonly through household land purchase with capital from high agricultural yields 
or through inheritance. In contrast to ex-combatants, few community members cited 




Livestock ownership across the GLR countries is generally low – though slightly higher than 
among ex-combatants. Community members cite lack of access to resources such as capital 
or suitable grazing land as a key reason for low livestock ownership in addition to 
overarching concerns about crime and general insecurity.   
 
Food security remains an important concern for community members across the GLR 
countries. While community members generally face a significantly lower level of food 
insecurity compared to ex-combatants across the GLR countries, there is still a sizable 
portion that often or always experience household hunger. Collectively, country to country 
variation in levels of access to land for cultivation and livestock among community members 
appears to show little relationship to core indicators of food security – which may be as 
much related to the overall economic situation in each of the GLR countries (e.g. through 
inflated prices of food stocks) than to land access and livestock ownership outright.  
 
8.2.2.1 Vulnerable Subgroups 
 
Female community members across the GLR countries display a range of differences in 
terms of the housing, land access, and food security that collectively may not necessarily 
entail a disadvantage, but do at least indicate a slightly altered narrative. Females are more 
likely to live with a different family than before conflict – possibly in part because of their 
high rate of being widowed compared to male community members. Female community 
members are more likely to live in a house, but dramatically less likely to own their house – 
instead commonly citing spousal or familial ownership.  Female community members have 
slightly less access to land for cultivation than male community members in addition to 
being less likely to owning livestock. However, female community members fare better 
overall in indicators of food security across the GLR countries. 
 
Female community members overall perform slightly better than female ex-combatants 
across the GLR countries in terms of housing, land, livestock, and food security. The core 
difference in the narrative that female community members and female ex-combatants 
experience across the GLR countries is that female community members are generally more 
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likely to be integrated into a familial unit and reap the benefits this extended support 
network. 
 
8.2.2.2 Unique Country Trends 
  
As outlined above, land access among community members in RoC is considerably lower 
than on average across the rest of the GLR countries. It is possible that this trend is a product 
of the sample from RoC being captured exclusively in the Pool region of the country. Pool 
was the region of RoC in which the low level insurgency prevailed in the early 2000s and 
persisted longer than in other parts of the country. Due to displacement, insecurity and 
laggard recovery, land access has become a prevalent issue. Indeed, while community 
members in RoC have seen the greatest increases in their levels of land access of the GLR 
countries this is likely because community members in RoC started with very low land access 
at the end of conflict in the first place – and despite large improvements continue to have 
the least access to land across the GLR countries. Land access in RoC is also likely tied to the 
lowest levels of livestock ownership across the GLR countries.  
 
 
8.3 Economic Issues 
 
The following is an analysis of the economic status of community members and their 
relationship to that of ex-combatants across the GLR countries. The analysis proceeds in five 
main parts: (i) an examination of community members’ employment statuses and general 
outlooks on employment; (ii) an examination of the barriers that non-economically active 
community members face to gaining a stable economic status; (iii) an examination of female 
community members’ specific economic issues; (iv) an examination of community members’ 
levels of income, savings, and access to credit as indicators of their general economic 
stability and ability to leverage economic opportunities; and (v) an examination of 
community members’ level of engagement with economic associations as an extended 
support / opportunity network.  
  
The structured analysis here follows in close parity with that of the ex-combatant sample, 
serving as a comparison for charting the degree to which ex-combatants achieve economic 
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reintegration and economic stability – the two not necessarily being the same thing. Indeed, 
conventional wisdom is that economic reintegration is essential for the process of building 
peace and security – however the economic context across the Great Lakes Region is often 
one of severe development challenges posed to both community members and ex-
combatants alike. One way to view this is that ex-combatants reaching parity with 
community members along economic lines may end up meaning reaching a state of 
economic instability equal to community members. 
 
8.3.1 Economic Status and History 
 
Employment status was very consistent across the GLR countries for community members 
through time (prior to conflict, at the end of conflict, and at the time of sampling).127 As can 
be seen in Table 39 the most common employment status for community members across 
the GLR countries was self-employed in agriculture (36.9% prior to conflict, 42.5% at 
demobilization, and 38.3% at sampling). It appears that the slight spike in those community 
members self-employed in agriculture at the end in conflict coincides with drops in the 
number of unemployed and, more notably, drops in the number of community members 
studying or training compared to before conflict  (19% prior to conflict, 11.8% at the end of 
conflict, and 7.9% at sampling). Uganda displays an exaggerated version of this trend, as 
prior to conflict most community members in Uganda were studying or training (43.3%) 
followed by self-employed in agriculture (33.9%), however by the time of sampling the 
employment statuses of community members in Uganda fell very much in line with the 








                                                     
127 Due to the state of continued conflict in DRC, employment status was surveyed in reference to 5 years ago, 3 years ago, 
and today. Data on community member employment status in Rwanda is only available for the time of sampling. 
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Table 39: Community Member Economic Status at Three Time Points128 
 
 








































































































































































































































































































































Employment Status Prior to Conflict 
Male 12.90% 0.70% 6.90% 9.20% 37.00% 6.00% 2.80% 0.80% 0.70% 0.00% 20.10% 0.20% 2.50% 
Female 18.20% 0.30% 2.80% 3.90% 36.40% 5.10% 6.20% 1.30% 0.00% 0.00% 17.60% 8.10% 0.10% 
Age 18-30 18.90% 0.80% 4.50% 2.60% 18.40% 4.10% 3.00% 0.60% 0.60% 0.00% 42.60% 3.80% 0.00% 
Age 31-40 14.20% 0.60% 6.30% 6.10% 34.70% 8.20% 6.20% 0.90% 0.80% 0.00% 17.90% 4.00% 0.10% 
Age Over 40 12.70% 0.30% 5.40% 11.30% 51.10% 5.30% 4.30% 0.90% 0.00% 0.00% 2.00% 3.20% 3.60% 
DRC 19.90% 1.10% 9.00% 13.30% 18.10% 8.90% 8.10% 1.30% 0.00% 0.00% 11.40% 8.20% 0.80% 
RoC 15.60% 0.60% 2.90% 3.30% 59.60% 4.80% 2.60% 1.70% 0.00% 0.00% 2.90% 2.00% 3.90% 
Uganda 9.40% 0.00% 3.50% 4.10% 33.90% 2.90% 1.80% 0.00% 1.20% 0.00% 43.30% 0.00% 0.00% 
GLR Average 15.00% 0.60% 5.20% 7.00% 36.90% 5.60% 4.20% 1.00% 0.40% 0.00% 19.00% 3.50% 1.60% 
 Employment Status at the End of Conflict 
Male 11.70% 1.00% 7.00% 7.70% 44.50% 6.60% 3.70% 0.80% 0.30% 0.60% 13.00% 0.60% 2.30% 
Female 14.70% 0.50% 3.70% 4.80% 39.50% 5.50% 7.40% 1.20% 1.80% 0.90% 10.10% 9.80% 0.20% 
Age 18-30 14.00% 0.70% 6.90% 3.10% 28.40% 5.30% 4.30% 0.60% 2.30% 1.20% 28.10% 5.30% 0.00% 
Age 31-40 12.70% 1.50% 6.60% 7.10% 39.00% 8.70% 8.20% 0.80% 0.00% 0.80% 9.10% 5.40% 0.10% 
Age Over 40 12.10% 0.30% 4.40% 9.30% 54.90% 5.50% 4.40% 0.90% 0.50% 0.50% 0.50% 3.20% 3.40% 
DRC 17.50% 1.10% 8.50% 12.80% 20.40% 9.40% 8.90% 1.40% 0.00% 0.00% 8.80% 10.30% 1.00% 
RoC 15.10% 0.60% 2.00% 3.10% 62.00% 5.00% 3.10% 1.50% 0.00% 0.00% 1.50% 2.60% 3.60% 
Uganda 6.20% 0.60% 6.20% 3.40% 46.30% 4.00% 3.40% 0.00% 2.80% 2.30% 24.90% 0.00% 0.00% 
GLR Average 12.90% 0.80% 5.60% 6.50% 42.50% 6.20% 5.20% 0.90% 0.90% 0.80% 11.80% 4.40% 1.50% 
 Employment Status at Sampling 
Male 16.30% 1.80% 6.80% 8.40% 38.30% 8.60% 4.10% 1.10% 0.80% 1.50% 9.30% 0.60% 2.50% 
Female 18.20% 0.80% 4.30% 5.70% 37.90% 5.30% 7.90% 1.50% 2.30% 1.10% 5.70% 8.90% 0.30% 
Age 18-30 20.20% 1.30% 8.40% 5.30% 25.00% 7.70% 5.30% 0.80% 2.10% 2.50% 17.70% 3.80% 0.00% 
Age 31-40 15.60% 1.70% 5.90% 9.60% 39.20% 8.20% 6.30% 1.80% 1.40% 0.60% 4.00% 5.20% 0.30% 
Age Over 40 14.70% 1.40% 3.20% 8.50% 50.90% 6.40% 5.40% 1.20% 0.30% 0.50% 0.00% 2.90% 4.60% 
DRC 19.50% 1.00% 6.80% 12.20% 20.50% 9.40% 9.70% 2.20% 0.00% 0.00% 6.80% 10.20% 1.70% 
RoC 14.40% 0.40% 1.70% 2.60% 64.70% 5.10% 2.60% 1.50% 0.00% 0.00% 0.90% 1.90% 4.10% 
Rwanda 28.80% 3.60% 8.90% 8.10% 13.70% 6.20% 5.20% 1.20% 1.60% 3.60% 16.50% 2.20% 0.60% 
Uganda 5.10% 0.60% 5.60% 6.20% 55.40% 8.50% 4.50% 0.00% 4.00% 1.70% 7.30% 0.60% 0.60% 
GLR Average 17.00% 1.40% 5.80% 7.30% 38.30% 7.30% 5.50% 1.20% 1.40% 1.30% 7.90% 3.80% 1.70% 
  
 
Female community members were slightly more likely to be unemployed, self-employed in 
retail, or a housewife working in the home at all time periods when compared to male 
community members (see Table 39). Over time female community members have seen a 
slight drop in the rate of being self-employed in agriculture accompanied by slight increases 
in public and private sector employment as well as unemployment.  
 
                                                     
128 The use of the phrase “at three time points” indicates that respondents were surveyed at one time point with questions 
regarding three different time points. Because of the inclusion of Rwanda, cross-country community member employment 
status at the time of sampling is biased compared to data for before conflict and at the time of demobilization 
programming. For example, the cross-country GLR figure for unemployment at the time of sampling without Rwanda in the 




When those community members across the GLR countries who were not employed at the 
time of sampling were asked to explain why they were not working, there were several 
dominant responses: (i) 43% said they were not working due to lack of opportunity; (ii) 
16.8% cited financial problems (including lack of access to credit); (iii) 11.1% cited lack of 
sponsor; and (iv) 11.8% pointed to lack of marketable skills.129 Uganda stood out from this 
general trend in reasons for not working – instead the majority (44.4%) said they were not 
working because they were a student (matching the findings on Uganda’s higher rate of 
studying and training).  
 
Female community members across the GLR countries were less likely to cite lack of 
opportunity and lack of sponsor as the reason for their unemployment (37.6% and 8.6%, 
respectively) than male community members (48.2% and 13.1%, respectively). Inversely, 
female community members were more likely to cite a lack of marketable skills and financial 
problems including lack of credit (18.6% and 19.4%, respectively) compared to their male 
community member counterparts (5.8% and 14.1%, respectively). Along age demographic 
categories, those community members aged over 40 were less likely to cite lack of 
opportunity as a reason for their unemployment (36.5% vs. 51.9% of those 31-40 and 45.4% 
of those 18-30) and more likely to cite financial problems including lack of credit (23.3% vs. 
13.9% of those 31-40 and 8.5% of those 18-30).  
 
Across the GLR countries 31.9% of community members reported having more than one job 
/ income earning activity.130 When asked to explain further in Uganda there were several key 
responses: (i) 31.1% cited income supplementation for general survival as the reason for 
having more than one income earning activity; (ii) 19.7% explained that they subsistence 
farmed in addition to having a small business; and (iii) 19.7% said they worked more than 
one income generating activity for the general betterment of their economic situation. 
Females in Uganda were less likely to subsistence farm on the side of another job (14.3%) 
and more likely to work more than one job to meet basic needs (35.7%) than male 
                                                     
129 Rwanda is absent from findings on explanations for unemployment among community members due to lack of directly 
comparable data.  The term ”sponsor” here refers to the apprentice / master relationship. Community members are saying 
that they do not have anyone to apprentice under.  
130 Rwanda is absent from findings on number of community members who participate in more than one economic activity 
and the reason why due to lack of directly comparable data.  
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community members (21.3% and 29.8%, respectively). In DRC and RoC the range of 
explanations was similar though differently distributed, 40.7% farmed on the side of another 
income generating activity and 19.1% worked more than one job to meet basic needs.  
 
Of community members across the GLR countries, 57.3% would be willing to consider 
moving to another part of their country for better job opportunities.131 This figure reflects 
the trends in DRC and RoC well, however in Uganda the proportion of community members 
willing to consider moving for improved job opportunities was tipped the opposite direction 
(66.9% reporting that they would not consider moving). Across the GLR countries female 
community members were slightly less willing to consider moving for better job prospects 
compared to male community members (53% vs. 60.3%). Also, community members over 
the age of 40 were less likely to be willing to consider moving (49.2% vs. 64.5% of those 31-
40 and 61.7% of those 18-30) – sacrificing their overall stronger social footing in the 
community. 
 
When community members who were willing to consider moving for improved job prospects 
in Uganda were asked to explain further the most common responses were: (i) to improve 
their standard of living (33.9% total – 46.7% of females vs. 29.3% of males) and (ii) to seek 
out new opportunities and experiences (21.4% total – 6.7% of females vs. 26.8% of males).132 
Again in Uganda, when those community members who were not willing to consider moving 
to another part of the country for improved job prospects were asked to explain further the 
most common responses were: (i) lack of education / still being a student prevents work 
(31.9% total – 42.5% of females vs. 26% of males) and (ii) family responsibilities (30.1% total 
– 35% of females vs. 27.4% of males).  
 
Drawing from Uganda only, 59.4% of community members reported that they believe that it 
is harder for ex-combatants than others to find a job (compared to 78.7% of ex-combatants 
                                                     
131 Rwanda is absent from findings on community member willingness to migrate for better economic opportunities due to 
lack of directly comparable data.  
132 Questions regarding community members’ explanations for willingness to migrate for economic opportunities were only 
asked in Uganda. 
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in Uganda and 64.6% of ex-combatants overall).133 Female community members in Uganda 
were slightly more likely to perceive that ex-combatants had a harder time finding jobs than 
others when compared to male community members (64.2% vs. 57.4%). In addition, age 
showed a negative relationship to the perception that ex-combatants have a harder time 
finding a job (67.5% of those 18-30, 57.9% of those 31-40, and 48.1% of those over 40).  
 
Collectively community members’ economic trajectory and understanding of the dynamics 
surrounding this trajectory come together in community members’ overall outlook on their 
future. The vast majority of community members (77.9%) see their economic situation 
improving in the future. Both male and female community members across the GLR 
displayed a very similar positive outlook (79.3% vs. 76.8% respectively). Age displayed a 
negative relationship to the frequency of reporting a positive outlook on one’s economic 
future with a steep threshold for those aged over 40 (83.2% of those 18-30, 81.7% of those 
31-40, and 65.3% of those over 40) which, as outlined below, is especially tied to health 
related issues.  
 
The range of explanations given from community members for a positive outlook on 
economic prospects in the future were diverse across the GLR countries, making a 
meaningful cross-country comparison difficult, however a certain range of responses were 
more common: (i) improved agricultural performance was seen as key in Uganda (23.3%) 
however less important in DRC and RoC (11.6% and 8.6% respectively); (ii) gaining 
employment was important in all countries (15.8% in Uganda, 16.8% in DRC, and 12.9% in 
RoC); (iii) personal effort or hard work was especially important in RoC but much less so in 
Uganda and DRC (35.8% in RoC, 13% in Uganda, and 17% in DRC); (iv) religious faith / grace 
of god was central in DRC and RoC (25% and 20.5% respectively) and completely absent (0%) 
in Uganda.134  
 
                                                     
133 Again, Uganda is discussed exclusively here because questions on the perception of relative difficulty that ex-combatants 
have finding jobs were only asked to community members in Uganda, whereas in ex-combatant surveys the same question 
was asked across all GLR countries excluding Rwanda. 
134 These findings should not play down the role of religion in Northern Ugandan culture. For example, the Acholi people 
have a rich tradition of belief blending indigenous and Christian religious customs. Rwanda is excluded from findings on 
reasons for community members’ positive and negative outlooks on their overall economic situation due to lack of directly 
comparable data.  
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Of those community members who had a negative outlook on their economic prospects in 
the future there were also a range of common answers: (i) ill health was a common response 
in Uganda and DRC (34% and 22.2%, respectively) – this was an especially prevalent 
response among community members over the age of 40; (ii) poor agricultural yield was a 
common explanation in Uganda and RoC (21.3% and 23.2%, respectively); and (iii) general 
economic decline / lack of opportunities was a frequent explanation as well (14.9% in 
Uganda, 24.2% in DRC, and 34.3% in RoC).  
  
As a final point, looking only to DRC and RoC we can observe that 56.1% of community 
members work for pay 12 months of the year, the remainder working for paid labor closer to 
the average 9.47 months a year. This makes sense, as 72.3% of all community members 
work 1-3 months for unpaid labor in addition to their paid labor. Female community 
members worked slightly longer on average for both paid and unpaid labor compared to 
make community members (9.59 months paid labor vs. 9.36 months, and 3.23 months 
unpaid labor vs. 3.05 months). Community members over the age of 40 had the largest 
average period of the year spent in paid labor (9.78 months) and the lowest average period 
spent in unpaid labor (3.07 months).  
 
It appears as though in DRC and RoC, community members most commonly fall into one of 
three categories: (i) working 12 months a year for paid labor; (ii) working 12 months a year 
for paid labor and for 1-3 months of the year (farming season) working for unpaid labor; and 
(iii) working for around nine months of the year for paid labor and spending the remaining 
three months (farming season) in unpaid labor.  
 
8.3.2 Non-Economically Active Community Members on Employment Issues 
 
Those community members across the GLR countries who were not economically active 
explained a range of coping mechanisms to get by financially without an income. Most 
commonly, community members reported that they relied on cash contributions from family 
(28%), borrowed money from unspecified sources (19.3%), used past savings (15.8%), or got 
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help from public sources such as the community or a church (14.1%).135 Female community 
members were less likely to use savings (11.7%) compared to male community members 
(19.5%) and more likely to rely on cash contributions from family than male community 
members (33.9% vs. 23%), supporting the idea that females (ex-combatants and community 
members alike) are especially reliant on the family and have fewer economic support 
networks overall. Age showed a positive relationship to the likelihood of using savings to get 
by (8% of those 18-30, 17.8% of those 31-40, and 19.8% of those over 40). 
 
Looking specifically to Uganda, a large proportion of non-economically active community 
members (77.8%) believe that that they have a harder time finding a job than other 
people.136 Further, 100% of non-economically active female community members thought 
they had a harder time finding a job compared to 66.7% of their male counterparts. When 
asked to explain why they thought they had a harder time, non-economically active 
community members in Uganda most commonly cited incomplete studies / still a student 
(28.6%), low or no education (28.6%), and disability (28.6%). Female community members 
cited lack of education or qualifications at a higher rate (50%). This reinforces the evidence 
that community members, at least in Uganda, see education as a key pathway to gaining 
employment.  
 
Across the GLR countries, non-economically active community members generally held quite 
polarized outlooks on their prospects of gaining employment in the near future. Of those 
community members, 48.9% reported that they think they have a good chance of getting a 
job in the near future, 1.4% that they have neither a good or bad chance, and 49.7% that 
they have a poor chance. This clear polarization was characteristic most clearly in DRC, 
however in RoC a larger proportion has positive outlooks (66.6%) and in Rwanda a lower 
proportion had positive outlooks (33.1%). These trends are visible in Table 40. Age showed a 
clear positive relationship to the likelihood of having a poor outlook on gaining employment 
in the future (44.1% of those 18-30, 47.4% of those 31-40, and 61.4% of those over 40). 
 
                                                     
135 Rwanda is absent from findings on non-economically active community members’ coping strategies due to lack of 
directly comparable data.  
136 This question on whether non-economically active community members perceive having a harder time finding a job than 




Table 40: Non-Economically Active Community Member Outlook on Employment 
 
 
What are your chances of getting a job in the near future? 
Good Poor 
Male 50.13% 49.23% 
Female 48.70% 51.30% 
Age 18-30 54.15% 45.85% 
Age 31-40 52.60% 47.40% 
Age Over 40 38.60% 61.40% 
DRC 47.60% 52.40% 
Republic of Congo 66.60% 33.40% 
Rwanda 33.10% 66.90% 
Uganda 50.00% 50.00% 
GLR Average 49.60% 50.40% 
 
In Uganda non-economically active community members were questioned further as to the 
reasons behind their answers.137 Those who had a positive outlook explained their optimism 
with one of three answers: (i) that they hold qualifications and have papers (50%), (ii) that 
they are currently pursuing studies, and (iii) that they are bright, capable, hard working and 
motivated. Of non-economically active female community members in Uganda with a 
positive outlook on gaining employment in the near future, 100% explained their optimism 
as tied to their current studying.  
 
Of those non-economically active community members in Uganda who had a negative 
outlook on gaining employment in the near future there were also three common 
explanations: (i) that they were disabled (50%); (ii) that they had low or no qualifications 
(25%); or (iii) that corrupt officials made gaining employment unlikely (25%). We can take 
away that, at least in Uganda, non-economically active community members perceive the 
attainment of education as among the key pathways to gaining employment in the near 
future – and inversely the lack there of as a key barrier. 
 
8.3.3 Female Community Members on Employment Issues 
 
Non-economically active female community members across the GLR countries generally did 
not feel discriminated against as a female (83.2% did not feel discrimination and 16.8% did). 
Uganda was the only GLR country that stood out from this trend – where 50% of non-
economically active female community members felt discriminated against on the basis of 
                                                     




being female. In Uganda, 100% of those non-economically active female community 
members identified male bosses or employers as the ones discriminating against them on 
the basis of gender.138 
 
When economically active female community members across the GLR countries were asked 
whether they perceived being discriminated against on the basis of being a female the 
proportion which felt discriminated against as a female was similar, but slightly lower 
(14.6%) than with non-economically active females. In Rwanda discrimination was perceived 
on the lowest level (4.8%) across the GLR countries, while it was highest in Uganda (23.3%). 
Still looking at Uganda, of those economically active female community members who did 
feel discriminated against on the basis of gender 57.2% identified that discrimination as 
coming from co-workers (50% of those specified male co-workers, 25% female co-workers, 
and 25% all co-workers).  
 
When economically active female community members across DRC and RoC were asked 
whether they perceived female ex-combatants as having a harder time, 36% responded yes 
(the other 64% replying no). When those 36% that did think that female ex-combatants had 
a harder time than others were asked to explain, the most common explanations were the 
brutality and misconduct of ex-combatants (34.6%), the poor reputation of ex-combatants 
(32.1%), and distrust of ex-combatants (12.6%). 
 
 
8.3.4 Income, Savings and Access to Credit 
 
In the context of the severe development challenges that characterize most of the Great 
Lakes Region, levels of community member economic activity are a good starting point for 
understanding basic individual and household economic stability. However, it is through 
more closely examining community members’ income, savings and access to credit that we 
can begin to reveal some about their ability, or in some cases lack thereof, to move beyond 
                                                     
138 Questions on both non-economically active and economically active female community members’ perceived sources of 
discrimination were only asked in Uganda. 
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mere subsistence by leveraging economic opportunities and in turn exhibiting economic 
mobility.  
 
Table 41: Community Member Sole Household Breadwinner Proportions 
 
 
Are you the sole, or only, breadwinner or do others in your household 
also earn an income? 
Sole Others assist 
Male 57.50% 42.50% 
Female 32.80% 67.20% 
Age 18-30 42.90% 57.10% 
Age 31-40 54.20% 45.80% 
Age Over 40 55.70% 44.30% 
DRC 80.00% 20.00% 
Republic of Congo 36.00% 64.00% 
Rwanda 61.30% 38.70% 
Uganda 44.80% 55.20% 
GLR Average 49.70% 50.30% 
 
Across the GLR countries, 49.7% of community members reported that they were the sole 
breadwinner in their household, the remaining 50.3% reporting that others assist them. 
Despite this cross-country average, community members within the individual GLR countries 
responded in different proportions as to whether they were the sole breadwinners of their 
household – these findings are presented in Table 41. Concerning demographic categories, 
age shows a positive relationship to the likelihood of being a sole breadwinner (42.9% of 
those 18-30, 54.2% of those 31-40, and 55.7% of those over 40. In addition, across the GLR 
countries female community members were less likely to be the sole breadwinner of their 
household compared to male community members (32.8% vs. 57.5%) – contributing to the 
idea that female community members generally have fewer economic networks than males.  
 
 
Table 42: Community Member Sole Breadwinner Meeting Monthly Expenses 
  
 
At the end of each month, do you meet your household expenses? 
Usually have 
money left over 
Usually break-
even 
Usually have to 
use past 
savings 
Rely on family 
money 
transfers 
Usually have to 
borrow 
Male 4.50% 32.50% 5.50% 19.30% 38.20% 
Female 0.40% 22.90% 2.40% 24.40% 49.80% 
Age 18-30 4.40% 25.10% 3.10% 24.90% 42.50% 
Age 31-40 0.30% 38.70% 7.90% 10.70% 42.50% 
Age Over 40 3.60% 29.50% 4.00% 23.70% 39.20% 
DRC 0.00% 40.00% 0.00% 0.00% 60.00% 
RoC 9.10% 34.10% 13.60% 18.20% 25.00% 
Uganda 3.00% 29.10% 4.20% 21.20% 42.40% 




Of those community members across the GLR countries who are the sole breadwinners of 
their household only 29.3% report that they break-even in meeting their household 
expenses each month while the remaining 42% usually have to borrow money, 21% rely on 
money transfers from family, and 4.5% use past savings.139 Only 3.2% of community 
members usually have money left over after meeting their monthly expenses. Within each of 
the GLR countries the variation across these responses is displayed in Table 42. Female 
community members were less likely to break even in their monthly expenses than males 
(22.9% vs. 32.5%) and more likely to rely on family money transfers (24.4% vs. 19.3%) and 
borrowing in general (49.8% vs. 38.2%). 
 
Regarding age demographics, those 31-40 are the most likely age group to break even on 
their monthly expenses (38.70%) and the least likely to rely on family money transfers 
(10.7%) – whereas those 18-30 and over 40 were less likely to break even (25.1% and 29.5%, 
respectively) and more likely to rely on family money transfers (24.9% and 23.7%, 
respectively). However, in terms of borrowing more generally those aged 31-40 were on par 
with other age demographics. These trends could suggest that those aged 31-40 are in a 
period where they are financially independent from the familial unit in which they were 
raised, though not yet having established their own familial unit to such a level that it can 
serve as a extended support network – though to confirm this speculation would require 
triangulation in future studies. 
 
Of those 65.4% community members across the GLR countries who are sole breadwinners 
and have a shortage of income for meeting their monthly expenses, they are on average 
short by 46% of their required income. Of those 4.2% of community members across the GLR 
who have a surplus of income after meeting monthly expenses, they have on average a 
surplus of 32% of their income. Within-country averages for monthly income deficit and 
surplus are displayed in Table 43. Female community members on average have larger 
income shortages (mean 53%) and slightly smaller surpluses (mean 30%) than male 
community members (mean 41% and 34% respectively). Age showed a negative relationship 
to the average income shortage among community members (mean 51% of those 18-30, 
                                                     
139 Rwanda is absent from findings on community member sole breadwinners’ meeting monthly expenses, surplus 
percentages, and deficit percentages due to lack of directly comparable data.   
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42% of those 31-40, and 40% of those over 40). However in terms of average income surplus 
those 31-40 have the smallest average surplus (22%) while those 18-30 and over 40 have 
somewhat larger surpluses (28% and 38% respectively).  
 
Table 43: Community Member Sole Breadwinner Average Monthly Income Shortages and 
Surpluses. 
 
 Average Monthly Income Shortage Average Monthly Income Surplus 
Male 41% 34% 
Female 53% 30% 
Age 18-30 51% 28% 
Age 31-40 42% 22% 
Age Over 40 40% 38% 
DRC 30% 13% 
RoC 42% 35% 
Uganda 46% 31% 
GLR Average 46% 32% 
 
Those community members across the GLR countries who are not sole breadwinners 
contribute 40% on average of their total household income. The variation in average income 
contribution within each of the GLR countries is displayed in Table 44. On average non-sole 
breadwinner female community members contribute less than males (mean 37% vs. 43%). 
Those aged 31-40 contribute the largest proportion of household income on average 
compared to other age demographic groups (mean 52% vs. 33% of those 18-30 and 44% of 
those over 40).  
 
Table 44: Community Member Average Non-Sole Breadwinner Household Income 
Contribution  
 
 Average Non-Sole Breadwinner Household Income Contribution Percentage 
Male 43% 
Female 37% 
Age 18-30 33% 
Age 31-40 52% 





GLR Average 40% 
 
In the two years prior to sampling 31.7% of community members across the GLR countries 
have had to borrow money to help meet their day to day needs, the remaining 68.3% not 
having needed to borrow, though there is a split between DRC and RoC where 23.1% and 
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20.3% (respectively) had to borrow, and Uganda where 52.3% had to borrow.140 In DRC and 
RoC the most common expenses that borrowed money was used for were: (i) to assist family 
(26.7%); (ii) as a means of subsistence (21.6%); and (iii) for a business investment (18.5%). In 
addition in DRC and RoC the most common borrowing source was friends (53%) followed by 
family (20%). 
 
Across the GLR countries, only 13.3% of community members had ever applied for micro-
credit from a financial institution, the remaining 86.7% never having applied (possibly due to 
lack of access). This cross-country figure is very much an average in that there was a clear 
split between DRC and RoC, on the one hand, where micro-credit application rates were very 
low (5.3% in DRC and 3.4% in RoC), against Rwanda and Uganda, on the other hand, where 
higher proportions of community members had applied for micro-credit (24.6% and 26.4% 
respectively). This division may be a product of the overall levels of development in the 
sampled areas of DRC and RoC (especially eastern DRC) – financial institutions as such being 
nearly non-existent. Generally speaking female community members were just as likely to 
have applied for micro-credit across the GLR countries when compared to male community 
members (13.1% vs. 13.4%). In Uganda there was a gendered trend visible in which 37.1% of 
female community members versus 19.6% of male community members had applied for 
micro-credit.  
 
Of those community members who had applied for micro-credit most had successful 
applications (90.4%). At a cross-country level female community members reported slightly 
lower success rates in micro-credit applications (84.4% vs. 94.5%) – at a within-country level 
there is further nuance to examine. In Uganda, male community members were 100% 
successful in their micro-credit applications compared to 69.2% of female community 
members. Inversely, in RoC 85% of female community members had successful applications 
compared to 60% of male community members. The explanatory factor behind these 
opposing gender trends in micro-credit application rates is challenging to identify, but could 
prove a useful direction of inquiry in future studies.  
                                                     
140 Rwanda is absent from all findings on borrowing to meet monthly expenses due to lack of directly comparable data. 





8.3.5 Economic Associations 
 
Across the GLR countries, just over half of community members (53.7%) are currently 
involved in micro-economic activities – though in DRC this was a notably lower proportion 
(34.2%).  
 
Across the GLR countries 21.8% of community members were currently a member of an 
economic association, 7.6% were previously a member but were no longer, and 70.6% had 
never been a member of an economic association. However, in Rwanda and Uganda there 
were notably higher proportions of community members who were currently members of 
economic associations (25.2% and 42.9% respectively) – these trends are displayed in Table 
45.  Across the GLR countries, female community members were slightly less likely to 
currently be a member of an economic association when compared to male community 
members (19.7% vs. 23.3%). However, Uganda stands out from this otherwise durable trend 
– female community members were actually more likely to currently be in an economic 
association than their male counterparts (54.5% vs. 37.5%). 
 
Table 45: Community Member Economic Association Membership 
 
 
In the past two years have you ever been a member of an Economic Association? 
Yes, have been a member 
previously – but not now 
Yes, am currently a 
member now 
No, have never been a 
member of an economic 
association 
Male 7.50% 23.30% 69.20% 
Female 7.70% 19.70% 72.60% 
Age 18-30 7.00% 21.00% 72.00% 
Age 31-40 7.10% 27.10% 65.80% 
Age Over 40 8.10% 20.10% 71.80% 
DRC 4.80% 9.80% 85.30% 
Republic of Congo 4.40% 9.40% 86.20% 
Rwanda 10.30% 25.20% 64.40% 
Uganda 10.90% 42.90% 46.30% 
GLR Average 7.60% 21.80% 70.60% 
 
Looking only at Rwanda and Uganda, we can see that the most common form of economic 
association for community members is local savings and credit cooperatives, in which 40.3% 
of those who were currently a member of an economic association in Uganda belonged to 
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and 61.1% of those in Rwanda belonged to.141 The next most common form of economic 
association among community members was farmers associations (8.3%) – of which female 
community members were less likely to be a member of when compared to males (3.3% vs. 
11.9%).  
 
When asked about the primary benefits they gain from membership to their economic 
association there were diverse trends across the GLR countries. In Rwanda and Uganda, 
community members most commonly identify financial support as a key benefit of their 
membership to an economic association (38.9% and 69.2% respectively). However, for 
community members in DRC and RoC, social networking (30.2% in DRC and 23.9% in RoC) 
and economic networking (39.7% in DRC and 46.9% in RoC), and moral support (27% in DRC 
and 19.5% in RoC ) were the key benefits to membership in an economic association. Though 
not the most common reply, social and economic networking were also perceived as 
benefits to economic associations in Rwanda (14.2% and 20.4%) but not in as much so in 
Uganda (3.1% and 4.6%). 
 
Age appears to play a role in the value of economic associations in at least two ways. First, as 
age increases, community members are less likely to see financial support as the main 
benefit of being in an economic association (52.3% of those 18-30, 46.9% of those 31-40, 
and 37.5% of those over 40) – most relevant in Rwanda and Uganda. Second, as age 
increases, community members are more likely to see economic networking as the chief 
benefit (14% of those 18-30, 19.1% of those 31-40, and 20% of those over 40) – especially 










                                                     
141 Questions regarding the type of economic associations to which community members belonged were only asked in 
Rwanda and Uganda. In Rwanda these local savings and credit cooperatives commonly existed under the name VSLA – 
Village Savings and Loan Association.  
142 However, this age related trend in DRC and RoC may be a product of the sampling biases in these countries towards 
community members over the age of 40. 
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Table 46: Community Member Economic Association Members Breakdown 
 
 



















































































































































































DRC 1.6% 1.6% 0.0% 58.7% 30.2% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 6.3% 
RoC 1.9% 5.7% 43.4% 46.2% 2.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Rwanda 0.0% 9.2% 6.4% 84.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Uganda 0.0% 36.4% 49.4% 0.0% 11.7% 1.3% 0.0% 1.3% 0.0% 
GLR Average .3% 22.5% 31.9% 33.3% 9.8% .7% .2% .7% .7% 
 
Across the GLR countries when community members were asked about the membership of 
their economic associations there was considerable variation across countries. The variation 
within each GLR country for community members’ perception of the membership of their 
economic association is presented in Table 46. Community members in DRC and Rwanda, 
and to a lesser extent RoC, were most heavily involved in economic associations without ex-
combatant members, while community members in Uganda were more commonly members 
of economic association that also had ex-combatant members. It unclear this is a reflection 




Community members across the GLR countries show a relatively stable trajectory of 
economic status over time – the average unemployment rate varying as little as 2%. The 
majority of community members are self-employed in small-scale agriculture. Indeed, 
through time this remains the most important economic activity for community members 
across the GLR. Though the proportion of community members self-employed in small-scale 
agriculture peaks at the end of conflict and then drops some at the time of sampling, these 
drops, along with a continuous drop in the number of community members studying, are 
absorbed most notably into employment in public and private sector as well as self-
employment in non-agricultural service and retail – indicative of the initial onset of improved 
stability and security in the wake of peace. Though, in DRC these is a nearly static state of 
employment among community members through time – likely a result of the continuing 




Like ex-combatants, community members see their primary barrier to gaining a stable 
economic status as the lack of opportunities available to them but are also more likely to cite 
economic problems (such as access to credit) and lack of marketable skills as barriers than 
ex-combatants. In further contrast to ex-combatants, few community members were willing 
to migrate for better economic opportunities, likely an indicator of their stronger social and 
economic footing in the community. Non-economically active community members relied 
heavily on borrowing from family and friends to get by. However, overall community 
members had a positive outlook on their economic prospects in the future.  
 
Community members across the GLR displayed a near even split between household sole 
breadwinner and non-sole breadwinner status. While on average non-sole breadwinners 
contributed less than half of their total monthly household income this was supplemented 
against the support of the rest of their household members’ income contributions, placing 
them at a clear advantage to sole breadwinners. Over half of sole breadwinners had to 
borrow money from family or friends to meet their household expenses on a monthly basis.  
Sole breadwinners between the ages of 31 and 40 were the most likely to meet their 
monthly expenses without borrowing, and when they did borrow they were much more 
likely to do so from friends instead of family. Further, those non-sole breadwinners aged 31-
40 also contributed the most to their total household income on average. These elements 
combined suggest that community members aged 31-40 are at their economic prime and 
among the most capable at meeting their household economic responsibilities.  
 
The number of community members who have access to micro-credit is low across the GLR 
countries, and few were members of economic associations – though some community 
members came into economic associations with ex-combatants as a part of reintegration 
programming in some countries (e.g. DRC and RoC). The primary value that community 
members identified to economic associations (most commonly local credit and savings), was 
largely reflective of programmatic dimensions in each country – e.g. in DRC and RoC social 
and economic networking were the primary value of economic associations that community 




8.3.6.1 Vulnerable Subgroups 
 
As consistent with the analysis presented throughout this survey of community dynamics in 
the Great Lakes Region, female community members exhibit a distinct range of 
characteristics that collectively paint a picture of a weaker platform of economic stability. 
Female community members are more likely than males to be unemployed through time, 
and vastly more likely to work taking care of the household – to an extent this can be 
expected as a result of traditional gender roles in the GLR countries. Female community 
members are less likely to cite lack of opportunity as the primary barrier to gaining 
productive economic status, though still the primary, and more likely to cite lack of 
education or skills than male community members.  
 
Across the GLR, household sole breadwinner status was generally an indicator of economic 
instability. In this sense females are at an advantage to males, being less likely to be a sole 
breadwinner. However, those female community members who were non-sole 
breadwinners contributed less to the household on average than males. Further, those 
female community members who were sole breadwinners were less likely to meet their 
expenses and more likely to borrow from family or friends to meet household expenses on a 
monthly basis than male community members – their income shortages were larger and 
their surpluses were smaller. So while female community members are less likely to be 
exposed to the economic vulnerability of sole breadwinner status, when they are, this 
vulnerability is more accentuated than for male community members. These findings flag 
female headed households as particularly vulnerable. 
 
At first glace young community members (18-30) also appear to have some disadvantages to 
other age demographic groups. Young community members are the most likely to be 
unemployed at any time point, are less likely to meet monthly expenses, and have larger 
income shortages than their older peers. However, young community members are also the 
least likely age group to identify themselves as a household head and receive the support of 
their familial/ household unit – in a sense insulating them from the weight of their 
employment and income disadvantages. It may be that the disadvantages that young 
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community members face are simply an indication of their life stage in establishing an 
income source and building economic networks.  
 
8.3.6.2 Unique Country Trends 
 
In the analysis of economic issues presented in this section of the study, community 
members in DRC stand out subtly. First, across the GLR countries, self-employment in 
agriculture is the dominant economic status at all time points. While this is still the case in 
DRC, the overall proportion of community members self-employed in agriculture at all time 
points (before conflict, at start of demobilization programming, at the time of sampling) is 
considerably lower than the cross-country average. The difference is explained in part by the 
community members in DRC’s higher levels of unemployment (highest at all time points 
across the GLR), employment in the public sector, and self-employment in services or retail. 
Overall this could suggest that community members in DRC have a harder time gaining 
employment, specifically self-employment in agriculture, than in other GLR countries and as 
a result participate more deeply in a range of alternative income activities. 
 
In addition, community members in DRC are the most likely across the GLR to be sole 
breadwinners – and thus subject to greater household economic instability. Indeed, while 
sole breadwinners in DRC are the most likely across the GLR countries to meet their monthly 
expenses, less than half do so – instead relying on borrowing from friends and family on a 
regular basis. Though sole breadwinners in DRC have smaller monthly income shortages than 
those in other GLR countries, they also have smaller surpluses. Essentially, while sole 
breadwinner community members in DRC are slightly better off than those in other GLR 
countries, community members in DRC are also more likely to be a sole breadwinner – still 
an indicator of greater exposure to economic instability.  
 
Collectively these two points, community members in DRC as the most likely to be 
unemployed and the most likely to be a sole breadwinner, cement the economic conditions 





8.4 Social Capital 
 
The following section provides a discussion and analysis of the many facets of social capital 
in the community member sample. The concept of social capital essentially revolves around 
the idea that social networks have value, both tangible and intangible, for individuals and 
communities and are a key indicator of the overall social health of communities – in turn, 
their ability to leverage this social capital towards social and economic outcomes. As such 
the analysis of social capital for community members across the Great Lakes Region 
presented here is comprised of five core components: (i) an examination of the size of 
community members’ social networks and their levels of sociability; (ii) an examination of 
individual community members’ levels of trust and solidarity with others in their community; 
(iii) an examination of community members levels of social cohesion and inclusion in the 
community; (iv) in turn, an examination of how these factors come together in community 
members’ overall sense of empowerment; and (v) their perception of social change over 
time. Beyond serving as a key backdrop for understanding ex-combatants’ position relative 
to community members, the analysis here represents a look into the core social dynamics 
present in communities across the GLR countries.  
 
8.4.1 Networks and Sociability 
 
Across the GLR countries, community members are unlikely to be in many social groups – 
though they are still in more social groups than ex-combatants on average. Community 
members across the GLR countries are in an average of 0.63 social groups. This average is 
reflected across the GLR countries with the exception of Uganda, where community 
members had more (0.93) social groups on average. Female community members had 
slightly fewer social groups than male community members on average (0.56 vs. 0.67). 
 
In terms of change in number of social groups, 40.7% of community members across the GLR 
countries reported that the number of social groups that they belonged to at the time of 
sampling was more than that of one year prior, 45.8% the same number as one year prior, 
and 13.5% reported their current number of social groups was less than one year prior.143 
                                                     
143 Rwanda is absent from findings on change in number of social groups due to lack of directly comparable data.  
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However, there is a sharp division between DRC and RoC on the one hand and Uganda on 
the other. In DRC and RoC, 77.9% of community members had seen an improvement in their 
number of social groups. Uganda stood in contrast from DRC and RoC as only 9.8% of 
community members were currently in more social groups than one year ago, 73.6% were in 
the same number, and 16.6% were in fewer groups. So while in Uganda community 
members had more social groups than in DRC and Roc in absolute terms, those community 
members in DRC and RoC had seen considerably more improvement.144  
 
Across the GLR countries, female community members were more likely to be in more social 
groups than one year ago compared to male community members (46.4% vs. 36.9%). In 
addition age displayed a positive relationship to the likelihood of being in more social groups 
than one year ago (31.3% of those 18-30, 45.5% of those 31-40, and 46.1% of those over 40).  
 
Only 39.6% of community members across the GLR countries were on a management or 
organizational committee for a local group or organization – another indicator of social 
interaction and overall engagement in the community.145 Female community members were 
less likely to be on a committee than male community members (30.4% vs. 45.7%). Those 
between the ages of 31-40 were the age segment that most commonly was on a committee 
(45.7%), compared to those 18-30 (33.1%), and those over 40 (41.5%).  
 
The majority of community members (73%) across the GLR countries have contact with their 
immediate family.146 However this cross-country figure masks some nuance in the trends 
within each GLR country. For example in RoC the proportion of community members who 
had contact with their families was absolute (100%) and in Uganda nearly so (97.3%). 
However, in DRC only 31% of community members had contact with their immediate family 
– likely a product of the extreme difficulty of travel and overall dynamics of displacement in 
                                                     
144 It is possible that this gap between DRC/RoC and Uganda could be an indicator of the health of the overall social fabric in 
these countries, however it is also possible that it could be a product of periodization issues – e.g. a longer amount of time 
passed between the start of DDR programing and the time of sampling in Uganda than DRC in which time the overall 
security situation has improved considerably.  
145 Rwanda is absent from findings on membership to management or organizational committees due to lack of directly 
comparable data.  
146 Rwanda is absent from findings on familial contact, frequency of familial contact, reasons for levels of familial contact, 
and desired levels of familial contact due to lack of directly comparable data.  
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eastern DRC. Female community members across the GLR were slightly less likely than male 
community members to have contact with their immediate family (68.2% vs. 76.2%). 
 
Of those community members across the GLR countries who did have contact with their 
immediate family, they most frequently had daily contact (63.9%), though in Uganda this 
proportion was much larger (93.2%). A cross-country summary of community members’ 
frequency of familial contact is displayed in Table 47. Age showed a negative relationship to 
the frequency which community members reported having daily contact with their 
immediate family (53.1% of those 18-30, 40.1% of those 31-40, and 25.9% of those over 40). 
 
Table 47: Community Member Frequency of Familial Contact 
 
 
Frequency of contact between community member and immediate family these days 




Male 69.40% 11.90% 8.20% 1.60% 0.60% 7.90% 0.20% 
Female 55.10% 11.30% 14.60% 1.30% 1.50% 15.90% 0.40% 
Age 18-30 78.00% 9.30% 5.20% 1.10% 0.60% 5.70% 0.10% 
Age 31-40 63.50% 13.40% 11.50% 1.60% 1.40% 8.50% 0.20% 
Age Over 40 52.90% 12.70% 14.40% 1.50% 0.90% 16.80% 0.80% 
DRC 33.70% 17.40% 17.90% 0.50% 2.20% 28.30% 0.00% 
RoC 23.30% 22.40% 25.00% 3.80% 2.20% 22.00% 0.90% 
Uganda 93.20% 4.50% 1.10% 0.60% 0.00% 0.60% 0.00% 
GLR Average 63.90% 11.70% 10.60% 1.50% 1.00% 10.90% 0.30% 
 
Table 48: Community Member Desired Level of Familial Contact 
 
 
Is the current level of contact the maximum you wish or could it be more 
frequent? 
Maximum Could be more frequent 
Male 54.20% 45.80% 
Female 42.30% 57.70% 
Age 18-30 54.60% 45.40% 
Age 31-40 45.20% 54.80% 
Age Over 40 47.10% 52.90% 
DRC 11.90% 88.10% 
Republic of Congo 35.10% 64.90% 
Uganda 87.80% 12.20% 
GLR Average 49.30% 50.70% 
 
When community members across the GLR countries who did have contact with immediate 
family were asked whether the current level of their contact was the maximum they would 
desire, 49.3% responded yes – the remaining 50.7% responding no. Again, there is some 
nuance to be added here. In Uganda where daily contact was much higher, 87% responded 
that their current level of familial contact was the maximum they would desire. In contrast, 
in DRC, where the number of those who had contact with their family at all was much lower, 
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only 11.9% felt they currently had the maximum level of contact with their families that they 
would desire – these trends are displayed in Table 48. 
 
When in DRC and RoC community members were asked to explain why they do not see their 
families more often, the most common responses were: (i) distance of travel (37.1%), (ii) not 
enough time (15.5%), and (iii) the cost of travel (19.2%) – largely corroborating the assertion 
above that familial contact, especially in eastern DRC, is a product of the difficulty of travel 
due to weak road infrastructure, mountainous terrain, strong seasonal rains, and continuing 
regional insecurity.147 It is also likely that regional dynamics of forced displacement and 
migration may further damage social capital in DRC, RoC, and the GRL more broadly.  
 
Across the GLR countries, when community members were asked to describe the number of 
friends they had the majority reported that they have lots of friends (48.5%), followed by a 
few good friends (30.9%), and not many friends (20.6%). Uganda stands out from this trend 
with 74.3% of community members reporting having lots of friends. Female community 
members across the GLR countries were less likely to describe having lots of friends and 
more likely to describe having not many friends compared to male community members 
(39% vs. 54.3% and 17.8% vs. 16.1%, respectively).  
 
Across the GLR countries, when community members were asked to think about the age, 
gender, and educational background of their friends,148 the majority of community members 
reported that their friends mostly shared the same age (57.7%) and gender (62.1%), while 
few (25.7%) shared the same educational background. These trends are durable across the 
GLR countries and are displayed in Table 49. In terms of demographic groups it is worth 
noting that female community members were slightly less likely than male community 
members to have most of their friends of the same age (54.4% vs. 60.1%) or educational 
background (24.9% vs. 26.3%), but slightly more likely to have them of the same gender 
(64.5% vs. 60.4%). Across age demographics, those over 40 were consistently the least likely 
to have most of their friends in the same age, gender, or education background group (only 
                                                     
147 Questions regarding the reasons for less familial contact than desired were only asked in DRC and RoC. 
148 Rwanda is absent from findings of the demographic background of community members’ friends due to lack of directly 
comparable data.  
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marginally less than those 31-40, see Table 49) – an indicator of older community members 
slightly more diverse social groups and overall stronger social footing. 
 
When community members across the GLR countries were asked to whom they would turn 
to for help if they were to encounter an economic problem the most common responses 
were (i) family (39.9%) and (ii) friends (33.4%) – the remaining 26.7% said they would turn to 
no one (10.3%), to formal institutions such as local saving and credit associations (7.5%) or a 
range of other sources including the church (8.9%). Female community members were less 
likely to turn to friends and more likely to turn to family compared to male community 
members (27.2% vs. 37.2% and 44.9 vs. 36.8%, respectively). Age showed a negative 
relationship to the frequency at which community members reported that they would turn 
to family for economic support (50.4% of those 18-30, 35.8% of those 31-40, and 31.8% of 
those over 40). In addition, age showed a positive relationship to the frequency which 
community members reported turning to no one (6.3% of those 18-30, 9.2% of those 31-40, 
and 15.4% of those over 40). 
 
Table 49: Community Member Friend Group Demographics 
 
Thinking about your friends, are most of them of the same age? 
Most Some Few None 
Male 60.10% 26.70% 10.20% 3.00% 
Female 54.40% 27.50% 12.70% 5.50% 
Age 18-30 62.30% 22.50% 12.50% 2.70% 
Age 31-40 55.60% 32.10% 8.70% 3.60% 
Age Over 40 55.20% 27.90% 11.70% 5.20% 
DRC 60.20% 24.60% 8.80% 6.50% 
Republic of Congo 54.20% 29.40% 10.60% 5.80% 
Uganda 58.20% 27.50% 14.30% 0.00% 
GLR Average 57.70% 27.10% 11.30% 4.00% 
 
Thinking about your friends, are most of them of the same gender? 
Most Some Few None 
Male 60.40% 27.20% 10.20% 2.20% 
Female 64.50% 24.70% 7.30% 3.50% 
Age 18-30 64.20% 24.10% 9.10% 2.60% 
Age 31-40 62.60% 26.30% 8.40% 2.70% 
Age Over 40 59.60% 27.80% 9.50% 3.10% 
DRC 60.20% 25.10% 9.30% 5.40% 
Republic of Congo 62.50% 26.30% 8.30% 2.90% 
Uganda 63.50% 27.10% 9.40% 0.00% 
GLR Average 62.10% 26.20% 9.00% 2.70% 
 
Thinking about your friends, are most of them of the same educational background or 
level? 
Most Some Few None 
Male 26.30% 32.90% 31.30% 9.50% 
Female 24.90% 28.00% 29.80% 17.30% 
Age 18-30 32.30% 30.40% 26.60% 10.70% 
Age 31-40 22.90% 30.50% 32.60% 13.90% 
Age Over 40 22.40% 31.30% 32.90% 13.40% 
DRC 21.40% 35.40% 23.90% 19.30% 
Republic of Congo 21.50% 26.10% 35.10% 17.20% 
Uganda 33.50% 30.80% 33.50% 2.20% 





Generally speaking, across the GLR countries community members did not socialize often in 
public – meeting with people in a public place either to talk or have food or drinks. On 
average community members across the GLR countries met in public to socialize 1.33 times a 
week – though females met less often than males (0.95 vs. 1.57 times a week). An 
interesting note is that in DRC and RoC when community members were asked how often 
they met to discuss community issues with others over food or drinks, as opposed to just for 
socialization, the response rates were notably higher (mean = 2.12 times a week). With this, 
the majority of community members (57.4%) in DRC and RoC think that community issues 
have created the space by which they can more generally meet people and socialize.  
 
Community members across the GLR countries indicate that their level of public socialization 
is most commonly the same as two years ago (50.4%), followed by more often (28.1%), and 
less often (21.5%). Female community members were notably less likely to see 
improvements in their level of public socialization in the two years prior to sampling than 
male community members (23.3% vs. 31.5%). 
 
8.4.2 Trust and Solidarity 
 
Drawing from Rwanda and Uganda, we can observe that trust among community members 
towards others in their community is generally high.149 The majority of community members 
(63.3%) believe that people in their community can be trusted to a great extent, followed by 
to neither a great nor small extent (22.8%), and lastly to a small extent (13.9%). Female 
community members on average were less trusting of others in the community than their 
male counterparts – 58% of female community members had high trust compared to 65.7% 
of male community members and 18.8% of female community members had low trust 
compared to 11.7% of male community members. 
 
As a further indication of this general level of trust, across the GLR countries 18.8% of 
community members felt that if they were to disagree with something that everyone else in 
                                                     
149 This specific question about general trust levels in the community was only asked in Uganda and Rwanda. 
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their community agreed on they would not at all feel free to speak out, 63.5% reported they 
would definitely feel free to speak out, and 17.7% that they would feel free to speak out but 
only on certain matters.150 Female community members were slightly more likely to feel 
they could not speak out at all and less likely to feel they could definitely speak out when 
compared to male community members (22.8% vs. 15.9% and 57.6% vs. 67.8%, 
respectively). It is possible that local gender based social norms play a role in these findings. 
 
When asked whether or not they felt that the level of trust had improved in the last year / 
two years in the community, 43.4% of community members across the GLR countries felt 
that it had improved, 47.9% that it was the same, and only 8.7% that trust had 
deteriorated.151 This cross-country figure however is very much an average as within the 
individual GLR countries there were distinct trends – for example, in Uganda a clear majority 
(63.3%) felt that trust had improved while in DRC an even larger majority (73.6%) felt that 
trust had stayed the same. These within-country trends are displayed in Table 50. A 
consistent trend along gender demographic lines does, however, exist. Across and within the 
GLR countries, female community members are consistently less likely than male community 
members to see trust as improved (39.4% vs. 45.9% at a cross-country level) and more likely 
to see it as the same (51.7% vs. 45.5% at a cross-country level).  
 
Table 50: Community Member Perceptions of Change in Trust 
 
 
In the past year / two years, has the level of trust in your area got better, worse, or 
stayed about the same? 
Better Same Worse 
Male 45.90% 45.50% 8.50% 
Female 39.40% 51.70% 9.00% 
Age 18-30 41.60% 47.30% 11.10% 
Age 31-40 41.30% 51.90% 6.80% 
Age Over 40 45.30% 46.90% 7.80% 
DRC 15.30% 73.60% 11.10% 
Republic of Congo 56.10% 39.50% 4.40% 
Rwanda 39.30% 49.40% 11.30% 
Uganda 63.30% 28.90% 7.80% 
GLR Average 43.40% 47.90% 8.70% 
 
                                                     
150 Rwanda is absent from findings on comfort of speaking out in disagreement with their community due to lack of directly 
comparable data. 
151 In Uganda and Rwanda this question was asked with reference to the last year, where as in DRC and RoC it was asked in 
reference to the last two years. This creates some issues with periodization and comparability. These figures should be 
treated with caution. Interestingly, though the question refers to a longer period of time in DRC and RoC, this does not 
appear to translate to greater perceptions of improved trust among community members. In the case of DRC this may be 
the product of continuing insecurity. 
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When those community members across the GLR countries who thought that trust had 
improved in the last two years were asked to explain further, the majority (42.2%) cited 
improved safety and security as the main reason for improved trust – this answer was 
particularly prevalent among female community members (56.6% vs. 34.7% of male 
community members).152 A notable portion of community members (44.5%) also expressed 
a range of explanations that related to improved collaboration, cooperation and 
understanding due to communal living – a key component of the confrontational process of 
social reintegration.  
 
Looking the other direction, when those community members across the GLR countries who 
thought that trust had deteriorated in the last two years were asked to explain further, 
responses were diverse – however, the most common were as follows: (I) dishonesty in 
general (23.4%), (ii) dishonest authorities (19.6%), and (iii) insecurity (11.9%)  
 
8.4.3 Social Cohesion and Inclusion 
 
When reflecting on the level of diversity among the people they live around, 36.7% of 
community members described their community as diverse (characterized by lots of 
differences between people), 25.9% as neither particularly diverse or homogenous (neither a 
great nor small extent of differences between people), and the remaining 37.4% described 
their community as fairly homogenous (characterized by few differences between 
people).153 This relatively even distribution across the GLR countries can be nuanced with a 
closer look within each of the countries – for example, in Uganda and DRC, community 
homogeneity (low diversity) was perceived as considerably higher (57.5% and 56.7%, 
respectively) while in Rwanda, community members’ perceived high levels of diversity 
(62.1%).154 These specific within-country trends are displayed in Table 51.  
                                                     
152 Rwanda is absent from findings on the reasons for improved trust over the last two years due to lack of directly 
comparable data. 
153 Here the percpetion of diversity in consttuted but the perception of unsepcified differences among people in the 
community. Another way to phrase this would be the level of ”differentness” that community members percieve in their 
community. 
154 It is possible that the perception of differences (or diversity) can have a diverse range of meanings across the contexts of 
different GLR countries. For example DRC is a country with rich diversity along cultural, ethnic, and linguistic groups. 
However, the difficulty of movement in eastern DRC means that many such socio-linguistic groups live in isolation from 
each other. The community members may accurately perceive low diversity in their community, though at a national level 
diversity may be high. In contrast, the perception of differences (or diversity) may be high in Rwanda due to the centrality 




At a cross-country level, age showed a distinct relationship to the perception of community 
diversity among community members. As age increased the likelihood of perceiving high 
diversity decreased (42.4% of those 18-30, 36.9% of those 31-40, and 30.7% of those over 
40) and accordingly the likelihood of perceiving low diversity increased (33.5% of those 18-
30, 34.5% of those 31-40, and 42.9% of those over 40). 
 
Table 51: Community Member Perception of Community Diversity 
 
To what extent do differences between people characterize your community? 
To a great extent, i.e. lots 
of differences between 
people 
Neither great nor small 
extent 
To a small extent, i.e. few 
differences between 
people 
Male 37.50% 24.70% 37.80% 
Female 35.50% 27.80% 36.70% 
Age 18-30 42.40% 24.00% 33.50% 
Age 31-40 36.90% 28.70% 34.50% 
Age Over 40 30.70% 26.40% 42.90% 
DRC 34.50% 47.00% 18.40% 
Republic of Congo 25.10% 18.20% 56.70% 
Rwanda 62.10% 20.40% 17.60% 
Uganda 24.90% 17.70% 57.50% 
GLR Average 36.70% 25.90% 37.40% 
  
When community members across the GLR countries were asked whether differences 
between people in their community caused problems such as disagreement, arguments 
or disputes the majority (68.5%) replied no (31.5% responding yes).155 Only Uganda 
breaks significantly from this trend – 69.1% of community members did think that 
differences caused problems in their community.156 Congruent to the age demographic 
trend above in regards to the perception of diversity, as age increases among community 
members across the GLR countries they are less likely to see differences between people 
as a source of problems (43.9% of those 18-30, 29.5% of those 31-40, and 24.3% of 
those over 40) and more likely to not see them as a source of problems (56.1% of those 
18-30, 70.5% of those 31-40, and 75.7% of those over 40). To recap, older community 
members are both less likely to see differences between people, and less likely to see 
these differences as a source of problems. Though female community members 
                                                     
differences across the different GLR countries is a challenging task with few clear answers, and as such these findings 
should be treated with caution.  
155 Rwanda is absent from findings on if community diversity is a source of problems due to lack of directly comparable 
data.  
156 As noted previously, the meaning of community members perceptions of differences among people in the community 
(broadly understood as level of diversity) is difficult to decipher and is likely highly context specific. Understanding the 
reason for community members in Uganda’s higher rate of belief that differences between people are a source of problems 
remains challenging and the concept of diversity or “differentness” is so broad that even meaningful speculation about this 
trend may not be possible.  
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identified levels of diversity in their communities on a level similar to male community 
members, they were less likely to think that diversity was a source of problems (28.7% 
vs. 33.5%). 
 
Looking specifically at DRC and RoC, community members were asked to further explain 
the nature of the kinds of problems they encounter. Community members most 
commonly described the problems as revolving around (i) envy, slander or taunts 
(29.8%); (ii) misunderstanding (20.5%); or (iii) unspecified accusations made towards 
ex-combatants (12.7%).157 
 
Despite varying levels of perceived diversity and their association with problems in the 
community, across the GLR countries the majority of community members (75.3%) 
report that they feel a high level of togetherness and closeness with their community 
(19.6% feel neither distant nor close and 5.1% feel distant). Across demographic lines, 
this level is very even as well. However, DRC stands out from the trend as the country 
with the lowest proportion of community members who feel a high level of closeness 
and togetherness (61.4%). In addition, while in other GLR countries there is little 
variation along demographic lines, in DRC female community members are less likely to 
feel close to their community (57.4% vs. 65.1%) and more likely to feel neither distant 
nor close (32.2% vs. 27.5%) or distant (10.4% vs. 7.5%) compared to male community 
members.  
 
In alignment with overall feelings of togetherness with the community, across the GLR 
countries 69.5% of community members had in the last year worked with others in the 
area they live to do something for the benefit of their community (the remaining 30.5% 
not having done so). Despite this cross-country figure there is a clear polarization 
between DRC and RoC, on the one hand, where the rate of participation was lower 
(53.2% and 54.9%, respectively) and Rwanda and Uganda, on the other, where 
participation was higher (92.9% and 76.9%, respectively).158 
 
                                                     
157 Questions on the type of problems that diversity can cause were only asked in DRC and RoC. 
158 In the case of Rwanda, working for the benefit of the community is institutionalized in the practice of Umuganda – a 
practice dating back to Rwanda’s colonial era in which on the last Saturday of every month all able bodied adults participate 
in unpaid communal labor – with enforced penalties for non-participation.  
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There is a dispersed range of information regarding the perceived importance of 
community participation from community members. For example, in Uganda 25.3% of 
community members cite lack of participation in community activities as the cause of 
marginalization in the area that they live. In DRC and RoC an average of 53.3% of 
community members reported that there were penalties, both formal (such as a ticket or 
fee) or informal (such as social resentment or exclusion), for those who didn’t 
participate in community activities – though within each country the figures were 
almost perfectly inverse (In DRC, 39.7% said that there were penalties and 60.3% said 




Empowerment is an important indicator of overall levels of social capital and is understood 
as a result of individuals’ levels of social connection and their ability to leverage the benefits 
of these connections and the community and the larger context of society. Collectively, the 
extent of these benefits and in turn the functions that they fulfill for individuals play a role in 
the psychosocial concept of empowerment – the individual or collective ability to affect 
change in one’s life. 
 
When asked to reflect on their general level of happiness, 71.8% described themselves as 
happy, 17.4% described themselves as neither happy nor unhappy, and 10.8% reported that 
they were unhappy. Community members in DRC were the least likely to report being happy 
(65.2%), while community members in Uganda were the most likely to report so (80.8%). 
Across the GLR countries, female community members were slightly less likely to be happy 
and more likely to be unhappy than male community members (67% vs. 70.6% and 15% vs. 
11.4%, respectively). 
 
When asked to what extent they felt they had the power to make important decisions that 
affect the course of their lives, community members across the GLR countries most 
commonly reported that they felt that they had such power to a large extent (51.3%), 
followed with decreasing frequency by to a medium extent (33.3%) and to a small extent 
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(15.4%).159 These overall perceptions of power were remarkably durable within each of the 
GLR countries – however there are distinct demographic trends in regard to gender. Female 
community members across the GLR countries were nearly half as likely as their male 
counterparts to report having a large extent of power to make decisions in their lives (35.6% 
vs. 62.3%) while more likely to perceive power to a medium extent (41.8% vs. 27.3%) and 
more than twice as likely to have it to a small extent (22.6% vs. 10.4%). 
 
Table 52: GLR Community Member Empowerment (Power, Ability, and Control) 
 
Do you feel that you have the power to make important decisions that can change 
the course of your life? 
Large extent Medium extent Small extent 
Male 67.0% 24.7% 8.3% 
Female 35.6% 40.3% 24.1% 
Age 18-30 46.5% 34.4% 19.1% 
Age 31-40 55.6% 31.6% 12.8% 
Age Over 40 55.1% 30.6% 14.2% 
GLR Average 51.3% 33.3% 15.4% 
 
Do you feel that you have the ability to make important decisions that can change 
the course of your life? 
Able to change life Neither able nor unable Unable to change life 
Male 86.0% 10.1% 3.9% 
Female 67.9% 22.7% 9.3% 
Age 18-30 75.0% 18.1% 6.9% 
Age 31-40 80.7% 13.7% 5.5% 
Age Over 40 78.0% 15.6% 6.3% 
GLR Average 78.8% 14.9% 6.7% 
 
How much control do you feel you have over decisions that affect your everyday 
activities? 
Lots of Control 
Neither a lot nor a little 
control Little Control 
Male 71.6 % 21.6% 6.8% 
Female 53.1 % 31.9% 15.1% 
Age 18-30 61.1 % 26.7% 12.2% 
Age 31-40 68.3 % 26.3% 5.4% 
Age Over 40 65.7 % 23.5% 10.8% 
GLR Average 64.4 % 25.6% 10.0% 
 
Interestingly, when community members were asked a very similar question as to what 
extent they felt they had the ability (as opposed to power) to make important decisions that 
affect the course of their lives, perceptions of empowerment were considerably higher – 
78.8% reporting that they were able to make changes, 14.9% that they neither were able or 
unable to make changes, and 6.7% that they were unable to make changes in their life.160 
Very similar to the question above on power to make change, females also considerably less 
                                                     
159 Rwanda is absent from findings on sense of empowerment in terms of power to make important decisions and ability to 
make important decisions due to lack of directly comparable data.  
160 The analytical distinction between senses of empowerment in terms of power versus ability is not clear. Interpreting any 
meaning to the disparity in levels of power and ability is therefore problematic and these data should be treated as a broad 
indicator of a positive sense of empowerment rather than as exact measures of different components of empowerment.  
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frequently reported having the ability to make changes and more frequently neither being 
able nor unable as well as just unable (as is displayed in Table 52). 
 
Table 53: Community Member Perception of Individual Impact on Community 
 
Do you personally have a positive or negative impact on the place you live? 
Positive impact 
Neither positive nor 
negative impact 
Negative impact 
Male 70.10% 20.70% 9.20% 
Female 51.00% 28.80% 20.20% 
Age 18-30 68.30% 19.50% 12.20% 
Age 31-40 64.30% 23.70% 12.10% 
Age Over 40 57.20% 28.00% 14.80% 
DRC 35.80% 37.30% 26.90% 
Republic of Congo 39.20% 36.80% 23.90% 
Rwanda 93.70% 4.90% 1.40% 
Uganda 81.30% 16.50% 2.20% 
GLR Average 62.60% 23.90% 13.60% 
 
When asked yet another question about perceived levels of empowerment, but this time 
scaled in reference to the extent that community members feel control over decisions that 
have an effect of their everyday activities, the trends are remarkably similar to the previous 
two questions above.161 Of community members questioned across the GLR, 64.4% perceive 
that they control most decisions that affect their everyday lives, 25.6% perceive that they 
control some decisions, and 10.1% few decisions. A very similar gender-based demographic 
trend was exhibited here as well – as is visible in Table 52. 
 
When community members across the GLR countries were asked about whether or not they 
had a positive impact on the community they live in, there was a clear polarization between 
DRC and RoC on the one hand, and Rwanda and Uganda on the other. As is visible in Table 
53 in DRC and RoC there were relatively even distributions of community members’ 
responses to having a positive impact, neither a positive nor negative impact, and a negative 
impact. In Rwanda and Uganda, by contrast, the frequency of community members having 
the perception of having a positive impact on their community was high – in the case of 
Rwanda, almost absolute.  
 
                                                     
161 This question regarding community members’ levels of control over everyday decisions has been re-coded from a five 
point scale to a three point scale for increased comparability to the other two measures of empowerment (power and 
ability) presented here.  
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In regards to gender, in DRC and RoC female community members much less frequently than 
male community members reported having a positive impact on their community (27.9% vs. 
46.1%), while in Rwanda the extent of the gap between female and male community 
members is approximately half of that in DRC and RoC (87.9% vs. 96.3%). In Uganda, female 
community members even have a slightly higher likelihood of perceiving a positive impact 
than males (82.5% vs. 80.8%).  
 
Turning to age demographics, in DRC and RoC age showed a positive relationship to the 
likelihood of the perception of having a positive impact on the community (26.3% of those 
18-30, 39.1% of those 31-40, and 43.6% of those over 40). While there was no linear trend in 
regards to age visible in Rwanda; in Uganda, age showed a slight negative relationship to the 
likelihood of the perception of having a positive impact on the community (85.7% of those 
18-30, 82.5% of those 31-40, and 73.2% of those over 40).   
 
Certain parts of this trend of polarity between DRC/RoC and Uganda/Rwanda continue when 
community members are asked to what extent they feel valued by others in the area they 
live. On average across the GLR countries, 70.3% of community members felt valued by 
others in their community. However DRC showed smaller proportions of community 
members who felt valued (64.4%), while in Uganda almost all (98.3%) community members 
felt valued. Female community members were notably less likely to feel valued by their 
community compared to male community members (66.5% vs. 72.9%). 
 
When asked how often in the past year they had joined with other people to express 
concerns to the government or local leaders for the benefit of the community, 44.7% of 
community members across the GLR countries had never done so, 11.6% had once done so, 
21.1% had done so a few times (five or less), and 22.6% had done so many times (five or 
more). This cross-country trend in which the large majority of community members have 
never gathered to express community concerns is characteristic of DRC, RoC and Uganda. 
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However, in Rwanda the frequency of gathering was most commonly many times (62.4%) – 
as is displayed in Table 54.162 
 
Table 54: Community Member Frequency of Public Gathering to Express Concerns 
 
 
In the past year, how often have you joined other people to express concerns to officials 
or local leaders on issues benefiting the community? 
Never Once 
A few times, five or 
less 
Many times, more 
than five 
Male 34.60% 13.40% 24.10% 27.90% 
Female 60.70% 8.70% 16.30% 14.30% 
Age 18-30 43.30% 9.90% 20.20% 26.50% 
Age 31-40 39.40% 11.60% 23.20% 25.90% 
Age Over 40 49.30% 12.80% 21.00% 17.00% 
DRC 69.60% 11.00% 13.60% 5.80% 
Republic of Congo 70.40% 13.70% 14.40% 1.50% 
Rwanda 5.90% 5.90% 25.70% 62.40% 
Uganda 34.10% 15.90% 30.20% 19.80% 
GLR Average 44.70% 11.60% 21.10% 22.60% 
 
Female community members were more likely to have never participated in voicing 
community issues when compared to male community members (60.7% vs. 34.6%) and less 
likely than males to have participated once (8.7% vs. 13.4%), a few times (16.3% vs. 24.1%), 
or many times (14.3% vs. 27.9%). Age shows a slight negative relationship to the likelihood 
of gathering many times for political participation in the last year (26.5% of those 18-30, 
25.9% of those 31-40, and 17% of those over 40).163 
 
When questioned further as to the extent that they thought that local government and 
leaders take into account those concerns voiced by the community when they make 
important decisions that affect the community, 17.4% of community members across the 
GLR countries felt that leaders took their concerns into account a lot, 41.7% a little, and 
40.9% not at all.164 Female community members were less likely than male community 
members to feel that leaders took their concerns into account either a lot or a little (15.8% 
and 37.5% vs. 17.6% and 44.7%, respectively) and more likely to feel that leaders did not 
take their concerns into account at all (46.7% vs. 36.8%).  
 
                                                     
162 This high rate of public gathering to express concerns in Rwanda is likely another effect of Umuganda. While the main 
purpose of Umuganda is community work it also serves as a platform for leaders to communicate important news on a 
national and local level as well as for individuals and communities to express concerns and plan for future Umuganda.  
163 This age related trend in the likelihood of public gathering may in part be related to the heavy sampling bias in RoC, the 
country where community public gathering was lowest, towards community members over 40. 
164 Rwanda is absent from findings on the extent to which community members feel leaders take their concerns into 
account due to lack of directly comparable data.  
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8.4.5 Social Change 
 
Similar to trends in the ex-combatant sample, across the GLR countries community members 
generally were polarized in their outlook on the likelihood of their overall situation 
improving in the future between those that thought that it would improve in a few years and 
those that thought that their situation would deteriorate in the future. Overall, only 1.5% of 
community members thought that their situation would improve in a few weeks, 4.9% 
thought it would improve in the coming months, 50% that it would improve in a few years, 
6.4% that it would remain the same, and 37.3% reporting that they foresee their overall 
situation deteriorating in the future.165 As in the ex-combatant sample, only Uganda stood 
apart from this trend – 79.3% of community members reporting that they thought their 
overall situation would improve in a few years. These findings may suggest that while in 
general community members have a polarized outlook for their future, those who do have a 
positive outlook understand the time horizons of social change – occurring in the scale of 
years rather than days, weeks, or even months.  
 
Female community members across the GLR were less likely to report that their situation 
would improve in the next few years compared to male community member (43% vs. 54.9%) 
and more likely to think that their overall situation would deteriorate in the future (44.7% vs. 
32%). Age as well held a clear relationship to polarized response between these two 
outcomes. As age increased community members were less likely to see their overall 
situation improving in a few years (61.4% of those 18-30, 54.4% of those 31-40, and 40.3% of 
those over 40) and more likely to see it deteriorating (24.8% of those 18-30, 37% of those 
31-40, and 46.9% of those over 40). 
 
When questioned whether they are satisfied with the way that their life has been to date, 
across the GLR countries 32.5% of community members reported that they were satisfied, 
8.2% that they were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, and the remaining 59.3% that they 
were dissatisfied. However, this cross-country figure fails to depict the nuance between GLR 
countries as there was a clear split between Uganda on the one hand, and DRC / RoC on the 
                                                     
165 Rwanda is absent from findings on community members’ overall outlook on their situation for the future and their 
overall level of satisfaction with their life up until sampling due to lack of directly comparable data. 
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other. In Uganda 43.3% of community members being satisfied, 24.4% neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied, and 32.2% being dissatisfied. In contrast, in DRC and RoC 73% of community 
members were dissatisfied with their life to date and only 27.1% were satisfied.166 Female 
community members were slightly more likely to be dissatisfied with their life to date than 
male community members (62.9% vs. 55.9%). 
 
Table 55: Community Member Cross-Category Social Change167  
 
Consider a 9-step 
ladder where on the 
bottom (the first step) 
stand the poorest 
people, and on the 
ninth step stand the 
richest – On which 
step were you one 






























































Male 3.49 3.39 3.53 2.93 3.97 3.71 3.69 
Female 3.57 3.60 3.62 3.20 4.04 3.77 3.66 
Age 18-30 3.44 3.35 3.51 2.95 4.30 3.69 3.94 
Age 31-40 3.68 3.59 3.67 3.15 4.00 3.86 3.83 
Age Over 40 3.50 3.52 3.54 3.04 3.82 3.69 3.45 
Burundi 3.39 3.18 3.57 2.91 2.77 3.30 XXX 
DRC 4.06 4.19 4.23 3.49 4.37 3.89 4.40 
RoC 3.58 3.46 3.47 3.17 3.60 3.59 2.92 
Uganda 2.94 2.77 2.99 2.46 XXX XXX XXX 
GLR Average 3.49 3.40 3.57 3.01 3.58 3.59 3.67 
Consider a 9-step 
ladder where on the 
bottom (the first step) 
stand the poorest 
people, and on the 
ninth step stand the 
richest – On which 






























































Male 3.73 3.60 3.89 3.16 4.06 3.81 3.80 
Female 3.75 3.78 3.85 3.31 4.19 3.84 3.77 
Age 18-30 3.85 3.65 3.98 3.28 4.35 3.88 4.07 
Age 31-40 3.91 3.85 3.96 3.41 4.18 3.97 3.96 
Age Over 40 3.54 3.61 3.73 3.07 3.94 3.69 3.54 
Burundi 3.61 3.45 3.72 2.94 3.03 3.44 XXX 
DRC 3.96 4.17 4.18 3.41 4.31 3.81 4.36 
Roc 3.93 3.70 3.94 3.42 3.91 3.84 3.18 
Uganda 3.34 3.16 3.48 2.84 XXX XXX XXX 
GLR Average 3.70 3.62 3.83 3.15 3.74 3.69 3.78 
 
Community members were questioned about their perceptions of their own position in 
society across a range of fields at the time of sampling and a year prior using a nine-step 
                                                     
166 It should be noted that in DRC and RoC, community members were not given the option of replying that they were 
neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with their life up to the time of sampling – this scaling issue may have inadvertently 
inflated the number of community members who expressed being dissatisfied with their life.  
167 In Table 55 the use of XXX signifies a field where no data is available.  
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ladder response prompt.168 Their responses are tabulated below in Table 55 by mean score. 
The lower the mean score is the closer the community member is to the bottom rung of the 
ladder – where the poorest people tend to be. Generally speaking, across and within the GLR 
countries community members, as with ex-combatants, consistently identify themselves in 
the poorest half of society – between steps two and four. However community members 
rank themselves slightly better than ex-combatants on average across all categories. 
 
Looking at the GLR countries as a whole there is a slight increase in the mean scores for 
community members across all categories. This trend is reflected within each country with 
the exception of DRC – where on average, scores were higher across all categories, but had 
declined across all categories from a year prior (with the exception of leisure). A closer look 
at DRC reveals that the only demographic group that saw average improvements across any 
categories was those aged 18-30 (who improved across all categories with the exceptions of 
finance and school fees). At a cross-country level, all gender and age demographic categories 
see improvements across all categories (with the exception of the health category for those 
over 40 which stays the same over time). Interestingly, despite the range of economic and 
social disadvantages that females hold, they perceive themselves as slightly better off than 
males across all categories except for clothing and leisure at the time of sampling and one 





Overall, community members across the GLR countries show positive levels of social capital 
and a general trajectory of improvement. Community members have a growing number of 
social groups and high levels of contact with their families, forming a broad social platform 
that can serve as a fallback position in times of hardship or a springboard in moments of 
opportunity. While community members have diverse friend groups who they can often turn 
to for support, the family unit is still the core of their social support network.  
 
                                                     
168 Rwanda is absent from these social change findings due to lack of directly comparable data, however this is the only 
section in the community dynamics annex (§8) of this study where Burundi is included. 
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With these generally strong social networks, community members in turn display a high level 
of trust in the community and show a continued positive trajectory in this field – also aided 
by increased stability and security in the end of conflict. These factors have set the context in 
which community members feel a strong sense of togetherness and meet to work together 
for the betterment of their communities. Further, community members report being 
generally happy and describe a broadly positive sense of empowerment in their lives 
(though they are simultaneously dissatisfied with their lives to date in general). While 
community members rank themselves consistently in the poorest half of society across a 
range of categories, they also display a shallow trajectory of improvement over time. Indeed, 
while community members are polarized in their general outlooks for the future, those with 
a positive outlook express that they understand that social change does not occur over 
night, but rather in the scale of years.  
 
Very generally speaking, it appears that the social dynamics of communities across the GLR 
countries (with the exception of DRC) and provide a context for which ex-combatants can 
return to communities and strive towards reintegration into an already stable community 
setting in terms of social capital. However, this general ability of the communities in the GLR  
absorb ex-combatants and serve as a setting which they can reintegrate into should not 
mask the realities of the post-conflict social landscape. Families, communities and broader 
networks in the GLR countries have been affected severe violence and displacement - to the 
great detriment of trust, solidarity, and social cohesion across the broader social fabric of 
society. In this sense to long-term project of rebuilding society is one that ex-combatants 
and community members face together.  
 
8.4.6.1 Vulnerable Subgroups 
 
As consistent with the analysis presented throughout this study, female community 
members fare worse off than male community members in terms of most indicators of social 
capital and are thus further solidified as a vulnerable group. Female community members 
have weaker social networks and less family contact that subtracts overall from their ability 
to leverage the value of these social connections – leaving female community members in a 




Though there is some variation from country to country, female community members feel 
less trust with the community, less togetherness with the community, are less happy 
personally, are less likely to feel they have a positive impact on the community, and feel less 
empowered to affect change in their lives. However, despite this broad range of 
disadvantages in terms of social capital female community members consistently perceive 
themselves as slightly better off relative to the rest of society than male community 
members across a broad range of categories including food, housing, finances, and health.  
 
Many of the social disadvantages that female community members display may be the result 
of traditional gender structures and their resulting gender-based inequalities. Understanding 
these disadvantages is important in the examination of community dynamics themselves, 
but also carries weight for the return of female ex-combatants. What this means for female 
ex-combatants is that social reintegration (in terms of reaching parity with community 
members) may inadvertently mean reintegrating back into basic gender inequalities – 
possibly with the added dimension of stigma as an amplifying force to these disadvantages. 
With this in mind it is important to recognize the importance of reintegration programming 
that not only addresses the specific disadvantages that female ex-combatants face, but to fit 
in as part of and effort towards affecting a larger collective shift towards gender equality in 
post-conflict and development settings.  
 
8.4.6.2 Unique Country Trends 
 
Overall, community members in DRC rank lower than community members in the rest of 
the GLR countries across a broad range of social capital indicators. Collectively, the core 
weaknesses of community members in DRC in terms of social capital can be 
characterized along three dimensions: (i) weak family connections; (ii) weak community 
connections; and (iii) weak personal self-worth and empowerment.  
 
Access to family networks is an important inroad for building further social and 
economic networks and in turn leveraging the tangible and intangible value of these 
networks.  In terms of family, community members in DRC have the lowest levels of 
contact with their families, those who do have contact with their families have it the 
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least frequently, and in line with this community members in DRC are the least likely to 
be satisfied with their level of familial contact. The weak state of familial networks that 
are characteristic of community members in the DRC are likely a product of the social 
geography of eastern DRC. Many community members have been displaced or migrated 
and continuing instability coupled with the mountainous landscape, near non-existent 
road infrastructure, and heavy seasonal rains keep family networks effectively fractured 
– isolated by social and physical barriers.  
 
The weakness in family connections in DRC corresponds to a distinct weakness in 
community connections among community members as well. Community members in 
DRC have a low number of social groups on average, reported weakest levels of 
improvement in trust in the community, the lowest sense of togetherness, and were the 
least likely to work with others for the betterment of their community compared to 
community members in other GLR countries. These indicators of weak social capital for 
community members in terms of family connections and community networks 
correspond to the overall weaker economic situation of community members 
highlighted in §8.3.6.2 of this annex. 
 
Further, these broad weaknesses in community members in DRC’s familial and 
community networks correspond to their low senses of self-worth and empowerment. 
Community members in DRC are the least likely to feel they have a positive impact on 
the community, the least likely to feel valued by others in the community, and the most 
likely to be dissatisfied with their life compared to community members in other GLR 
countries. In addition while community members in DRC perceive themselves as slightly 
better off compared to the rest of society across a range of categories than community 
members in other GLR countries, they are the only group who see a decrease in their 
perceived standing over time – possibly a result of continuing instability in the region.  
 
Violent conflict has damaged the social fabric of individuals and communities across the 
GLR. However, it appears that the continued insecurity in eastern DRC coupled with the 
intense geographic landscape in the region has contributed to a fragmented social 
geography in which familial and communal networks are fractured and cannot be 
leveraged for their value by community members – leaving them particularly exposed to 
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social and economic isolation. Future studies on social capital in the region could flag the 
interaction of social capital and social geography as a field for further analysis. 
 
 
8.5 Reintegration Experiences 
 
The following is an analysis of community member experiences of the reinsertion and 
reintegration of ex-combatants. Most importantly, the analysis here highlights the changes 
in community perspectives towards ex-combatants since the reintegration process began. 
For the greatest analytical value this chapter should be read in conjunction with §7.5 on ex-
combatants’ DDR experiences. Owing to data constraints, this section of the study draws 
exclusively from DRC, RoC, and Uganda. 
 
8.5.1 Community Sensitization and Preparedness 
 
Across the GLR countries, community members most commonly received information, 
though not necessarily official information, about ex-combatants coming to the area they 
live in to reintegrate through: (i) word of mouth (41.2%); (ii) radio (27.3%); or (iii) a 
community meeting (11.1%). In Uganda, though the three most common mediums by which 
community members received information about returning ex-combatants were the same, 
radio was the most common medium (30.2%), followed by word of mouth (22.5%), and 
community meetings (14.8%). Across the GLR countries, female community members were 
more likely to get information about ex-combatants from word of mouth than male 
community members (49% vs. 35.9%) and less likely to get it from radio (23.8% vs. 29.8%). 
Those aged 18-30 were particularly likely to have received information through radio 
compared to other age demographic groups (35.2% of those 18-30, 27.1% of those 31-40, 
and 22.1% of those over 40). 
 
The vast majority of community members across the GLR countries (70.5%) reported that 
they were given no help in understanding how reintegration was going to take place, the 
remainder reporting receiving some help (20%) or reporting receiving lots of help (9.5%).169 
                                                     
169 At least in eastern DRC, the geographic challenges of face-to-face sensitization can play a role in these figures.  
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Uganda stands out from the cross-country trend with a less unipolar distribution (47.2% no 
help, 34.8% some help, 18% lots of help). In regards to gender, female community members 
were more likely to report receiving no help compared to male community members (77.3% 
vs. 65.8%). While this gendered trend continued in Uganda there was an additional 
dimension – female community members were also more likely to have received lots of help 
on understanding how reintegration would take place compared to male community 
members (23.2% vs. 15.6%). 
 
When asked further whether they thought they should have been informed or given more 
help before ex-combatants were reintegrated into their community, there was a near even 
split across the GLR countries in community members responses – 52.1% reporting that yes 
they should have been given info and help and 47.9% replying no. A closer look at each of 
the individual countries shows that in RoC and Uganda there was an approximate 60/40 split 
between those who responded yes and no. Interestingly, in DRC this split in responses was 
reversed 40/60. This is interesting because DRC was the country where community members 
most frequently (87.6%) reported receiving no help on understanding how reintegration 
would take place.  
 
When asked by what medium they would have liked to have received information about the 
reintegration process the three most common replies are the same as the three most 
common mediums by which community members actually did receive information – though 
with distinctly different distributions between these responses – 44.1% of community 
members wanted to receive information about reintegration in community meetings, 29.3% 
preferred radio, and 9.4% by word of mouth.170 As displayed in Table 56 though the most 
common medium by which community members across the GLR countries received 
information about reintegration was word of mouth the most preferred was clearly 
community meeting. Female community members were slightly less likely to prefer radio as 
an information medium compared to male community members (26.5% vs. 30.7%) and more 
likely to prefer word of mouth (16.5% vs. 5.6%). 
 
                                                     
170 Unfortunately there is no data available regarding community members’ perspectives on the content of the information 
and sensitization they did receive.  
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Table 56: Community Member Information Sources on Reintegration171 
 
 
How were you 
informed about Ex-
Combatants coming 
to reintegrate into 
the area you live? 
How should you have 
been informed? 
Community meeting 11.1% 44.1% 
Word of mouth 41.2% 9.4% 
Radio 27.3% 29.3% 
Church or mosque 1.5% 4.7% 
NGOs or charities 1.4% 2.2% 
Government ministries 1.9% 6.5% 
Newspaper .8% 2.3% 
Phone call/ Megaphone/ Public Announcement .0% .2% 
National Commission 0.0% .1% 
Letter .2% .1% 
Door-to-door announcement .1% .1% 
Other 3.6% .3% 
Was not informed 11.0% XXX 
All Means XXX .8% 
Subtotal 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
8.5.2 Community Perspectives on Ex-Combatant Reintegration and Fear 
 
Across the GLR countries, community members had only a moderate level of personal 
interaction with returning ex-combatants – 35% had lots of direct contact, 21.2% had a little 
direct contact, and 43.9% had no contact. However, this cross-country figure masks the 
diversity in levels of community member contact within the GLR countries – In DRC, the 
levels of contact were drastically lower than average (10.1% lots of contact, 11.1% some 
contact, and 78.8% no contact) while in Uganda, contact levels were generally higher than 
average (63.7% lots of contact, 23.1% some contact, and 13.2% no contact).172 RoC fell 
closest to the cross-country average with 30.1% lots of contact, 31.2% some contact, and 
38.8% no contact.  
 
In DRC and RoC, where community member contact with returning ex-combatants was 
lower, female community members were less likely to respond that they had lots of direct 
contact than male community members (7.8% vs. 12.2% in DRC and 23.4% vs. 35.9% in RoC) 
and more likely to respond that they had no contact (82.6% vs. 75.3% in DRC and 43.4% vs. 
34.8%) while in Uganda, where contact levels were generally higher, the trends were 
reversed – female community members were more likely than male community members to 
                                                     
171 In Table 56 the use of XXX signifies a field with no available data. 
172 In DRC, especially eastern DRC, these lower levels of community member contact with returning ex-combatants may be 
a product of the difficulty of travel and continued insecurity as a part of the dynamics of return.  
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respond that they had lots of direct contact than male community members (73.7% vs. 
59.2%) and less likely to respond that they had no contact (8.8% vs. 15.2%).173 Across the 
GLR countries, age showed a negative relationship to the likelihood of reporting having lots 
of contact with returning ex-combatants (44.2% of those 18-30, 31.9% of those 31-40, and 
287% of those over 40) and, inversely, a positive relationship to the likelihood of having a 
little contact (13.7% of those 18-30, 23.5% of those 31-40, and 25.9% of those over 40). 
 
Drawing specifically from DRC and RoC, the majority of community members (64.3%) 
described their contact with ex-combatants as positive, while 25% described their contact as 
neither positive nor negative, and the remaining 10.7% as negative.174 Female community 
members were slightly less likely than male community members to describe their contact 
with ex-combatants as positive (60.5% vs. 66.7%) and more likely to describe it as neither 
positive nor negative (26.7% vs. 23.9%) or just negative (12.9% vs. 9.4%). Community 
members over the age of 40 were the least likely demographic subgroup to describe their 
interactions as positive (60.1%) and the most likely to see interactions as neither negative 
nor positive (27.1). Interestingly, the two demographic subgroups with the highest 
frequencies of describing their contact with ex-combatants as either negative or neither 
positive nor negative, females and those over 40, were also those that reported the lowest 
levels of direct contact with ex-combatants as described above.175 
 
Table 57: Community Member Fear of Ex-Combatants   
 
When ex-combatants first came to live in your 




of Congo Uganda Subtotal 
Male Ex-Combatants Yes, I feared them 97.1% 95.6% 83.3% 91.1% 
No, I did not fear them 2.9% 4.4% 16.7% 8.9% 
Female Ex-Combatants Yes, I feared them 60.4% 62.2% 29.4% 47.4% 
No, I did not fear them 39.6% 37.8% 70.6% 52.6% 
Child Ex-Combatants Yes, I feared them 63.6% 63.9% 25.5% 46.8% 
No, I did not fear them 36.4% 36.1% 74.5% 53.2% 
Disabled Ex-Combatants Yes, I feared them 63.0% 57.0% 19.6% 42.2% 
No, I did not fear them 37.0% 43.0% 80.4% 57.8% 
                                                     
173 This gendered trend is likely a product of the fact that female community members who had a spouse were more than 
twice as likely as male community members to have a spouse who was an ex-combatant. 
174 Questions regarding the positive or negative nature of contact with returning ex-combatants were only asked in DRC and 
RoC. 
175 It is difficult to decipher the relationship between levels of community member contact with returning ex-combatants 
and perceptions about the positive or negative character of those interactions – if there is one at all. One could postulate 
that lower levels of contact with returning ex-combatants provides a limited base on which for community members to 
break down stereotypes and stigma. Or, one could just as well propose that precisely because of negative experiences with 




When asked to reflect on when ex-combatants first came to live in their community, just 
over half of community members (51.5%) reported that they had fears about their presence 
– the remaining 48.5% reporting that they had no fears. This near even split is fairly durable 
across the GLR countries. Female community members are slightly more likely than male 
community members to report having fears about ex-combatant presence in the community 
(53.5% vs. 50%).  
 
When asked about which specific groups of ex-combatants they feared, community 
members across the GLR countries gave a consistent message: community members 
reported fearing male ex-combatants to a very high level (91.1%) and female, child and 
disabled ex-combatants to a considerably lower level (47.4%, 46.8% and 42.2%, 
respectively). As is visible in Table 57, across all categories Uganda showed lower levels of 
overall fear – especially in regards to female, child, and disabled ex-combatants.176 In regards 
to community member demographic trends, female community members were slightly 
more likely to report fearing ex-combatants across all categories and age showed a positive 
relationship to the likelihood of fearing ex-combatants across all categories.  
 
In Uganda, community members were asked to outline what kinds of specific fears they held 
about different kinds of ex-combatants. As is visible in Table 58, the most common fear that 
community members held in regards to the return of all types of ex-combatants was the 
possibility of ex-combatants being a perpetrator of violent crime such as murder or rape. 
Interestingly when community members are asked about the fears they have about the 
presence of ex-combatants in their community today now that ex-combatants have been 
there for some period of time, 93.1% report that they have no fears – the remaining 6.9% 
still holding some fears. This denotes a dramatic improvement in the community’s ability to 
absorb ex-combatants since their initial return and a key hint for understanding the process 
of social reintegration in the GLR countries. 
                                                     
176 One explanation for the lower levels of fear of child ex-combatants in Uganda could be related to the dynamics of 
mobilization and return. Abduction is a known recruitment tactic of the LRA in northern Uganda. In terms of dynamics of 
return this has created a sentiment among community members in which they view child ex-combatants simultaneously as 
victims and perpetrators and have displayed accepting attitudes of their return. It is also possible that the long period of 
time between informal and formal demobilizations and the overall trickle-in model of demobilization in Uganda may play 




Table 58: Community Member Specific Fears of Ex-Combatants in Uganda 
 
When ex-combatants first came to live in your community, describe what fears you 

































































Possibility of ex-combatants being a perpetrator of violent activity or crime such as 
murder, rape 
38.6% 28.6% 38.5% 31.6% 
Fear due to ex-combatants carrying firearms and weapons 14.5% 7.1% 11.5% 10.5% 
Lack of trust in ex-combatants or fear of ex-combatants 7.2% 3.6% 0.0% 0.0% 
Fear due to possibility of resumption of rebel activity by ex-combatants, or 
retaliation, or resurgence of rebel activities 
4.8% 3.6% 3.8% 15.8% 
Intelligence gathering, spying 1.2% 10.7% 11.5% 10.5% 
Inability to stay or coexist with community 1.2% 0.0% 3.8% 0.0% 
Interruption of the community, cause problems in the community, cause insecurity 
in the community 
3.6% 7.1% 7.7% 10.5% 
Uncontrollable, badly behaved, drinking, unsociable habits 13.3% 10.7% 7.7% 5.3% 
No mercy or sympathy or empathy shown, bad character of ex-combatants 1.2% 14.3% 7.7% 5.3% 
Ex-combatants’ appearance 1.2% 3.6% 3.8% 5.3% 
Interpersonal conflicts with other people 1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Ex-combatants being bitter and unforgiving 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 
Psychological problems, such as they quickly change moods and become hostile 12.0% 10.7% 3.8% 0.0% 
 
Across the GLR countries, 31.3% of community members believe that ex-combatants should 
have behaved differently since coming to the community (the remaining 68.7% responding 
that ex-combatants should not have behaved differently), a figure that is very consistent 
within the individual GLR countries and across demographic subgroups. Similarly, when 
community members were asked whether they thought the community should have 
behaved differently since the arrival of ex-combatants, 27.5% thought that the community 
should have behaved differently. When asked about whether or not there was any 
resentment in the community about the support that ex-combatants received, 27.9% 
thought that there was resentment, though it is unclear how this resentment is related to 
the ways in which community members think returning ex-combatants and community 
members should have behaved differently.  
 
8.5.3 Positive and Negative Perceptions of Ex-Combatants 
 
Across the GLR countries, 29.8% of community members believe that there are negative 
dimensions to having ex-combatants in the community – the remaining 70.2% responding 
that there are no negative dimensions. However Uganda stood apart from this trend, instead 
community members less frequently identified ex-combatant presence as having negative 
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dimensions (18.1% yes negative factors, 81.9% no negative factors). When asked to outline 
the types of negative dimensions related to having ex-combatants in the community the 
most notable responses were: (i) that having ex-combatants in the community increased the 
risk for violent crime (54.4%); (ii) that ex-combatants have generally bad or brutal behavior 
(18.3%); or (iii) that ex-combatants can bully, intimidate, or threaten others (10.7%). 
 
When asked whether there were positive aspects to having ex-combatants in the 
community, across the GLR countries, 67.7% of community members responded that there 
are distinct positive dimensions to having ex-combatants in the community – a higher 
proportion than identified negative aspects. Again, Uganda stands apart with 95% of 
community members identifying that there are distinct positive dimensions to having ex-
combatants in the community. When asked to outline the main positive dimensions to 
having ex-combatants in the community, notable responses from community members 
were: (i) that ex-combatants give sound advice to other people and serve as good role 
models (23.9%); (ii) that ex-combatants make positive contributions to the economic fabric 





There are several key findings to take away from this section. In terms of information and 
sensitization: (i) across the GLR countries community members most commonly received 
information and sensitization about the return and reintegration of ex-combatants through 
word of mouth; (ii) community members across the GLR countries would most dominantly 
have preferred to receive information and sensitization about the return and reintegration 
of ex-combatants in a community meeting forum. 
 
Turning to community members’ levels of fear surrounding returning ex-combatants there 
are also several key points: (i) community members across the GLR countries had generally 
high levels of fear, particularly in regards to violent crime, associated with the return of ex-
combatants – especially male ex-combatants before their return; (ii) after ex-combatants 
have returned to communities the level of fear that community members hold towards ex-
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combatants dropped drastically – though some resentment remained; and (iii) after ex-
combatants have returned to communities, community members more commonly identify a 
range of positive aspects to having ex-combatants than negative.  
 
Collectively this narrative of high community member fear, exposure to ex-combatants, 
followed by low fear with a mostly positive perception of ex-combatants is a positive 
indication of communities’ ability to absorb returning ex-combatants. Further, this narrative 
gives support to the idea that much of the social dimension of reintegration is constituted by 
a process of confrontation and atonement – eroding distrust and stigma. While it appears as 
though initial trust barriers may fall quickly the longer road to reaching social and economic 





Conflict across the Great Lakes Region has carried enormous weight in affecting the lives of 
ex-combatants and community members alike. Though conflict-affected countries in the GLR 
are generally characterized by severe economic development challenges and a deteriorated 
social fabric, this study has revealed that in the wake of peace, communities across the GLR 
have reached a level of relative social and economic stability. It is this stability that 
constitutes communities’ capacity to play a positive role in accepting and absorbing 
returning ex-combatants into their social and economic fabric. Indeed, without a relatively 
stable social and economic base in the community the idea of the “reintegration” of ex-
combatants would lose much meaning – as ex-combatants would reintegrate into economic 
instability and social marginalization. Thus, understanding the state of communities and 
their social and economic dynamics is an essential backdrop for understanding ex-
combatants’ position and trajectory on the path to reintegration – gaining social and 






8.6.1 The Community and Economic Reintegration 
 
The analyses of the community member sample presented in this study have shown that 
community members across the GLR display a stable economic trajectory over time. The 
majority of community members are engaged in self-employment in small-scale agriculture 
and as such land access for cultivation and grazing is a key issue. In addition, community 
members show some diversification into self-employment in service or retail related 
activities. Overall community members’ employment statuses are stable over time and 
unemployment varies little on average. 
 
Like ex-combatants, community members see the primary barrier to improving their 
economic situation as revolving around lack of opportunities. Beyond this, community 
members cite lack of access to capital and credit as among the additional barriers to 
leveraging what opportunities do come towards their economic betterment – and indeed 
their access to capital and credit in terms of the reception of micro-loans or membership in 
economic associations such as local savings and credit organizations is low.  
 
In the context of the severe development challenges that characterize the GLR countries, 
community members’ core strength lies in their relative economic stability. The vast majority 
of community members meet their monthly household expenses alone, or with the help of 
others in their household. Only a minority is locked into patterns of borrowing from family 
and friend networks to meet their basic needs. It is this economic context of relative stability 
that provides the context in which ex-combatants can return to communities and strive 
towards parity in a meaningful sense – the longer term process of upward economic mobility 
occurring outside the bounds of reintegration. 
 
8.6.2 The Community and Social Reintegration 
 
The analysis presented in the community member sample presented in this study shows that 
across the GLR countries community members have a generally positive level of social 
capital, and further a positive trajectory over time – as the social fabric of communities is 
mended in the wake of improved peace and security. The core of social capital revolve 
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around social networks, be they familial, communal, interpersonal friendships, or strictly 
economic. Networks have value both in the sense that they serve as a platform for social and 
economic support within communities, but also can be leveraged to create new social and 
economic opportunities. Community members across the GLR countries show that they have 
connection to those around them in terms of social groups, diverse friends, and economic 
networks. In this sense older community members (over 40) have perhaps the highest social 
capital and a solid footing in the community – often rank highest on core indicators. 
However the core of community members’ social capital, and gateway to accessing broader 
social networks, is their solid grounding in the family unit accessed through marriage.  
 
Indeed, marriage rates are a powerful indicator of overall community social capital – 
correlating to larger social and economic networks on average. As community members 
marry they expand their social networks and the overlap of these individual networks grows 
– in a very literal sense weaving together to constitute the social fabric of communities and 
societies. Community members’ rates of marriage are entangled with their number of social 
groups in general and contribute to their overall engagement in the community in terms of 
trust, solidarity, social cohesion, and inclusion – in turn feeding back into network building. It 
is this dynamic interaction of community members’ networks and their collective benefits 
that feed back to the individual as well – cementing their personal sense of empowerment 
and understanding of their place in society. Understanding the dynamism of social networks, 
the family core among them, as fabric connecting individuals into communities is core to 
understanding the contexts which ex-combatants approach in the process of social 
reintegration. Essentially social reintegration means that ex-combatants must find a way to 
connect into this social fabric – perhaps most meaningfully through marriage. 
 
The analysis presented in this annex suggests that though issues of stigma and distrust 
towards returning ex-combatants may exist in many contexts across the GLR, these barriers 
break down fairly quickly. It is the presence of an underlying social fabric, in terms of 
individual social capital, that exists throughout communities across the GLR countries, with 
the notable exception of DRC – discussed below, that can serve as the necessary condition 




8.6.3 Female Community Member Sub-Group 
 
Throughout the analysis of community dynamics presented in this annex female community 
members have consistently displayed a range of disadvantages across nearly all core 
demographic, economic, and social indicators that collectively paint a narrative of gender 
inequality across the GLR countries.  
 
Female community members have lower literacy and educational achievement levels than 
male community members – this, in part, affects their higher likelihood of unemployment 
through time. Female community members understand this connection between education 
and unemployment – being more likely to cite lack of education and skills as a barrier to 
gaining a productive economic status. Furthermore, perhaps not surprisingly, female 
community members are more likely than males to work in the household fulfilling 
traditional gender roles. Female community members are less likely to be a sole household 
breadwinner, an advantage, though when they are they fare considerably worse off than 
male community members in terms of meeting monthly expenses.  
 
Beyond their weaker overall economic position, female community members also face 
considerable disadvantages in terms of social capital. Female community members have 
smaller social networks in terms of levels of familial contact and number of social groups; in 
turn, they are less integrated into the social fabric of communities – leveraging the value of 
their networks in terms of support and opportunities. Female community members feel less 
trust in the community, less togetherness with the community, feel they have less of a 
positive impact on the community, and are less happy and empowered overall.  
 
Collectively the range of disadvantages that female community members face across the 
GLR countries is likely a product of traditional gender inequalities. In this sense these 
disadvantages are both structurally ingrained and culturally reproduced. Acknowledging the 
social-structural disadvantages that female community members face across the GLR 
countries is not only an important dimension of understanding community dynamics, but 
also the prospects that female ex-combatants face as they approach the process of 
reintegration. If female ex-combatants are to gain parity with female community members, 
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issues of stigma will no doubt serve as a barrier to entering the community, but if female ex-
combatants are rather to reach parity with male community members, a much deeper set of 
social-structural barriers stand in their way – barriers that they and their female community 
member counterparts face together. In this sense reintegration programming is poised to 
serve not only the needs of female ex-combatants, but also represents an opportunity to 
encourage a larger community-wide transformation. 
 
 
8.6.4 DRC – A Splintered Society 
 
While throughout the analysis of community members presented in this annex each of the 
GLR countries has varied considerably in terms of specific contextual trends, only DRC 
displays a truly divergent narrative of community dynamics. As outlined in §8.4.6.2, 
community members in DRC stand out from the rest of the GLR countries with the weakest 
levels of social capital across a broad range of indicators. When female community members 
across the GLR countries display disadvantages, these disadvantages are often exaggerated 
in DRC. Though the exact reasons for these trends are unclear, it is likely that this weak 
social capital at the individual level, and weak social fabric at the community level, are 
related to ongoing instability in Eastern DRC coupled with the harsh social geography in the 
region – keeping families, social groups, and networks separated by physical barriers. The 
analysis presented paints DRC as a splintered society where community members have weak 
familial and communal networks – missing the opportunity to leverage their value.  
 
This narrative has considerable weight for understanding the community dynamics in DRC 
itself, but is also essential for understanding the prospects for meaningful ex-combatant 
reintegration in DRC. If reintegration means reaching parity with community members then 
ex-combatants appear to have done well in reentering this splintered society with weak 
social fabric – though this is not to suggest that ex-combatants in DRC do not face significant 
barriers to reentering communities. However, if social reintegration is understood as going 
beyond mere parity, to a process of building social networks and in turn leveraging their 
value then this is a challenge that community members and ex-combatants alike will face in 
DRC. With this in mind, it may be that in the context of DRC, or perhaps settings of long-
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lasting or continuing conflict in general, community based approaches to reintegration 
focused on benefiting the community could prove particularly impactful. However, as 
always, reintegration programming must be grounded in the context that is meant to affect. 
In DRC, or elsewhere, meaningful reintegration programming must be anchored in 
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